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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the nature and significance of the legal framework for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Saudi Arabia after reforms introduced by the 
Foreign Investment Law of 2000 (FIL). This framework is examined in terms of its 
practicality and the degree to which Islamic law is reconciled with globalised FDI 
laws and related areas. 
Saudi Arabia, to reduce its dependence on oil, increased its efforts to attract 
FDI for a more diversified economy, technology transfer, and to provide employment 
opportunities. Linked to FDI is the privatisation of certain sectors of the economy, 
potentially opening them to foreign investors. 
Saudi Arabia faces considerable challenges in this area, some are specific to 
Muslim-majority countries, and some—particularly those related to merging Islamic 
law with Western FDI laws—are unique to Saudi Arabia.  
This study provides an analysis of the legal framework for FDI, including: the 
practicality of the FIL, its compliance with the World Bank Guidelines on the 
Treatment of FDI, and its facilitation of the legal and administrative aspects of FDI; 
the correlation between privatisation and FDI in Saudi Arabia; and the recognition of 
arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism. The study examines FDI theories, with 
reference to conflicts between FDI and the Islamic nature of the Saudi Arabian legal 
system. 
This research concludes that FDI in Saudi Arabia has been reasonably 
successful, but could be improved. It also shows that Saudi Arabia is capable of 
relaxing certain traditional standards in favour of more international regulations 
which are not in conflict with Islamic law.  
This thesis is the first general study of the new legal framework of FDI in 
Saudi Arabia, addressing the link between the Islamic legal environment and the 
needs of FDI. It also lays the groundwork for future FDI theories addressing the 
unique situation of Muslim-majority countries. 
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World Bank's Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 1992 World Bank Guidelines 
World Trade Organization WTO 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales YPF 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms and Transliteration System 
 
bai’ Sale 
diwan al-mazalim Board of Grievances 
fatwā 
An authoritative legal opinion given by a muftī (legal 
scholar) in response to a question posed by an 
individual or a court of law 
faqih A scholar who is specialist in fiqh 
fiqh Conceptually, the human attempt to understand divine law (sharī‘ah). 
gharar Hazard, risk, speculation, or uncertainty in contract 
ghasb Unjustly seizure of the property or right of another person 
ḥadīth 
Report of the words and deeds of Muhammad and 
other early Muslims; considered an authoritative 
source of revelation, second only to the Qur’an. 
ḥalāl Qur'anic term used to indicate what is lawful or permitted 
ḥarām Legal term for what is forbidden or inviolable under Islamic law 
ḥajj Pilgrimage; a religious duty, the fifth pillar of Islam 
ijara Hire 
ijmā‘ 
Consensus or agreement. One of four recognized 
sources of Sunni law. Utilized where the Qur’an and 
Sunnah (the first two sources) are silent on a 
particular issue. 
ijtihād 
Islamic legal term meaning “independent reasoning,” 
as opposed to taqlīd (imitation). One of four sources 
of Sunni law. Utilized where the Qur’an and Sunnah 
(the first two sources) are silent on a particular issue 
kafala 
Letter of Guarantee 
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madhhab/madhāhib Doctrine (as in Islamic schools jurisprudence that a jurist may follow) 
mu’assasa Establishment/foundation/legal entity 
mudāraba Investment/trustee partnership or investment partnership account 
murābaÎah 
Islamic banking principle in which a bank purchases 
a good on behalf of the client and later resells it to the 
client at a marked-up price (Cost plus Sale) 
mushāraka Partnership 
mujtahid One who exercises independent reasoning (ijtihād) in the interpretation of Islamic law 
niẓām Regulation, system, decree-law 
qāḍῑ Judge 
qānūn A general rule on an applicable matter 
qiyās In Islamic law, the deduction of legal prescriptions from the Qur’an or Sunnah by analogical reasoning. 
rahn; Pledge, collateral 
ribā Interest or usurious interest 
sharī‘ah 
God's eternal and immutable will for humanity, as 
expressed in the Qur’an and Muhammad's example 
(Sunnah), considered binding for all believers; ideal 
Islamic law 
sharika dhat al-mas’Ùliyya 
al-maÎdÙda 
Société à responsabilité limitée; limited liability 
company 
sharika musāhama Société anonyme; joint stock company 
sharika al-tawÒīyya al-basīÔa Société en commandite simple; limited partnership without share capital 
sharika al-tawÒīyya bil-ashum Société en commandite par actions; limited partnership with share capital 
siyāsah Policy, governance, administration, ruler’s laws 
siyāsah shar‘īyya Siyāsah (the ruler’s laws) in accordance with shari’ah
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tashri’a Legislation/Regulation 
‘ulamā’ 
Men of knowledge (sing.,‘alīm). Refers to scholars 
who have been trained in religious sciences (Qur’an, 
Îadīth, fiqh, etc.) 
‘umrah Pilgrimage to the holy city of Makkah any time of the year (optional ritual). 
wadi Man-made law 
wakala Agency 
waqf (pl. ‘awqaf) a perpetual charitable trust, mortmain 
zakāt 
The obligation known as zakāt constitutes one of the 
five pillars of Islam. Zakāt is an obligation to donate 
a percentage of one’s income to the poor 
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1.1 Saudi Arabian Dependence on Oil and Foreign Direct 
Investment  
Saudi Arabia’s economy has been dependent on oil for many years. This 
dependence has caused numerous problems, and made it apparent that alternative 
sources of financing for diversifying the economy, providing new employment 
opportunities, and transferring technology were necessary. Starting in 1970, the 
government attempted to address the situation in successive development plans, 
which were designed to improve and modernize the economy. However, the then-
prevailing protectionist attitude, fostered by the government’s desire to maintain 
national control over all economic activities and to preserve the country’s religious 
and moral values, failed to provide adequate solutions and undermined efforts to 
attract FDI. In the post-globalisation climate, the government became convinced that 
a new approach was necessary. This shift in attitude led the Saudi government to 
subscribe to the general international trend towards encouraging Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI),1 which resulted in considerable changes in the existing legal 
framework, including the replacement of the Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1979 
(1979 Law) with the Foreign Investment Law of 2000 (FIL).2  
Despite this progress, Saudi Arabia faces several unique challenges in 
integrating FDI into its economy. These challenges mainly concern the successful 
reconciliation of the overarching concepts of Islamic law with the globalised 
Western-based structure of the legal regimes governing FDI. This thesis examines the 
nature and significance of the legal framework for FDI in Saudi Arabia in light of 
these challenges. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
Laws governing the application of FDI are created to provide favourable 
conditions that will attract foreign investors to a host state. FDI can provide 
significant benefits to a host country, but problems may arise in areas of bureaucratic 
inefficiency, erosion of traditional values, and consequences arising from foreign 
                                                 
1 Saudi Arabia’s shift in attitude towards FDI can be partially explained by the dependency and 
middle-path theories, as described in chapter 2, sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
2 The Foreign Investment Law of 2000 was issued by Royal Decree No. M/1, dated 5/1/1421 AH (10 
April 2000), and it replaced the Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1979 that was issued by Royal 
Decree No. M/4, dated 2/2/1399 AH (1 January 1979). The FIL will be examined in detail in chapter 3. 
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competition and ownership. Muslim-majority host countries face particular 
difficulties intrinsic in relationships that attempt to incorporate foreign investment 
policies into Islamic legal and political systems while attempting to safeguard the 
inherent nature of the country. Prospects for reinterpretation of Islamic law depend on 
the attitude of the religious establishment, as well as the degree of willingness and 
commitment on the part of government to undergo changes in that direction. This 
conflict is particularly acute in Saudi Arabia, which is often regarded as the Islamic 
state par excellence. The government is forced to balance legal amendments with the 
protection of traditional values while not deterring foreign investors. In other words, 
Saudi Arabia is setting a precedent for other Muslim-majority hosts of FDI, and, as a 
result, is providing an excellent example for integrating FDI into an Islamic legal 
system.  
On 10 April 2000, Saudi Arabia enacted the FIL in an attempt to attract FDI 
into the country, with the goal of reducing its great dependence on oil. The Saudi 
government has been diversifying its economy since the 1980s. The Seventh 
Development Plan (2001–2005), which is discussed in Chapter 4, emphasises the role 
of the private sector and promotes non-oil resources. The government is hoping to 
attract private assets owned by Saudi nationals abroad and invested overseas. 
FDI is expected to benefit the Saudi Arabian economy by creating jobs, 
enhancing technological knowledge, and providing funding for new enterprises. As 
observed by Andre Van Heemstra, ‘foreign direct investment not only creates jobs 
directly, it usually supports additional employment up and down the supply chain.’3 
This study examines the nature and significance of the legal framework for 
FDI in Saudi Arabia by initially analysing the degree to which the FIL is effective; his 
analysis is carried out with particular reference to the background of the enactment of 
the FIL, comparison with the former regime under the 1979 Law, its compliance with 
the World Bank Guidelines of the Treatment of FDI, and the challenges remaining 
after the enactment of the FIL. The study does not address the far more complex 
question of whether the FIL is actually effective in attracting FDI. Rather, it provides 
a legal, and not empirical, analysis on whether the legal framework for FDI in Saudi 
Arabia facilitates the legal and administrative aspects of FDI. The study examines, in 
                                                 
3 Andre Van Heemstra, “What Foreign Direct Investors Provide and What They Seek,” in Financing 
for Development: Proposals from Business and Civil Society, ed. Barry Herman, Federica Pietracci, 
and Krishnan Shar (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 55–56.  
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particular, possible conflicts between global FDI laws and the Islamic nature of the 
Saudi Arabian legal system; the nature of the correlation between privatisation and 
FDI in Saudi Arabia; and the recognition of arbitration as an alternative dispute 
settlement mechanism between the government and foreign investors, with reference 
to the Islamic nature of Saudi Arabian law. Since the general rules of FDI are 
essential, the study examines how its theories can be utilised to explain the 
government’s changing FDI regulations. 
 
1.3 Primary Research Issues Addressed in the Thesis 
The thesis addresses a number of fundamental issues, including:  
 FDI in general: theories, classifications, and benefits; 
 The extent to which the Saudi legal system reconciles rules of Islamic law 
with modern rules of investment and trade; 
 Whether the FIL significantly changed traditional investment rules that 
were not always friendly to foreign investors; 
 The extent to which privatisation contributed to the influx of FDI into 
Saudi Arabia; 
 How FIL encourages foreign investment by allowing for arbitration as a 
means of investment dispute resolution; and 
 Whether lessons can be learnt from the case of Saudi Arabia as a Muslim-
majority country. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology for this thesis relies on the literature review 
available in the context of FDI and Islamic law in Saudi Arabia. Since there are 
limited sources, the author obtained reports of FDI-related court cases. Furthermore, 
the author conducted interviews with different entities to examine the administrative 
barriers to investment in Saudi Arabia. Finally, the author used a questionnaire to 
understand various obstacles facing foreign investors who choose to conduct business 
in Saudi Arabia.  
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1.4.1 Literature Review 
Some literature does exist on FDI in Saudi Arabia. However, few writers have 
covered the specifics and there is no up-to-date monograph. In other words, the 
subject requires further research that provides a critical analysis of the existing legal 
system and that highlights its deficiencies and shortcomings in relation to FDI. 
In his work, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Yahya A. Al Samaan4 focused on the legal protection of foreign 
investment in the Kingdom. However, his work was published in 2000, prior to the 
enactment of the FIL. In The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan 
and Saudi Arabia, Fath El Rahman Abdalla El Sheikh5 concluded that the Saudi legal 
system has been responsive to the new economic developments, as evident in new 
foreign investment laws, the availability of insurance against commercial risks, and 
arbitration for dispute resolution. However, El Sheikh focused more on the general 
principles of foreign investment, economic development, and remedies, but with few 
references to the Saudi experience. Another of the few writings that touch upon 
aspects of FDI is Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, by Rodney Wilson.6 In his 
work, Wilson focused on an economic approach to the recent economic development 
in Saudi Arabia, especially in the areas of oil and gas, banking, and electricity. 
Although Wilson addressed the employment problem in different sects of the 
economy, he did not address the legal aspects of the problem or the impact that the 
newly adopted foreign investment law has had on employment and other investment 
issues. Two more recent works on specialized areas of FDI have been written: Fawaz 
Binsaeed’s Factors Affecting Foreign Direct Investment Location in the 
Petrochemicals Industry, and Farhan Al Farhan’s Legal Impacts and Challenges 
Facing Saudi Foreign Direct Investment Law: Reforming Saudi Foreign Direct 
Investment Laws as a Case Study.7 Both focus exclusively on the oil and 
petrochemicals industry. A third recent work is Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi 
                                                 
4 Yahya A. Al-Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(Saudi Arabia, Hail: Dar Al Andalus, 2000). 
5 Fath El Rahman Abdalla El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
6 Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004). 
7 Fawaz Binsaeed, “Factors Affecting Foreign Direct Investment Location in the Petrochemicals 
Industry” (PhD dissertation, Brunel University, 2009); Farhan Al Farhan, “Legal Impacts and 
Challenges Facing Saudi Foreign Direct Investment Law: Reforming Saudi Foreign Direct Investment 
Laws as a Case Study” (PhD dissertation, University of Portsmouth School of Law, forthcoming). 
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Arabia: Joint Venture Equity Shares and Source Country Characteristics, by 
Abdulaziz Almahmood.8 
As specialized studies on FDI in Saudi Arabia are scarce, this thesis makes use 
of the many general treatises on the subject that analyse in detail the various aspects 
of FDI, particularly John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan’s Multinational Enterprises 
and the Global Economy; Peter Muchlinski’s Multinational Enterprises and the Law; 
Asif H. Qureshi’s International Economic Law; Ibrahim F. I. Shihata’s Legal 
Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank Guidelines; and 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah’s The International Law on Foreign Investment.9 In 
assessing the rules of FDI in Saudi Arabia, this study relies on the World Bank’s 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter, World Bank 
Guidelines) since the text, although non-binding and sometimes contested, 
nonetheless provides a useful summary of the general principles of entry, incentives, 
guarantees, and dispute settlement.10 In addition, the report released by the World 
Bank and the International Financial Corporation, Saudi Arabia: Administrative 
Barriers to Investment,11 invites both a comprehensive analysis of obstacles that a 
foreign investor in Saudi Arabia may face and recommendations that may facilitate 
such investment. 
Literature on Islamic law, on the other hand, is extensive and the application 
of Islamic law in the Saudi legal system has been covered in many works, especially 
in Frank Vogel’s Islamic Law and Legal System Studies of Saudi Arabia,12 which 
forms the basis for many subsequent works on the subject. Vogel’s analysis of 
codification and the relationship between Muslim scholars and the Saudi state reveals 
many foundations for existing Islamic rules and certain interpretations of these rules. 
However, a comprehensive study of Islamic law is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
                                                 
8 Abdulaziz Almahmood, “Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia: Joint Venture Equity Shares and 
Source Country Characteristics,” (PhD dissertation, Newcastle University Business School, 2010). 
9 John Dunning and Sarianna Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2nd ed. 
(Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008); Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Asif H. Qureshi, International Economic Law (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2007); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World 
Bank Guidelines (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993); 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
10 World Bank, Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. For a discussion of the 
World Bank Guidelines, see chapter 2, section 2.8.3.2. 
11 Foreign Investment Advisory Service (a joint service of the International Financial Corporation and 
the World Bank), “Saudi Arabia: Administrative Barriers to Investment” (unpublished report, 2002). 
12 Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, Studies of Saudi Arabia. Vol. 8 of Studies in Islamic 
Law and Society (Boston: E. J. Brill, 2000). 
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which is limited to addressing the specific question related to the development of the 
law in the areas of trade, commerce, and investment in which, as is discussed, Islamic 
law plays a relatively minor part. 
 
1.4.2 Court Cases 
 The author found the collection of court cases to be difficult because judicial 
decisions are not available to the general public. Nonetheless, a number of cases were 
obtained from contacts working within the Board of Grievances, the Ministry of 
Labour, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA), and the 
Committee of the Settlement of Banking Disputes. Although some of the names of 
individuals and entities were redacted in the transcripts, the cases were nonetheless 
useful to the author’s research. 
 
1.4.3 Interviews  
As a result of the deficiencies in literature and reporting of court cases in the 
examination of the administrative barriers to investment in Saudi Arabia, the research 
also relies on interviews with the authorities responsible for the implementation of the 
law. 
These interviews were important for the research, as official documents are 
not always made available to the general public by the responsible authorities, so 
information is thus difficult to obtain in Saudi Arabia. The interviewees were selected 
on the basis of their prominent positions and access to information as leaders within 
the government, international organizations, or business community. Interviews were 
conducted between September 2005 and June 2008. While most of the interviews 
were conducted formally in the offices of the interviewees, several were held 
informally at social gatherings and events. 
Importantly, interviews were conducted with the governor of SAGIA to 
inquire into the nature of commercial activities, the types of investments, the size and 
significance of the investors, the basis for issuing investment licenses, and the reasons 
for denying any application for investment. Similar interviews were also conducted 
with the secretary-general of the Supreme Economic Council (SEC), which is charged 
with boosting investments, promoting privatisation, diversifying the economy, and 
enhancing the ability of the national economy to cope efficiently with international 
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changes. The SEC also has the authority to issue a list of activities excluded from 
foreign investment, which are recorded on the ‘negative list.’13 
Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the World Trade 
Organization, the Board of Grievances, and the Bureau of Experts at the Council of 
Ministers. In addition to a number of prominent business figures. 
General ethical rules were followed in the interview process, including 
confidentiality, integrity, transparency, and the proper use of information provided for 
the sole purpose of this project.  
 
1.4.4 The Questionnaire 
As previously stated, obtaining information can be very challenging in Saudi 
Arabia, as information is either lacking, incomplete, or considered so secret that it 
cannot be disclosed. As such, the author chose to send out questionnaires to 
individuals representing foreign companies in Saudi Arabia, giving respondents the 
opportunity to reply anonymously. A Saudi intermediary delivered thirty-five 
questionnaires, all in English, to foreign companies operating in Saudi Arabia. Nine 
anonymous responses answering the following questions were returned to the author. 
 What major obstacles did your company face in obtaining the 
investment license? Did SAGIA adhere to the required time (30 
days) for issuing the license? 
 Based on your experience, how would you describe the 
coordination among the different government agencies involved in 
the process of foreign investment (such as the Ministries of 
Commerce, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Labour, and Justice)? 
 In your point of view, to what extent does the ‘negative list’ (which 
excludes certain foreign investment activity) impede the flow of 
FDI to Saudi Arabia? 
 What obstacles, if any, did you face in obtaining entry visas to 
Saudi Arabia? What are your thoughts on Saudi policy towards 
Saudization regulating the hiring and dismissal of Saudi 
employees? 
                                                 
13 FIL, Article 3. See, generally, the website of the SEC, http://www.sec.gov.sa (last visited 25 
September 2012). 
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 Settlement of investment disputes is an important issue in solving 
conflicts among parties. Has Saudi Arabia succeeded in reforming 
its legal system so that it attracts FDI?   
 Does the Saudi legal system, which is based on Islamic law 
(Shari’ah), pose an obstacle to foreign investors in Saudi Arabia? 
 What changes should be made to the Saudi investment policy in 
order to improve its business environment to better attract FDI? 
 
1.5 Main Areas of Study  
Primarily, this study relies generally on an assessment of the legal framework 
for FDI in Saudi Arabia; it critically analyses the FIL, addresses the comprehensive 
history of the economic situation and circumstances that eventually led to the 
necessity of the FIL, and examines the obstacles and deficiencies that remain within 
the legal framework for FDI, even after the enactment of the FIL. 
In order to achieve these aims, this work initially considers FDI in general. 
This preliminary study is limited, examining only the operation of the rules of FDI in 
Saudi Arabia using the World Bank Guidelines, which provide a broadly recognized 
set of minimum standards for an FDI regime. Although the guidelines are non-
binding on governments, they were developed for the purpose of influencing new 
laws and treaties.14 
The principal areas investigated, therefore, are the administrative barriers that 
prevent successful integration of FDI, including the permissible zone of activities 
open for foreign investment, the role of privatisation in promoting FDI in Saudi 
Arabia, the chosen methods to settle investment and business disputes, and the extent 
to which Islamic principles of shari’ah have affected the legal framework of FDI in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five main chapters, with concluding remarks and 
recommendations in a final chapter. 
                                                 
14 See Note 10. 
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Chapter 2 begins with the definition and classifications of FDI, and addresses 
various economic theories related to the benefits or desirability of FDI. It outlines the 
reason behind the choice by transnational corporations to invest abroad, which is best 
illustrated by the ownership–location–internalization paradigm. It also underlines 
benefits and costs associated with FDI for host countries. Finally, this chapter focuses 
on the several contemporary sources of FDI regulations by host and source countries.  
Chapter 3 poses the question of how Saudi law developed in the areas of 
investment, trade, and commerce, and it examines Islam as the basis of the legal 
system. It also demonstrates that Saudi commercial law has evolved independently 
and has not been influenced by Islamic law, except to the extent needed to preserve an 
Islamic value or to give effect to an Islamic prohibition. It concludes that such 
development did not change any existing Islamic traditions or teachings. 
Chapter 4 focuses on FDI in Saudi Arabia before the FIL by analysing various 
plans set up by the Saudi Arabian government starting in 1970, by evaluating the 
degree to which their objectives have been achieved, and by addressing the reasons 
for the introduction of the FIL. This analysis helps to delineate the Saudi Arabian 
economic situation at the time of the enactment of the FIL and what the FIL aimed to 
change. The chapter also deals with the history of FDI in Saudi Arabia, offers a 
comparative analysis of rules of foreign investment in the 1979 Law and the FIL, and 
provides a critique of the provisions of the FIL. 
Chapter 5 discusses privatisation as a method to provide the necessary 
infrastructure for FDI in Saudi Arabia. It also examines access to and the availability 
of Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure—an important element of the investment policy 
framework—as well as privatisation in Saudi Arabia (which has been a slow and 
incomplete process) using several industries as case studies. This chapter argues that 
there is a correlation between the process of privatisation and FDI and that the process 
may be utilized to enhance FDI. 
Chapter 6 analyses arbitration as a form of submission to the Western world; 
the Saudi Arbitration Laws of 1983 and of 2012 (that is, a change in arbitration 
policy); the ratification of the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 and related implications and 
problems; a dual-court system, specifically when the Board of Grievances has 
jurisdiction to decide commercial disputes, including disputes pertinent to foreign 
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investment; and the enforcement of arbitral awards by the Board of Grievances 
through a study of cases of enforcement and non-enforcement. 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains conclusions and recommendations, which may be 
summarized as follows: 
 While the FIL is in conformity with the aforementioned World Bank 
Guidelines, this study questions whether the principle of equal treatment is 
truly incorporated into Saudi law, especially in the area of tax rates and 
restrictive immigration regulations. 
 To truly reap the full benefits of FDI, certain restrictive elements must be 
abandoned, including administrative barriers and immigration laws that 
remain in spite of changes in the legal structure of FDI.  
 The limitations and prohibitions relating to riba and gharar15 should be 
subject to reinterpretation, especially in cases where there is no doubt, 
uncertainty, or speculation. 
 Saudi Arabia must continue to diversify and develop its economy and 
sources of revenue. As the FIL has opened the country to foreign 
investment, the government must now focus on strengthening the private 
sector. 
 The judiciary in Saudi Arabia should recognize arbitration as a valid form 
of dispute settlement. 
 It is possible to devise FDI regimes in countries that respect Islamic law 
and traditional values and are, at the same time, adequate and effective in 
attracting foreign investment. 
 In the settlement of investment disputes, the Kingdom should accelerate 
the establishment of a specialized commercial court, which would have the 
effect of expediting the resolution of commercial disputes; it is even more 
important to train judges on commercial matters. 
 State-owned enterprises, especially those that are inefficient and costly, 
must be transferred into private ownership as privatisation may have a 
positive impact on FDI in the country.  
                                                 
15 See Glossary of Arabic Terms and Transliteration System for English translations. 
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 While the law allows for the ownership of real estate by foreigners, this 
privilege is limited to the business establishment; the government should 
consider expanding real estate ownership by foreigners.  
 The implementation of the conventions to which Saudi Arabia is party 
must be strengthened; judges must be educated on these conventions, such 
as the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and the International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
 The Saudi educational system should be reformed at all socio-economic 
levels to prepare competent Saudi employees.  
 There are many restrictions on social life and work life in Saudi Arabia 
that can be lifted without offending Islamic principles and teachings. 
 
1.7 Technical Matters 
In his transliteration of Arabic words and titles, the author made use of the 
transliteration table of the Library of Congress. For ease of reading, a simplified form 
without diacritics is used in the text, while fully transliterated forms are given in the 
Glossary of Arabic Terms. It should be mentioned that the common Western practice 
of using the word ‘law’ to translate as ‘nizam’ (regulation) is followed. All quotations 
from the Qur’an are based on the Yusuf Ali translation. Most dates are written in 
accordance with the Gregorian calendar, and where Hijri dates have been used (that 
is, in the discussion of laws, Royal Decrees, and decisions of the Council of 
Ministers), the Gregorian equivalent is provided. 
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2.1 Introduction  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a complex topic as a result of its multi-faceted 
classification. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the basics of FDI and 
a discussion of its application in the Saudi Arabian legal system. This chapter provides 
extensive elaboration of the various economic theories in support of FDI, examines the 
ways that FDI is classified, and describes the benefits and detriments that attend foreign 
investment. 
Economic theories consider FDI from various perspectives; for example, the neo-
classical theory views FDI as wholly beneficial to the host state. Conversely, the 
dependency theory maintains that FDI is an impediment to a host country’s development. 
Another theory, the middle-path theory, provides a balance of both the positive and 
negative effects of FDI.  
Further, this chapter examines the various economic classifications of FDI. These 
range from classification by type of production to classification by method of investing, 
and each covers a wide range of production and investment procedures.  
Additionally, there is a detailed explanation of the long debate on whether the 
benefits of FDI sufficiently outweigh its costs and potential negative effects. The 
beneficial effects of FDI, such as the introduction of capital, access to foreign 
technological assets, access to new skills, increased competition to stimulate local 
businesses, and other benefits, provide extremely compelling reasons for a host country 
to allow foreign investment. However, there are potential negative impacts of FDI as 
well, such as increased competition from abroad, risk of abusive business practices, and 
socio-economic risks. Finally, the sources of FDI regulations are also discussed. 
While an introduction to the general rules of FDI is essential, this study limits this 
chapter to the extent necessary to understand the operation of the rules of FDI in Saudi 
Arabia. Specifically, the study examines the application of these general rules of FDI in 
the Foreign Investment Law of 2000 (FIL)in light of general FDI theories and the World 
Bank Guidelines on the treatment of FDI. 
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2.2 Definitions of FDI 
A basic definition of FDI: It is the capital provided by an investor to acquire the 
ownership of a business unit in a foreign country, or the transfer from one country into 
another of material or intangible assets that will be used in that country for the purpose of 
producing wealth under the entire or partial management of the owner of the assets.1 In 
other words, FDI involves both capital transactions, including the transfer of the 
ownership of a business in the host country to a foreign investor and, more importantly, 
the relocation of intangible assets, such as expertise and access to the global market, from 
the foreign investor’s country to the host country, for the production of wealth.2  
Most international institutions, however, define FDI from a rather different 
perspective, placing the emphasis on the investor’s management of the business unit or 
asset in the foreign country. Thus, the World Trade Organization (WTO) secretariat 
defines FDI as ‘when an investor based in one country (the home country) acquires an 
asset in another country (the host country) with the intent to manage that asset.’3 
Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
defines FDI as ‘a category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a 
lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise 
(direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct 
investor. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between 
the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of 
influence on the management of the enterprise.’4 
This management aspect is the crucial factor in distinguishing FDI from other 
types of foreign investment, such as portfolio investments in stocks, bonds, and other 
                                                 
1 James D. Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law in Foreign Investment, the World Bank 
Guidelines on the Treatment of the Foreign Direct Investment, and Normative Rules of International Law 
of Foreign Direct Investment,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15, no. 2 (1998): 
663; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8. 
2 Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law,” 663. 
3 WTO News “Trade and Foreign Direct Investment,” news release, 9 October 1996, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm (last visited 25 September 2012). 
4 See OECD, “OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment,” in Glossary of Foreign Direct 
Investment Terms and Definitions, 4th ed. (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008),  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/1/2487495.pdf, (last visited 25 September 2012). 
  40
financial instruments.5 Most commonly, FDI involves the establishment of a new 
business, called ‘greenfield investment,’ or for the purchase of an existing business 
abroad and, in either case, exercising direct control over its operations.6 In this regard, 
FDI may be classified as an active investment because the investor actively participates 
in the daily management of the acquired company’s business. By contrast, portfolio 
investment may be classified as a passive investment because the investor earns returns 
without contributing to the management of the business.7 Portfolio and FDI investment 
also differ in the degree and allocation of risk undertaken by the investor. In a portfolio 
investment, the investor may, as soon as risk is seen, easily pull the investment out and 
transfer it into another portfolio investment. An FDI investor does not have such an 
opportunity because the investment cannot be easily withdrawn from the host country.8 
It is also important to stress the foreign component in the definition of FDI. For 
example, under the Chinese foreign investment regulations, an investment is defined as 
‘foreign’ if it comes from outside the territory of China, even if it is provided by Chinese 
nationals or corporations or if it consists of profits produced by foreign enterprises 
operating in China when such profits are reinvested within China’s territory.9 
There are also distinctions in the approaches favoured by developed and 
developing countries in defining FDI. The definition preferred by developed, capital-
exporting countries tends to be broader and includes equity capital because those 
countries wish to ensure the maximum legal protection for investments incurred by their 
                                                 
5 WTO News, “Trade and Foreign Direct Investment.” For linkages between foreign direct and portfolio 
investment, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “World Investment 
Report 1997,” Chapter III, http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir1997_en.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
6 Anne-Wil Harzing, “Acquisitions versus Greenfield Investments: International Strategy and Management 
of Entry Modes,” Strategic Management Journal 23, no. 3 (March 2002): 211. 
7 See Edward M. Graham, “Direct Investment and the Future Agenda of the World Trade Organization,” in 
The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead, ed. Jeffrey J. Schott. (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996): 205-217. 
8 See Mohamed A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievement, and Challenges, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Springer, 2010), 338  
9 Anyuan Yuan, “Perspective: Foreign Direct Investments in China—Practical Problems in Complying with 
China’s Company Law and Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises,” Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business 20, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 479. For the purposes of this definition, Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Taiwan are regarded as being outside of China (Ibid., 479–480). See also Eileen Francis Schneider, 
“Be Careful What You Wish For: China’s Protectionist Regulations of Foreign Direct Investment 
Implemented in the Months Before Completing WTO Accession,” Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, 
Financial and Commercial Law 2, no. 1 (2007): 267.  
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nationals.10 Conversely, developing, capital-importing countries tend to support a 
narrower definition of FDI to minimise their liberalisation obligations in international 
agreements, thereby reflecting their desire to retain the maximum feasible scope of 
control over their sovereignty and infrastructure.11 
 
2.3 Theories of FDI 
There are two basic, mutually exclusive economic theories regarding the benefits 
and, thus, desirability, of FDI.12 Addressing these theories is important to understanding 
the merits of FDI. The following is a brief description of each in order to examine its 
applicability in the context of Saudi law. 
 
2.3.1 The Neo-classical Theory 
According to the neo-classical theory, FDI is perceived as extremely helpful to 
developing states.13 This theory forms the basis for the ‘benign model of FDI and 
development,’14 and, in essence, FDI is seen as a pre-condition for sustainable growth 
and development.15 This model stresses that the contribution of inputs by foreign 
entrepreneurs to a domestic scene encourages dynamic competition and, thus, helps the 
host country to emerge from a condition of constant underdevelopment.16 The neo-
classical theory rests on the arguments of neo-classical economics, in which free trade 
                                                 
10 Rebecca Trent, “Implications for Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa Under the African 
Growth Opportunity Act,” Comment, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 23, no. 1 
(Fall 2002): 219.  
11 Ibid. 
12 See, generally, Imad A. Moosa, Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
13 Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law,” 664. Note that the original neo-classical theory is 
sometimes referred to as either the modernisation school or the perfect market approach theory. See Saskia 
K. S. Wilhelms, “Foreign Direct Investment and Its Determinants in Emerging Economies,” African 
Economic Policy Discussion Paper no. 9 (July 1998): 8.  
14 Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy Agenda for 
Developing Countries and Economies in Transition (Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1998), 19. 
15 Wilhelms, “Foreign Direct Investment,” 10. 
16 Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, 19. 
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and open access to economies promote growth. In this model, transnational corporations 
(TNCs) are important actors.17 
Some proponents of the neo-classical theory even go so far as suggesting that 
developing countries could not survive or develop economically without FDI.18 
Consequently, neo-classicists advocate the facilitation of transnational capital flows by 
removing distorting state interventions and by affording the broadest scope of protection 
to FDI under international and national laws. Nevertheless, the neo-classical theory fails 
to explain why there is still state interference in FDI, despite its numerous benefits.19 
However, many of the underlying principles of the neo-classical theory have provided 
policy justifications for documents relating to the international law on FDI.20  
 
2.3.2 The Dependency Theory 
The dependency theory emerged as a response to the neo-classical vision of the 
world economy.21 The dependency theory holds that FDI, at least as performed by 
powerful TNCs, is generally disadvantageous to the growth and development of 
developing world countries and, as such, should not be promoted or supported.22 The 
dependency theory is the basis for the ‘malign model of FDI and development,’ in which 
foreign investors coming from an environment of imperfect competition might have a 
negative impact on domestic economies, which are already saddled with market 
                                                 
17 In Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, transnational corporations 
are defined as ‘enterprise that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or, in some ways, 
controls value-added activities in more than one country.’ Through FDI, TNCs are involved in trade in 
monetary assets and expertise, and they provide access to the global market and present employment 
opportunities. Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law,” 664. See also United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “World Investment Report 2011,” x, 
http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012), which 
states that currently there are some 650 TNCs globally, with some 8,500 affiliates.  
18 See Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law,” 664. 
19 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 48. 
20 Ibid., 48. A number of World Bank–sponsored documents, including in the preamble to the1992 World 
Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, are based on the neo-classical theory. 
21 The dependency theory is sometimes divided into two sub-schools. The first—the dependencia, or neo-
Marxist school—defines exploitation as the transfer of profits by TNCs out of developing countries. The 
second—the structuralist school—holds that peripheral (developing) economies do not gain from 
capitalism as much as central (developed) economies because they are forced to perform according to the 
export needs of the TNCs. Wilhelms, “Foreign Direct Investment,” 9. 
22 Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law,” 664. 
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imperfections, by distorting their equilibrium.23 Adherents of the dependency theory see 
TNCs as an economic weapon of Western imperialism, claiming that TNCs are inclined 
to have coercive, deceptive, and unfair practices that might destabilise the local political 
order and purposefully circumvent national laws and policies to serve their ends.24 
Dependency theory further holds that FDI, in essence, turns the developing host nation 
into a submissive marginal economy that serves the needs of the TNCs’ home states, 
thereby reducing the host nation’s capacity to determine its national economic policies 
independently.25 Further, exploitation by industrialised nations in this manner is seen as a 
primary cause of global underdevelopment.26 Consequently, proponents of the 
dependency theory see a complete ban on FDI as a panacea to all development problems. 
According to the dependency theory, any benefit from FDI that exists flows only to the 
host country’s elite. The remainder of the population, on the other hand, is exploited, 
causing unequal development within the host country.27 
The dependency theory, which dominated between the 1960s and the 1980s, 
provide policy justifications for those countries wishing to restrict FDI. Some authors 
have cautioned that the dependency theory may re-emerge, particularly given the modern 
trend toward the recognition of economic development as a right of the people rather than 
a right of the state.28 This view of development as a human right is advanced by the 
proponents of the dependency theory, who see economic development not as a mere 
transfer of assets to the host country but as an even distribution of wealth among the host 
country’s citizens. The theory greatly appeals to those advocating the supremacy of the 
rights of the people over the rights of states.29  
 
2.3.3 The Middle-path Theory 
 A third alternative theory of FDI has emerged. The middle-path theory—or 
‘integrative school’—takes into account both the beneficial effects and the recognised 
                                                 
23 Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, 19-20. 
24 Nolan, “A Comparative Analysis of the Laotian Law,” 664. 
25 Ibid., 665. 
26 Wilhelms, “Foreign Direct Investment,” 9. 
27 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 53. 
28 See, e.g., Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 54. 
29 Ibid. 
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harmful effects of FDI on host countries.30 Thus, the new theory attempts to analyse FDI 
from the perspective of both host countries and foreign investors.31 The identification of 
the costs and harmful practices associated with FDI has enabled host countries to 
implement the requisite regulatory measures designed to alleviate such costs and to 
counter such practices. At the same time, developing countries are no longer perceived as 
victims of FDI because of the growing understanding that FDI may, in fact, be crucial for 
economic growth.32  In addition, the theory appeals to TNCs because it urges them to 
implement internal codes of conduct that require them to avoid specific behaviour 
patterns that might be detrimental to the economic development of developing 
countries.33 
This theory has been gaining influence, particularly as the driving force of key 
FDI legislation in developing countries.34 Because of the increased popularity of the 
middle-path theory, many have recognised, for instance, that FDI is entitled to protection 
on a selective basis, depending on the contribution to the host state in terms of concrete 
benefits and the promotion of the economic goals of the host state.35 
 
2.4 Classifications of FDI 
FDI is classified in many different ways, including by direction (that is, inward 
and outward), by target (greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions), and by 
motive (natural resource-, market-, efficiency-, or strategic asset-seeking). FDI may also 
be classified as horizontal or vertical (backward vertical and forward vertical).36 Beyond 
that, FDI can be classified by type of production and by form or method of investing. The 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 55; see, generally, Zein Kebonang, “NEPAD: Drawing Lessons from Theories of Foreign Direct 
Investment,” Indian Journal of Economics and Business 5 (2006): 255; Wilhelms, “Foreign Direct 
Investment and Its Determinants in Emerging Economies.” 
31 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 55. 
32 Ibid.  
33 For a general background on the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, see 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 242–249. 
34 Ibid., 58. 
35 Ibid., 58–59. 
36 See, generally, Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. who conclude 
that because of the various motives that may drive FDI, ‘it is difficult to perceive an all-embracing theory 
of the determinants of these activities in the sense of encompassing, within a single explanatory equation, a 
set of variables that can fully explain each at the same time’ (Ibid., 78). 
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following is a discussion of the two most common types of FDI (horizontal and vertical), 
in addition to other categories classified according to the method of investing.  
 
2.4.1 Classification by Type of Production 
FDI is divided into horizontal and vertical categories.37 Horizontal, or ‘market-
seeking,’ FDI involves a host-country subsidiary that produces the same types of goods 
and services as those produced in the investor’s home country.38 In such a scenario, both 
the investor’s country and the host country are typically developed nations, although the 
host-country subsidiary usually only produces for its local or regional market without 
exporting to other countries.39 The motive for setting up such FDI usually involves 
reducing the costs related to exporting products to that market (for example, 
transportation costs or tariffs) or otherwise increasing the overall competitiveness of a 
TNC in that market.40 
Vertical, or ‘production cost–minimising,’ FDI involves a host-country subsidiary 
that produces inputs or assembles single components.41 In this situation, the production is 
international in the sense that the manufacture of the final good is fragmented across 
borders, thus benefiting from particularly advantageous conditions and input costs in 
certain countries in different phases of production, such as cheaper labour, intermediate 
goods, or access to certain externalities.42 This type of FDI also commonly covers the 
‘raw material–seeking’ or ‘resource-seeking’ FDI because raw materials and other 
inexpensive inputs in a particular location may be sought after.43 In situations involving 
vertical FDI, the host country is typically a developing nation, and the local subsidiary 
                                                 
37 See, generally, Byung-Hwa Lee, FDI from Developing Countries: A Vector for Trade and Development 
(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002). 
38 Ewe-Ghee Lim, “Determinants of, and the Relation between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: A 
Summary of the Recent Literature” (International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 01/175, 2001), 11, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01175.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012); Keith S. 
Maskus, “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 9, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 120. 
39 Maskus, “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights,” 120. 
40 Lim, “Determinants of, and the Relation between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth,” 11. 
41 Maskus, “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights,” 120.  
42 Lim, “Determinants of, and the Relation between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth,” 11. 
43 Ibid; see also Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 68–69. 
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usually exports the bulk of its output, most frequently to a TNC’s home market.44 As a 
result, vertical FDI is rarely affected by the market size of the recipient economy.45 
 
2.4.2 Classification by Form or Method of Investing 
In addition to the basic dichotomy of FDI in horizontal or vertical categories, all 
FDI transactions may be classified on the basis of the procedure of such transactions. 
Thus, FDI can take place through the establishment of a new branch or subsidiary, or by 
participation in a joint venture, or via production-sharing agreement 
Currently, the most frequently used forms are establishment of a subsidiary and 
participation in a joint venture. Although establishing a branch may be similar in certain 
characteristics to establishing a subsidiary, a branch is not treated as a separate legal 
entity in most legal systems; therefore, it may expose the parent company to greater risks 
and liabilities. Consequently, establishing a branch is rarely used as a form of FDI.46 
 
2.4.2.1 The Subsidiary Method.  
The subsidiary method usually involves the transfer of the final stages of 
assembly to a foreign market or, occasionally, the transfer of component production. This 
offers a number of advantages for foreign investors. For example, a subsidiary is 
recognised as a separate legal entity in most legal systems and, as such, limits the 
potential liabilities of the parent company. At the same time, the subsidiary remains a part 
of a group; therefore, it contributes to internalisation and facilitates the transfer of ideas 
between the parent company and the subsidiary. Furthermore, the parent company retains 
total managerial and ownership control of the subsidiary. However, there are also 
drawbacks. These include the fact that the use of a subsidiary implies the greatest degree 
of involvement in a foreign market, placing the full burden of financing the new 
company’s operation on the parent company. A wholly foreign-owned subsidiary may 
also mean that foreign investors have less ability to familiarise themselves with local 
laws and business practices or customs, which has the potential of increasing 
                                                 
44 Maskus, “The Role of Intellectual Property,” 120. 
45 Lim, “Determinants of, and the Relation between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth,” 11. 
46 George T. Ellinidis, “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Newly Liberalized Nations,” Journal 
of International Law and Practice 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 302–303. 
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misunderstandings and tensions with local business and government counterparts. In 
addition, it has been suggested that, in the absence of at least partial domestic ownership, 
the foreign company is more likely to face various economic and political uncertainties, 
including expropriation, inconvertibility of currency, and import and export restrictions.47 
 
2.4.2.2 The Joint Venture. 
The joint venture represents a more flexible arrangement than a subsidiary. It is a 
mutual relationship undertaken by two or more businesses to accomplish a particular 
objective or to engage more successfully in a single, defined project as a result of the 
combination of their assets and expertise.48 Joint ventures may exist in partnership form, 
similar to the partnership form in a common-law country, or to the corporate form in 
which both parties agree to incorporate a company to meet their shared goals, be 
transitional or long-term, or be organised under regulatory or statutory schemes.49 In 
some cases, a joint venture may be the only acceptable or permissible form of FDI, 
because many countries have introduced legal requirements of a certain minimum 
percentage of domestic ownership and control in FDI.50 This form of FDI also has 
additional advantages because it allows the foreign investor to have better access and 
interaction with local markets and institutions, and it is used as a way to acquire 
knowledge about labour conditions and local supply capabilities.51 It also allows the 
foreign investor to spread the risk of liability among several parties. For those reasons, 
the joint venture has been a preferred form of FDI for foreign investors in developing 
countries, because sometimes a joint venture with a local partner is the only available 
form of FDI entry. For developed countries, the joint venture is used primarily in high-
technology industries and in certain industries with a high degree of international 
cooperation, such as the aviation industry.52 However, the joint venture comes with 
several disadvantages that can undermine its effectiveness for FDI. The most important 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 304 et seq. 
48 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 116–117. 
49 Ellinidis, “Foreign Direct Investment,” 304–305. 
50 See Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 666. See also Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 271. In the Saudi Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1979, joint 
ventures were the most feasible option available for FDI enterprises; see Chapter 4, section 4.13. 
51 See Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 666. See also Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 271. 
52 Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 117. 
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of these are loss of flexibility and control in decision-making with respect to the 
investment. 
 
2.4.2.3 Production-sharing Agreements.  
Production-sharing agreements have become the dominant form of FDI in the 
natural resources sector, most notably in the petroleum industry. This circumstance 
represents a major change from the form of FDI that was predominant in this sector in the 
past, that being concession agreements. Under the old arrangement, vast tracts of land 
were virtually transferred to a TNC for a long period of time, while the role of the host 
country’s government was largely passive and confined to receiving royalties for the 
natural resources extracted.53 Production-sharing agreements are based on a completely 
different notion of the role of the host government, which alone has the ownership and, 
consequently, the sovereign right to dispose of the oil and other natural resources. The 
TNC is given a license for the exploration of parcels of land where there is a prospect of 
finding oil, and it bears the full risk of oil exploration on such parcels. If oil is found and 
extracted, the TNC is given a certain progressively diminishing percentage of the oil, 
which allows the TNC to recover the expenses of exploration and to secure a reasonable 
profit. Eventually, the entire exploration project is taken over by a state oil corporation. 
Until that time, the TNC and the state oil corporation jointly manage the FDI project.54 
In conclusion, one should note that it is common practice to supplement both joint 
venture and production-sharing agreements with a number of ancillary agreements, 
including management, transfer-of-technology, and other similar agreements that allow 
the host state to exercise control over the FDI project.55 The question becomes: What are 
the motivations of TNCs to engage in FDI? 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 118. 
54 Ibid. For a description of production-sharing agreements, see, generally, International Monetary Fund 
Committee on Balance of Payment Statistics, “Production Sharing Agreements,” BOPCOM-11/17, in 
Moscow, Russia, 24–26 October 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2011/11-17.pdf (last 
visited 25 September 2012). 
55 Ibid., 116. 
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2.5 Why Transnational Corporations Choose to Invest Abroad 
Although the fundamental underlying reason behind any foreign investment is the 
maximisation of the investor’s profits, there are several more pragmatic factors that may 
be used to explain the investor’s decision to channel financial and technological capital 
abroad. In the most basic language, when making a decision to invest abroad, companies 
must be better qualified, in terms of costs or technical expertise, than firms in the host 
country in order to compensate for any disadvantages they might face.56 
 
2.5.1 The Ownership–Location–Internalisation Paradigm  
Control over technology, brand names, economies of scale, and various intangible 
assets related to internal organisational and managerial experience of a firm have been 
listed among the special advantages behind a TNC’s decision to invest abroad.57 Without 
these advantages, the foreign investor’s costs related to communication and coordination 
among its subsidiaries would be too high and, furthermore, competition with local firms 
in host countries would be too difficult, given the latters’ counter-advantages in dealing 
with tastes, culture, local labour, and public relations.58 In addition, empirical studies 
have estimated that the decision of a business entity to engage in FDI is, on the one hand, 
positively influenced by the host country’s market size, advancement of reforms, and 
abolition of trade barriers. On the other hand, the decision is negatively influenced by 
entry costs, situations of local tension, and lack of recognition or protection of intellectual 
property rights.59 These obstacles and the extent to which they hinder FDI in Saudi 
Arabia is the subject of discussion in Chapter 4. 
The advantages for foreign investors, which are taken into account when making 
an investment decision, are best illustrated by the ‘ownership–location–internalisation’ 
(OLI) paradigm.60 The favourable combination of these three advantages is crucial in a 
TNC’s decision to invest abroad. In other words, a firm decides to engage in FDI because 
                                                 
56 Maskus, “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights,” 121. 
57 Moran, Foreign Direct Investment and Development, 21. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Beata Smarzynska, “Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Transition Economies” (Working Paper No. 2786, World Bank Policy Research, February 2002), 
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60 See Dunning and Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 666. See also Muchlinski, 
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it considers it profitable to exploit the ownership advantage by internally organising the 
firm in a multinational activity, of which the location is chosen according to local market 
characteristics.61 
The ownership advantage typically involves a TNC’s ownership of tangible as 
well as intangible knowledge-based assets, including long-term financial capital; 
intellectual property rights; trademarks and brand names; superior technology; 
engineering, organisational, managerial, and marketing skills; financial services; market 
access; and reputation. Most TNCs are usually presumed to hold this advantage and are, 
therefore, able to enter foreign markets. At the same time, any new investment is said to 
be initially disadvantaged when compared with local producers.62 Therefore, in making 
decisions as to the recipient countries of their capital, TNCs must look at location 
advantages of the host countries, including those specific features that make it profitable 
for the investor to produce in that particular country rather than at home.63 In general, 
such an advantage occurs when, for different reasons, the production costs in a host 
country are lower than the costs of exporting goods produced in the investor’s home 
country.64 The most typical examples of location advantages include lower wages in the 
host countries, lower transportation and communication costs, and fewer trade 
restrictions, as well as generally favourable tax and regulatory regimes afforded to 
foreign investors in the host country.65 Those advantages are particularly important in the 
context of vertical FDI, because they allow a TNC to structure its production cycle 
among the different host countries in the best way possible. Finally, internalisation 
advantages, which are sometimes viewed as a subset of ownership advantages, derive 
from a comparison between the costs of internal organisation and the sale of goods or 
licensing of technologies on the open market, thus allowing a TNC to select the option of 
doing business associated with the lowest transaction costs.66 Internalisation advantages 
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66 Maskus, “The Role of Intellectual Property Rights,” 125. Although it may be more efficient and less 
costly to combine ‘manufacturing, marketing and distribution in a single corporate structure,’ this is not 
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are particularly important in the context of horizontal FDI and in sectors featuring 
intensive research and development programs, promotional efforts, and frequent 
introduction of complex products. In this context, transfers of technology generally occur 
internally within the firm, especially when it is difficult to contract, monitor, and enforce 
them.67 In this context, Peter Muchlinski distinguishes the four types of international 
investments: natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic 
assets-seeking.68 The last can be accomplished through establishing new firms or by 
acquiring or allying with existing local firms.69  
 
2.5.2 Transparency 
Another important factor influencing the investment decisions of foreign 
investors, which does not fall into any of the separate advantages categories, is the 
transparency of the host country’s general economic and investment policies.70 There are 
several reasons why transparency is vitally important to foreign investors. First, a lack of 
transparency imposes additional costs on businesses, resulting mainly from informational 
asymmetries and from the corruption existing in some countries. Typically, FDI 
participants anticipate major involvement in the local market, which includes hiring local 
labour, setting up a new plant, complying with local regulations, designing new 
marketing plans, and making many other vital decisions that can be made only when 
foreign investors have adequate information.71 Second, transparent economic policies 
facilitate transborder mergers and acquisitions by making it easier for the potential 
investors to work with the local monopoly commissions or other similar agencies. Third, 
transparency of the protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights, is 
important for investors. Fourth, transparency is said to have a positive influence on 
business attitudes, because investors often seek countries with clear and predictable 
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69 Ibid. 
70 Much of this section is based on the analysis in Zdenek Drabek and Warren Payne, “The Impact of 
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economic policies that minimise the risks of unpleasant and costly surprises. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, foreign investors typically base their investment decisions on 
country credit rankings developed by the International Monetary Fund and various 
private credit rating agencies, whose rankings, in turn, are influenced heavily by a 
country’s policy performance and transparency.72 
 
2.5.3 Intellectual Property Rights  
An area of particular importance that influences foreign investors’ decisions to 
invest is the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). A study of the relationship 
between IPR protection and level of FDI in Central and East European countries in 
transition determined that FDI is significantly influenced by the degree of IPR 
protection.73 Thus, weak IPR protection undermines TNCs’ ownership advantages and 
decreases location advantages, while increasing the benefits of internalisation 
advantages.74 In particular, the study found that inadequate IPR protection discourages 
FDI and generally deters it throughout the economy, most visibly in the traditional 
technology-intensive sectors, namely ‘drugs, cosmetics and health care products; 
chemicals; machinery and equipment; and electrical equipment.’75 At the same time, 
TNCs appear to be less concerned about IPR protection when they consider investing in 
sales and distribution outlets rather than in local manufacture of their products. 
Consequently, as a result of poor IPR protection, investors are more likely to pursue a 
non-manufacturing project rather than renounce FDI altogether.76 
In summary, foreign investors are most likely to choose FDI if it allows them to 
enhance the competitiveness of their product abroad through tariff-jumping, cheap 
labour, natural resources, and investment incentives in the host country.77 Furthermore, 
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FDI carries a number of important benefits for a TNC’s home country. In particular, FDI 
contributes to strengthening the home country’s competitive position in world markets 
and creates new markets for that country’s goods and services. This results in increased 
exports, new jobs, and higher earnings in the home country’s domestic economy. Many 
also see FDI as an important means for fostering and enhancing diplomatic relations and 
the home country’s foreign policy initiatives.78 
 
2.6 Benefits Associated with FDI for Host Countries  
It has been argued that the interests of TNCs and those of the host country are 
engaged in an ‘inherent conflict.’79 Yet, despite the risk of such conflict, host countries 
can receive significant benefits that outweigh the potential conflicts by allowing the entry 
of FDI.80 Before turning to the description of such benefits, however, it is necessary to 
include an important caveat. Benefits derived from FDI are not automatic;81 rather, they 
depend on the nature of the FDI and the state of the economy in the host country.82  
 
2.6.1 Injection of Capital into the Host Country 
One of the most obvious benefits of FDI is the introduction of needed capital and 
‘flow of hard currency,’ which is of particular importance for those economies with 
scarce financial resources.83 The importance of this benefit has been demonstrated by the 
post-communist transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, which were able to 
put the additional foreign capital to work while restructuring their industries and 
modernising their economies.84 In other cases, host countries can generate extra savings 
that can be invested in additional financial resources to develop their natural resource 
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base.85 FDI also allows the host country to increase its foreign exchange earnings through 
the increased exports of products manufactured by the TNCs.86 
In addition, FDI is not a debt instrument. Thus, it does not require regular debt-
service payments from the host country and cannot significantly affect that country’s 
balance of payments.87 FDI also carries more stability than bank loans or portfolio 
investments. It is less likely to be subject to capital reversals, because it is more 
complicated to disinvest large, fixed, illiquid assets rather than to withdraw short-term 
bank lending or to sell stock holdings.88 During monetary crises, FDI has been extremely 
flexible, which was proven, for instance, during the 1994 Mexican peso and the 1997 
Asian financial crises.89 
 
2.6.2 Spillover Benefits  
The overall potential effect of FDI on a host country’s developing economy is that 
it may facilitate economic growth, as it can inject fresh capital and significantly improve 
efficiency.90 Increased economic growth because of FDI is also possible in developed 
countries.91  
Other benefits to host countries, that are less obvious but are perhaps more 
important, stem from the fact that FDI is not simply a source of financial capital. Rather, 
it is a combination of financial resources, managerial expertise, skill, and marketing 
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relations.92 Unlike other types of trans-border flows of goods and capital, such as 
international trade, FDI features the transfer of technology.93 Thus, the increased access 
to foreign technological assets and managerial skills that results from FDI increases the 
productivity of the host country’s industry both directly and through the diffusion in the 
host economy of numerous indirect ‘spillover benefits’ (spillovers).94  
Spillovers may be defined as ‘pure externalities (such as the facilitation of 
technology adoption) that may accompany FDI.’95 The theory of spillover benefits 
flowing from FDI for the local economies was first formulated in the late 1970s. 
According to this theory, FDI is able to advance technological progress in the host 
country by introducing more advanced technology, expertise, and management skills 
from the foreign firms, which can produce a ‘contagion effect.’96 Thus, spillovers occur 
when the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) increase the productivity of 
local firms in a host country but ‘the multinationals do not fully internalise the value of 
these benefits.’97 These potential benefits are regarded as more enduring than other types 
of benefits because they are the most capable of boosting sustainable development by 
enhancing local capacities.98 
Technology spillovers may occur in several situations.99 Thus, because foreign 
companies have higher productivity levels than their domestic (host nation) counterparts 
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in the same sector, the latter may be forced to upgrade their technologies to successfully 
compete with TNCs.100 These spillovers happen in several basic forms. 
 
2.6.2.1 Horizontal Spillovers.  
Spillovers may result from the ‘demonstration effects,’ where local firms begin 
copying (through imitation or reverse engineering) the technology used by TNCs in the 
local market, thus increasing their productivity.101 In essence, FDI expands the set of 
technologies available to local firms. First, without FDIs’ introduction of new 
technologies into local economies, it might be too costly for local firms to acquire those 
technologies by themselves.102 Thus, spillovers may be the only chance for local firms to 
gain access to the new technologies. Second, as a result of increased competitive pressure 
from foreign TNCs, local firms are forced to use existing technologies more efficiently or 
to search for more efficient technologies to use in their production.103 All of these are 
horizontal spillovers, which occur because of foreign firms’ direct competition with their 
local counterparts operating in the same sector or industry.104 
 
2.6.2.2 Vertical Spillovers.  
In addition, spillovers can occur through vertical channels because of the 
relationship between the FDI enterprises and their potential local suppliers of 
intermediate goods (backward links) and the contacts with investors’ potential customers 
(forward links).105 The existing literature identifies the following examples of backward 
vertical spillovers: assisting prospective suppliers by setting up new production facilities; 
demanding from suppliers the timely delivery of reliable, high-quality products while 
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simultaneously providing them with technical assistance or information on improving 
their products or facilitating innovations; training and assisting local suppliers in 
managerial and organisational issues; and helping suppliers to expand their customer 
base, including through a TNC’s sister affiliates in other countries.106 Vertical spillovers 
may also occur in forms of direct knowledge transfer to local suppliers; indirect 
knowledge transfer through movement of labour; increased demand for intermediate 
goods, which allows local suppliers to benefit from the economies of scale; and 
competition effects caused by TNCs’ choosing to source intermediaries in the local 
markets, thus breaking the existing supplier–customer relationships and increasing 
competition in the intermediate products market.107 Although forward vertical spillovers 
have not received much attention in the existing literature, some studies have concluded 
that direct contact with the new users of a TNC’s products can be the principal factor 
explaining technology diffusions.108 It has also been suggested in several studies that 
vertical spillovers are more likely to occur than horizontal spillovers because TNCs have 
an incentive to prevent flows of information that would advantage their local competitors, 
yet at the same time might want to transfer know-how to their local supplier.109 In fact, 
there are empirical studies that have found strong evidence of positive vertical spillovers 
resulting from backward links, but there is no evidence whatsoever of horizontal 
spillovers.110  
Muchlinski observed that, ‘only a few major developing countries are in the 
process of moving from being technology importers to becoming innovators and 
technology exporters in their own right.’111 However, as he also states, ‘this phenomenon 
should not be allowed to shroud the continuing problem of equitable access to 
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technology, products, services, and processes that developing and least developed 
countries may experience.’112 
At the same time, it has been noted that the spillover effects of FDI will have a 
significant effect only in those economies that possess a sufficient human capital base to 
absorb the advanced technology. This base includes adequate levels of education and 
infrastructures, as well as competition in domestic markets.113 In fact, below a definite 
threshold of human capital, FDI cannot produce a positive effect on growth.114 Therefore, 
it has been suggested that to maximise the magnitude of spillover benefits throughout a 
host economy, the latter must possess a certain ability to absorb foreign technology that, 
in turn, depends on the size of the technology gap between local and foreign firms.115 At 
the same time, this ‘absorptive capacity’ for productivity spillovers of the local economy 
is largely policy-created; thus, the overall effect of spillover benefits can be determined, 
at least to some extent, by the appropriate investment policies implemented by the host 
country’s government.116 It should be noted that any spillovers rarely occur immediately 
after FDI’s entry into the host market, and domestic firms may be expected to face a 
situation of increased competition.117 
 
2.6.2.3 Spillover of Competition. 
Furthermore, FDI can stimulate local businesses and innovation by breaking local 
monopolies and by increasing competition via the introduction of efficient and 
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internationally competitive businesses into the domestic economy.118 In addition, local 
businesses can benefit from demonstration effects, thus improving their knowledge base 
and skill level and, ultimately, increasing their productivity, which will result in an 
increased level of domestic investment in fixed capital and education.119 In the long run, 
such increased competition will make local businesses able to effectively compete as 
equals with the foreign companies.120 Furthermore, the open investment climate created 
to attract FDI has been cited as one of the factors that increase the number of local 
business entrants into the economy, eliminate comparatively inefficient domestic 
businesses, and create restrictions within the local economy that might prevent 
competition. Also, FDI can integrate national markets quickly and effectively into the 
world economy, thus increasing the level of globalisation and improving the host 
country’s capacity to benefit from its integration into the global economy.121 
 
2.6.2.4 Socio-economic Spillovers. 
 FDI can produce a number of socio-economic benefits for the host country’s 
population at-large and can increase the standard of living within the country.122 These 
include the availability of an ample variety of specialised products, inputs, and 
technologies; a more skilled and better-trained domestic labour force; and higher real 
wages.123 Thus, local consumers benefit from greater access to valuable goods and 
services at lower costs.124 Because FDI commonly uses state-of-the-art technologies, the 
laws of many host countries may require TNCs to provide specialised training for the 
local labour force in using such technologies.125 Consequently, classical FDI theory 
posits that FDI both creates new jobs within the host country and results in spillover 
effects from enhanced training of the local labour force.126 Finally, FDI may contribute to 
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social growth of surrounding communities by building new or upgrading existing local 
schools, hospitals, and roads, as well as transportation and other social infrastructure 
facilities.127 Overall, the levels of per-capita income increase, thus helping many host 
countries escape ‘a poverty trap.’128 
 
2.6.2.5 Employment Spillover.  
The effects of FDI on local employment deserve special notice. It has been 
suggested that FDI can influence domestic employment directly through the creation of 
new types of jobs; regional distribution of new employment; and increase in wages, 
income distribution, and skills transfer.129 In addition, those direct benefits are 
complemented by a particular type of spillover effect that occurs when the local labour 
force, trained by foreign investors in using new technologies, moves from foreign 
companies to other sectors of the local economy, as well as when foreign companies 
begin to use an increasing number of local sub-contractors in their operations.130 Local 
employees who accept jobs from other local firms or set up their own businesses 
introduce spillovers, such as the transmission of business culture, corporate values, 
organisational structures, and management practices, or contribute further to technology 
diffusion.131 Most important, the training and flow of knowledge benefit local employees 
at nearly all levels, from those with simple manufacturing duties to supervisors, to highly 
skilled professionals, and to top managers.132 As a result, all of these categories of 
employees become capable of diffusing their improved knowledge and skills throughout 
the local economy. These training and educational spillovers are said to be relatively 
more important in developing countries with weaker public education systems.133 
Some studies have attempted to determine the role of FDI in changing the 
structure of employment in the host country and its effect in both creating new jobs and 
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preserving existing ones.134 Tomasz Mickiewicz, Slavo Radosevic, and Urmas Varblane 
have concluded that although FDI has played an important role in enhancing the local 
employment, it cannot totally substitute ‘domestic-led restructuring.’135 Rather, FDI 
should complement domestic measures aimed at generation or preservation of 
employment. Furthermore, these authors found that different types of FDI may bring 
more advantages to the host economy because they can result in different types of 
spillovers and skill transfers.136 Most importantly, FDI creates a chain reaction: high 
volumes of FDI raise the country’s reputation and creditworthiness, which then attract 
further investment into the host country’s economy.137 
 
2.7 Negative Impacts Associated with FDI for Host Countries  
It should be noted that the theories in favour of FDI rest on the common 
assumptions that foreign investors conduct their activities ‘with the same good 
citizenship standards abroad that they do at home’ and that there are highly competitive 
conditions in the host country.138 In the real world, however, the benefits associated with 
FDI do not come without certain costs of increased openness of a host country to foreign 
presence.139 
The costs of FDI have led to a prevalent view among developing countries that 
FDI is, in fact, a ‘mixed blessing.’140 Specifically, FDI might alter the equilibrium of a 
local economy, thus damaging its eventual development prospects of the host country.141 
For example, in an economy with relatively few links between its various sectors, FDI 
may operate in enclaves, with limited spillovers into those sectors dominated by local 
firms. In that case, the benefits for the host country as a whole would be very limited.142 
Other negative impacts of FDI are now summarised. 
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2.7.1 Increased Competition from Abroad  
Increased competition from foreign companies, although potentially beneficial for 
the overall economic development of a host country, may produce a number of negative 
results, at least in the short run. In particular, such competition can cause the death of 
inefficient or formerly protected domestic businesses, thus pushing out local capacities 
and increasing unemployment rates in the host country.143 In extreme situations, FDI 
enterprises may put all local firms out of business, and thus out of competition, 
establishing monopolies that may be more dangerous than the domestic oligopolies they 
replace.144 Unemployment in a host country may be further increased because of the 
privatisation of formerly state-owned companies, as foreign investors are likely to lay off 
most of the older, unqualified staff members.145 Furthermore, repatriation of the TNCs’ 
profits to the investor’s home country exhausts the already insufficient foreign exchange 
reserves of the host country.146  
 
2.7.2 Risk of Abusive Business Practices From Foreign 
Enterprises  
Another major area of concern to host countries is that TNCs may engage in 
abusive business practices, including:  
[R]estrictive licensing conditions, requiring technology grant-backs, engaging in 
tied sales, tying up technology fields through cross-licensing arrangements, 
establishing vertical controls through distribution outlets that prevent product 
competition, and engaging in price discrimination as well as predation against 
local firms.147  
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Competition from TNCs may also become fierce and undermine the officially recognised 
rules of fair competition, making it harder for the local companies to survive.148 Another 
widespread harmful practice TNCs engage in is transfer pricing, where the parent 
company and the subsidiary sell products between each other at artificially distorted 
market prices, thus affecting the host country’s balance of payments.149 
Finally, through their investment in the host country, TNCs may introduce new 
technologies that are harmful for the environment.150 In fact, there have been a number of 
dramatic examples of the potential harm to both life and environment that resulted from 
TNCs exporting hazardous technologies into host countries that they would not have been 
allowed to use in their home countries. The most notable of these is the Bhopal disaster in 
India, which was caused by a gas leakage in a plant set up by a TNC.151 Such practices 
can reduce the ultimate effect of the potential benefits of FDI on the host country’s local 
economy. 
 
2.7.3 Socio-economic Risks 
So far in this study, the ability of FDI to generate labour turnovers and spillovers 
has been questioned. Thus, because TNCs’ superior technology and relevant knowledge 
are among its key intangible assets, the TNCs may want to prevent the diffusion of their 
technology to local competitors.152 One of the most efficient methods of doing so is to 
limit labour turnover by paying higher wages than those of local rivals.153 
It has been suggested that FDI may increase inequality among different groups 
and classes of populations.154 This inequality may occur particularly by widening the gap 
between elites and other groups within a society. These potential negative costs can be so 
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high as to prevent local social and economic reforms.155 Indeed, they may even cause 
considerable harm to the host country’s development policies.156  
 
2.7.4 Mitigating the Risks of FDI 
At the same time, most, if not all, of the negative costs can be alleviated through 
the development of effective national regulations and policies that both attract FDI and 
bring the greatest benefit to a host country. In fact, several assessments of the effect of 
FDI on the economic growth of developing countries demonstrate that FDI usually has a 
positive effect on the national income of host countries. Although a large minority of FDI 
projects did have a clear and negative effect on the economic welfare of a host country, 
the differences between positive and negative effects may be a result of policy variables 
that the authorities of the host country can control.157 It has been argued that the costs 
associated with FDI should more accurately be defined as the result of a failure to 
develop policies that can efficiently take advantage of all the benefits of FDI.158 When 
properly designed, such a policy system will make FDI more beneficial and thus more 
desirable for the host country, despite the risk of possible side effects. According to the 
United Nation’s “World Investment Report 2012,” ‘the key policy challenge is to strike 
the right balance between regulation and openness.’159 This approach can fall under the 
umbrella of the middle-path theory. The Saudi policy on FDI and whether it has been 
successful so far is the subject of study in Chapter 3. 
 
2.8 Sources of FDI Regulations 
There are several contemporary sources for the regulation of FDI by host and 
source countries. These include national laws, bilateral investment treaties, multilateral 
and regional agreements, customary international laws, and a growing number of non-
binding initiatives advocated by multilateral development institutions. FDI may also be 
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regulated through self-policing efforts, including corporate codes of conduct undertaken 
by the TNCs themselves.160 
 
2.8.1 National Laws  
Presently, national FDI laws and policies are the most important sources of 
regulating the inflow of FDI.161 It is important in this chapter to state that, when properly 
drafted and implemented, these laws allow host countries to alleviate the potential costs 
and abuses associated with FDI while maximising the benefits received from such 
investments. Thus, national FDI laws, which should be viewed ‘as a quid pro quo for the 
right to invest,’ have a twofold purpose: to impose various entry restrictions and 
performance requirements on FDI, and to demonstrate that TNCs have a ‘credible 
commitment’ to provide host countries with the benefits that derive from the exercise of 
their activity.162  
 Muchlinski distinguishes among three types of state control over FDI: restrictions 
that exclude certain types of investment, partially or entirely; a review process to which 
foreign investors must be subject to, to be able to invest in the host state; and the laws of 
the host state that regulate foreign investment activities upon entry.163 Consequently, this 
third type involves a post-entry phase.164 The applicability of these various forms of state 
control in Saudi Arabia is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
2.8.1.1 Entry and Operational Restrictions.  
Typically, national FDI laws contain two distinct types of provisions: entry and 
operational restrictions.165 In the former, admission of FDI into a host country may be 
conditioned on specific government objectives, such as locating FDI in an approved 
region of the country, investing in a particular high-priority sector, undertaking FDI in a 
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certain form, or completely prohibiting FDI in some sectors of the economy.166 Many 
developing countries impose such entry restrictions indirectly through licensing and 
citizenship requirements.167 Sectoral limitations, in which industries of importance to 
national security are closed to foreign investors, are also quite common. Yet another 
variation of entry restriction exists in which the equity participation of foreign investors 
is limited to only minority shares or nonvoting shares.168 
Operational restrictions, also known as performance requirements, may include 
the following: ‘local content restrictions, trade balancing requirements, export 
performance requirements, limitation on imports, foreign exchange remittance 
restrictions, minimum local equity restrictions, technology transfer requirements, local 
employment requirements, personnel entry restrictions, and product licensing 
requirements.’169 Operational restrictions may also include requirements: of local 
collaboration in FDI, typically in the form of a joint venture; of minimum capitalisation; 
related to mandatory local research for manufactured products and for adaptation of the 
products to local conditions; that the processing of natural resources and minerals take 
place locally; and so on; these are all aimed at maximising the benefits of FDI to the local 
economy.170 
In recent years, many countries have begun to introduce various environmental 
restrictions and requirements for the operation of foreign companies. For instance, 
investors may be required to conduct feasibility studies assessing the effect of the 
investment on the environment before gaining permission to enter a host state, and host 
countries may retain the sovereign right to deny admission to any investment if its effects 
on the environment would be harsh, as well as the right to cancel investment projects that 
cause significant environmental harm.171 
It has been suggested by some that both entry and operational restrictions may, at 
times, be too harsh and create unintended consequences. The greatest possible negative 
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consequence is that such restrictions might deter potential foreign investors who are not 
inclined to conform to strict conditions, or businesses may decide not to invest because of 
the risk of leakages to potential competitors.172 For instance, empirical research suggests 
that, by far, the joint venture requirement—one of the most common entry restrictions—
fails to accomplish the transfer of technology.173 
 
2.8.1.2 Favourable Legislation. 
Since the 1980s, there has been a global trend to adopt national laws that attract 
foreign investors by creating an appealing investment climate.174 As stated by the United 
Nations in its 2012 “World Investment Report,” ‘regulation is not only a State right, but 
also a necessity. Without an adequate regulatory framework, a country will not be 
attractive for foreign investors, because such investors seek clarity, stability and 
predictability of investment conditions in the host country.’175 Because of this trend, 
many countries created ‘enclaves of special legislation’ to regulate the activities of 
foreign investors, with rules differing significantly from those stipulated for domestic 
investors.176 In particular, special investment laws often provide tax holidays and various 
other non-fiscal incentives to foreign investors, with the aim of attracting a large number 
of investors. The latter group of incentives can be more properly referred to as ‘selective 
removals of distortions,’ because they represent exemptions from various entry and 
operational restrictions on FDI, as well as from import duties on capital goods and raw 
materials and other trade barriers.177 This trend has been coupled with the trends towards 
the general diminution of barriers for inward flows of FDI and ‘the reduction of post-
entry interferences.’178  
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Yet, there seems to be a general consensus that, although generally beneficial in 
the early stages of legal development, such special legislation is excessive and 
unnecessary in the long run. Many of the special incentives granted to foreign investors 
can deplete domestic resources and establish bureaucratic procedures that may needlessly 
complicate the investment climate and make information and transactions more costly for 
foreign investors.179 Rather, countries should strive to repeal specific FDI laws and 
replace them with general commercial law safeguards for all investors in the economy. 
 
2.8.2 Bilateral Investment Treaties  
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are bilateral agreements between capital-
exporting and -importing states that aim to advantage and protect national investors 
engaging in business in the other party’s state.180 They are a relatively new 
phenomenon.181 In recent years, however, they have become increasingly important in 
regulating the flow of capital investments between sources and host countries. The 
number of BITs currently stands at 2,833.182 They serve as an important guarantee that 
investors of the signatory countries will be accorded, on a reciprocal basis, certain basic 
rights and privileges when investing in enterprises located within another signatory 
country. 
Many have regarded BITs as an important driving force that protects investment 
and sets the precedents for other investment systems.183 Indeed, some authors have even 
suggested that BITs have played a significant role in the high rate of investment flows in 
recent years, and that these arrangements have left host states free to plan their economic 
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and, more specifically, investment policies.184 At the same time, some scholars stress the 
scarce role of BITs in contributing to the establishment of firm rules of law in the area of 
FDI because of the great variations in the substance of the provisions of such treaties on 
many points.185  
These agreements represent a compromise between the competing interests and 
approaches of developed and developing countries in the area of FDI. On the one hand, in 
entering a BIT, a developed nation usually seeks to achieve as much protection for its 
investors as possible. However, realising that this protection is not always possible, it 
often concedes to many of the host country’s demands.186 Developing states, on the other 
hand, usually seek to concede as little as possible to ensure that a BIT is consistent with 
its domestic FDI laws and national interests and to maintain, as much as possible, its 
sovereign control rights over FDI. As observed by Muchlinski, ‘the content and effect of 
host state laws on the legal rights of foreign investors may be subject to review in 
accordance with the standards contained in the applicable treaty.’187 As a result, many 
treaties are often criticised as incorporating terms that are too vague, making the 
protection afforded to foreign investors insufficient.188 
The primary focus of most BITs is on the rights of the foreign investors and the 
obligations of the host country, with very little attention given to the obligations of the 
investors’ home country or the obligations of the foreign investor itself.189 More 
specifically, BITs address the issue of the entry of FDI into a host country, the standards 
of post-entry treatment and protection of FDI by the host country (including the right to 
repatriation of profits, the nature of compensation provided to foreign investors for loss 
resulting from wars and civil riots, and the standard of compensation in the event of 
expropriation of the foreign property), and the dispute settlement process to be used in 
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the event of a dispute between a foreign investor and the host country.190 For example, all 
of the BITs entered into by the United States are based on the following fundamental 
principles: 
 Better-than-average or most-favoured-nation treatment for U.S. investors, which 
implies that the host government must treat U.S. companies at least as favourably 
as their competitors; 
 Setting forth clear limits on the expropriation of FDI and requiring fair 
compensation for U.S. investors; 
 Granting U.S. investors the right to transfer funds into and out of the country 
without delay using a market rate of exchange; 
 Restricting the ability of the host government to require U.S. investors to adopt 
inefficient and trade-distorting practices;  
 Allowing U.S. investors to submit investment disputes to international arbitration 
without requiring them to first exhaust the national remedies available within the 
host country; and 
 Guaranteeing U.S. investors the right to engage the managerial personnel of their 
choice, regardless of nationality.191 
These principles are now examined in the context of BITs between Saudi Arabia and 
other countries. 
 
2.8.3 International (Multilateral) Regulations 
Currently, there is no single binding multilateral instrument that serves as a 
comprehensive mechanism for international regulation of FDI. Investment-related 
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provisions found in various multilateral documents are sporadic, not comprehensive.192 
The following section discusses some of the multilateral regulations relevant to FDI. 
 
2.8.3.1 International Customary Law.  
There are several basic principles in international customary law pertinent to the 
regulation of FDI.193 These include rules related to the admission of FDI, the treatment 
afforded to foreign investors, the expropriation of investors’ property and proper 
compensation, and dispute settlement rules.194 International law views admission, or 
entry, of FDI into a host country as the state’s absolute, unlimited right that rests on its 
permanent sovereignty.195 Under international law, states are generally allowed to impose 
entry restrictions and to conduct initial screenings of FDI before admitting foreign 
investment, as long as such restrictions and screenings do not discriminate against 
investors from any particular nation.196 Muchlinski defines screening laws as involving 
‘the case-by-case review of proposed foreign investments by a specialised public 
authority in the host state that is charged with the task of establishing whether or not a 
given proposal is in accordance with the economic and/or social policies of the host 
state.’197 
This implies the right to exclude undesirable FDI, to admit FDI conditionally, and 
to withdraw a particular TNC’s license to invest in that country.198 In addition, by making 
an entry into the host state, the foreign investor voluntarily subjects both itself and its 
property to the legal regime of the host state.199 Although developed countries tend to 
have a more open policy toward FDI, most developing and transitioning economies have 
imposed administrative controls over the inflow of FDI.200 The role of international law 
in regulating the entry of FDI into and the treatment of FDI in a particular country is 
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restricted, because the principal purpose behind any domestic FDI legislation is to 
enhance the scope of the national government’s control over FDI.201 
Although there is no settled rule with respect to the treatment of foreign investors, 
strong evidence suggests that a host state should afford foreign investors ‘national 
treatment’ when applying its laws. In other words, a host state should not distinguish 
between foreign- and locally owned firms.202 However, developed nations, which are 
usually the source countries for FDI, prefer another standard—the ‘minimum standard of 
international justice’—which ‘mandates a certain de minimus treatment of aliens 
irrespective of the treatment accorded to nationals.’203 The national treatment standard, 
however, appears to be more common than the minimum standard of international justice. 
Under international law, a state’s right to expropriate or nationalise private 
property, including property owned by foreign entities or individuals, is viewed as its 
inherent and sovereign power.204 However, this power is commonly interpreted as 
allowing expropriation only for a public purpose—’for reasons of public necessity or 
utility.’205 With respect to compensation for expropriated foreign property, preferences 
differ greatly between the developed (FDI-source) and the developing (FDI-recipient) 
countries as to the proper measure for such compensation. The developed countries 
advocate the application of the so-called Hull Formula, which requires that compensation 
be ‘prompt, adequate, and effective.’206 The developing countries believe that 
compensation should be ‘appropriate,’ which is a flexible compensation that is designed 
according to the facts of each case by considering the balance of interests, political and 
economic conditions, and the capacity to pay.207 Although both standards of 
compensation are applied in approximately equivalent numbers of BITs, the appropriate 
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compensation standard presently appears to be the ‘contemporary … international 
law.’208 
In the Barcelona Traction Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that 
the nationality of a company is established in accordance with its place of incorporation 
and management and not by the nationality of the controlling shareholders. 
Consequently, as Muchlinski observed, there is no real guarantee of diplomatic 
protection. Rather, the ICJ was unwilling to grant a right of diplomatic protection for 
shareholders in a foreign company where that company suffers a loss through an act of a 
third state. Muchlinski argued that such protection might be inappropriate in some cases, 
and in many cases a method other than diplomatic protection will be used for the 
resolution of investment disputes.209 
Finally, contemporary international law seems to be settled on the issue of dispute 
resolution between the foreign investor and the host country. There is a strong 
predilection for international adjudication or arbitration over national resolution of 
investment disputes.210 In practice, the majority of BITs provide for arbitration under the 
auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).211 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention goes so far as to exclude national remedies once the 
parties consent to ICSID arbitration.212 
 
2.8.3.2 World Bank’s Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment.  
The World Bank has played a significant role in the area of designing 
comprehensive multilateral standards for the regulation of FDI. One of the more recent 
examples of the World Bank’s endeavours in this area has been the adoption in 1992 of 
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the World Bank Guidelines, a non-binding document that establishes general principles 
designed to guide governmental behaviour toward foreign investors.213 They represent a 
comprehensive international quasi-regulatory instrument with respect to the inflow of 
FDI into the recipient countries and play a role in shaping the domestic FDI policies of 
those countries. The World Bank Guidelines follow quite closely the well-defined 
principles of international customary law, although they deviate from customary law in 
some important respects.214 Overall, however, these guidelines represent ideas generally 
accepted by the international community because they advance solutions approved by 
both developed and developing states.215  
As previously indicated, one must emphasise what the guidelines state, as the 
‘guidelines are not ultimate standards, but an important step in the evolution of generally 
acceptable international standards which complement, but do not substitute for, bilateral 
investment treaties.’216 Consequently, as noted by Muchlinski, ‘departure from the 
standards contained in the guidelines will not have any financial implications for states 
seeking a loan from the World Bank.’217 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, the father of the World 
Bank Guidelines, explains, however, that ‘the basic role of the guidelines is to provide 
standards for application when bilateral treaties do not exist.’218 He observes that, 
nonetheless, ‘the differences between the standards offered in those guidelines and the 
most ‘pro-investment’ standards in recent BITs are few indeed, and in some respects the 
guidelines offer better treatment because of their greater specificity with regard to certain 
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details, such as the methods of valuation of expropriated property.’219 The following is an 
overview of the World Bank Guidelines’ basic rules towards the regulation of FDI.220 
With respect to entry of FDI, World Bank Guideline II advocates a strong 
preference for open admission of FDI. However, acknowledging that this preference 
exists is not always feasible and may interfere with a state’s sovereignty. Guideline II 
suggests that states may condition admission of FDI into certain sectors of the economy 
by requiring special licensing and may prohibit admission of FDI into other sectors in the 
interests of national security, public policy, public health, and environmental concerns. It 
also recommends a transparent FDI admission process and abolition of unnecessary or 
unduly cumbersome and complicated procedural admission regulations. 
In the treatment of foreign investors, World Bank Guideline III advances two 
different standards: ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘national treatment.’ Thus, this 
guideline puts forth the principle of equal treatment among foreign investors without 
discrimination based on nationality; advocates the TNCs’ freedom to employ top 
managers regardless of their nationality; and encourages the unrestricted transfer of a 
‘reasonable part’ of the profits of foreign investors, which should occur in a convertible 
currency. However, Guideline III supports the idea of national treatment for foreign 
investors on issues such as grants of permits, licenses, and employment authorisations, as 
well as tax treatment, noting that ‘reasonable and stable tax rates are considered a more 
effective incentive than exemptions accompanied by future uncertain or excessive rates.’ 
It further imposes an obligation on capital-exporting countries not to obstruct the flow of 
investment to developing countries. 
World Bank Guideline IV follows the established principles of customary 
international law in allowing expropriation only ‘in good faith pursuance of a public 
purpose and without discrimination based on nationality.’ However, as the proper 
standard for compensation, this guideline endorses the Hull Formula, which does not 
conform to the now-prevailing international principle requiring ‘appropriate’ 
compensation. 
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Finally, World Bank Guideline V deviates from international customary law in 
that it advocates ‘the primacy of national courts over international arbitration.’ Instead, it 
simply recommends that the foreign investors attempt to settle their disputes through 
negotiation or, if that fails, through independent arbitration under the auspices of ICSID.  
 
2.8.3.3 FDI Under the WTO System and Other International Systems.  
In addition to the efforts undertaken by the World Bank in the area of regulating 
FDI, there are other international fora that are capable of achieving a greater, and more 
binding, consensus with respect to regulating the transnational flows of capital.221 Thus, 
the International Labour Organization has recently issued a number of recommendations 
touching on the relationship between FDI and labour markets in host countries.222 
Similarly, Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement represents a 
successful example of regional regulations of the flow of foreign investment, which has 
been characterised as continuing ‘to underpin FDI in Mexico.’223 Regional investment 
regimes have also been set up through the 1987 Agreement among the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations Members for the Promotion and Protection of Investment;224 the 
2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement;225 the 1988 Agreement for Promotion, 
Protection and Guarantee of Investment adopted under the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference;226 and through a number of European Union agreements.227 The main focus 
                                                 
221 See, generally, Michael Gestrin and Alan Rugman, “Rules for Foreign Direct Investment at the WTO: 
Building on Regional Trade Agreements,” vol. 8 of The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis, eds. Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton, and Michael G. Plummer (New York: 
Springer U.S., 2005). 
222 Alvarez, “The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment,” 2. 
223 A. T. Kearney Management Consultants, “Global Business Policy Council,” FDI Confidence Vol. 5 
(September 2002): 13. The North American Free Trade Agreement investment provisions are modelled on 
the norms incorporated in the numerous BITs signed by the United States. 
224 Qureshi, International Economic Law, subsection 14-001. 
225 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)  
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/Economic/AFTA/annex/ASEAN%20Trade%20in%20Goods%20Agree
ment,%20Cha-am,%20Thailand,%2026%20February%202009.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
226 See Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) http://www.oic-
oci.org/uploads/file/conventions/en/conv_brief/en_conv_promotion_protection_investment.pdf (last visited 
25 September 2012). 
227 Qureshi, International Economic Law, subsection 14-001. Recently, it has also been suggested that the 
establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas is perceived by many investors as crucial for 
increasing Latin America’s appeal to investors. See A. T. Kearney Management Consultants, “Global 
Business Policy Council,” 15. 
  77
of these and other regional investment systems is the protection of FDI, non-
discrimination provisions, and dispute settlement mechanisms.228 
The current WTO framework contains a number of instruments touching on 
issues pertinent to both foreign trade and foreign investment. In particular, important 
provisions relating to the regulation of FDI can be found in WTO documents such as the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS); the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS); and the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.229 
Between 1995 and 1998, the OECD went the furthest when it designed the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).230 This agreement would have represented 
the most comprehensive multilateral investment treaty, at least for developed countries. 
However, negotiations on the agreement came to a halt and were never resumed.231 
Developing nations would be reluctant to enter into a similar type of comprehensive 
investment agreement because they maintain that they have the right to impose 
investment policy, which is an element of national economic policy.232 At the same time, 
they also fear that the liberalisation of investment policies might facilitate abuse by 
multinational enterprises and a lack of sovereign control over the economic development 
of the country.233 It is, therefore, unlikely that negotiations for a comprehensive 
investment treaty under the auspices of the WTO will proceed successfully in the near 
                                                 
228 Qureshi, International Economic Law, subsection14-001. 
229 See Burt, who provides a detailed explanation of the investment-related provisions of each of the WTO 
framework documents, in “Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations,” 1030–1039  
230 See, generally, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for 
Financial and Enterprise Affairs, “Multilateral Agreement on Investment.” 
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_1894819_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 25 
September 2012). See also Stefan Amarasinha and Juliane Kokott, “Multilateral Investment Rules 
Revisited,” in Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, ed. Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, 
and Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 119-153. 
231 See Qureshi, International Economic Law, subsections14-018 through 14-022, which review the 
provisions of the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, its strong points and flaws, and the history 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development negotiations on the agreement. 
232 Burt, “Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations,” 1017.  
233 Friedl Weiss, “Trade and Investment,” in Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 188 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 182-225. 
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future, despite the much-articulated need for a better and more coherent multilateral 
international framework in the field of investment.234 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
FDI is a complex and layered issue. While FDI is acknowledged to bring 
invaluable benefits to a host country, as well as to investors, there are also possible 
adverse effects. Simply put, FDI is the capital provided by an investor to acquire the 
ownership of a business unit in a foreign country, involving both capital transactions and 
intangible assets such as knowledge and access to the global market. 
However, the WTO and OECD add intricacy to this basic idea of FDI. The 
investment is seen as a wish to participate in the management of the enterprise, which 
distinguishes FDI from other foreign investments. Thus, FDI is an active investment in 
which the investor is involved in the management of the enterprise, making it difficult to 
withdraw from the host country. This is yet another layer to the complexity of defining 
FDI, as the economic status of the host country inevitably will affect the enterprise. 
Developed countries, then, want a broader definition to ensure maximum protection for 
investments, while developing countries support a narrower definition to minimise their 
liberalisation obligations. 
The driving force behind foreign investment is to maximise the investor’s profit. 
The ownership–location–internalisation paradigm is often used to decide whether a 
company should invest. This paradigm focuses on the profit of ownership, location, and 
internalisation as well as concentrates on the transparency of the host country’s general 
economic and investment policies. Foreign investment is also influenced by the 
protection of intellectual property rights.  
The host country reaps several benefits from FDI. Primarily, the investment 
provides capital, which is necessary for the development of a country’s economy. 
Further, the capital from FDI is stable and non-debt related, due to the involvement of 
investors in the management of the enterprise, and is the opposite of short-term bank 
lending and stock holdings. FDI brings the added benefit of new technological 
                                                 
234 See Qureshi, who lays out the case for a multilateral investment agreement, in International Economic 
Law, subsections14-025 and 14-026.  
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development, which, in turn, brings more advanced technology expertise that not only 
forces local firms to upgrade but also increases their productivity, though benefits from 
technology are only effective insofar as the host country educates personnel.  
FDI has great potential to break local monopolies and bring local suppliers and 
national markets into the world economy while expanding their customer base. 
Moreover, there are socio-economic benefits for the people of the host countries, such as 
becoming a skilled and better-trained domestic labour force and higher wages, which are 
extremely valuable for improved infrastructure and development.   
However, FDI also has negative effects. Increased competition from foreign 
companies can put local firms out of business and technological advances may be 
harmful to the environment, and it may increase the inequality between the elite and other 
groups within society. Many of these negative costs are preventable, however, through 
the creation and enforcement of effective national regulations and policies. Such 
regulations, for instance could be legislation in the form of entry restrictions and 
operational requirements or bilateral and multilateral regulations.  
These are the general aspects of FDI that need to be examined in the Saudi 
Arabian context. However, there is no discussion in the general FDI literature concerning 
the role of religion, or more particularly Islam, as a factor in FDI. In order to deal with 
this issue, the next chapter contains a discussion of the Saudi legal system and the ways 
in which investment, trade, and commercial laws have been affected by Islam, which 
constitute the basis of the law. 
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Chapter Three: Islamic Elements in the Commercial Law 
Environment in Saudi Arabia: A Discouragement to FDI? 
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3.1 Introduction 
One potential area of concern for investors is the existence of problematic 
elements in the commercial law environment of a host jurisdiction—elements that 
might adversely affect their investment activities and therefore discourage investment 
in a host state. 
The basis of law in Saudi Arabia is mainly the Hanbali school of the shari’ah  
(Islamic law), and the courts of general jurisdiction are shari’ah courts. Saudi Arabia 
is one of the few investment destinations in which Islamic law plays such a role. This 
chapter inquires whether any Islamic elements within Saudi commercial law create 
challenges for foreign investors, and therefore hinder FDI.1 
Thus, an account is needed of the pertinent aspects of Saudi law, which fall 
into two main categories: Islamic law and state-enacted regulations. Also relevant are 
the non- shari’ah court tribunals. These are explained in this chapter. 
Section 3.2 lays the foundation for a thorough understanding of the 
fundamentals of Islamic law, especially of the Qur’an and the sunnah, ijma, and 
qiyas.2 In addition, it asks whether there is a law in Islam. 
Section 3.3 looks at Islam as the basis of the legal system in Saudi Arabia, 
including the non-separation of law and religion, the Hanbali school, the process of 
ijtihad, and hesitation on the codification of the law. 
Section 3.4 examines the principles and specifics of Islamic commercial law. 
In particular, a sketch of Islamic commercial law of the classical period and the terms 
and conditions of contracts in the Islamic legal system is provided. The chapter also 
emphasises limitations on the contract-making process, including the prohibitions of 
riba and gharar and the theory of limited damages. 
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 are concerned with the creation of state commercial law, 
which is the law of commerce and is independent of shari’ah in Saudi Arabia. These 
sections focuse initially on duality in Saudi Arabian law, and especially the role of the 
Islamic scholar in the state, the early introduction of modern law in the Saudi legal 
system, the influence of Egyptian law (based on French law), examples of state 
                                                 
1 It is not the purpose of this chapter to investigate the efficiency of the Saudi legal system. Although a 
valid topic of research as regards FDI, such an investigation goes beyond the object of this thesis, 
which is a legal, not empirical, analysis of the FDI environment in Saudi Arabia. 
2 For all terms in this chapter, see the Glossary of Arabic Terms and Transliteration System. 
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regulations, and resolving the tension between law and shari’ah by the introduction of 
state tribunals and the dual systems of judiciary. 
 
3.2 Fundamentals of Islamic Law 
The word ‘Islam’ translated into English means ‘to surrender oneself, to 
commit or resign oneself to the will of God.’3 In other words, ‘Islam is the act or state 
of submission.’4 It is the classical Muslim view that all legislative function lies with 
Allah (God). Thus, the law ‘is divine, eternal, and all-embracing and is promulgated 
by revelation and elaboration by tradition and interpretation.’5 This divinely given law 
is known as the shari’ah, which translates into ‘the path to a well or spring.’6  
In common usage, the term ‘Islamic law’ includes two components—the 
shari’ah and fiqh.7  
Shari’a is the ideal law as it ought to be in the divine realm . . . thus human 
beings must strive and struggle to realize shari’a law to the best of their 
abilities . . .  In contrast, fiqh is the human law . . . and unlike shari’a, is not 
eternal, immutable, or unchanging [but is] subject to error, alterable, and 
contingent.’8 
  
The term ‘fiqh’ describes the ‘learned study, juristic interpretation and 
application’ of the Qur’an and the sunnah.9 It means ‘praxis understanding’ and 
provides ‘insight into how one ought to act and live as a Muslim.’10  
Consequently, the scope of Islamic law is much broader than one would 
ordinarily expect from the concept ‘law.’ Islamic legists offer guidance about 
contracts, marriage and divorce, torts, crimes of property, and crimes of 
                                                 
3 Bernard Lewis and Buntzie Ellis Churchill, Islam, the Religion and the People (Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Wharton School Publishing, 2009), 8.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid., 30. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For an explanation of the difference between fiqh and shari’ah, see Nicholas H. D. Foster, “Islamic 
Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I: An Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief 
Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law,” European Business Organization Law 
Review 11, no. 1 (April 2010): 3–34. doi: 10.1017, 8. 
8 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft, Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 150. 
9 Foster, “Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I,” 8. 
10 Kevin Reinhart, Introduction to Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of the Major Schools, 
adapted by Laleh Bakhtiar (Chicago: ABC International Group, 1996), xxxiii.  
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conduct, but also about ritual and ritual conditions . . . government, and state 
craft.11 
 
3.2.1 The Qur’an and the Sunnah 
Western law is a man-made affair: it did not exist until man created it. The 
secular nature of Western law makes it subject to change and empowers legislators to 
alter the law in the face of changing social and economic factors. However, that 
secular nature limits the Western legal system from legislating areas of individual 
moral concern that are not relevant for maintaining public order in civil society, and 
that, according to shari’ah law, makes it fallible. 
In contrast, Islamic law derives its legitimacy from divinity. The two core 
sources driving Islamic law are the Qur’an and the sunnah. The Qur’an is the word of 
God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and the sunnah is a 
set of rules derived from the sayings and conduct of the Prophet, known as hadith.12 
The word often used to describe these sources of law is ‘immutable.’13 
‘Whether moderate, conservative, or puritan, all Muslims believe that the 
Qur’an is the literal word of God as transmitted by the Angel Gabriel to the Prophet 
Muhammad.’14 This revelation of the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad is believed to 
have occurred in the seventh century CE or, more precisely, from 610 CE to the 
Prophet’s death in 632 CE.15 
The sunnah contains the traditions of the last prophet of Islam. It includes ‘the 
things he said, i.e. his hadith, as well as the things he did or refrained from doing.’16 
Two secondary sources, or rules of interpretation, exist in Islamic law: ijma 
and qiyas. Ijma refers to the general consensus among Islamic scholars of a particular 
era.17 Qiyas means reasoning by consensus or by analogy.18 The process of qiyas is 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (London: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16. 
13 Lewis and Churchill, Islam, the Religion and the People, 22; see also J. N. D. Anderson, “Is the 
Shari’ah Doomed to Immutability?” The Muslim World 56 (1966): 10–13. 
14 Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft, 143. 
15 M. Cherif Bassiouni and Gamal M. Badr, “The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making,” 
UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 1 (Spring/Summer 2002): 148.  
16 Irshad Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements,” Journal of Islamic 
Law and Culture 7, no. 1 (2002), 33. 
17 Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, Studies of Saudi Arabia, vol. 8 of Studies in Islamic 
Law and Society (Boston: E. J. Brill, 2000), 45–51.  
18 See Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law: An Overview,” 27; Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, “The Epistemology of 
Qiyas and Ta'lil between the Mu'tazilite Abu ‘L-Husayn Al-Basir and Ibn Hazm Al-Zahiri,” Comment, 
UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 2, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2003): 281. 
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governed by strict rules of deductive logic and, as a product of human reason, is 
subordinate to divine revelation. 
As the sources of Islamic law are divine in nature, they cannot be altered by 
the courts or amended by legislators. Their sacredness also influenced the legal 
system in that it ‘restricted the Islamic jurist’s power to interpret and amend laws 
according to contemporary values and needs.’ To the Islamic mind-set, the rule of law 
was already in existence and it is man’s duty to adhere to it. 
However, discovering this law is not always easy. There are significant 
differences within the Sunni sect regarding the sources of law, particularly ijma and 
qiyas. These differences led to the four schools, called madhahib, of jurisprudence: 
the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali schools.19 The schools differ in their 
interpretation of the law and there is room for difference among scholars even within 
one school. Further complicating interpretation is the fact that some Western judges 
have claimed that Islamic law is not, in fact, law but religion. These issues are 
examined in the next section. 
 
3.2.2 Is There Law in Islam? 
The difficulty of recognizing a law in Islam is illustrated in Shamil Bank of 
Bahrain v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals, an English case decided in 2004.20 The 
claimant bank was incorporated in accordance with the law of Bahrain. It entered into 
financing agreements based on murabaha, a cost-plus form of finance that avoids, or 
attempts to avoid, the Islamic prohibition of riba, or interest-based transactions. The 
concept of riba is discussed in detail in section 3.4.3.1. The financing agreements 
contained a choice of law clause that provided: ‘Subject to the principles of the 
glorious shari’ah, the agreements should be governed and construed in accordance 
with the laws of England.’21 The English court of appeal held that English law alone 
governed the financing agreements, especially because shari’ah law is not the law of 
                                                 
19 See Abdal-Haqq, “Islamic Law: An Overview,” 27. 
20 Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited and Others, [2004] 1 WLR 1784, 
England and Wales CA. See also Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited v. Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi, 18 International Law Reports 144, 149 (Arbitral Tribunal 1951), International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 247, 251 (1952); Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co. Ltd. (1953), 20 
International Law Reports 534, 545 (1957); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (1958), 
27 International Law Reports, 117 (1963). 
21 Shamil v. Beximco, paragraph 1. 
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a ‘country’ within the meaning of that term in Article 1.1 of the Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (the Rome Convention of 1980). 
More importantly though, the court went further and questioned whether 
shari’ah is law at all. In his opinion, Lord Justice Potter stated: ‘The principles of the 
shari’ah are not simply principles of law but principles which apply to other aspects 
of life and behaviour.’22 The court concluded that, ‘[E]ven treating the principles of 
shari’ah as principles of law, the application of such principles in relation to matters 
of commerce and banking were plainly matters of controversy.’23 The court found it 
evident that: 
There are indeed areas of considerable controversy and difficulty arising not 
only from the need to translate into propositions of modern law texts which 
centuries ago were set out as religious and moral codes, but because of the 
existence of a variety of schools of thought with which the court may have 
to concern itself in any given case before reaching a conclusion upon the 
principle or rule in dispute.24 
 
Similarly, the problem of defining the concepts of Islamic law was expressed 
by Judge Jan Jurden of the Superior Court of Delaware in Saudi Basic Industries 
Corporation (SABIC) v. Mobil, a case decided in the United States in 2003.25 In 
SABIC, the court struggled with defining the Islamic tort of misappropriation, or 
ghasb. The court stated:  
[T]his difficulty was caused, in large part, by the fact that the concept of stare 
decisis has no place in Saudi law . . . the Islamic legal system in Saudi Arabia 
is based on juristic or scholarly opinion, rather than on the precedential 
authority of court decisions or on extensive legislation or codification.26 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid., paragraph 40. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., paragraph 55. Also note that: ‘The decision has been welcomed by the banking community and 
their lawyers, for it tells us that the English courts will enforce Islamic finance documents governed by 
English law in accordance with their terms.’ Nicholas H. D. Foster, “Encounters Between Legal 
Systems: Recent Cases Concerning Islamic Commercial Law in Secular Courts,” Amicus Curiae, 
(November/December 2006): 2, 4. 
25 Saudi Basic Industries Corporation v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Corporation, Inc. and Exxon 
Chemical Arabia, Inc., No. 00C-07-161JRJ, 2003 LEXIS 294, (Delaware Superior Court, Aug. 26, 
2003). 
26 Ibid.  
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The counterargument to the reasoning of these judges is that the difficulty of 
understanding Islamic law should not be a reason for excluding its application as a 
foreign law;27 only when the foreign law is offensive to public policy may it be 
excluded in the courts.28  
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has extensively promoted foreign investment by 
loosening requirements and developing an independent and authoritative body of 
commercial law separate from the shari’ah, which is intended to provide certainty 
and predictability consistent with the expectations of TNCs. Still, uncertainty is 
pervasive. Although it incorporates large pockets of man-made law that allow 
activities not contemplated in traditional Islamic sources, the Kingdom is thoroughly 
and fully Islamic.  
 Uncertainty, for example, arises because, although Saudi Arabia embraces the 
development (and creation) of commercial law, Islamic law will prevail over 
commercial law when the two conflict. This difference is exacerbated when, if a 
dispute is adjudicated in the West, there is a question as to whether shari’ah is 
considered law at all. Further concerns arise when contemplating dispute resolution in 
Saudi Arabia, as there are hosts of uncertainty inherent in litigating in a traditional 
Islamic, though recently reformed, court system where decisions are not codified and 
stare decisis is non-existent.  
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that although a variety of schools of 
thought exist as a source of shari’ah law, only the Hanbali school applies in Saudi 
Arabia, which limits the uncertainty that arises when all schools of thought are 
considered.  
 
3.3 The Non-separation of Law and Religion in Saudi Arabia 
and Islam as the Basis of the Legal System 
Whereas in Western legal systems religion and law are separate, such 
separation has not taken place in Saudi Arabia. The desire of Mohammed Ibn Abdul 
Wahhab (the founder of Wahhabism, which is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi 
                                                 
27 See Maurits S. Berger, “Conflicts Law and Public Policy in Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law 
through the Backdoor,” American Journal of Comparative Law 50, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 555; Thomas 
Foley, “Extending Comity to Foreign Decrees in International Custody Disputes between Parents in the 
United States and Islamic Nations,” Student Note, Family Court Review 41, no. 2 (April 2003): 257.  
28 The public policy exception to honouring foreign laws is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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Arabia) and of Mohammed Ibn Saud (founder of the Saud dynasty) in the mid-1700s 
was to create a new political entity to spread the message of the Qur’an.29 The 
corresponding Qur’anic verse reads, ‘[T]his day have I perfected your religion for 
you, completed my favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your 
religion.’30 This desire is still the foundation of modern Saudi Arabia, and it is the 
basis from which the Saudi royal family still garners most of its support.31 Abdul Aziz 
Ibn Saud, the founder of the current state in 1902, adhered to the doctrine of his 
predecessors.32 
The foundational principle upon which the rule of law is based in Saudi 
Arabia and the purpose of the legal system is therefore to uphold and protect the rule 
of Islam.33 Consequently, as Bryant Seaman remarked: ‘The continued, intense 
impact of the special heritage of Islamic law in Saudi Arabia distinguishes the 
Kingdom from other Islamic countries and offers insight into the evolution of the 
present system of law and government.’34 
This principle is firmly established in various places in the Basic Law of 
Governance, in which the Kingdom declares Islam as its religion and sets forth the 
encompassing role of Islam throughout the Saudi government.35 For example, the law 
states that the Saudi constitution is the Qur’an and the sunnah,36 and explains that the 
government derives its authority from the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition, 
and bases its actions on the premise of ‘justice, shura (consultation), and equality in 
accordance with the Islamic shari’ah.’37 The law explains that the state protects Islam, 
implements the shari’ah, encourages people to do good and to shun evil, and to fulfil 
the duty regarding God’s call.38 It also explains the role of Islam in the courts, which 
                                                 
29 For general background on Wahhabism, see David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi 
Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); Library of Congress, “Country Profile: Saudi Arabia” (September 
2006), http://www.memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Saudi_Arabia.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
30 Qur’an 5:3; the Qur’an also says ‘[B]ut who, for a people whose faith is assured, can give better 
judgment than Allah?’ Qur’an 5:50. 
31 See, generally, Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. 
32 Ibid. 
33 ‘He hath commanded that ye worship none but Him: that is the right religion, but most men 
understand not’ (Qur’an 12:40); see David J. Karl, “Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign 
Attorneys Should Know,” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 25 (1992): 
131-170.  
34 Bryant Seaman, “Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the Shari’ah to 
Regulate Government,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 18 (1979–1980): 416.  
35 Basic Law of Governance issued by Royal Decree No. A/90, dated 27/8/1412 AH (1 March 1992). 
36 Ibid., Article 1. 
37 Ibid., Articles 7–8. 
38 Ibid., Article 23. 
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must apply the rules of the shari’ah in all cases primarily in accordance with Islam 
and secondarily with appropriate Royal Decrees.39 The Basic Law also establishes 
Islam as the source of regulatory authorities and commands that citizens pay 
allegiance to the king in accordance with the Holy Qur’an and the tradition of the 
Prophet.40 
The legal relations of Saudi Arabia are accordingly governed by religion, or 
what may be called the ‘rule of traditional law.’41 The Qur’an states, ‘[V]erily, this is 
my way leading straight: follow it.’42 As Wael B. Hallaq observed, ‘[W]hile it is true 
that the Qur’an is primarily a book of religious and moral prescriptions, there is no 
doubt that it encompasses pieces of legislation.’43 
The shari’ah is the expression of these sacred institutions. As an organic 
religious system, Islam embraces all spheres of life and has strict commandments for 
conduct.44 Consequently, Islam in Saudi Arabia is more than just a state-endorsed 
belief pattern. Rather, as already mentioned, it is the system by which all things 
relating to life are governed and it defines and structures all aspects of human 
behaviour. Thus, the scope of jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia has a significantly wider 
breadth than jurisprudence in a Western system. Subjects like fasting, prayer, ritual 
obligations, and zakat are discussed as legitimate legal issues in Saudi Arabia because 
they depend upon accurate interpretations of Islam. In other words, the shari’ah is the 
source from which Saudi society must live.45 
 
3.3.1 The Hanbali School and the Rejection of Qiyas 
Reflecting the adherence of the new ruler, King Abdul Aziz, to Wahhabism, in 
1928 the Judicial Board of Saudi Arabia issued a resolution requiring the courts to 
resolve litigation arising from secular transactions by referring to Hanbalite teachings 
and, in particular, the two Hanbalite treatises by Al-Bahuti, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat 
                                                 
39 Ibid., Article 48. 
40 Ibid., Article 67. 
41 Ugo Mattei, “Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems,” 
American Journal of Comparative Law 45 (1997): 10. Mattei argues that legal systems can be 
classified as adhering to the rule of professional law, the rule of political law, or the rule of traditional 
law. 
42 Qur’an, verse 6:153. See also 5:48, ‘to each among you have we have prescribed a law ’  
43 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul Al-fiqh 
(LCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3. 
44 See Foster, “Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I,” 7. 
45 Bassam Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change, trans. Clare Krojzl (Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1991). 
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(Explanation of the Act of Will) and Sharh al-Iqna’ (Explanation of the Means of 
Persuasion), as well as fatwas.46 In other words, Hanblai became the official school of 
law in Saudi Arabia in 1928. 
The Hanafi school is often described as the most liberal because of its 
recognition of reasoning by qiyas. The Hanafi school is the most widely followed and 
is found in Bangladesh, Central Asia, India, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, 
and Turkey.47 
Saudi Arabia, however, subscribes to the Hanbali school, which is followed 
almost exclusively because it is the school of Wahhabism. This school, founded by 
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal in the early eighth century is, by contrast to the Hanafi school, 
characterised by a ‘literal interpretation of Islamic texts.’48 Wahabbism strongly 
prefers ijma based upon agreement of Islamic jurists, and qiyas is not recognised by 
the Hanbali school as a legitimate source of Islamic law.49 Thus, followers of the 
Hanbali doctrine, together with Maliki school followers, are called ‘people of the 
traditions,’ unlike followers of the Hanafi and Shafi’i schools, who are known as 
‘people of the opinion.’50 
As the Hanbali school is the official school of Saudi Arabia, the rejection of 
qiyas by the Hanbali school implies rejection by Saudi Arabia of this source of the 
shari’ah. The influence of the Hanbali school, which focuses on literal interpretation 
of the text, is key to understanding the influence of Islam on the law in Saudi Arabia. 
 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 46 n163; Nabil Saleh “The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia” 38, no. 4 (1989) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 761, 764-765. A fatwa, the legal opinion of a muftī, states general 
divine law concerning a particular issue or topic. The difference between qada (judging) and a fatwa is 
that the ruling is specific, particular, enforceable, and only concerns the two parties, while the fatwa is 
generally applicable, general in terms, and neither binding or mandatory. See Vogel, Islamic Law and 
Legal System, 14-17. Note that in mid-August 2010, King Abdullah issued a Royal Decree ordering 
that only members of the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta may issue fatwas. Royal 
Embassy of Saudi Arabia, “Royal Order Announced on Issuing Fatwas,” news release, 12 August 
2010, http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news08121002.aspx (last visited 25 September 2012). 
47 Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 37. 
48 Hossein Esmaeili, “On a Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law: the Nature of Law in the Saudi 
Arabian Legal System,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 26, no. 1 (2009): 10.  
49 ‘Ahmad Ibn Hanbal put qiyas last in his list of usual . . . authorities, after even deficient prophetic 
hadiths and reports about the Prophet’s Companions; he said that qiyas should be used only when it is 
the only source available.’ Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 54. 
50 See Islamic-Finance.com, “Schools of Thought,” http://www.islamic-finance.com/item38_f.htm 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
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3.3.2 The Narrow Interpretation of the Law in the Saudi Legal 
System 
Since Islam is the basis of law in Saudi Arabia, the legal profession in Saudi 
Arabia does not require knowledge of civil codes or of the common law precedent. 
Rather, legal practice requires research into the opinions of ulama, who are experts on 
scriptural interpretation and application. The process by which the ulama come to 
understanding is commonly referred to as ijtihad, and the understanding itself is 
called fiqh. 
Muslim scholars developed the science of ijtihad in order to understand and 
interpret the message of the Qur’an to the varying conditions and needs of their 
society.51 For example, during the time of the Prophet, it was customary to cut off the 
hands of thieves for stealing. The corresponding Qur’anic verse reads, ‘[A]s to the 
thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands.’52 Fifteen years after the death of 
Muhammad, Caliph Umar ibn-al-Khattab stopped the practice because many people 
were stealing out of necessity because of poverty and famine.53 At the time, this type 
of ijtihad was considered legitimate because Islamic law was still in its early 
formative stages. 
Unfortunately, ijtihad became confined to the grey areas of law, where human 
reasoning on the basis of the texts might uncover the law as intended by God. When 
the law was sufficiently clear in authoritative texts and sources, ijtihad had no role. 
Where knowledge, equated with clear certainty, is lacking, however, learned opinion 
must suffice. Religious interpreters have come to accept that God did not see fit to 
make knowledge of his law easily available but asks for the best that man can 
achieve.54 
                                                 
51 Ijtihad describes the process of making a legal decision by independent interpretation of the Qur’an 
or the sunnah. This connotes thorough exertion of a Muslim jurist’s mental faculty in finding a solution 
to a legal question. For more detailed explanation of ijtihad, see Nazeem Goolam, “Ijtihad and its 
Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation,” Michigan State Law Review 2006, no. 6 (Special 2006): 
1443–1466. 
52 Qur’an 5:38.  
53 Goolam,“Ijtihad and its Significance,” 1447. 
54 The doors to ijtihad began closing under the rule of the Abbasid Dynasty (750–1258 CE). The 
Abbasid Dynasty outlawed various sects of interpretation in order to more tightly control religious 
worship and political matters. See, generally, Dan Jahn, “The Sharia’ Backbone or Achilles’ Heel of an 
Islamic State?” Pacem 2006. However, there is considerable controversy over whether the Gate of 
Ijtihad was, in fact, closed. See, generally, Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 16, no. 3 (1984): 3–41 and “On the Origins of the 
Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of Ijtihad” Studia Islamica, no. 63 (1986): 
129. 
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Though authoritative, opinions derived through ijtihad are still opinions, they 
are distinguished from the law of God. The possibility of error is implied in even the 
most duly sincere and diligent efforts in determining an accurate reflection of God’s 
will concerning a legal question. The opinions of mujtahidin are highly respected.55 
And when scholars form consensus on a matter of law, the ijma can become as 
authoritative as a source of primary law. 
In the face of the socio-political ideologies and pressures over the past several 
centuries from the West in regards to the Middle East, religious leaders and legal 
scholars in many Muslim countries have displayed a trend of adopting more 
conservative views on issues such as legal interpretation in order to preserve 
traditional values and institutions.56 Similar to shari’ah, ijtihad embodies law, 
morality, and even notions of political sovereignty, and is wielded by scholars, 
religious leaders, governments, and opposition movements alike. 
Interpretation, however, does not allow for changing the established rules of 
Islam. These rules are immutable and are not subject to modification; if the Qur’anic 
verse gives a male heir double the share of a female heir, one may not modify such a 
rule to grant equal shares of inheritance for a male and a female.57 The Qur’an rejects 
the doctrine of sameness. The Qur’an also rejects strict equality. 
Similarly, a Qur’anic verse also states that two male witnesses must sign a 
written contract of debt. If a male witness is unavailable, two female witnesses may 
be substituted for one male, so if one woman errs, the other can correct her.58 One 
may not modify such a rule. Therefore, one must distinguish between the immutable 
principles of Islamic law and the changeable rules that require reinterpretation.59 If 
the Qur’an provides a specific rule regarding inheritance or evidence, it must be 
                                                 
55 A mujtahid is a qualified jurist who is capable of reaching independent personal opinions based on 
the sources. To become a mujtahid, one must first be a male of Islamic faith, legitimately born, and 
display intelligence and integrity. In addition, he must be fluent in Arabic, know the Qu’ran and all its 
legal contents, have adequate knowledge of the sunnah, be able to verify the ijma of Companions of 
the Prophet and the leading imams and mujtahidin of the past, and have knowledge of the rules and 
procedures of qiyas. 
56 David Smock, “Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Islamic Principles for the Twenty-first Century” (United 
States Institute of Peace, Special Report 125: 2004), 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr125.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
57 ‘Allah (thus) directs you as regards your children's (inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that 
of two females.’ Quran 4:11. 
58 Qur’an 2:282. 
59 Ali Khan, “Islam as Intellectual Property ‘My Lord! Increase me in knowledge,’” Cumberland Law 
Review 31 (2000-2001): 636-644; Bernard Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of 
Ijtihad,” American Journal of Comparative Law 26 (1977-1978): 199. 
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applied as stipulated. If the Qur’an offers a ‘flexible principle’ instead of a ‘firm rule,’ 
this principle may be interpreted to provide for a rule.60 
Because the Hanbali school relies only on the text of the Qur’anic legislation 
and the traditions of the Prophet, there are very few opportunities for ijtihad in Saudi 
Arabia.61  
 
3.3.3 Hesitation on Codification of Islamic Law in Saudi 
Arabia 
In order to promote a consistent application of the law, some argue that 
Islamic law should be codified in Saudi Arabia, though there has been resistance to 
this idea.62 The concept of codification of the law is predominantly a Western idea 
and falls uncomfortably with the Qur’an and the sunnah, as it may, even if 
theoretically, take decision-making power away from the ulama and thus may 
undermine the religious sources of law.63 As Noah Feldman observed: 
The transformation of the shari’ah—from a body of doctrines and principles 
to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars to a set of rules that 
could be looked up in a code—effected a corresponding transformation in 
the social meaning of the role of the scholars as Keepers of the Law. In the 
classical era, a person asking the question, ‘Where is the law?’ in the 
Islamic world could be answered only by an interlocutor’s pointing to the 
scholars and saying, ‘The shari’ah is with them.’ After the Mecelle 
(Majalla), the same question could be answered by pointing to the code 
itself—not to those empowered to apply it. Therefore, codification sounded 
the death knell for the role of the scholars as Keepers of the Law. The 
aspiration to codification obviated the traditional need for the scholars. It 
                                                 
60 Murtada Mutahhari “The Principle of Ijtihad in Islam,” trans. John Cooper, Al-Serat Journal X, no. 
1; Khan, “Islam as Intellectual Property,” 640; Smock, “Ijtihad: Reinterpreting Islamic Principles”; 
Weiss, “Interpretation in Islamic Law.” 
61 Esmaeili, “On a Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law,” 4–16. 
62 This section owes much to the draft thesis of Sulaiman Al-Turki on the codification of Islamic law in 
Saudi Arabia. 
63 In 2000, the Saudi Board of Senior Ulama issued a fatwa (Fatwa No. 8) rejecting codification of 
shari’ah, reasoning that it is un-Islamic. Others agree; see Esmaeili, “On a Slow Boat Towards the 
Rule of Law,” 30–31; Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 338–339.  
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took from them the all-important claim to have the final say over the content 
of law.64 
According to Frank E. Vogel, ‘because codification epitomizes macrocosmic, 
particularly rule-law forms, it directly threatens fiqh’s microcosmic, particularly 
instance-law predilections.’65 
On the other hand, the concept of codification of the law is not completely 
novel to Saudi Arabia. In the Ottoman Empire, qanuns were laid down as a form of 
regulation to be used in general application.66 And, in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, the Ottoman Empire enacted the Majalla (1869–1876), which was ‘a 
selective digest of shari’ah principles.’67 
Yet, Saudi history demonstrates the conflict between state and the ulama. 
Although the state aims to ‘modernize, adhere to economic principles, and respond to 
international pressure,’ the Islamic scholars aim to protect the process of ijtihad.68 
Therefore, codification in Saudi Arabia has, at present, not progressed beyond debate 
over the form of codification. According to Vogel: 
Codification in Saudi Arabia arouses in stark terms the issue of Saudi 
allegiance to the ideal that qadi law is microcosmic law. All doctrines or 
precedents in fiqh whether from the jihad/taqlid hierarchy or the fiqh/siyasa 
hierarchy that uphold that ideal become arrayed as arguments against 
codification, while all doctrines or precedents that make inroads on that 
ideal are marshaled for codification.69 
3.4 Islamic Commercial Law  
Although Islamic law is the source of law in Saudi Arabia and is applicable in 
all legal matters, there are vagaries in the Islamic legal system that make determining 
what the law is difficult, and even whether there is law on a point.70 First, the Qu’ran 
and the sunnah do not contemplate every eventuality. Second, as just noted, Islamic 
law is not codified in Saudi Arabia. Gaps are filled by supplemental sources, 
                                                 
64 Noah, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008): 63–64. 
65 Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 310. 
66 See Foster, “Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I.”  
67 William M. Ballantyne “The Majella: Introduction,” Arab Law Quarterly 1, no. 4 (1985–1986): 
364–366. 
68 Esmaeili, “On a Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law,” 28. 
69 Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 336.  
70 This is discussed in section 3.2.2. 
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including scholarly interpretations, Royal Decrees, administrative circulars, and other 
regulations, which are themselves in compliance with the shari’ah. Thus, the 
following section investigates whether Islamic law recognises specific rules of 
commerce, trade, and investment. 
 
3.4.1 Islamic Commercial Law before Western Influence 
Following its inception in the seventh century, Islamic law continued to 
develop for approximately four hundred years.71 After that time, and after the 
development of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s school of reasoning, new interpretations 
and applications of Islam required broad consensus of the faithful. This, of course, 
means that for adherents of the Hanbali school, most authoritative Islamic commercial 
law is ten centuries old, and applies, for the most part, only to very narrow situations 
without the application of qiyas.72 That notwithstanding, there is some evidence that 
Islamic law was reasonably effective until the nineteenth century, as it covered bai', 
ijara, wakala, musharaka, mudaraba, rahn, and kafala.73 As described in section 
3.4.2, although the Qu’ran provides direct authority, as it commands the faithful to 
fulfil their obligations, freedom of contract is constrained in Islamic law. 
 
3.4.2 The Terms and Conditions of Contracts in the Islamic 
Legal System 
Contracts are respected in Islamic law.74 The Qur’an commands followers to 
fulfil their obligations and to uphold their promises in many verses. For example, it 
says that ‘those who break Allah's covenant after it is ratified and who sunder what 
Allah has ordered to be joined, and do mischief on earth cause loss (only) to 
themselves’; it commands the faithful ‘to be steadfast in prayer and practise regular 
charity; to fulfil the contracts which they have made; and to be firm and patient in 
                                                 
71 Judith Thomson, “Developing Financial Law in Conformity with Islamic Principles: Strict 
Interpretation, Formalism, or Innovation?” Deakin Law Review 4, no. 2 (1999–2000): 82. 
72 Ibid.. 
73 See, generally, Nicholas H. D. Foster, “Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations 
II: The Sharia and Western-Style Business Organisations,” European Business Organization Law 
Review 11, no. 1 (2010): 273–307. doi: 10.1017; Nicholas H. D. Foster, “Islamic Commercial Law: An 
Overview (II),” InDret  4 (2006): 7.  
74 For general information on contracts in Islamic law, see Nayla Comair-Obeid, The Law of Business 
Contracts in the Arab Middle East: A Theoretical Reference to Modern Legislation (London: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996); S. E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: A Comparative 
Analysis with Particular Reference to the Modern Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab 
Emirates (London, Graham & Trotman: 1991).  
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pain (or suffering) and adversity and throughout all periods of panic’; and exclaims 
‘O ye who believe! Fulfil (all) obligations.’75 
The Qur’an stresses honesty and good intentions, and strictly prohibits fraud 
and fraudulent dealings. The principle of good faith includes reasonableness, fair 
dealings, and disclosure of defects relating to goods. According to Mohammed Billah, 
the holy tradition states, ‘[I]t is illegal for one to sell a thing if one knows that it has a 
defect unless one inform the buyer of that defect.’76 
Is writing required for the formation of an Islamic contract? The Qur’anic rule 
is that ‘when ye deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a 
fixed period of time, reduce them to writing.’77 It is debated whether this rule is 
mandatory or merely permissive. The general rule is that private contracts are valid 
regardless of their form, and only certain types of legal documents, such as wills, are 
required to be in writing. Therefore, a written document is not a requirement for 
proving a contract.78 
There are interesting parallels with Article 11 of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (UNCISG).79 The rule 
under Islamic law, as well as under the convention, is that formalism of contracts, 
although recommended in commercial transactions, is not mandatory. As in Article 
11, a contract in Islamic law may be proved by any means, including by witnesses. 
The oral agreement is the primary form of proof, and in this context resort may be 
made to ‘all relevant circumstances of the case including negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usage and any subsequent 
                                                 
75 Qur’an 2:27; 2:177; 5:1. 
76 Mohammed Ma'sum Billah, “Caveat Emptor versus Khiyar al-'Aib: A Dichotomy,” Arab Law 
Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1998): 287.  
77 Qur’an 2:282 
78 Fatima Akaddaf, “Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law 
Principles?” Pace International Law Review 13 (2001): 28. 
79 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 11 April 1980, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html (last visited 25 
September 2012). 
 96 
 
conduct of the parties.’80 However, under Qur’anic rule, when writing is involved it 
should be formally witnessed by two males, or one male and two females.81 
Islamic law does not recognise the notion of a limitation period.82 According 
to traditional Islamic rule, a Muslim’s right shall not be extinguished by passage of 
time. However, this rule has been disregarded in the Labour Law of 2005, in which all 
actions arising from employment contracts that are within the jurisdiction of the 
commission for the settlement of labour disputes are time-barred after one year.83 
 
3.4.3 Limitations Within the Contract-making Process 
Apart from the institutional debates, the harmonisation of Saudi laws with the 
Western commercial world has raised a number of separate issues. Two age-old 
problems are riba and gharar, which affect contracts between Saudi Arabian and 
Western companies, and thus how contract disputes are settled. These issues are 
discussed in detail in this section. 
 
3.4.3.1 The Prohibition of Riba  
Riba can be roughly translated as usury, although it is broader than that 
concept, and it is prohibited by the shari’ah.84 The Qur’an states: 
                                                 
80 Ibid., Article 8(3). ‘The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any 
practices, which they have established between themselves.’ Article 9(1). ‘As to the performance of the 
contract, it must be performed in good faith.’ As stated by Article 7(1), ‘in interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be made to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in 
its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.’  
81 ‘And get two witnesses, out of your own men and if there are not two men, then a man and two 
women.’ Qur’an 2:282. 
82 A limitation period is a period during which a potential claimant must sue. If the statute of 
limitations expires and no claim is filed, the claim is lost forever and may not be brought by the injured 
party. In contrast, the U.N. Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods of 
1974, Article 8, provides for a statute of limitation period of four years for commercial litigation. 
Article 22 prohibits the parties from modifying the limitation period. (Convention on the Limitation 
Period in the International Sale of Goods, 14 June 1974, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1974Convention_limitation_period.html 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
83 The principle was re-stated in Article 222 (1) of the Labour Law of 2005: ‘[N]o case shall be 
accepted by the commissions provided for in this law involving a claim of the rights provided for in 
this law or arising from a work contract after twelve months following termination of the work 
relation.’ (Saudi Labour Law of 2005, issued by Royal Decree No. M/51 1426 H (2005). 
84 See Qur’an, 2:275–2:279, 3:130, and 4:161 for four particular revelations that refer to the prohibition 
of riba: ‘The first revelation emphasizes that interest deprives the wealth of God’s blessings. The 
second revelation condemns interest in juxtaposition with wrongful appropriation of property 
belonging to others. The third revelation enjoins Muslims to stand clear of interest for the sake of their 
own welfare. The fourth revelation establishes a clear distinction between interest and trade, urging 
Muslims to take only the principal sum and to forgo this sum even if the borrower is unable to repay’ 
Mohamed Ariff, “Islamic Banking,” Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 2, no. 2 (September 1988): 3. 
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[T]hose who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the evil 
one by his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they say: “trade is 
like usury”, but Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury. Those who 
after receiving direction from their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; 
their case is for Allah (to judge); but those who repeat (the offence) are 
companions of the fire: they will abide therein (forever). Allah will deprive 
usury of all blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity: for He loveth 
not creatures ungrateful and wicked.85 
 
The prohibition of riba is also cited in no uncertain terms in the hadith 
(sayings of the Prophet). The Prophet condemned not only those who take riba but 
also those who record or witness the transaction, saying that they are all alike in 
guilt.86 
Riba embodies the notion of social justice and, as such, has a timeless 
application, rejecting the exploitation of the poor by those with the plenty.87 Several 
Islamic countries do not allow riba as part of an arbitral award.88 In fact, riba has a 
broader definition than interest or usury; it can be defined as an ‘unlawful gain 
derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter-values in any transaction 
purporting to affect the exchange of two or more species which belong to the same 
genus and are governed by the same efficient cause.’89 The rationale for the 
prohibition of riba under Islamic law is based on the assumption that it reinforces the 
tendency of the accumulation of wealth into the hands of the few and diminishes a 
                                                                                                                                           
See, generally, Ahmad Ziauddin, “The Qur’anic Theory of Riba,” The Islamic Quarterly 20–22 (1978): 
3–14. 
85 Qur’an 2:275–276. 
86 See Sunan Abu Dawud, book 23: 3333-3335-3336 
87 ‘In the eleventh century, Abu Bakr Ibn Ali al-Bayhaqi (d. 1065) declared riba to be a broad term 
including those things that result in the impoverishment of needy groups by stronger groups or classes. 
In 1995, consistent with the thoughts of al-Bayhaqi, most modern jurists similarly argue that the 
practice of riba enriches the class of moneylenders and usurers who accumulate wealth by 
impoverishing those who are forced to borrow money or commodities from them for mere 
consumption of basic necessities or for limited production purposes.’ Barbara Seniawski, “Riba Today: 
Social Equity, the Economy, and Doing Business under Islamic Law,” Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 39 (2000–2001): 706.  
88 Cases regarding this issue in the context of Saudi Arabia are examined in Chapter 6.  
89 Nabil A. Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar, and Islamic 
Banking, 2nd ed. (London: Graham & Trotman, 1992): 16. 
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man’s concern for his fellow men. Islam does not allow gain from financial activity 
unless the beneficiary is also subject to the risk of potential loss. In addition, Islam 
regards the accumulation of wealth through riba as selfish, as compared to 
accumulation through work and personal activity.90 
In the commercial context, the most relevant aspect of riba is that it prohibits 
the payment of interest, a vital tool in conventional contractual obligations. Modern 
Islamic finance systems have chosen to work around the riba prohibition by using 
tools such as mudaraba, musharaka, and ijara, which allow for a profit to be made by 
the lender without directly applying an interest charge.91  Mudaraba refers to a 
situation where the investor provides all the capital and participates in none of the 
management; funds are repaid through profit-share. While musharaka involves joint 
profit-sharing and decision-making; thus, all parties share in the profit or loss of the 
venture. In ijara, the bank purchases the assets from a client and then leases them 
back. A variation on this model is the lease–purchase, which gives the client the 
option of purchase after a specified number of lease payments. 
A less thought-out and often used method of circumventing riba is through 
service charges equivalent to the standard interest rate. The argument that fixed 
interest rates on official loans are no more than commissions for services rendered is a 
strong one. Interest payments have been ignored by Saudi courts in the past and 
constitute a voided element of a contract. Even commissions and set fees for services 
have been held to be disguised interest, leaving the foreign investor perplexed over 
the validity of any such contract.92  
A system of Islamic banking using the profit-sharing and trust-financing 
strategies addressed earlier has developed rapidly as two of the main ways to ensure 
that usury does not taint the contractual transaction.93 Conventional and Islamic 
                                                 
90 See Talib Siraaj Adbus-Shahid, “Interest, Usury and the Islamic Development Bank: Alternative, 
No-Interest Financing,” Law & Policy in International Business 16 (1984): 1102–1103.  
91 For general information on mudaraba, musharaka, and ijara, see Sulman A. Bhatti, “The Shari’ah 
and the Challenge and Opportunity of Embracing Finance ‘Without Interest,’” Columbia Business Law 
Review 10, no. 1 (2010): 205–44; Ali Adnan Ibrahim, “The Rise of Customary Businesses in 
International Financial Markets: An Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of 
International Integration,” American University International Law Review 23, no. 4 (2007): 661–732. 
92 Kristan L. Peters-Hamlin, “The Impact of Islamic Revivalism on Contract and Usury Law in Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt,” Texas International Law Journal 22 (1987): 360. 
93 ‘The Islamic Development Bank was formally opened on 20 October 1975 pursuant to the 
Declaration of Intent issued by the Conference of Finance Ministers of Muslim Countries held in 
Jeddah in Dhul Q’adah 1393H, corresponding to December 1973.’ The Bank’s functions are ‘to 
participate in equity capital and grant loans for productive projects and enterprises besides providing 
financial assistance to member countries, in addition to setting up trust funds. The Bank is authorized 
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banking are both recognised.94 In 1971, the Nasir Social Bank, the first Islamic 
interest-free commercial bank, was established in Egypt, though ‘the Egyptian 
government made no reference to Islam or shari’ah in the charter of the Nasir Social 
Bank.’95 
 
3.4.3.2 The Prohibition of Gharar  
A concept posing similar problems to riba is gharar, which refers to risk or 
uncertainty.96 It is an important rule of prohibition in that it may apply to any 
transaction that is speculative, indefinite, or ambiguous, such as future contracts, 
options, or financial derivatives.97 It also applies to remedies, especially moral 
damages or punitive damages, which entail an element of uncertainty or speculation. 
In commercial contexts, however, it is most frequently applied in the field of 
insurance, an area of importance to investors.  
Insurance pursued solely for profit is considered gambling because it is based 
on the premise that risks against the insured will, in all likelihood, not occur, so as a 
consequence it is disallowed under the shari’ah. After long debate, this was finally 
articulated in 1976 at the First International Conference on Islamic Economics.98 A 
year later, it was endorsed by the Saudi Arabian ulama.99 Similarly, the incorporation 
of companies with limited liability with insurance as one of their objectives is 
prohibited in the Saudi Companies Law of 1965.100 The answer to this  uncertainty is 
                                                                                                                                           
to accept deposits and to mobilize financial resources through shari’ah compatible models. It is also 
charged with the responsibility of assisting in the promotion of foreign trade especially in capital 
goods, among member countries; providing technical assistance to member countries; and extending 
training facilities for personnel engaged in development activities in Muslim countries to conform to 
the shari’ah.’ Islamic Development Bank, “About IDB,” http://www.isdb.org/ (last visited 25 
September 2012). 
94 For background information regarding Islamic banking, see Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, “Interest and 
the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance,” Fordham International Law Journal 27 
(2003): 108; Scheherazade S. Rehman, “Globalization of Islamic Finance Law,” Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 25, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 625.  
95 Rehman, “Globalization of Islamic Finance Law,” 637. 
96 For more information, see Abdul-Rahim Al-Saati, “The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical 
Islamic Jurisprudence,” Journal of King Abdul Aziz University: Islamic Economics 16 no. 2, (1424 H 
(2003)): 3–19, 
http://www.kau.edu.sa/Files/320/Researches/50833_20970.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012); Saleh, 
Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law. 
97 Bjorn Sorenson, Ethical Money: Financial Growth in the Muslim World, American International 
Law Review 23 (2011): 647, 650; Kimberly J. Tacy, Islamic Finance: A Growing Industry in the 
United States, University North Carolina Law 10 (2006): 355, 357 
98 Andreas Haberbeck, “Risk Sharing in an Islamic Society,” Arab Law Quarterly 2, no. 2 (May 1987): 
141. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Companies Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/6, dated 22/3/1385 AH (21 July 1965), Article 159. 
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mutual insurance schemes, in which risk is shared because the policyholders are given 
ownership rights in the insurance company.101 In 1985, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz 
established a state-owned mutual insurance entity to insure government enterprises 
and state-owned companies.102 Lately, insurance disputes have entered arbitration, 
given its recent acceptance in the Kingdom. 
First, as described above, one argument against allowing insurance contracts is 
that insurance is a type of exploitation. Consider, for example, liability insurance. The 
insured pays a certain amount of money, and if no accident takes place, the insurer 
keeps the entire amount while paying nothing to the insured. Obviously, from the 
shari’ah perspective, this raises questions as to whether the trade is fair or constitutes 
exploitation. Another example is life insurance. If the insured pays the first premium 
and then dies, his beneficiary is entitled to the whole sum of money. If he fails to pay, 
the beneficiary will lose all the benefits of the contract. 
Second, an insurance contract includes uncertainty.103 Traditional insurance 
policies entail an element of speculation, which is prohibited in Islamic law.104 For 
example, the insured has no knowledge at the time of the formation of the contract as 
to the number of premiums he shall make. 
Third, insurance companies invest their reserve money on usury so that the 
insured recovers his compensation not only from the premiums paid but also from the 
interest of such payments. Since this is riba, it is prohibited in Islamic law.105 
One may argue, however, that insurance contracts are not indefinite. In fact, 
they include a definite compensation, which is specified during the formation process. 
Ignorance applies only to the number of premiums. This does not prevent execution 
of the contract, as long as the insurer pays the agreed-upon compensation on the 
occurrence of a certain event. Therefore, this type of ignorance does not affect the 
formation of a contract. 
 
                                                 
101 See Masudul Alam Choudhury, “Insurance and Investment in Islamic Perspective,” Finance in 
Islam, Learning Islamic Finance, http://www.financeinislam.com/article/1_37/1/125 (last visited 25 
September 2012).  
102 Haberbeck, “Risk Sharing in an Islamic Society,” 143.  
103 ‘There is gharar in insurance as both the parties do not know their respective rights and liabilities 'til 
the occurrence of the insured event.’ Syed Khalid Rashid, “Islamization of Insurance—A Religio-
Legal Experiment in Malaysia,” Religion and Law Review 2, no. 1 (1993): 27. 
104 Sunan Tirmidhi, book 10, chapter 17: 1275. 
105 Bhatti, “The Shari’ah and the Challenge and Opportunity of Embracing Finance ‘Without Interest,’” 
217.  
 101 
 
3.4.3.3 The Prohibition of Speculative Risk.  
The prohibition of gharar has created a problem in Islamic law with 
speculative damages, which has led to several disputes regarding the application of 
the shari’ah in international breach of contract claims. On occasion the application of 
shari’ah law has worked to the detriment of the party who insisted on its inclusion in 
the contract. In one notable case, National Group for Communications and 
Computers Ltd. [hereafter, NGC] v. Lucent Technologies International [hereafter, 
Lucent], Saudi Arabian NGC filed suit in the District Court of New Jersey against the 
U.S.-based company Lucent. The plaintiff, NGC, alleged that Lucent was in breach of 
a telecommunications construction sub-contract.106 
Lucent had entered into a construction agreement with the Saudi Ministry of 
Communications and, in turn, granted a sub-contract to NGC. NGC was to provide 
engineering services in order for Lucent to complete its project in accordance with its 
contract with the Saudi government. The project was to develop a roadside assistance 
program and installation of pay phones along the Kingdom’s highways. Lucent was to 
pay NGC a sum of more than $75 million over the course of four years.107 The price 
stipulated in the contract was settled, static, and not subject to any adjustment. The 
contract was never completed and, ultimately, terminated. NGC was forced to shut 
down its telecommunications projects department as a direct result of the termination 
of this project. Department jobs were lost and assets such as equipment, offices, 
vehicles, and so on became useless. NGC’s claim for damages was based on the value 
of its telecommunications department at the time that the office had to be closed. The 
project department of NGC had been valued, on two different valuations, between 
$153 million and nearly $174 million. Both of these valuations were conducted by the  
Saudi-based Riyad Bank for the purpose of attracting investors.108 
After these valuations had been conducted, an interested investor, Kingdom 
Holding Company, hired the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen to conduct its own 
assessment, which resulted in a valuation of $112.3 million. Subsequent transactions 
provided the basis for assuming that the value of the department immediately prior to 
                                                 
106 National Group for Communications and Computers Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies International, Inc. 
331 F. Supp. 2d 290 (District Court of New Jersey 2004), 292. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., 293. 
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its collapse was $111.7 million. This value, however, was based on expected (rather 
than current) profits.109 
The subcontract between Lucent and NGC contained a choice of law clause 
designating the law of Saudi Arabia as the applicable law; therefore, it was agreed 
that Saudi Arabian contract law applied to this breach of contract dispute. The issue 
presented in this case was the interpretation and application of Saudi contract law 
regarding claims for lost profits, which were a significant component of NGC’s 
financial loss and, therefore, its legal claim.110 
The court’s analysis relied on shari’ah experts and texts, and the opinion 
invoked language directly from Saudi laws as well as the Qur’an. The court also 
relied on the Islamic prohibition of gharar, which can be translated for present 
purposes as ‘risk.’ If the contract were to be found risky, then losses that flowed from 
the breach of such a contract would be considered speculative—and speculation is not 
permitted in the calculation of losses under Islamic law. 111 
In assessing whether the alleged losses were based on risky contingencies in 
the contract, the court adopted what they believed would be the views of the Saudi 
Arabian Board of Grievances in determining the existence of gharar. 
The court accepted that Arthur Andersen’s valuation ($112.3 million) was 
based on only 20 per cent of the then-current holdings of NGC, and 80 per cent on 
future earnings. This meant that, by shari’ah standards, 80 per cent of the value of 
NGC’s telecommunications department at the time of Andersen’s findings was 
speculative, not actual. The elements that were considered speculative by both 
Andersen’s and NGC’s experts included ‘intangibles beyond future contracts, such as 
good will.’112 The court applied shari’ah law in accordance with the contract’s choice 
of law clause, and it held that the only recoverable amount was the total of NGC’s 
direct, tangible, and actual losses.113 Thus, the application of shari’ah inured to the 
benefit of the American party to the contract and harmed the Saudi Arabian party. 
                                                 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., 292. 
111 Ibid,. 299. 
112 Ibid., 300. The court reasoned, ‘[I]t is clear to this Court that in Saudi Arabia, the Board of 
Grievances would not award damages based on Plaintiff's valuation of the Projects Department. To do 
so would be equivalent to placing a value on fish in the sea, or purchasing food that has not yet been 
weighed. Although Plaintiff's valuation is rejected, this does not mean that Plaintiff cannot recover 
damages for its losses. However, the measure for the loss of the Projects Department must be limited to 
the actual existing assets of the Department, and not to those items impinged with gharar.’ Ibid.  
113 Ibid. 
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Scholars have illuminated the shari’ah-based prohibition of gharar, as well as 
what, in particular, qualifies as gharar. In Noor Mohammed’s114 article on Islamic 
contract law, Ibn Rushd’s formula for calculating gharar is cited, which is based on 
the principles that:  
[M]aterial want of knowledge in either the subject matter or in price can 
produce gharar. But if the subject matter could be adequately described and 
price could be clearly fixed then it would eliminate the speculative risk and 
hence, gharar would become inapplicable.115  
 
According to this article, the thrust of Ibn Rushd’s determination of gharar is 
that there should be no ambiguity in the value of the items exchanged, the identity of 
the items exchanged, or the date for performance in the contract.116 The concept of 
gharar continues to be interpreted, or ‘refined,’ and ‘has been narrowed down to the 
presence or absence of uncertainty about future performance and not to the existence 
or nonexistence of the subject matter at the time of contract.’117 
 
3.5 State Commercial Regulations 
Shari’ah commercial law and the shari’ah courts are significant, and their 
characteristics need to be borne in mind by the foreign investor. However, alongside 
these is another system of specialised regulations and tribunals. 
In recent years, there have been rapid economic, social, cultural, and political 
shifts in Saudi Arabia. As the country tries to keep pace under the guidance of the 
king, some radical changes have been made, particularly in the field of trade and 
commercial laws. As discussed in Chapter 4, Saudi Arabia has gone from a country 
that did not welcome outside interaction to one that embraces FDI. 
 
3.5.1 The Need for Another Commercial Law System 
As the thirteenth largest merchandise exporter and the twenty-third largest 
importer worldwide, Saudi Arabia took the progressive step in 2005 of joining the 
                                                 
114 Noor Mohammed, “Principles of Islamic Contract Law,” Journal of Law and Religion 6, no. 1, 
(1988): 122. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid.  
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World Trade Organization, committing itself to the principle of international trade.118 
The legislation that was enacted over the past thirty years to open the Saudi economy 
to outside interaction has had to confront the wariness of the Saudis towards exterior 
legal systems that are themselves not rooted in the shari’ah. 
Ironically, the Hanbali school is one of the most liberal when it comes to 
contractual obligations and the freedom of a person to enter contracts,119 and this 
contributes to the ease with which the king has issued Royal Decrees on commercial 
law. This is greatly due to the writings of Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiya, who stated that 
entering contracts is permissible unless specifically prohibited by the Qur’an or the 
sunnah.120 
Apart from its joining the WTO, Saudi Arabia also become a member of the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the 
Universal Copyright Convention, the International Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 121 
In the commercial context, Saudi Arabia has found no alternative but to 
embrace the Western methodology of law. The movement towards establishing 
modern legal provisions and legal institutions, as Hossein Esmaeili observed, 
‘indicates that the legal system of Saudi Arabia is moving from a traditional shari’ah-
based and closed system to a system with more modern legal institutions and 
significant modern legal principles.’122 As another scholar, George Sfeir, explained: 
 
                                                 
118 On 11 December 2005, Saudi Arabia became the 149th member of the World Trade Organization. 
World Trade Organization, “Protocols of accession for new members since 1995, including 
commitments in goods and services” (23 July 2008, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm#sau (last visited 25 September 2012). 
119 Kamali, M. H., “Islamic Commercial Law an Analysis of Options,” American Journal of Islamic 
Social Sciences 14(3) (1997): 28. 
120 Ibn Taymiya, III Majmuat Fatawa (1908–1911): 326, 338. 
121 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, called the ICSID Convention, was opened for signature 18 March 1965, and entered into force 
14 October 1966. The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty promulgated by the World Bank. The 
Universal Copyright Convention, 6 September 1952,  
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=15381&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html; Saudi Arabia became a party 
to the convention on 13 April 1994. The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958; see  
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (last visited 25 
September 2012); Saudi Arabia ratified the convention on 19 April 1994, and it entered into force on 
18 July 1994. See also Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, http://www.miga.org (last visited 25 
September 2012). 
122 Esmaeili, ”On a Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law,” 31–32. 
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[J]ustified by the demands of changing economic conditions and expanding 
business relations, these statutory enactments have succeeded in 
supplementing a substantial segment of the traditional legal structure 
without, however, abrogating any of the rules of the shari’ah. The result has 
been the emergence of a temporal legal subsystem, autonomous, but not 
fully independent of the shari’ah.123 
 
This ‘temporal legal subsystem,’ a specialised trade, investment, and 
commercial law created independently of shari’ah, exists alongside shari’ah 
commercial law, which alone is not sufficient for the needs of the modern world. This 
specialised business-related law is less subject to the influence of the religious law.124 
Indeed, in this area, the shari’ah is merely a subsidiary or a secondary source of law, 
to be applied only in the absence of a specific law governing a business matter. 
 
3.5.2 Duality in Saudi Arabian Law 
The parallel system of state laws and tribunals does not, in fact, use the words 
‘law’ or ‘legislation’ because of their secular heritage. Rather, the word niẓām is used, 
and the bodies that carry legislative authority are known as regulatory bodies.125 As 
Rashed Aba-Namay observed: 
[T]he concept of legislation, or tashri’a, is not accepted by many Muslims, 
including Saudis. Tashri’a is considered to be alien to Islam: it is perceived 
as inconsistent with a shari’ah-based legal system, since shari’ah is regarded 
as the highest law. Only God is the supreme legislature, human beings can 
only interpret God’s law, not make their own.126 
 
In addition, since 1992, a system of fundamental laws, enacted by Royal 
Decree, has existed. The most important of these is the Basic Law of Governance, 
                                                 
123 George Sfeir, “The Saudi Approach to Law Reform,” American Journal of Comparative Law 36 
(1988): 729. 
124 Ibid.; see also Ran Hirschl, “The Rise of Constitutional Theocracy,” Harvard International Law 
Journal Online 49 (2008). 
125 As mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.7, the common Western practice is followed of using the word 
‘law’ in the name of regulations. 
126 Rashed Aba-Namay, “The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 42, no. 2 (1993): 309. 
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followed by the Consultative Council Law and the Regional Law.127 The Basic Law is 
the closest reflection of a typical state constitution. It articulates the roles of the 
monarchy, system of government, and the Qur’an; the features of the Saudi family, 
economic principles, rights, and duties; and the relationship between the king, 
legislative bodies, and judiciary.128 As indicated, in every aspect, the shari’ah 
explicitly and implicitly permeates the Basic Law. 
The Saudi legal system has, therefore, been described as a dual system. Vogel 
provided a good description of the duality in Saudi Arabian law when he observed: 
[I]n most Islamic states other than Saudi Arabia, the legal system is 
bifurcated: one part is based on man-made, positive (wadi) law; the other 
part on Islamic law. The first part usually exists in the form of 
comprehensive codes similar to those of the European civil law systems, 
and the second in the form of Islamic law, usually codified as well. The 
positive legal system provides the basic or residual law, while the Islamic 
law is exceptional, supplementary and relatively narrow in scope. There is a 
similar bifurcation in the institutions that apply the law, for example, 
between positive law tribunals and religious law courts. Saudi Arabia also 
has a dual legal system, but the relative roles of the two sides are reversed. 
The Islamic component of the legal system is fundamental and dominant. 
The positive law, on the other hand, is subordinate, constitutionally and in 
scope.129 
 
This explanation entails the definition of duality as ‘the division of something 
conceptually into two opposed or contrasted aspects,’ and it emphasises that duality 
of a legal system means the ‘existence of [such] opposing and contrasting aspects, 
norms, principles and substantive laws within the same legal system.’ 130 
 
                                                 
127 Basic Law of Governance, issued by Royal Decree No. A/90, dated 27/8/1412 AH (1992); the 
Consultative Council Law, or Shura Law, was issued by Royal Decree No. A/91, dated 27/8/1412 H 
(1992); the Regional Law was issued by Royal Decree No. A/91 dated 27/8/1412 H (1992). 
128 See Basic Law of Governance. 
129 Frank Vogel, “Islamic Governance in the Gulf: A Framework for Analysis, Comparison, and 
Prediction,” in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and 
Religion, ed. Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1997): 275-276. 
130 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th ed., ed. Judith Pearsall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999): 141. 
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3.5.3 The Role of Islamic Scholars in the State 
The king enacts the Royal Decrees, making him an intrinsic element in the 
legal system. As noted, religion and politics are inseparable in Saudi Arabia, in the 
same way that religion and the law are inseparable.131 The king has three 
simultaneous roles according to the shari’ah: as a religious leader, the leader of the 
tribes, and the king (that is head of the executive branch of government and prime 
minister for the state). Article 55 of the Basic Law provides that, ‘[T]he king carries 
out the policy of the nation, a legitimate policy in accordance with the provisions of 
Islam; the king oversees the implementation of the Islamic shari’ah, the system of 
government, the state’s general policies, and the protection and defense of the 
country.’ Concerning legislation, the king may establish regulations by issuing Royal 
Decrees. This is a particularly important role given the jurists’ limitations to reason 
out the Qur’an and the sunnah. Here lies the opportunity to mould Saudi law to 
modern needs. This opportunity has been used most frequently in the context of 
commercial law. David J. Karl offers an insight on the relationship between the 
shari’ah and the king’s decrees. 
While the king’s ability to issue Royal Decrees provides a means of 
supplementing the shari’ah as modern needs demand, the divinely revealed 
shari’ah is revered by the Saudis as being the only law of the Kingdom. To 
ensure that there is no confusion regarding the status of the shari’ah versus 
that of commercial regulations, the latter are referred to as regulations or 
statues rather than laws. Ultimately, ‘only Allah can make law . . . and the 
government’s regulations will be effective only to the extent that they do not 
contradict shari’ah law.’132  
 
Thus, decrees by the king are not official expressions of Islamic law but, 
according to the doctrine of siyasa shar’iyya, will be upheld by the courts provided 
that they do not conflict with sharī‘ah principles.133 In practice, the king’s decrees are 
                                                 
131 ‘The state protects Islam; it implements its Shari’ah; it orders people to do right and shun evil; it 
fulfills the duty regarding God’s call.’ See Basic Law of Governance, Article 23. Article 7 states the 
‘government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Koran and the Prophet’s tradition.’ 
132 Karl, “Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia,”144.  
133 Siyasa shar’iyya means siyasa (the king’s laws) in accordance with shari’ah (the Qur’an and the 
sunnah); ‘The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Shari’ah in the cases that are brought before 
them, in accordance with what is indicated in the Book and the sunnah, and the statutes decreed by the 
Ruler which do not contradict the Book or the sunnah.’ Basic Law, Article 48. 
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formulated by the Council of Ministers, which approves regulations and then 
recommends them to the king. Once a Royal Decree is issued, it is published in the 
Umm al-Qura (Official Gazette) and the regulation becomes law. 
It is a principle of the Islamic power structure that regulations are taken 
through a process of consultation and cooperation. The Prophet is reported to have 
said, ‘[M]y people would never unanimously agree on a wrongful thing.’134 This 
principle is evidenced by Article 44 of the Basic Law, which provides: 
[T]he authorities of the state consist of the following: the judicial authority; 
the executive authority; the regulatory authority. These authorities cooperate 
with each other in the performance of their duties, in accordance with this 
and other laws. The king shall be the point of reference for all these 
authorities. 
 
Although the king is the core point of reference, both the Council of Ministers 
and the Consultative Council (known as the Shura Council) also have regulatory 
powers, again in an approach of legislative cooperation.135 
However, the king serves as head of the Council of Ministers, and is free to 
reject or accept the proposals of either body. Hence, despite the consultative ethos, the 
king is the head of the regulatory system, subject, of course, to the ever-pervasive 
need for homogenization with the shari’ah. 
At first glance, the relationship between the king and the ulama appears 
harmonious. In reality, however, there is a complicated dynamic between these two 
sources of law. This dimension of powers between the state and the ulama varies 
according to the area of law in question. For example, 
                                                 
134 Hassan Mahassni and Neal F. Grenley, “Public Sector Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia: 
Procedures and Practices of Saudi Arabia’s Administrative Court,” International Lawyer (ABA) 21, no. 
3 (1987): 829. 
135 Articles 67 through 69 of the Basic Law provide for the relationship between the regulatory bodies. 
Article 67 includes that, ‘This authority exercises its functions in accordance with this law and the laws 
pertaining to the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council.’ Article 68 calls for ‘a 
Consultative Council to be created. Its statute will specify how it is formed, how it exercises its powers 
and how its members are selected.’ Article 69 explains ‘[T]he king has the right to convene the 
Consultative Council and the Council of Ministers for a joint meeting and to invite whoever he wishes 
to attend that meeting to discuss whatever matters he wishes.’ The Council of Ministers is the supreme 
executive organ of the Saudi government but has all of its decisions approved by the king. The Shura 
Council was designed to allow members of civil society to participate in the advisory aspect of 
governance. Shura Council Law, issued by Royal Decree No. A/91, dated 27/8/1412 H (1992),  
http://www.shura.gov.sa/wps/wcm/connect/ShuraEn/internet/Home/ (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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In some areas such as personal law patterns (marriage, divorce, custody of 
children, and inheritance), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is the dominant law. 
The ulama (Muslim jurists) are the interpreters of the law and deliver 
judgments in this area whilst the state sees no reason to involve itself with 
the ulama. Yet in other areas, such as criminal law, there is a kind of shared 
responsibility and power arrangement between the ulama and the king. This 
cooperation is based on the nature of criminal law and procedure under 
Islam. In other areas, such as taxation, immigration, and traffic matters, the 
state is the primary authority.136 
 
Although the king is empowered to make law, the doctrine of siyasa shar’iyya 
provides that when there is conflict between the law of the king and the shari’ah, the 
shari’ah will prevail. It is also true, however, that the ulama are dependent upon the 
regulations of the king for Saudi society to operate effectively and, in turn, for the 
ulama to retain their role. ‘Their world, apparently self-contained, actually can exist 
only in symbiosis with another source or authority for law and its application, the 
king or ruler.’137 In reality, the king has immense discretion to implement regulations 
as he perceives fit for the public good. Texts are irrelevant except insofar as they 
provide a limit of power. The king’s modus operandi of making laws is so far from 
that of the ulama which Vogel has described the siyasa shar’iyya as the virtual 
inverse of the fiqh as a law-making method.138 Naturally, a tension has arisen and this 
is a point to which we shall return in our discussion, prefaced only by Samir Shamma 
noted as early as 1965: 
[T]he fiction is that these regulations serve only to apply and to supplement 
and enforce the shari’ah, and are well within the competence of the political 
authority. This permissive legislation, which started in subsidiary spheres, 
has already acquired wider application. This has led to an unprecedented 
relationship between religious and temporal law.139  
 
                                                 
136 Esmaeili, “On a Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law,”28. 
137 Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 169. 
138 Ibid., 174 
139 Samir Shamma, “Law and Lawyers in Saudi Arabia,” International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 14 (July 1965): 1035. 
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3.5.4 The Introduction of Modern Law into the Saudi Legal 
System 
The introduction of modern legislation into Saudi Arabia began when King 
Abdul Aziz, who ruled from 1932 to 1953, unified the country in its modern form by 
integrating the Hijaz—a settled, mercantile society with a codified Ottoman-style 
legal system—with the Najd and other territories that had more nomadic populations. 
The Commercial Court Law, decreed by the Consultative Council created through the 
Constitution of the Hijaz prior to unification, was a direct translation of the Ottoman 
Commercial Code, and it is still largely in force today, though in a modified form.140 
Continuing from that precedent set at the very outset of settling Saudi Arabia as a 
country, the Council of Ministers has promulgated many regulations, a concept 
foreign to shari’ah, which were inspired by the French legal system. For example, 
regulations for chambers of commerce, customs, mines, ports, public companies, and 
public finance were influenced by the French legal system, as were commercial 
regulations for companies and laws for commercial agencies. The first decree ever 
issued by the king was the Commercial Court Law in 1931.141 That law dealt with the 
issues of bankruptcy, companies, commercial paper, and maritime commerce, as well 
as the establishment of a Commercial Court; Ottoman legislation and French 
precedent influenced the rules in the decree. For more than thirty years, until the 
promulgation of the 1965 Companies Law, the commercial law remained the high 
watermark of law-making outside the realm of the fiqh, and the Commercial Court the 
largest derogation from fiqh jurisdiction.142  
 
3.5.5 The Influence of Egyptian Law Based on French Law 
Generally, Egyptian legal scholars worked closely with their younger Saudi 
counterparts to create the early Saudi commercial laws. These young Saudi scholars 
were trained in Egypt and other areas of the former Ottoman Empire—areas having 
legal systems deeply influenced by the French tradition of civil codes—or were 
trained in Europe. This naturally led the regulations drafted to take a European 
character, and more particularly a French one, even though one might initially assume 
                                                 
140 Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System,, 288. 
141 Ibid.; see Umm al-Qura [The Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] No. 347 (22 Rabi I 
1350/Aug. 7, 1931). 
142 Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 286. 
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that the imperial British influence in the Gulf would have led to a common law 
tradition. However, the common law system was not adopted by Saudi Arabia. Some 
of the reasons behind this are the influence of Egyptian law, which is largely based on 
French law; the fact that common law was never translated into Arabic; and that 
common law entered the region too late to influence Islamic law. In contrast: 
[T]he civil law’s importance as an influence in more modern times is 
explained by the Arab’s need to fill a vacuum. Where Islamic law did not 
provide for forms of business entities suitable for modern commerce, 
France’s code for example did, and Saudi Arabia adopted it.143 
 
The influence of the civil law system of French descent is particularly evident 
in the Saudi Company Law 1965 which copies the Egyptian code, which itself 
imitates the French Company Law.144 
 
The structure of Saudi companies involves sharika musahama (joint stock 
companies, equivalent to the French société anonyme), sharika dhat al-mas’uliyya al-
mahduda (limited liability companies, equivalent to the French société à 
responsabilité limitée), sharika al-tawsiyya al-basita (limited partnerships without 
share capital, equivalent to the French société en commandite simple), and sharika al-
tawsiyya bil-ashum (limited partnerships with share capital, equivalent to the French 
société en commandite par actions).145 
Thabet Koraytem found the structure of French and Saudi companies to be so 
similar that it would be more time consuming to point out differences between the 
two laws than similarities. For example, compulsory models of contracts and an 
obligation to get them authenticated by a notary public exist in Saudi law.146 The 
minimum number of partners in a company limited by shares is five in Saudi Arabia, 
seven in France.147 The regulation does not specify that any company without any of 
the legal forms as given in Article 2 of the Companies Law shall be null and void 
                                                 
143 Joseph L. Brand, “Aspects of Saudi Arabian Law and Practice,” Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 9, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 26. 
144 Maren Hanson, “The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia,” Arab 
Law Quarterly 2, no. 3 (August 1987): 290. Hanson refers to Royal Decree No. M/6, dated 22/3/1385 
H (1966), modified by Royal Decree No. M/14, dated 1397 H (1977). 
145 Thabet Koraytem, “The Islamic Nature of the Saudi Regulations for Companies,” Arab Law 
Quarterly 15 (2000): 64.  
146 Companies Law of 1965, Article 10.  
147 Ibid, Article 48. 
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‘excepting the Islamic types of companies.’148 In practice, however, the shari’ah 
courts do not deal with the structure of Saudi companies, nor have the Islamic types 
of companies ever been articulated.149 Koraytem explains, 
‘Influence’ does not seem to be the right word to describe the similarity 
between Saudi and French laws of companies. The Saudi companies’ 
regulations, especially the 1965 one, seem in fact to have copied almost 
word for word the French law in its version prior to 1996. But some 
elements lead us to think that it also adapted an Islamization of the said 
law.150 
 
Koraytem argues that the real Islamisation occurs in areas that are less 
concrete and difficult to grasp, such as the ‘personalisation’ of relationships 
between partners.151 For example, women may not be appointed as administrators 
of limited partnership or limited liability companies. However, this prohibition does 
not exist for companies limited by shares. Saudi Arabia has a strong tendency to 
personalise relationships in commercial matters, which is demonstrated by the large 
number of mu’assasa, a type of sole proprietorship.152 Although this construct is 
used more frequently by small businesses, some of the largest Saudi companies 
take this format.153 
Examples of the efforts made by the authorities to ensure that Western-style 
laws do not contradict Islamic law can be found in several Saudi laws. The Saudi 
Labour Law is based on the Egyptian Labour Law, but it contains special provisions 
that disregard the presence of men and women in the same workforce and that allow 
for special holidays for the performance of pilgrimage.154 
Intellectual property is another area that has been the subject of Royal Decree 
within recent history. In order to encourage domestic creativity and entrepreneurial 
activity, several regulations have been enacted. 
                                                 
148 Ibid., Article 2. 
149 These ‘companies’ are, in common law terms, partnerships: see, generally, Foster, “Islamic 
Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I,” 13-27. 
150 Koraytem, “The Islamic Nature of the Saudi Regulations for Companies,” 65. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Saudi Labour Law of 2005, Article 4: ‘[W]hen implementing the provisions of this Law, the 
employer and the workers shall adhere to the provisions of shari’ah.’  
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Intellectual property rights are generally honoured in Saudi Arabia, owing to a 
celebrated decision by the Islamic Jurisprudence Council that convened in Makkah in 
1986. The council decided that intellectual property rights fall under the ‘permissive’ 
standards of Islamic interpretative jurisprudence for two reasons.155 First, the Qur’an 
and the traditions of the Prophet do not specifically address intellectual property 
rights. Therefore, by deductive reasoning, it would be considered permissive. Second, 
based upon general premises, it may be concluded that Islamic law supports a 
balanced observation of intellectual property rights. These general premises include 
Islamic law’s advocacy of the promotion of science and doctrine prohibiting unfair 
competition. 
In 1982, Saudi Arabia acceded to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Convention, followed by slower accession to the Paris and Berne 
Conventions in 2004.156 
Another example is the Trademarks Law of 2002.157 Trademarks are a 
valuable part of corporate identity. They are most commonly designed for their 
immediate attention-grabbing icons or acronymic names to better aid memory, 
making them a considerable asset to the company they represent. In this area, the 
Trademarks Law of 2002, which replaced the Trademarks Law of 1984, is of note. 
This law is fairly typical and follows the international classification with a few 
restrictions. Notably, marks that offend the public or morality will not be registered 
and Class 33 of the International Classification regarding wines, liquors, and spirits is 
not recognised, because they are forbidden in Islam.158  
                                                 
155 See Resolutions and Recommendations of the Council of Islamic Fiqh Academy 1985-2000, 
Resolution No. 43, 89; see generally Irshad Abdul Kadir, “Trademark Protection in the United Arab 
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Technology 43, no. 2 (2003): 151–206. 
156 The WIPO Convention was signed in Stockholm on 14 July 1967, entered into force in 1970, and 
was amended in 1979. WIPO is an intergovernmental organization that in 1974 became one of the 
specialised agencies of the United Nations system of organizations. WIPO has two main objectives; the 
first is to promote the protection of intellectual property worldwide. The second is to ensure 
administrative cooperation among the intellectual property unions established by the treaties that 
WIPO administers. World Intellectual Property Organization Convention, 14 July 1967, is summarised 
at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/summary_wipo_convention.html (last visited 25 September 
2012). Note that the convention entered into force in Saudi Arabia on 22 May 1982. 
157 Trademarks Law of 2002, issued by Royal Decree No. M/21, dated 1423 AH (2002). 
158 International Classification of Goods and Services: For the Purposes of the Registration of Marks 
(Nice Classification), 7th ed., WIPO, Geneva 1996, 
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nice/en/pdf/7_textual_part.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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However, the recognition of intellectual property rights in Islamic law is 
subject to certain prohibitions, including the prohibition against uncertainty (gharar) 
and harm.159 Intellectual property laws must ensure that Islamic law is respected. For 
instance, Article 2 of the Trademarks Law of 1984 provides that ‘in implementing the 
provisions of this law, the following shall not be considered trademarks . . . any 
expression, sign or drawing contradictory to the religious rites or which is identical or 
similar to symbols of a purely religious nature.’160 It should be noted, however, that 
Saudi government officials have grown more lenient with restrictions since the 
passage of the new Trademark Law in 2002.161 Similarly, Article 9 of the Patent Law 
states, ‘a patent shall not be granted if the invention itself or its use is contrary to the 
Islamic shari’ah. Any patent granted to the contrary shall be abrogated.’162 
Finally, Saudi law has also followed the French lead by adopting the law 
Governing Bids for Government Procurement, which is a copy of the Egyptian 
translation of French legislation in this area.163 
 
3.6 State Commercial Tribunals 
It is helpful to provide a parallel system of tribunals in which state commercial 
law can be enforced.  
 
3.6.1 Resolving Tension between Law and Shari’ah 
Although the structure of the Saudi legal system and recent legislative 
developments appear to portray the Kingdom as coping solidly with the advent of 
commercial development, a closer examination raises a number of issues that prove 
difficult to reconcile. The first issue is a topic touched upon above and involves the 
dynamic between the ulama and the king, as both parties serve to provide a body of 
rules.164 In an interesting and thoroughly comprehensive study, Vogel observed that 
the shari’ah courts often ignore the nizams: 
                                                 
159 More specifically, there should be no injury to a plaintiff, but if there is an injury, the injury must be 
removed. 
160 Trademarks Law of 1984, Article 2 (b). 
161 Dr. Khalid Al-Nimr, a judge at the Board of Grievances, in discussion with the author, Sept. 16, 
2009. 
162 Patents Law issued by Royal Decree, No. M/38, dated 10/6/1409 H (1989), Article 9. 
163 Government Tenders and Procurement Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M58, dated 4/9/1427 AH 
(1 October 2006); Hanson, “The Influence of French Law,” 289.  
164 Although both ulama and the king play a role in legislation, the king maintains ultimate authority 
over the ulama. For example, the king recently dismissed an alim from his post for challenging the 
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When confronted with a case arising under nizam, the shari’ah court judge 
will do as he himself thinks right. If he thinks that the case is governed by 
the fiqh, he proceeds to decide it according to the fiqh without reference to 
the nizam. If instead he thinks it a proper exercise of siyasa law-making, he 
usually dismisses the case, leaving it for some administrative entity to 
enforce.165 
 
As a consequence of this inherent opposition that the king’s regulations have 
faced from the beginning, the king has adopted an approach of inserting provisions 
within regulations that allow tribunals to enforce his laws.  
Although the classical siyasa shar’iyya authority clearly grants the king the 
exclusive authority to define jurisdictions and to create tribunals, yet the 
ulama have opposed the creating of these tribunals and the attendant 
reduction of their own jurisdiction . . . it seems insincere for the ulama to 
oppose most of the content of these laws and most of the adjudication 
enforcing them when they offer as yet nothing to put in their place.166 
 
In addition, the dichotomy between the ruler and the ulama, characterised by a 
complementary and interdependent relationship, on one the hand, and by 
possessiveness and competition, on the other, has a broader significance on the 
international level because it leads to uncertainty regarding the law. The 
unpredictability of the Saudi court system was one of the main features that the 
present king, as well as his predecessors, has attempted to circumvent with reforms.167 
But it also occurs as a consequence of the Saudi indifference to the rule of precedent. 
Since the shari’ah sources serve as the overriding principle, the preferred approach in 
Saudi law is to analyse disputes on a case-by-case basis. In order to mitigate the risk 
attendant in litigation in the Saudi courts, it is common practice among foreign 
investors to resort to arbitration.168 
                                                                                                                                           
king’s decision to allow the desegregation of men and women in the newly established King Abdullah 
University. 
165 Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, 175. 
166 Ibid., 176-177. 
167 Vogel outlines five ways in which this unpredictability arises with regard to the ulama–ruler 
relationship. Ibid., 177-178.  
168 This fact, and arbitration in general, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
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The state tribunals effectively constitute a second court system, with the result 
being a dual-court system to enforce the dual-legal system. Shari’ah courts have 
general jurisdiction, excepting subjects exempted from their jurisdiction by law. 
Administrative tribunals have jurisdiction over issues as prescribed by their 
constituent decrees.169 As recently as October 1, 2007, two new regulations—the 
Judiciary Law and the Board of Grievances Law—were passed by Royal Decree, 
giving the court system a structural overhaul.170 The shari’ah courts’ substantive 
focus concerns criminal, family, and property matters. Under the new regulation, 
appeals are made from the courts of first instance to the shari’ah court of appeals and 
then to the Supreme Court, which replaced the Supreme Judicial Council. The 2007 
reforms are significant, particularly for the shari’ah court system. Appeals were 
previously not possible and the decisions of the judges were often opaque. The 
Supreme Judicial Council remains in existence but handles only administrative duties 
such as overseeing judicial salaries and appointments. 
 
3.6.2 Dual Systems of Judiciary: The Competent Authority 
Deciding Investment Disputes  
The administrative tribunal court system lies under the umbrella of the Board 
of Grievances and reports directly to the king.171 Formerly, there was a judicial 
institution responsible for the hearing of grievances, the diwan al-mazalim. The board 
grew out of the Islamic tradition of taking complaints directly to the community’s 
leader. It developed gradually, alongside the ordinary courts, as a specialised type of 
dispute resolution body competent to hear disputes between an individual and the 
ruler.172 This concept was revived when the Saudi Board of Grievances was created in 
1955 as an independent tribunal with jurisdiction over disputes to which the Saudi 
Arabian government is a party.173 It was first instituted in Saudi Arabia by King 
Abdul Aziz, who allowed citizens to approach him with a complaint.174 From this 
                                                 
169 Law of the Judiciary, issued by Royal Decree, No. M/64, dated 14/7/1395 H (1975), Articles 5, 26. 
170Law of Judiciary and Law of Board of Grievances, issued by Royal Decree, No. M/78, dated 
19/9/1428 H (30 September 2007). 
171 For information on the Board of Grievances, see Mahassni and Grenley, “Public Sector Dispute 
Resolution in Saudi Arabia,” 827. 
172 See Karl, “Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia,” 147. 
173 Mahassni and Grenley, “Public Sector Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia,” 832. 
174 Ibid., 831. The king also posted at the gate of his palace a lock box to which only he held the key, 
and he allowed anyone to submit grievances against the government. Ibid. Although only signed 
grievances would be investigated, and those found to be false would lead to punishment for the 
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beginning, the Board of Grievances grew into a separate judicial body parallel to the 
shari’ah courts that handled legal matters when one of the parties was a government 
agent, or if the dispute involved commercial fraud. In 1987, the Board of Grievances 
was also given general jurisdiction over commercial disputes between private sector 
parties.175 
Although judgments of the board did not have a binding effect when it was 
first established, a 1982 Royal Decree determined that its rulings would be final and 
binding.176 Therefore, although the board was originally constructed to oversee public 
matters involving litigation against the State, it subsequently became the main forum 
in Saudi Arabia to handle administrative and judicial matters outside of the shari’ah 
courts.177 The 2007 Royal Decree that created the Judiciary Law and the Board of 
Grievances Law re-organised the structure of the Board of Grievances court system. 
One of the main features of this decree was to establish the board as an independent 
administrative judicial commission that is linked directly to the king. Another feature 
was to structure the board into three separate levels: the courts of first instance (the 
administrative courts), the courts of appeal (the administrative courts of appeal), and 
the high court (the High Administrative Court).178 As a result, the court structure is 
undergoing massive reforms to be more focused on its traditional role of adjudicating 
disputes between citizens and the government, similar to the role played by the 
Administrative Court of Egypt or the Conseil d’Etat of France. 
Moreover, there is an Administrative Judicial Council. It is composed of the 
president of the Board of Grievances, the chief of the High Administrative Court, the 
senior vice president of the board, and four judges from the appellate courts who are 
all appointed by Royal Decree.179 This council mirrors the newly fashioned Supreme 
Judicial Court, which serves the shari’ah courts and has a mandate to perform several 
administrative tasks.180 The administrative courts function through a number of 
                                                                                                                                           
complainant, the king took the concept seriously, claiming that ‘anyone who refrains from complaining 
of any injustice at the hands of an official . . . has no one to blame but himself’ Umm al-Qura [Official 
Gazette of Saudi Arabia] 24/10/1344 H (1926). 
175 Yahya A. Al Samaan, Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(Saudi Arabia: Dar Al Andalus: 2000), 221–32. 
176 Royal Decree, No. M/51, dated 1402 H (1982). 
177 See Karl, “Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia,” 131. 
178 Board of Grievances Law, Article 1, 8.  
179 Ibid., Article 4. 
180 Ibid., Article 5. 
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specialised circuits composed of a panel of either one or three judges.181 The 
administrative courts of appeal are also composed of specialised circuit courts and a 
three-judge panel.182 The High Administrative Court also has specialised circuit 
courts, as and when needed, and it is composed of a three-judge panel.183 The High 
Administrative Court consists of a president, who holds the rank of minister, and a 
number of judges, all appointed by Royal Decree on the recommendation of the 
Administrative Judicial Council. It has a General Council, which is presided over by 
the chief of the High Administrative Court and the membership of all member judges. 
The council’s decisions are issued by majority vote and considers cases when the 
chief of the High Administrative Court feels that it is necessary to depart from the 
decision of the same or a different circuit of the court.184 
A number of separate commissions also exist. These commissions include, but 
are not limited to, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) Committee for 
Solving Banking Disputes, the Committee for Stock Market Disputes, the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) Investment Disputes Settlement 
Committee and the Committee for Violations of the Foreign Investment Law, the 
Ministry of Commerce Committee to Combat Commercial Fraud and the Committee 
for Commercial Papers, the Ministry of Labour Commission for Settlements of 
Labour disputes and the Ministry of Finance Commission for Settlement of Customs 
Disputes and Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes. These commissions are 
empowered to adjudicate specific types of disputes and to operate largely 
independently of the administrative and the shari’ah court systems. The establishment 
of multiple commissions was necessary, not only because of the need to ease the 
burden on the courts, but also due to the nature of these disputes where only 
specialists are competent to adjudicate. These specialised tribunals deal with 
commercial law and labour law and are commonly referred to as quasi-judicial 
bodies. 
An interesting case, Jeha v. Arabian American Oil Co., covers the subject of 
forum non conveniens.185 The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas found the quasi-judicial tribunal adjudicating medical malpractice suits, the 
                                                 
181 Ibid., Article 9 (3). 
182 Ibid., Article 9 (1). 
183 Ibid., Article 9 (1). 
184 Ibid., Article 10. 
185 Jeha v. Arabian American Oil Company, 751 F.Supp. 122 (Southern District of Texas 1990).  
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Legal Medical Commission, to be an adequate forum for settling a dispute between 
the plaintiff Jeha and his employer, the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). 
Judge Lynn N. Hughes determined that there was sufficient recourse for redress in 
Saudi Arabia and in Lebanon, as the evidence was located in both states, and that 
there was insufficient connection to the United States.186 
The various commissions apply statutory law, whether it is labour, banking, or 
commercial laws. Nonetheless, rules of Islam are incorporated into the decisions 
made by these commissions, as appropriate. For instance, the Committee for 
Settlement of Banking Disputes Decision No. 1411/241 (1991) concerning the case of 
Crédit Agricole Indosuez (Lausanne) and Banque de la Méditerranée (Paris) v. 
Ameen Al-Hussaini Corporation, Waleed Al-Juffali, Al-Attar Corporation and Yassir 
Trade and Construction Corporation.187 The rules of Islam concerning power of 
attorney were applied, as specified in the Rules of Agency in Islamic Jurisprudence, 
which imply that the power of attorney is only valid for a specified act by the 
grantor.188 Similarly, issues of inheritance and wills may arise in banking transactions 
that must be considered by a shari’ah court before it renders its decision. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The fundamental questions raised in this chapter are whether rules of Islam are 
relevant in the area of investment and trade in Saudi Arabia and whether they pose a 
problem for foreign investors. It was indicated that the Qur’an and the traditions of 
the Prophet form the basic foundation of the Saudi legal system, which is based on the 
Hanbali school, which very often does not allow for much interpretation of legal 
texts. It also demonstrated that Saudi Muslim scholars are hesitant to accept 
codification of the law; thus Saudi law does not contain a civil law code or criminal 
law code. 
While the Saudi Arabian legal system is based on Islam, which is applied in 
its entirety in family law (including marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance), 
the development of commerce, trade, and investment laws took a different path. In 
                                                 
186 Ibid., 24. 
187 Crédit Agricole Indosuez (Lausanne) and Banque de la Méditerranée (Paris) v. Ameen Al-Hussaini 
Corporation, Waleed Al-Juffali, Al-Attar Corporation and Yassir Trade and Construction Corporation, 
Case No. 1409/401 Decision No. 1411/241 (1991) (Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes). 
188 Ibid. 
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contrast to the former, these laws were developed independently of Islamic law, yet 
without contradicting any of the principles or teachings of Islam. 
The creation of Saudi commercial law was greatly influenced by Western-
style law, especially French law. Egyptian law, which itself is based on French law, 
was often used as a model for the relevant secular regulations. These regulations 
cover many areas of interest for foreign investors, such as companies law, labour law, 
and intellectual property law. Nevertheless, as made clear in this chapter, some 
general principles of Islamic law are still relevant and may affect the conduct of 
business in Saudi Arabia. These principles include prohibitions against both riba and 
gharar. Consequently, Islamic finance and banking laws are important for foreign 
investors to understand. In addition, the restrictions regarding the enforceability of 
indefinite, uncertain, or speculative acts may affect the amount of damages 
recoverable in a breach of contract case because the only compensation to which a 
contracting party is entitled is the actual loss. 
These areas of Islamic law are sometimes difficult for foreign investors to 
understand. In fact, Western courts can face difficulties when contracting parties 
chose to follow Islamic law, partly because of the varying interpretations of the 
different schools. These variations may partly be the result of the evolution of new 
commercial concepts that were not known to early Muslim scholars.  
However, it must be noted that Saudi Arabian law is drawn mainly from one 
school of interpretation—the Hanbali school—and the Saudi judicial system, 
especially non-shari’ah tribunals, interpret law in accordance with the general 
principles of commerce and trade laws.  
The next chapter will discuss FDI in Saudi Arabia before the implementation 
of the FIL, with a brief look at the various economic and development plans 
historically applied by the Saudi government. It attempts to answer questions on the 
general principles of FDI, including:  
 To what extent does the newly adopted Saudi law on FDI, the Foreign 
Investment Law of 2000 (FIL), adhere to the various theories of FDI?  
 What are the administrative and legal obstacles that may hinder FDI in 
Saudi Arabia?  
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 How does the FIL, as an important pillar of the Saudi legal framework 
for FDI, conform to the World Bank Guidelines on the treatment of 
FDI? 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Foreign Investment Law of 2000 (FIL), which replaced the earlier 
Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1979 (1979 Law), was enacted as a result of a 
change of policy within the Saudi government. It was influenced by historical 
precedents: a changing global economy, an altered perception of economic 
development within Saudi Arabia, and developments within the international 
economic sphere. The establishment of the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA) to undertake the broad mandate of regulating and managing the 
national investment policy was one step taken by the Saudi Arabian government in 
this direction. 
In order to give the historical context for the enactment of the FIL, this chapter 
presents the various plans set up by the Saudi Arabian government since 1970 and the 
extent of the achievement of the plans’ objectives. It also delineates the Saudi Arabian 
economic situation at the time of the enactment of the FIL. In addition, this chapter 
explores the effectiveness of the FIL in achieving its goals of facilitating the legal and 
administrative aspects of FDI in Saudi Arabia.1 It also considers the contribution of 
the FIL towards the encouragement and attraction of foreign investment; studies the 
existing legal structure of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia; examines the 
structure’s weaknesses; and suggests changes that should be considered in the 
implementation of the enacted law and relevant regulations. 
Over the past three decades, a considerable transformation has occurred in the 
economy of Saudi Arabia, mainly because of the five-year development plans 
introduced by the government. It is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the 
economic development in Saudi Arabia prior to the enactment of the FIL to 
appreciate how it was designed to overcome obstacles that had historically plagued 
the growth of the Saudi economy and posed a hindrance to the application of the 
earlier 1979 law. 
Analysing the five-year economic development plans illustrates several 
reasons for the necessity to enact the FIL in Saudi Arabia. The unemployment rate in 
Saudi Arabia was, and continues to be, very high. Thus, FDI was needed to play a 
                                                 
1 Although the FIL has a very broad coverage, it must be read as one component of a comprehensive 
legal regime that includes the Companies, the Labour, the Income Tax, the Intellectual Property, and 
the Arbitration Laws. See Yahya A. Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia: Dar Al Andalus, 2000), 34.  
 125 
 
role in creating new jobs. Additionally, the FIL was needed in order to reduce the 
country’s dependence on oil revenues and to achieve economic diversification by 
fostering the establishment of non-oil forms of business. This chapter also claims that 
the FIL was also needed to help Saudi Arabia come in line with the global economy. 
Another important reason is that Saudi Arabia joined the WTO, which required 
reforming its existing laws in order to comply with WTO’s international standards. 
Finally, the FIL was needed to encourage the technology transfer and to help FDI 
fund capital expenditure.  
Moreover, this chapter examines how the FIL, as an important pillar of the 
Saudi legal framework for FDI, conforms with the World Bank Guidelines on the 
treatment of FDI, and how Saudi Arabia’s changing attitude towards FDI can be 
explained through various FDI theories. 
 
4.2 Historical Background for the Necessity of Change 
Historically, the Saudi Arabian government tried to insulate its economy from 
foreign influence as much as possible, maintaining national control over all economic 
activities and protecting the interests of local businesses from foreign competition.2 
This continued with the 1979 law, which, to a great extent, restricted entry of FDI. 
The dependency theory can be used to explain this attitude. As a reminder from 
Chapter 2, under this theory, any foreign investment is regarded as harmful to the host 
country’s economy. Thus, this theory provides justifications for countries wishing to 
restrict FDI. 
It should be noted that even when foreign investment was needed in oil-related 
industries to take advantage of the skills and market access of the multinational oil 
and chemical industries, foreign investments have been allowed. However, these 
investments have been controlled through the establishment of joint ventures under 
majority Saudi Arabian ownership in order to limit foreign interference.3 
While the FIL has reversed that policy to a more neo-classical approach, 
which perceived FDI as extremely helpful to developing states, this change can be 
better explained through the middle-path theory, which acknowledges there is a 
                                                 
2 Since the early 1970s, the oil industry has been under majority Saudi Arabian ownership, allowing 
production levels to be determined by the Ministry of Petroleum rather than by multinational oil 
companies. Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (London: Routledge Curzon, 
2004): 43. 
3 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 34. 
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balance between benefits and risks of FDI on a host country.4 In one sense, this 
change is surprising. However, it is in line with the general objectives of each of the 
Kingdom’s five-year plans: economic diversification, reduction of the country’s 
dependence on oil, and economic growth. These are discussed in detail in this chapter.  
Consequently, this chapter begins with an overview of the various economic 
plans implemented by the Saudi Arabian government since 1970, specifically 
examining its five-year plans. An overview is necessary to demonstrate that for 
several decades the Saudi Arabian government attempted to develop and encourage 
its economy, but these efforts were inadequate, necessitating a change in policies and 
laws that resulted in the enactment of the FIL. This chapter analyses the illustrative, 
specific reasons that made the FIL necessary. 
 
4.3 Economic Growth of Saudi Arabia: The Five-Year 
Development Plans 
Over the last four decades, Saudi Arabia’s considerable economic 
transformation has been achieved through extensive government investments within 
the framework of different five-year development plans.5 
The principal objectives of the Saudi government’s economic policy since the 
1970s have been economic diversification, reduction of the country’s dependence on 
oil revenue, and the promotion of sufficient economic growth to ensure satisfactory 
economic opportunities for its citizens.6 
 
4.3.1 The First Development Plan  
The First Development Plan was drafted in 1970. It contained a strategy 
intended to allow Saudi Arabia to preserve its religious and moral values while 
raising the living standards and welfare of its people.7 The basic philosophy 
underlying this strategy was that only through increases in the country’s stock of 
human capital would its citizens have a real opportunity to contribute more efficiently 
                                                 
4 For a general background on the dependency, neo-classical, and middle-path theories, see Chapter 2, 
sections 2.3.1–2.3.3. 
5 Ministry of Economy and Planning, “Plan Achievements,” http://www.mep.gov.sa/ (last visited 25 
September 2012).  
6 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 20. 
7 Ibid., 23. 
 127 
 
to production and to participate fully in the country’s development.8 For those 
reasons, the plan included the ‘development of human resources through an increased 
provision of education.’9 This plan emphasised the diversification of economic 
resources, as this was considered a better alternative to having the petroleum sector 
finance government expenditures.10 Specific objectives were to: raise the gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate, diversify the economy, and reduce the country’s 
dependence on oil. These goals were to be reached by increasing the contribution of 
other productive sectors to the national product, laying the foundation for sustained 
economic growth and human resources development.11 
As government expenditures and the GDP far exceeded the five-year 
projections, the First Development Plan was considered a success.12 However, ‘the 
growth of some crucial sectors fell below plan expectations, in spite of efforts in this 
direction.’13 Thus, the 13.2 per cent GDP growth rate did not reflect the rate of growth 
of the non-oil sector, that is, agriculture and manufacturing. The 11 per cent growth in 
the industrial sector, although substantial, fell short of the plan’s target. This was 
attributed to a strong performance in the private sector and not to satisfactory 
government efforts to achieve industrial growth.14 Some of the other targets of the 
plan were achieved, namely in education and transportation, it was because of rising 
oil revenues rather than good control of resources.15 
 
4.3.2 The Second Development Plan 
 The Second Development Plan (1975–1980) was designed under much more 
favourable conditions than the first plan because of the oil boom that quadrupled oil 
revenues between 1973 and 1974.16 Therefore, the issue became the ability of the 
country to absorb these new revenues by productive investment rather than by 
                                                 
8 Robert E. Looney, Saudi Arabia’s Development Potential: Application of an Islamic Growth Model 
(Lexington:  Lexington Books, 1982): 100. 
9 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 23. 
10 Looney, Saudi Arabia’s Development Potential, 100. 
11 Ragaei El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia, Rush to Development: Profile of an Energy Economy and 
Investment (Baltimore: Croom Helm, 1982): 145. 
12 Ibid., 156. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 23. See also Fath El Rahman Abdalla El Sheikh, 
The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 21. 
16 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 24. 
 128 
 
resource constraint.17 Indeed, since the 1973 increase in oil prices, the major 
economic problem in Saudi Arabia was finding domestic paths that could absorb the 
so-called ‘surplus fund.’18 In fact, among the members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Saudi Arabia was considered to be one of 
those with the lowest absorptive capacity of the economy.19 As noted by Rodney 
Wilson: 
In the case of oil-exporting economies of the 1970s, it was asserted that they 
were acquiring more foreign exchange receipts than could usefully be 
deployed domestically, the policy implication being either the imperative of 
investing surplus funds externally in international financial markets or of 
increasing the absorptive capacity by improving the physical and human 
capital base. A failure to achieve self-sustaining growth may reflect limited 
absorptive capacity, and an increase in the latter may be a precondition for 
such growth.20   
 
The main goal of the second plan was to increase that absorptive capacity.21 
The strategy was to improve and expand the country’s physical infrastructure and to 
diversify the economy through the promotion of non-oil productive activities.22 
Mainly, this was successful: the growth rate and absorptive capacity increased, 
inflation was reduced, and the infrastructure was improved. All these changes were 
achieved in a period of relative social stability. However, in several interviews 
conducted by the author, opinions were expressed that many aspects of this 
development plan was not fully, adequately, or effectively implemented. 
Infrastructure, including water supply and electricity, remained below the 
expectations stipulated in the plan. 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 ‘In development literature the concept of absorptive capacity refers to the ability of countries to 
make productive use of foreign investment flows or aid, which is linked to their existing resource 
endowment and development potential.’ Ibid., 9. 
19 El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia, Rush to Development, 163. 
20 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 9. 
21 The planners targeted four areas of development: heavy investments in the physical infrastructure 
area, preservation of hydrocarbon resources and promotion of energy-intensive industries with high 
export value, improvement of the administration, and encouragement of the private sector and 
diversification of the non-oil sector. Looney, Saudi Arabia’s Development Potential, 105.  
22 Ibid. 
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4.3.3 The Third Development Plan 
The Third Development Plan period (1980–1985) also began under favourable 
conditions. Saudi Arabia was one of the world’s main financial powers and ranked as 
the major oil exporter to the free world. The country’s shortfall in achieving its labour 
goals, caused by the continuing imbalance between the economy’s growing labour 
needs and the number of new Saudis entering the labour force, however, constrained 
development and was the central concern during the third plan.23  
The government contributed to the problem by making great demands on 
Saudi labour, thus reducing the supply of labour available for agriculture and 
industry. The resulting shortage of workers meant that these sectors were not 
considered an effective alternative to the oil industry. The concentration of the 
demand for labour was in the infrastructure sector, in areas that included construction, 
transportation, and distribution. However, these sectors did not contribute much to the 
growth of the GDP.24  
The third development plan’s response to the labour imbalance was to make 
more efficient use of domestic- and foreign-skilled workers in the capital-intensive 
hydrocarbon industries, and to promote the development of minerals other than oil. 
This skilled labour was also used in the agriculture and mining sectors, with the 
objective further diversifying the economy.25  
 
4.3.4 The Fourth Development Plan 
 By the time of the Fourth Development Plan (1985–1990), oil revenues were 
less satisfactory than in the past. As a result, funds to finance investments were cut 
and the emphasis was moved to completing existing projects rather than initiating 
new ventures.26  
Goals of economic diversification and human resources development were 
still important, but the main focus was on stressing the importance of increasing 
economic and administrative efficiency and the development of minerals other than 
oil, although very little success was achieved in the latter objective.27  
                                                 
23 Ibid.,  214–215. 
24 Ibid., 215. 
25 Ibid., 216. 
26 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 25. 
27 Ibid. 
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Planning in the fourth period became even more ineffective because the 
government had relatively fewer resources at its disposal in the mid-1980s. It was 
unable to create a successful policy of replacing non-Saudi workers with local citizens 
in the private sector, except in the banking and financial services fields.28  
 
4.3.5 The Fifth and Sixth Development Plans 
 In the Fifth and Sixth Development Plans (1990–1995 and 1995–2000, 
respectively), the focus was once again on achieving economic diversity, enhancing 
the role of the private sector, improving the education system, and creating more 
employment for Saudis. It can be argued that the trend in oil prices determined the 
different goals of the fifth and sixth plans.29 The fifth plan emphasised the 
consolidation of the country’s defences, the improvement of government social 
services, and the creation of increased private–sector opportunities for Saudis by 
reducing the number of foreign workers. Resolution No. 50, which was passed in 
1994, required any company with more than twenty employees to be comprised of no 
less than five per cent Saudis, a requirement that was raised to ten per cent in 1999.30 
However, lower oil revenues between 1995 and 2000 prompted the planners of the 
sixth development plan to once again call for the reduction of the country’s 
dependence on oil by diversifying its economic activities. Subsequently, both plans 
demonstrate how the government was unable to control an economy almost 
exclusively dependent on international oil prices.31  
 
4.3.6 The Seventh Development Plan 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000–2004) continued to focus on greater 
economic diversification, creation of a more substantial private sector in the Saudi 
economy, and goals for growth and additional jobs. The Saudi government aimed for 
an average GDP growth rate of 3.16 per cent per year, with projected growth of 5.04 
                                                 
28 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 25. 
29 Beginning in late 1997, Saudi Arabia faced the challenge of low oil prices. Because of a combination 
of factors, such as the East Asian economic crisis, a warm winter in the West caused by El Niño, and 
an increase in the production of oil in non-OPEC countries, the demand for oil slowed dramatically and 
oil prices fell by more than one-third. Global Tenders, “Economy of Saudi Arabia,” 
http://www.globaltenders.com/economy-saudi-arabia.htm (last visited 25 September 2012).  
30 Council of Ministers Decision No. 50, dated 21/04/1415 AH (27 September 1994); see Library of 
Congress, Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: Saudi Arabia 2006,”  
lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Saudi_Arabia.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012).  
31 Ibid. 
 131 
 
per cent for the private sector and 4.01 per cent for the non-oil sector. The 
government also set a target of creating 817,000 additional jobs for Saudi nationals.32 
However, unemployment in Saudi Arabia remained high due to ineffective 
implementation of the plan in addition to poor education system that continues to 
adhere to traditional standards and relies on old methodologies, despite the high level 
of attendance at universities and colleges. 
 
4.3.7 The Eighth Development Plan 
 The Eighth Development Plan (2005–2009) set several priorities, including: 
improving living standards for Saudi citizens, providing job opportunities, and 
expanding education and technological sciences. In addition, the plan took into 
consideration ‘the fast momentum of global economic and technological 
developments, diversification of the economic pace and improving productivity and 
boosting competitiveness of the national economy.’33 The plan also emphasised 
privatization as a strategic objective, which is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.3.8 The Ninth Development Plan 
The Ninth Development Plan (2010–2014) was created after extensive 
analysis of the country’s economic and social aspects. Another goal is once again to 
increase private sector participation in the economy.34 This plan is based upon five 
themes:  
[E]nhancing and intensifying efforts to improve citizens’ standard of living 
and promote their quality of life . . . development of national manpower and 
increasing their employment . . . balanced development among regions of the 
Kingdom . . . structural development . . . [and] raising the competitiveness of 
the national economy and national product.35   
                                                 
32 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 27. 
33 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Economy and Planning, “Preface,” in The Eighth 
Development Plan (2009).  
http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=F10517A331ECFB62E23FC9417D23DEB8.beta?event=
ArticleView&Article.ObjectID=3 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
34  See Mohamed A. Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievement, and Challenges, 
2nd ed., (New York: Springer, 2010), 25. Ramady also summarises the main objectives of the five-year 
development plan, 26. 
35 Ministry of Economy and Planning, Brief Report on the Ninth Development Plan (2010–2014), 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=BF1A46968AFCAB21DF10712B3DEA47E4.alfa?event=
ArticleView&Article.ObjectID=80 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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In light of development plans and because of restrictions which are discussed 
in this chapter, the environment before the FIL consisted mainly of investments 
nearly entirely in the form of joint ventures. The investments were largely limited to 
the oil and gas sectors and other petroleum-related activities.36 Between 1980 and 
1989, the share of petroleum-related investments in the total volume of foreign 
investment in Saudi Arabia was 94.73 per cent.37 As discussed above, over the course 
of the 1990s, the Saudi government undertook various steps to attract investment into 
other sectors of the economy in an effort to achieve greater economic diversification. 
As a result, between 1990 and 1998, the share of petroleum-related investments 
declined to 52.55 per cent of the total investment, while investments in other 
industries increased from 5.27 per cent to 47.45 per cent.38 Among the industries that 
attracted the highest share of investment were the electric manufacturing and the food 
and beverage industries. Their combined share grew to 25.54 per cent of total 
investment in Saudi Arabia.39 
 
4.4 Reasons for the Enactment of the FIL  
There are many reasons why the enactment of the FIL was necessary. As 
already noted, high unemployment rates, dependence on oil revenues, and increased 
globalisation all played a part in the changing attitude towards foreign investment in 
Saudi Arabia.  
As demonstrated in the history of the five-year development plans, the 
reduction of Saudi Arabia’s dependence on oil has always been at the forefront of the 
economic agenda. However, the constant presence of economic diversification among 
the goals of the nine development plans indicates that this result has never been 
effectively achieved. In fact, with oil revenues constituting nearly 90 to 95 per cent of 
total Saudi export earnings, 70 to 80 per cent of state revenues, and 40 per cent of the 
country’s GDP, Saudi Arabia’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil, although 
                                                 
36 Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), a joint service of the International Finance 
Corporation and the World Bank, “Saudi Arabia: Administrative Barriers to Investment” (Unpublished 
Report, March 2002), 2 section 6. 
37 Ibid., 3 section 7, which offers statistics provided by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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investments in petrochemicals have increased the relative importance of the 
downstream petroleum sector in recent years.40 
Thus the attempt, by the enactment of the FIL and other measures, to achieve 
economic diversification by fostering the establishment of non-oil forms of business 
is understandable. This aim derives not so much from a need to reduce the country’s 
dependence on an exhaustible resource, but from the uncertainty regarding future oil 
prices and the level of world demand for oil. According to the Minister of Oil, Ali Al-
Naimi, the Kingdom currently has reserves of some 260 billion barrels of oil and 
there is a potential for an additional 200 billion barrels.41 Saudi Arabia has reserves 
sufficient to sustain its current production of eight million barrels per day, or even 
higher production levels, for the next nine decades.42 However, oil prices are volatile 
and technological development has already led to the substitution of other fuels for 
oil, a trend that is set to continue.43 Saudi Arabia’s efforts at diversification are, 
therefore, best viewed as a ‘risk-reduction economic strategy.’44  
Nearly three-fourths of Saudi Arabia’s revenue is still derived from oil and 
state finances are extremely vulnerable to oil prices, thus one of the main weaknesses 
of the government continues to be its inability to secure any degree of independence 
from oil income. As a result, Saudi Arabia has experienced nearly two decades of 
heavy budget and trade deficits, with total government debt approaching almost 100 
per cent of Saudi GDP.45 The reduction in oil prices after 2000 resulted once again in 
a serious fall in Saudi Arabia’s government revenue and a consequent fiscal deficit.46 
A favourable FDI environment, with strong incentives for the creation of new 
enterprises, could extend the tax base of Saudi Arabia’s government and reduce its 
deficit. 
The government has acknowledged that the economic structure of the world is 
increasingly globalised. In November 1999, King Fahad stated, ‘[T]he world is 
                                                 
40 See U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Saudi Arabia Energy Oil Information,” EIA (June 
2002), http://www.unitedstatesaction.com/eia-june-2001-oil.htm (last visited 25 September 2012). 
41 CBS News. “Saudi Arabia Bullish on Oil’s Future,” 60 Minutes, interview with Lesley Stahl, 7 
December 2008, transcript,  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/05/60minutes/main4650223.shtml (last visited 25 September 
2012). 
42 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 46–47. 
43 Ibid., 47. 
44 Ibid., 8. 
45 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Saudi Arabia Energy Oil Information.” 
46 To control public expenditure, the cabinet decided to restrict salary increases for all government 
employees and to halt the creation of new permanent jobs in government ministries. Wilson, Economic 
Development in Saudi Arabia, 31. 
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heading for . . . globalization . . . [and] it is no longer possible for [Saudi Arabia] to 
make slow progress.’47 Clearly, then, Saudi Arabia recognises the importance of 
being in conformity with the progressively uniform global economy and reacting to 
the pressure from the Gulf Cooperation Countries, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and Saudi Arabia’s Western partners for reductions in protectionism.48 The 
country’s response consists of economic liberalisation that enhances the role of the 
private sector and gives only a supportive role to the government, which is only 
responsible for providing a positive environment for private sector activity.49 
In light of this new trend, the Saudi leadership has indicated that privatisation 
is a ‘strategic choice’ and that the economic policy of the country is based on the 
concept of a free economy and a free market for capital, goods, services, and 
products.50 The correlation between FDI and privatisation in Saudi Arabia is 
investigated in Chapter 5. In consideration of these new views and reforms, the 
enactment of the FIL can also be explained as a means to open Saudi markets further 
and to integrate the country into the global economy. 
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in 2005, a move that was actively 
pursued by the Ministry of Commerce.51 SAGIA, the government agency responsible 
for licensing foreign investment projects,52 believes that Saudi Arabia’s accession to 
the WTO will open more prospects for large investment flows as the country further 
liberalises trade and investment regimes.53 One may note, however, that there is still a 
lack of understanding of the mechanisms of the WTO and of the necessity to continue 
reforms beyond those that are required for WTO accession. Therefore, the FIL, along 
with other elements of the FDI framework, is essential to Saudi Arabia’s accession to 
the WTO. For example, the monopoly control of major export industries by the Saudi 
Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) is considered an obstacle to fair and 
transparent international competition.54  
                                                 
47 U.S. Energy Information Administration “Saudi Arabia Energy Oil Information.” 
48 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 7. 
49 Ibid., 126. 
50U.S. Energy Information Administration “Saudi Arabia Energy Oil Information.” 
51 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 34; see also U.S. Energy Information 
Administration “Saudi Arabia Energy Oil Information.” 
52 SAGIA’s mission and mandate is discussed later in this chapter. 
53 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Mobilizing Investment for 
Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region,” Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey, 11–12 February 2004, 2. 
54 According to its website, SABIC is ‘one of the world’s leading manufacturers of chemicals, 
fertilizers, plastics and metals.’ See Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation, “Our Company,” 
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Another factor that necessitated promotion of FDI was the government’s 
inability to generate the capital necessary to fund a significant expansion of its 
manufacturing industry and infrastructure without increasing its debt burden.55 As 
noted by Wilson, ‘an alternative would [have been] to raise capital for new ventures 
on the local stock market, but investors would have been reluctant to risk their capital 
without the reassurance of there being a foreign partner involved who was 
experienced in the field.’56 Meanwhile, foreign investors were previously unable to 
invest in the Saudi stock market. That changed with a decision by the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) in September 2008, which made it possible for foreigners to enter 
the market through swap agreements with authorised local firms.57 
Finally, it is important to note the dualistic nature of the Saudi economy. On 
the one hand, there are well-paid jobs for a minority of Saudi citizens but, on the other 
hand, there is work paying as little as SR 600 (US$160) per month.58 Transforming a 
dual-economic structure into a more integrated economy is a difficult task, and 
apparently there has been a degree of governmental failure in achieving equilibrium 
within the labour market.59 A policy of promoting FDI would help reduce this 
discrepancy, in the sense that it would contribute to the creation of more jobs and, as a 
result, to a more even distribution of income. This concern might have been one of 
the reasons for the enactment of the FIL. 
A legal framework that fosters FDI might also be useful in another respect. 
Government policy has failed to ensure that the supply-side of the domestic economy 
                                                                                                                                           
http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/default.aspx (last visited 25 September 2012); note 
also that there have been disputes with the European Union over feedstock pricing for petrochemical 
exports, which could have been resolved through benchmarking if alternative foreign-owned industries 
had existed in Saudi Arabia. Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 34. 
55 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 34. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Gordon Platt, “Global Finance, Emerging Markets: Saudi Market Opens to Foreign Investors” 
(October 2008),  
http://www.gfmag.com/archives/30-oct2008/781-emerging-markets-middle-east-dubai-international-
financial-center-business-is-growing-the-opening-of-saudi-arabias-stock-exchange-the-largest-in-the-
arab-world-to-investors-from-outside-the-gulf-cooperation-council-gcc-couldnt-have-come-at-a.html 
(last visited 25 September 2012). See also Saudi Gazette, “Tadawul swap deals prelude to foreign 
direct investment,”  
http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2008090516370 (last 
visited 25 September 2012). 
58 See, generally, Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 37.  
59 Ibid., 37-38. As a matter of fact, oil-rich countries should be distributive states in the sense that an 
important function of the state is to redistribute oil revenue, which gives the government the power of 
patronage. However, this function often means winning the support of influential groups rather than 
adopting policies that might help the poorer sections of society. Income redistribution policies might 
undermine political support, especially where the higher income group includes many people 
belonging to the royal family. Ibid., 16. 
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responds adequately to the demands of an ever-increasing population. Indeed, 
demographic pressure can become an advantage if domestic market expansion 
becomes the major engine of growth.60 In this way, flows of expenditure abroad 
should decrease over time as the economy grows. However, this process must be 
measured in decades rather than in years, and globalisation may slow down the 
process because ‘Saudi Arabian consumers increasingly demand the same goods as 
their Western counterparts, goods that cannot be supplied locally.’61 
 
4.5 Objectives of the FIL 
Having established the necessity of a favourable legal framework to promote 
and assist the growth of the Saudi Arabian economy, it is important to discuss the 
current objectives of the Saudi investment policy. These correspond to the issues 
already discussed. Saudi Arabia is both a significant capital-exporting country and a 
major capital-importing country, and includes among its main objectives, as defined 
by SAGIA, increasing and diversifying the sources of national income, creating 
employment opportunities for Saudis, encouraging technology transfer, and 
improving the quality of services and products delivered to the local population.62 All 
of those goals can be translated into long-term objectives of ‘diversifying the 
economy, creating world-class infrastructure, building a strong private sector, and 
creating employment.’63 In addition, new sources of investment capital must be 
found.64 Given the near total dependence of the Saudi economy on revenues from the 
export of crude oil, this objective became particularly apparent following the drop in 
oil prices in the late 1990s. Thus, it became imperative for the government to 
                                                 
60 Ibid.,, 38. 
61 Ibid., 37. 
62 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 21; see, generally, Saudi Arabia 
General Investment Authority, Executive Rules (2000) (SAGIA Executive Rules). Article 3 of the rules 
provides as follows: ‘The [state investment] policies [in Saudi Arabia] shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, the following objectives: Increase of national income and diversification of its sources; 
Transfer and domestic consolidation of technology; Developing exports; Development of local 
resources and the creation of sound employment opportunities for Saudi nationals; Strengthening of 
competition, improvement of services and products and broadening of choices for consumers; 
Investment integration in the Kingdom; Utilization of comparative advantages enjoyed by the 
Kingdom and its regions; Determination of investment strategic implications and priorities; Respect for 
the environment in relation to investment projects.’  
63 World Bank-FIAS, 2 section 5. SAGIA requested that the World Bank assess the investment climate 
in Saudi Arabia. Although the existence of the report is public knowledge, access to the report in Saudi 
Arabia is not possible, as the authorities refuse to disclose it due to its criticism of the Saudi investment 
climate. The author obtained the report from a contact in SAGIA. 
64 Ibid. 
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introduce diversification from oil to non-oil industries and to broaden the economy 
from one based on oil to one that includes non-oil producing industries, including 
those industries that use the derivatives of oil and natural gas.65 Although the country 
has managed to achieve a certain degree of diversification, manifested primarily 
through a giant industrial and export-oriented petrochemical industry, this objective 
remains largely an unfinished agenda.66 
 
4.5.1 Creating Jobs for Saudi Nationals 
As mentioned in this chapter, reducing the unemployment rate is of vital 
importance to the Saudi government. It is unsurprising, therefore, that a major 
objective of the Saudi foreign investment policy is to create more jobs for Saudi 
nationals, particularly as the Ministry of Economy and Planning estimated the rate of 
unemployment among Saudis to be 10 per cent in 2008.67 However, some reports put 
the overall unemployment figure much higher, at 25 per cent.68 
Between 1974 and 1992, the country experienced rapid population growth, 
more than tripling from approximately 7 million in 1974 to nearly 28.38 million in 
2011—a more rapid growth than almost any other nation.69 Major factors in this 
growth are increasingly high birth rates and a rapidly declining infant mortality from 
the 1970s and 1980s. This explosion has created such large numbers of Saudi Arabian 
citizens seeking to enter the workforce that youth unemployment is very high.70 The 
youth unemployment rate continues growing, to 28.2 per cent, ranking it seventeenth 
                                                 
65 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 41. 
66 Ibid., 21. 
67 Ministry of Economy and Planning, “Manpower and Labour Market,” in The Ninth Development 
Plan, 175. 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/themes/GoldenCarpet/index.jsp;jsessionid=8C6090DB54EB44B907CE05B6F
843671A.alfa (last visited 25 September 2012). 
68 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Unemployment Rate: Country Comparison to the World,” in 
CIA World Factbook 2012,  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
69 Ministry of Economy and Planning, “Population and Standard of Living,” in The Ninth Development 
Plan, 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=3AFA907046FA732B38AB623FD7D9AD47.alfa?event=
ArticleView&Article.ObjectID=79 (last visited 25 September 2012); see “Economic Indicators.” Ibid.  
According to the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, it was projected that the average annual future 
population growth rate would be 2.1 per cent, which could give rise to 31.6 million citizens by 2020, 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Forty-Sixth Annual Report, The Latest Economic 
Developments, 1431 H (2010), 215. 
http://sama.gov.sa/sites/SAMAEN/ReportsStatistics/ReportsStatisticsLib/5600_R_Annual_EN_2010_1
1_14.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012).  
70 Wilson, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, 2. 
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globally for youth unemployment.71 This situation necessitates a continuously 
increasing economic growth rate in order to create jobs for new generations, which is 
a serious challenge for the government. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, FDI can positively affect domestic employment 
through direct and indirect spillover effects.72 On the one hand, it is understandable 
that the Saudi government wishes to attract more FDI to play a role in providing the 
country with a much-needed source of employment. On the other hand, in recent 
years the Saudi government has adopted what it calls ‘Saudization,’ or replacing 
foreigners with nationals, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
4.5.2 Encouraging Technology Transfer 
 Technology transfer is one of the main objectives of the Saudi investment 
policy, which, it is hoped, will eventually lead to a Saudi-based technology industry. 
In fact, Article 3 of the Saudi Executive Rules explicitly states that one of the 
objectives of the state investment policy is the ‘transfer and domestic consolidation of 
technology.’73 The flow of foreign investment means the flow of technology and the 
building of infrastructure facilities. As recognised by the World Bank Guidelines, 
discussed in Chapter 2: 
[A] greater flow of foreign direct investment brings substantial benefits to 
bear on . . . the economies of developing countries in terms of improving the 
long-term efficiency of the host country through greater competition, transfer 
of capital, technology and managerial skills and enhancement of market 
access.74 
 
Unlike trade in goods, where developing countries try to acquire whatever 
information they can from imported products and services or try to import capital 
goods that embody modern technology, FDI involves explicit trade in technology. By 
encouraging FDI, Saudi Arabia hopes to import efficient foreign technology that may 
                                                 
71 CIA, “Unemployment, youth ages 15-24: Country Comparison to the World,” in CIA World 
Factbook 2012. In comparison to other countries, Qatar’s youth unemployment rate was 1.6 per cent; 
Pakistan 7.7 per cent; United Arab Emirates 12.1 per cent; and Egypt 24.8 per cent. Ibid. 
72 For an overview of the employment spillover effects on the host country, see Chapter 2, section 
2.6.2.5 
73 SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 3. 
74 World Bank, “Preamble,” in World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment 
(1992). 
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positively affect local firms that will then adopt the transferred technology through 
imitation or labour turnover.75 These spillovers, or technology diffusion, should have 
a positive effect on the local economy in the country. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that technology diffusion into host countries is not automatic; it requires 
adequate levels of human capital base to absorb technology.76 
 
4.5.3 Meeting the Requirements for World Trade Organization 
Membership 
 Saudi Arabia was required to open its markets to global business as a 
prerequisite for facilitating its admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO).77 
This liberalization of trade barriers is required by the WTO, which calls for 
conducting trade based on non-discriminatory treatment between nationals and 
foreigners and reducing any restraint on the movement of goods.78 The Saudi 
government had to reduce subsidies on some products, privatise public-sector 
companies, reduce tariffs, modify commercial laws, protect intellectual property 
rights, change the sponsorship rule, and allow foreigners to own property. Joining the 
WTO also necessitated a significant change in investment rules. Uprooting the 
protectionist traditions of the existing general rules of trade and investment had to be 
undertaken for Saudi Arabia to be in compliance with the WTO. ‘Saudi Arabia had to 
make major commitments on several trading issues and domestic reforms.’79 
However, while many laws were changed to meet the specific requirements for WTO 
                                                 
75 Labour turnover occurs when employees of a multinational firm start their own local businesses or 
leave to work at local firms. 
76 See Chapter 2, section 2.6.2 for a detailed discussion of spillover benefits. 
77 It should be noted that the Middle East has been slow to embrace the free trade principles of the 
WTO. Nevertheless, in 1997, the Arab league launched the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, which seeks 
to eliminate all tariffs between Arab countries by 2001. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was the last 
Gulf country to join the WTO, which it did in December 2005. For a discussion of the WTO and Saudi 
Arabia, see, generally, Susan Sakmar, “Bringing Energy Trade into the WTO: The Historical Context, 
Current Status, and Potential Implications for the Middle East Region,” Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 18 (2008) 89-111. 
78 According to WTO Article I, ‘With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect 
to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all 
matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties.’ 
79 See Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 299. Ramady summarises the steps that Saudi Arabia had 
to follow to become a member of the WTO. Ibid., 299–300.  
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accession, the implementation of these laws in practice is lacking. In other words, the 
main concern was to comply formally with WTO requirements rather than to respond 
to necessary economic and social changes that warrant genuine legal reform. As 
expressed by a senior Saudi banker,  
Definitely joining the WTO has been the motivator of some of the positive 
changes here, because people believe Saudi Arabia is a mature economy, but it 
needs to be a fully fledged member of the international economy for 
economic, social and, I guess, political reasons.80 
 
4.5.4 Enhancement of Multi- and Bilateral Trade Agreements 
In addition to its membership in the WTO, Saudi Arabia is also party to 
several multilateral investment agreements: the Unified Agreement for Investment of 
Arab Capital in Arab Countries of 1981; the Agreement for Promotion, Protection, 
and Guarantee of Investments among Member States of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference of 1981; the Agreement on the Establishment of the Inter-Arab 
Investment Guarantee Corporation of 1970; the Agreement on the Establishment of 
the Inter-Islamic Investment Guarantee Corporation (1992); the Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States of 1965; and the Convention on the Creation of the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985.81 
However, until recently, the government of Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to 
enter into bilateral investment treaties (BITs)82 with the home countries of foreign 
investors, even when such countries’ perception was that the investment climate in 
Saudi Arabia was relatively stable.83 Nevertheless, lately there has been a shift of 
policy, advocated by local Saudi businesses wishing to participate in joint ventures 
with foreign companies in Saudi Arabia and to invest abroad. Thus, between 1995 
and 2012, the country has negotiated various BITs with countries such as Australia, 
Austria, China, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, and Taiwan, which all provide for the 
most-favoured-nation treatment ‘in the areas of management, maintenance, 
                                                 
80 Caroline Montagu, interview with a senior Saudi banker at the United Kingdom Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), in “Saudi Arabia: On the Road to Reform” (June 2001): 5. 
81 See Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 82–83. 
82 For a general background on BITs, see Chapter 2, section 2.8.2. 
83 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 28. 
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enjoyment, and other activities related to investment.’84 As of late 2012, Saudi Arabia 
also signed treaties on avoidance of double taxation with Austria, China, India, Italy, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, South Africa, 
Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.85 
A typical BIT agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and a foreign country 
calls upon both parties to encourage to the fullest extent possible investment by the 
other party in a fair and just manner and with preferable treatment. The agreement 
also provides for investment guarantees, including a prohibition against 
misappropriation or nationalization, except in accordance with international 
standards, especially just, effective, and adequate compensation. The agreement 
finally allows for arbitration as a means of dispute settlement that will be binding on 
parties, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.86 
 
4.6 Administrative and Legal Obstacles Preventing 
Implementation of the Foreign Investment Policy 
With those goals in mind, the government of Saudi Arabia has embarked on a 
policy of encouraging foreign investment. As discussed earlier, since 1974 the 
country ‘has launched successive five-year plans in which it has allocated billions of 
dollars for infrastructural development to prepare its free economy for the desired 
industrialization,’ thus attracting foreign firms with the needed technology and 
expertise.87 Nevertheless, a number of administrative and legal obstacles prevented an 
effective implementation of the foreign investment policy. Among these obstacles 
were the lack of equal treatment for foreign investors and domestic business entities, 
the lengthy and cumbersome investment approval process, the prohibition on full 
foreign ownership of investment enterprises, the lack of a right to own real property, 
and the sponsorship requirements for foreign investors and their expatriate 
employees. These administrative and legal obstacles are discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 150. 
85 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance, The Government’s Agreements,  
http://www.mof.gov.sa/English/DownloadsCenter/Pages/Agreements.aspx (last visited 25 September 
2012). See also United Nations Treaty Collection databases, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
86 See Chapter 6, section 6.5.5 
87 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 21. 
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4.7 The Adoption of the FIL 
To strengthen the positive trend in diversifying its economy and to create a 
more investor-friendly climate, Saudi Arabia took a major step on 10 April 2000, 
when it adopted the FIL, which replaced and liberalized the 1979 Law.88 The 
adoption of the FIL indicated a significant shift in the country’s foreign investment 
policy. 
The FIL covers the following issues:  
 Forms of foreign investment enterprises, 
 Sectors of investment, 
 Licensing of foreign investment projects, 
 Investment incentives and guarantees, 
 Duties of the investor, 
 Penalties for violation of the provisions of the FIL, 
 Dispute settlement mechanisms, and  
 Formation and functions of SAGIA under the auspices of the Supreme 
Economic Council.89  
 
Many of these issues were not mentioned in the 1979 Law. Consequently, the FIL, 
which is aimed at encouraging and attracting foreign investment while removing 
obstacles, is seen as being ‘in direct contrast to the [1979 Law] . . . which restricted 
foreign capital investment to certain narrowly defined economic sectors.’90 The FIL 
represents an important ‘attempt to address market liberalization, transparency in 
government approval processes, and judicial reforms.’91 
The private sector’s response to the FIL has been overwhelming. Under the 
1979 Law, over the course of twenty-one years, there were 1,609 operating joint 
ventures, with total finance amounting to SR178.5 billion (US$50 billion). During the 
first three years following the passage of the FIL, there were 1,864 newly licensed 
                                                 
88 For a comparison of the main features of the FIL and the 1979 law, see Ramady, The Saudi Arabian 
Economy, 341.   
89 FIL, Articles 2-5 and 9-16. 
90 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 22. 
91 World Bank-FIAS, 153 section 675. 
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projects amounting to SR3.65 billion (US$13.71 billion)92; and by 2008, the total 
amount of FDI reached $38.15 billion. It is worth mentioning however, that the 
inflows of FDI into Saudi Arabia declined to $US28.1billion in 2010 and to $US16.4 
billion in 2011.93 According to SAGIA’s 2011 Annual Report of FDI into Saudi 
Arabia, 808 foreign companies and establishments entering Saudi Arabia in 2010 
were classified as greenfield investments.94 
Moreover, ‘the traditional investment pattern of joint ventures is changing to 
allow the complete foreign ownership of investment projects.'95 For instance, in 
December 2003, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) signed a significant 
investment agreement with Tihamah Company, a subsidiary of the International 
Power–Saudi Oger Consortium. According to the agreement, Tihamah Company will 
build, finance, and operate industrial facilities for the co-generation of electricity and 
steam at four important Aramco operating sites in the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia. Under this build–operate–own–transfer (BOOT) model, the ownership of 
these projects will be transferred to Aramco on expiration of the agreement’s 20-year 
term. The projects are expected to produce more than 1,000 kilowatts of electricity 
and more than 4 million pounds of steam per hour. The projects’ total value exceeds 
SR2 billion (US$7.5 billion).96  
 
                                                 
92 Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA), “A Comparison between the Provisions of 
Old and New Foreign Investment Laws in Saudi Arabia,”  
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/agora/images/docs/radE8BABPresentation_e%20Investment%20Law.ppt 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
93 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “World Investment Report 
2012,” http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf (last visited 25 September 
2012), 171. 
94 Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA), “Annual Report of FDI into Saudi Arabia 
2011,” 12 November 2011, National Competitiveness Center, 
http://www.saudincc.org.sa/getattachment/47de8ea3-c4a3-47f9-bb54-22344f2610ce/IFC-World-Bank-
Doing-Business.aspx, 2 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
95 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 23. 
96 See Muhammad Al-Harbi, “Saudi Aramco Signs Investment Agreement,” Arab News (21 December 
2003), http://www.arabnews.com/node/241924 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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4.8 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority: The 
Agency Responsible for Foreign Investment Policy 
Established under the FIL, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA) is the only government agency responsible for licensing foreign investment 
projects.97 This is a significant shift in Saudi policy that deserves attention.  
SAGIA replaced the Foreign Capital Investment Commission, which was part 
of the Ministry of Industry (which itself was previously the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity).98 The commission was limited to advising the Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity on foreign investment applications, examining the complaints submitted by 
foreign investors, and recommending penalties to be imposed on any project in 
violation of the investment legislation. Unlike its predecessor, SAGIA has broad 
authority over the investment policies of the country.99 Thus, SAGIA is responsible 
for designing the country’s investment policies and strategies that promote local and 
foreign investment and improve the general investment climate.100 It may also 
‘suggest the elimination of, or modification to, administrative procedures that 
negatively impact an investor’s ability to set up and operate a business in the 
Kingdom.’101  
Saudi Arabia was ranked in the “World Investment Report 2010,” published 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), among 
the top ten countries attracting foreign investment.102 It was the goal of the Saudi 
government to reach this ranking by 2010, a strategy called ‘10x10.’103 Saudi 
Arabia’s 10x10 Program examined ten areas affecting businesses: (1) starting a 
business, (2) dealing with construction permits, (3) employing workers, (4) 
registering properties, (5) getting credit, (6) protecting investors, (7) paying taxes, (8) 
                                                 
97 See, generally, the website of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, 
http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited 25 September 2012). 
98 See 1979 Law, Article 5. 
99 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 47. 
100 See Statute for Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAIGA), issued by Royal Decree, No. 
20, dated 5/1/1421 (10 April 2000); SAIGA Statute Articles 3(1)–(2); see also SAGIA Executive 
Rules, Article 4. 
101 World Bank-FIAS, 153 section 674 
102 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “World Investment Report 
2010”, 4, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2010_en.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
103 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, The Competitiveness Review, National 
Competitiveness Center (January 2009),  
http://www.sagia.gov.sa/Documents/General_pack/NCC_Report.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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trading across borders, (9) enforcing contracts, and (10) closing a business.104 
However, one may question the merits of the program and whether it is genuinely 
affecting FDI, as thus far there is a lack of any tangible results regarding the ten 
indicators.105 
In addition to implementing the 10x10 Program, SAGIA has ‘the right to 
monitor the implementation of the provisions of the [FIL and implementing 
regulations and] to examine records and all documents relating to the investment 
activity.’106 It is required to ‘provide all those interested in investment with all 
necessary information, clarification and statistics, together with all services and 
procedures to facilitate and accomplish all matters pertaining to the investments.’107 
To carry out this broad purpose, it is charged with being a ‘one-stop shop’—a single 
agency that handles all the steps to facilitate the establishment and operation of all 
investment projects in Saudi Arabia. SAGIA may also impose penalties on foreign 
investors violating the provisions of the FIL108; foreign investors may appeal a 
decision to imposed penalties, first to SAGIA’s Board of Directors and, if that is 
unsuccessful, to the Board of Grievances.109 
SAGIA is responsible for ‘coordinating and cooperating with the pertinent 
governmental bodies to enable the Authority to accomplish its mission.’110 To achieve 
this goal, SAGIA’s staff members include full-time representatives from all 
government agencies who are involved in investment decision-making and who 
provide the foreign investors with assistance related to post-licensing procedures.111 
In particular, SAGIA’s Board of Directors consists of one representative from each of 
the ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Industry, Agriculture, Water, 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Finance and National Economy, Planning, and 
Labour and Social Affairs; one representative from the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
                                                 
104 Ibid. 
105 Saudi Arabia dropped out of the top ten countries attracting FDI in 2011, falling to twelfth place. 
UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2012,” 29. 
106 See the Executive Rules of the Foreign Investment Law of 2000, Article 20 (FIL Executive Rules); 
see also SAGIA Statute, Article 3(3); SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 5. 
107 FIL, Article 10. 
108 Those penalties may include withholding investment benefits, imposing a fine in an amount up to 
SR500,000 (around US$133), or revoking the foreign investment license. Ibid., Article 12(2). 
Specifically, SAGIA may revoke a foreign investment license when a foreign investor does not adhere 
to the suggested timeline for setting up the investment project—if the ‘investor is found not to be 
diligent.’ Ibid., Article 17. 
109 Ibid., Articles 24 and 12(4); see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 25. 
110 SAGIA Statute, Article 3(5); see also SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 8. 
111 World Bank-FIAS, 47 section 227. 
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Agency; and two representatives from the private sector.112 Therefore, SAGIA is 
entrusted with a broad mandate of coordinating with other government agencies the 
process of setting up foreign investment enterprises. SAIGA is required to facilitate 
the establishment of foreign investment enterprises in the country, and one method is 
through the publication of the following:  
[A]n investment guide containing a description of the procedures of 
obtaining both permanent and temporary licenses and their modifications, as 
well as the forms, required documents to obtain the licenses and any 
information needed by the Foreign Investor. The guide shall also list the 
incentives, benefits and guarantees to be enjoyed by the Foreign Investor. In 
addition, the guide must contain substantial information about [the various 
legislative acts pertinent to investment and] . . . special sections on the 
customs and traditions observed in the Kingdom.113 
 
This investment guide is in conformity with the World Bank Guidelines, 
which states that ‘each state is encouraged to publish a handbook … adequate and 
regularly updated information about its legislation, regulations and procedures … 
and other information relating to its investment policies.’114 
Finally, the SAGIA statute provides for the establishment of the Investors 
Service Center within SAGIA.115 The center acts as a liaison office between the 
government agencies involved in investment-related decisions and is charged with the 
function of ‘extending its services to investors in a manner that ensures centralizing 
the receipt of applications and processing, prompt finalization of such matters and 
issuance of licenses, approvals, visas and residence permits required for carrying out 
the [investment] activities.’116 The Investors Service Center accepts applications for 
investment licenses, evaluates those applications and their conformity with 
investment licensing conditions and criteria, ‘serves investors and facilitates their 
requests with respect to procedures and steps necessary to execute projects [, and] 
                                                 
112 SAGIA Statute, Article 4. 
113 FIL Executive Rules, Article 9. 
114 As previously mentioned, the guidelines are non-binding, but are a useful indication of good 
practice. See the discussion in Chapter 2 section 2.8.3.2; see Guideline II.6. 
115 SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 20. 
116 SAGIA Statute, Article 9(2). 
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assists in processing requests for services in coordination with government bodies 
represented in the Center.’117 In other words, the center may provide investors with 
information related to the investment climate and regulations, familiarise investors 
with licensing procedures, coordinate the licensing process with relevant government 
agencies, and provide the services necessary to establish and operate investment 
projects.118 The SAGIA statute requires reciprocity from representatives of those 
government agencies, stating that they ‘shall facilitate the task of the Center in 
examining documents by providing information from the bodies they represent and 
shall act to facilitate satisfaction of investors’ requirements for information, issuance 
of licenses, approval, visas, and permissions.’119 
As will be discussed, privatisation is a primary concern for SAGIA since the 
agency has established a task force to keep track of the implementation of 
privatisation programs and to strengthen relationships with other government 
agencies responsible for sectors to be privatised.120 
 
4.9 The Establishment of a New Regulation Regarding 
Violations of the FIL 
Under the 1979 law, any establishment that violated the provisions of the 
investment law were notified by the Minister of Commerce and Industry to observe 
these provisions. If the establishment failed to comply with such notice, the minister, 
based on the recommendations of the investment committee, had the authority to 
penalise the establishment by revoking its investment licence or by withholding of all 
or some incentives and benefits given to foreign investors.121 
                                                 
117 SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 20. 
118 World Bank-FIAS, 46 section 226. Similar to SAGIA’s Board of Directors, the Investors Service 
Center also has full-time representatives from the following government ministries: Interior (the 
General Directorate of Passports and the General Administration for Recruitment); Foreign Affairs; 
Commerce; Industry and Electricity; Finance and National Economy (the Zakat and Income Tax 
Department and Saudi Industrial Development Fund); Agriculture and Water; Labour and Social 
Affairs (the Labour and Workmen’s Office); and Petroleum and Mineral Resources. SAGIA Statute, 
Article 9(1). 
119 SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 22. 
120 See, generally, Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century: Vol. VII. Shaping the 
Future of the Saudi Petroleum Sector, Final Review, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), 30 October 2002, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/s21_07.pdf (last visited 25 September 
2012). 
121 1979 Law, Article 10. 
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In 2004, a new regulation was adopted, establishing a committee to settle 
disputes regarding violations of the FIL.122 The committee has the authority to impose 
sanctions on any foreign investor who violates any provision of the law. These 
violations include:  
 any investment activity without a permit;  
 the conduct of activity by a non-investor; 
 using advertising materials that are inconsistent with the information 
provided by the investor to obtain the license; 
 failing to place a sign with the name and the activity of the enterprise;  
 failing to provide an annual budget;  
 producing a product that is unlicensed;  
 selling or marketing a product that is not one’s own;  
 producing more than what is permitted;  
 reducing the minimum investment capital on real estate projects;  
 failing to abide by the timetables agreed to with SAGIA;  
 failing to respond to a request by SAGIA to provide information or 
statistics; or  
 failing to comply with any other conditions specified in the permit.123  
 
The 2004 regulation gives investigators the authority to enter any enterprise and 
inspect the premises, in addition to the right to access all company records and to 
interview employees.124  
A number of disputes have arisen since the enactment of the regulation. The 
author had difficulty obtaining information on some of these cases, as they are not 
published, but did succeed in obtaining cases on a number of disputes involving: 
investment in real estate, which is not permissible under the law; producing goods 
that were not included in the investment permit; failing to provide either an annual 
budget or a zakat certificate; violating the rules regarding issuance of visas for 
employees working in the investment enterprise; changing the name of the enterprise; 
reducing the amount of invested capital; and non-compliance with the timetable for 
                                                 
122 Regulation on the Settlement of Disputes Regarding Violations of the FIL, issued by SAGIA Board 
of Directors decision no. 3/37, dated 19/4/1425 AH (7/6/2004). 
123 Ibid, Article 5. 
124 Ibid, Article 6.2 
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establishing the enterprise.125 In these and other cases, the investor found in violation 
of the law is granted a certain period of time to remedy the violation; otherwise, the 
committee imposes a fine, as required by the law. In a discussion between the author 
and a member of this committee, the member claimed that investigations conducted 
by the committee are inadequate because it is too difficult to monitor all of the 
various enterprises that have been established since the adoption of the new law, and 
because the committee in understaffed and has too few resources to effectively 
inspect violations of the FIL. 
 
4.10 Definitions of Foreign Investment under Saudi Law 
 The scope and definition of FDI has changed over time. On the one hand, the 
1979 Law provided a restrictive definition of FDI, which was narrowed to sectors of 
particular benefits to the country. On the other hand, the FIL offers a more flexible 
definition while excluding certain economic activities. A comparison of the 1979 Law 
and the FIL provides perspective. 
 
4.10.1 Restrictive Definition under the 1979 Law 
The 1979 Law ‘emphasized the desire of Saudi authorities to restrict foreign 
investment to enterprises [that] are essential to the industrial development of the 
country and to acquire foreign technical skills and expertise through foreign 
investment.’126 Therefore, any foreign investment had to satisfy two basic conditions: 
being part of an economic development project and offering foreign technical 
knowledge and expertise.127 
Another distinctive feature of the 1979 Law was the granting of a tax holiday 
to certain foreign investments in agricultural and industrial sectors.128 Under the 1979 
Law, ‘foreign capital was defined as any coins, currency notes, securities, machinery, 
equipment, spare parts, raw materials, products, transportation facilities and 
intangible rights such as patents, trademarks and similar assets.’129 Oil and mineral 
                                                 
125 Decision No. 118, Case No 18/26, 2004; Decision No. 120, Case No 21, 2006; Decision No. 116, 
Case No 19/26, 2005; Decision No. 119, Case No 20, 2005; Decision No. 121, Case No 26/27, 2006; 
Decision No. 110, Case No 17/25, 2005. 
126 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 36; see also 1979 Law, Article 2 (1-2). 
127 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 41. 
128 1979 Law, Article 7(b). 
129 Ibid., Article 1. 
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projects were excluded from the scope of the 1979 Law.130 However, downstream 
petroleum industries, such as oil refineries and petrochemical industries, fell within 
the scope of the 1979 Law if they could be classified as economic development 
projects.131 The law also restricted the possibility of obtaining more than one 
investment license by requiring that all licenses must be under the same activity. In 
addition, certain projects that were authorised to operate in Saudi Arabia by special 
legislation or by agreements with the government (such as agreements between the 
Ministry of Defense and foreign private companies) were excluded from the scope of 
the 1979 Law.132 Finally, professional services, such as banking, were not covered by 
the 1979 Law.133 
 
4.10.2 Definition of Foreign Investment under the FIL 
 In contrast with the 1979 Law, the FIL does not contain a restrictive 
definition of foreign investment. Thus, foreign investment is defined as any 
‘investment of Foreign Capital in a licensed activity.’134At the same time, the FIL 
definition of foreign capital includes, but is not limited to, the following funds and 
rights, as long as they are possessed by a foreign investor: (1) money, instruments, 
securities and commercial instruments; (2) foreign investment profits if they are 
invested to increase the capital, expansion of existing projects, or establishment of 
new projects; (3) machinery, equipment, supplies, spare parts, means of 
transportation, and production requirements relevant to the investment; (4) intangible 
rights, such as licenses, intellectual properties, technical know-how, administrative 
skills, and production techniques.135 
It should be noted, however, that unlike the WTO and OECD’s definition of 
FDI,136 the FIL defines FDI without differentiating between foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment. 
                                                 
130 Ibid., Article 2(1). 
131 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 37. See also Article 2 of the Council of 
Ministers Decision No. 952, dated 4/11/1400 AH (13 September, 1980). 
132  Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 38–39. 
133 Ibid., 39. The government has been following a policy of Saudization of the banking sector since 
1977, when a policy was passed that required ‘all banks operating in the Kingdom . . . within a period 
of one year to have a minimum participation of 60 per cent by Saudi nationals.’ El Sheikh, The Legal 
Regime, 42. 
134 FIL, Article 1(F); see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 1. 
135 FIL, Article 1(G); see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 1. 
136 See Chapter 2, section 2.2 for an overview of FDI definitions. 
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However, not every activity may be subject to foreign investment. 
Consequently, an examination of what is called the negative list is warranted. 
 
4.11 The Negative List: Activities Excluded from Foreign 
Investment 
Two methods are commonly used to control the entry of foreign investment 
into a host country. One method is the positive list approach, in which all foreign 
investment is forbidden until specifically authorised and placed on the list. In this 
method, every proposed project is investigated to decide whether it is in the interest of 
the economy to allow it. The other method is that of the negative list approach, in 
which foreign investment is, in principle, permitted unless it falls within a specified 
list of activities in which FDI is forbidden. The negative list approach is designed to 
control investments in activities considered to be of national strategic importance. If a 
project is not on the negative list, the foreign investor can normally register the 
investment and proceed without government approval. Defining investment entry 
rights through the negative list approach is easier, cheaper, faster, and uses less 
government resources than determining the business activities where investment is 
allowed and then screening potential projects to determine their compliance with the 
established criteria for investment. Because there is a negative list of activities, it may 
be argued that a foreign investment license is unnecessary.  
According to the World Bank Guidelines, ‘States will note that … open 
admission, possibly subject to a restricted list of investments (which are either 
prohibited or require screening and licensing) is a more effective approach.’137 The 
FIL replaced the positive list approach used under the 1979 Law with a negative list 
approach. 
According to the FIL, foreign investment may be undertaken under several 
licenses and in different fields of activity simultaneously, and all industrial, 
agricultural, or services sectors are open to investment, provided that the specific 
activity is not listed on the negative list of excluded activities. It should be noted that 
the negative list is periodically updated by the Supreme Economic Council (SEC).138 
                                                 
137 Guideline II.3. 
138 FIL, Article 4; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 7. According to the implementing regulations 
of the FIL, a request for a new license to invest in the same field of activity is considered an expansion 
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The excluded activities included on the negative list ‘are considered . . . to be of 
strategic importance for the protection of the economy and the national security.’139 
Furthermore, the World Bank Guidelines state that, ‘Without prejudice to the general 
approach of free admission … a state may … refuse admission to a proposed 
investment which is … inconsistent with …. [r]equirements of national security or 
which belongs to sectors … of its national interest.’140 The exclusions contained 
under the negative list include the following:  
 oil exploration, drilling, and production;  
 manufacture of military materials and equipment and civilian 
explosives;  
 services related to catering to the military sector;  
 security and detective services;  
 real estate investment in Mecca and Medina (due to religious reasons) 
and real estate brokerage;  
 tourist orientation and guidance services related to the Hajj and the 
Umrah;  
 recruitment and employment services;  
 certain printing and publishing activities;  
 commercial agencies, with the exception of franchise rights; 
 land transportation services, excluding the intra-city passenger 
transport by trains; 
 audiovisual and media services;  
 fisheries; and 
 services rendered by midwives, nurses, physiotherapists, and 
paramedics, as well as blood banks, poison centers, and quarantines.141 
This discretionary negative list may seem to be ‘a serious impediment to the 
flow of foreign investment to the Kingdom.’142  However, its restrictive provisions are 
expected to be reconsidered by the government in the future to further implement the 
                                                                                                                                           
of an established project and not a grant of an additional license; note also that the Supreme Economic 
Council has the power to issue a negative list in accordance with Article 3 of the FIL. 
139 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 41.  
140 Guideline II.4. 
141 Saudi Arabian Supreme Economic Council, “Negative List: Activities Excluded from Foreign 
Investment,” http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/be8e7887-27b1-4bb7-9879-bd75f8ad9acf/list-of-types.aspx 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
142 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 64. 
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policy of free markets and liberalisation of trade.143 Saudi Arabia’s membership in the 
WTO is a significant factor here. In fact, SAGIA is required to ‘periodically review 
the list of activities excluded from foreign investment in order to shorten it.’144 The 
negative list should therefore be interpreted as ‘a temporary measure for the 
protection of the national economy against globalization.’145 Nevertheless, although 
foreign persons and entities may invest in all industries and services under the FIL, 
the negative list of exempted industries indicates hesitation on the part of the 
government to open wide the door to foreign investment.  
 
4.12 Additional Licensing Conditions and Criteria under the 
FIL 
However, even if a project is not on the negative list, the FIL Executive Rules 
impose several other licensing conditions for foreign investment projects, meaning 
that product standards and production processes must be approved under Saudi 
Arabian laws. In the absence of such a law, the laws of the European Union, the 
United States, or Japan must be complied with. The investor must not have been 
previously convicted of any financial or commercial violations, and the grant of a 
license must not violate any international or regional agreements to which Saudi 
Arabia is a party.146
The negative list is subject to constant amendments and modifications by the 
government.147 It should be noted that the exemption of Mecca and Medina from 
foreign investment is based on religious and not business reasons.148 The former 
reason can sometimes hinder legal transactions in the Kingdom, an interesting case 
that illustrates this problem is that of Dynalectron Corp, a U.S. corporation that 
provided helicopter services in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabian law prohibits the entry of 
non-Muslims into the holy cities of Mecca and Medina under penalty of death, so, 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 23; 41. Apart from the negative list, all sectors are now open to foreign investors. See 
Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 342.  
144 FIL Executive Rules, Article 3. 
145 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 23. 
146 FIL Executive Rules, Article 6. 
147 Author interview with the governor of the Supreme Economic Council, Dr Abdulrahman Al 
Tuwaijri, 2007. 
148 Investment in Mecca and Medina is restricted not only to non-Muslims but also to foreigners, 
whether Muslim or not. The governor of the Supreme Economic Council expressed the opinion that 
investment in Mecca and Medina is restricted for religious and security purposes and, as such, it does 
not violate the principles of the WTO. 
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consequently, the corporation required all pilots to be or to become Muslims.149 It 
regularly sent pilots to Islamic law courses, where they were taught the basic concepts 
of Islam, converted thereto, and then employed in Saudi Arabia. Wade Kern went 
through such a course, but he refused to convert to Islam and was denied the job. He 
then filed, and lost, a religious discrimination suit against the corporation because the 
court found that being a Muslim was a bona fide qualification for employment. Apart 
from this sort of relatively rare situation, however, Muslims have no special privileges 
over non-Muslims in trade or profession.150 
After this discussion of permissible activities, the next question is: What form 
of foreign investment may a foreign enterprise acquire in accordance with the law? 
 
4.13 Forms of Foreign Investment Enterprises under the 
1979 Law 
The issue of legal forms of foreign investment enterprises was not addressed 
in the 1979 Law; rather, it was part of the Companies Law of 1965.151 Essentially, 
foreign investors were allowed to operate in Saudi Arabia pursuant to a contract with 
the government or an investment license. A licensed investor had the option of setting 
up a wholly foreign-owned company or engaging in a joint venture enterprise with a 
Saudi partner.152 In addition, an investment enterprise had to be set up in one of the 
eight different forms of business entities stipulated by the Companies Law.153 The 
most popular legal form was the limited liability company, a corporation that could 
consist from two to fifty members who were responsible for the liabilities of the 
company to the extent of their private contributions to the capital.154 A limited 
liability company was not allowed to use public subscription for raising its capital or 
for obtaining loans, and could not engage in insurance activities, savings, or 
banking.155 
                                                 
149 Kern v. Dynalectron Corp, 577 F.Supp. 1196, D.C.Tex, October 19, 1983. 
150 See Nehaluddin Ahmad, “The Modern Concept of Secularism and Islamic Jurisprudence: A 
Comparative Analysis,” Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 15 (2009): 102. 
151 Companies Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/6, dated 22/3/1385 AH (21 July 1965). 
152 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 41. 
153 Companies Law, Article 2. See also El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 
51.  
154 Companies Law, Article 157. See also El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 
52. 
155 Companies Law, Articles 158–159. See also El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private 
Investment, 52. 
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Although investment enterprises with 100 per cent foreign ownership were 
allowed under the 1979 Law and were guaranteed the same protection as national 
companies, they were at a disadvantage compared to joint ventures because they were 
not eligible for most investment incentives. For instance, wholly foreign-owned 
companies could not enjoy the benefits of tax holidays or interest-free loans from the 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund.156 In addition, such companies could not 
establish branches or offices within Saudi Arabia, publicly offer their securities to 
local entities or individuals, or bid for government contracts.157 Those restrictions 
resulted from ‘the industrial development policy of the Kingdom, which aims at 
maintaining control over its industrial development whilst obtaining technical know-
how and expertise through foreign investment.’158 Thus, the 1979 Law constituted ‘an 
indirect statutory imposition of a national participation’ requirement for all foreign 
investment projects in the country.159 
Consequently, joint ventures were the most feasible option available for 
foreign investment enterprises in Saudi Arabia. This form of foreign investment 
enterprise was strongly encouraged by the Saudi authorities, who viewed joint 
ventures as ‘a satisfactory compromise between [the government’s] desired objectives 
and those of foreign investors.’160 And, the Saudi Foreign Capital Investment 
Committee strongly preferred those ‘foreign applicants whose proposed enterprise 
included local participation.’161 Moreover, joint ventures were also viewed as the 
preferred form of foreign investment by the Saudi private sector.162 
To be classified as a joint venture and, thus, to be entitled to the various 
incentives, an investment company under the 1979 Law had to include at least 25 per 
cent Saudi equity participation.163 Furthermore, to be allowed to bid on government 
contracts, the joint venture’s minimum share of national ownership had to be 50 per 
cent, and 60 per cent local participation exempted it from certain performance bond 
requirements.164 Finally, joint ventures with at least 51 per cent of Saudi equity were 
                                                 
156 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 41. 
157 Companies Law, Article 228. See also Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 41-
42. 
158 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 42. 
159 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 65. 
160 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 42. 
161 Ibid., 46. 
162 Ibid., 43. 
163 1979 Law, Article 7(b); see also Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 42. 
164 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 42. 
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exempted from a rule that required foreign contractors of public works projects to 
subcontract at least 30 per cent of their contracts to local companies.165 
Thus, although the 1979 Law, in theory, allowed the establishment of 
investment enterprises with 100 per cent foreign ownership, this form of foreign 
investment was not desirable given the numerous restrictions.166 
The FIL represents a major change in the government’s policy in this area. It 
allows 100 per cent foreign ownership in investment projects and provides the same 
incentives to such projects as are given to joint ventures and fully Saudi-owned 
entities.167 
However, while the law allows full foreign ownership of an enterprise, in 
practice such enterprises may find it difficult to enter the Saudi market without the 
counsel and expertise of Saudi nationals.168 The extent to which the new law removes 
these obstacles is addressed in the following section. 
 
4.14 Barriers to Entry of Foreign Investment  
As stated in the World Bank Guidelines, the host state must: ‘[F]acilitate the 
admission and establishment of investments by nationals of other states and avoid 
making unduly cumbersome or complicated procedural regulations for, or imposing 
unnecessary conditions on, the admission of such investments.’169 In addition, the 
“World Investment Report 2012” affirms the importance of the establishment of an 
‘open, stable and predictable entry conditions for investment’ in designing a country’s 
investment policy.170  
In this context, how does the host country screen a foreign investment entry? 
For a foreign investor, entry into the host country begins with an application for 
investment and registration. Complex administrative procedures required to establish 
and operate a business discourage FDI.171 Simple administrative procedures begin 
                                                 
165 Ibid.  
166 Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 340. 
167 FIL, Articles 4–6. Nevertheless, it should be noted that among the objectives of SAGIA is 
‘encouraging the establishment of joint-venture projects between Saudi investors and their foreign 
counterparts.’ SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 6(7); see also FIL Executive Rules. 
168 A joint venture with a Saudi partner is still preferred to 100 per cent ownership, as the Saudi partner 
is familiar with the culture, traditions, and investment climate. 
169 Guideline II.2. 
170 UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2012,” xxvi. 
171 Jacques Morisset and Olivier Lumenga Neso, “Administrative Barriers to Foreign Investment in 
Developing Countries,” (Policy Research Working Paper No. 2848, World Bank and International 
Finance Corporation Foreign Investment Advisory Service, May 2002). As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
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with the establishment of one agency—a one-stop shop—to decide an investment 
application. But the question becomes: Does the FIL resolve this tension in favour of 
the foreign investor?  
 
4.14.1 Licensing and Registration Procedures for Foreign 
Investment 
It is a general principle of Saudi Arabian foreign investment policy that 
foreign investors may not do business in the country unless they obtain government 
approval.172 However, the length of time and the process of registration varied greatly 
between the 1979 Law and the FIL; a time limit is imposed and a coordination 
mechanism has been put in place to facilitate business registration.  
 
4.14.1.1 Procedures under the 1979 Law  
Before the passage of the FIL, the Foreign Capital Investment Committee was 
the principal authority for licensing investment projects. The committee was part of 
the Ministry of Industry and Electricity, and its investment licensing decision was 
issued in the ministry’s name.173 However, foreign investors wishing to conduct 
business in Saudi Arabia had to receive approvals from several other government 
agencies before receiving a license. Those agencies included the Foreign Capital 
Investment Board and the ministries of Agriculture, Commerce, Finance, Industry and 
Electricity, Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and Planning.174 The Foreign Capital 
Investment Committee had complete discretion in making investment licensing 
decisions, after being endorsed by the Minister of Industry and Electricity, which 
were final and could not be further appealed.175 In fact, the committee was highly 
reluctant to issue any license that did not envision Saudi participation in the 
                                                                                                                                           
section 2.8.3.1, the right of a state to control entry of foreign investment is an aspect of state 
sovereignty. A state may exclude or limit such entry. Imposition of such requirements is based on the 
principle of the sovereignty of the state. A sovereign state has the right to regulate all economic 
activities that take place within its territory and an unlimited right to control entry by a foreigner. See 
Chapter 2, section 2.8.1.1 for entry and operational restrictions. 
172 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 46. For a general overview of the 
business climate in Saudi Arabia, see Paul C. Homsy, “Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Saudi 
Arabia,” International Lawyer 16, no. 1 (1982): 51. 
173 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 47. 
174 1979 Law, Article 4  
175 World Bank-FIAS, 46 section 224. 
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investment project.176 The 1979 Law did not specify a period for making a decision 
on the investment application and, reportedly, the process could take ‘anywhere from 
six months to two years, depending upon the nature of the project.’177 
 
4.14.1.2 Licensing of Foreign Investment Projects by SAGIA: 30-Day Limit  
Under the FIL, the authority for the licensing of foreign investment enterprises 
is vested in SAGIA, which may issue both permanent and temporary licenses.178 It 
must make a decision on the license within thirty days of receiving the completed 
application with all supporting documents.179 If the decision is not made within that 
period, SAGIA must issue the license to the investor.180 Thirty days may seem 
unrealistic, but ‘the private sector indicated that SAGIA adheres to this time 
frame.’181 A denial of the investment license application must be based on a justified 
reason.182 A potential investor who is dissatisfied with SAGIA’s decision may appeal 
it, first to SAGIA’s Board of Directors and then, if the application is again denied, to 
the Board of Grievances.183 
Overall, the process of obtaining an investment license from SAGIA involves 
eight steps: (1) application for the approval of foreign investment; (2) filing of the 
documents; (3) verification of the data contained in application documents by the 
Investors Service Center staff; (4) verification of the licensing conditions and criteria 
by the licensing department; (5) approval or rejection of the application by the 
licensing department; (6) return of the application to the investors service center; (7) 
notification to the foreign investor about the decision; and (8) payment of the fees and 
collection of the license by the foreign investor.184 
 
                                                 
176 See, e.g., Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 46; El Sheikh, The Legal Regime 
of Foreign Private Investment, 47. 
177 World Bank-FIAS, section 264. 
178 FIL, Article 2; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 2. 
179 FIL, Article 2. Potential investors may submit their licensing applications by mail, fax, or e-mail. 
See FIL Executive Rules, Article11. 
180 FIL, Article 2. 
181 World Bank-FIAS, 53 section 260. 
182 FIL, Article 2; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 14. 
183 Although the FIL does not explicitly mention the body to which the appeal should be addressed, this 
issue is resolved by the FIL Executive Rules, Articles 14 and 15. 
184 World Bank-FIAS, 49-53 subsections 239–259, which describe each of these steps in detail. 
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4.14.1.3 Assisting Licensed Investors with Further Registration Steps 
  In addition, the FIL requires SAGIA to assist foreign investors with other 
administrative processes, which must be completed in the course of setting up 
investment enterprises. Thus, the law requires that SAGIA, through its Investors 
Service Center, coordinate the overall registration process. In practice, however, this 
process remains rather complicated and SAGIA has a long way to go before 
establishing a full-scale one-stop shop for all procedures related to licensing, 
registering, and starting up a foreign investment enterprise. At present, it functions 
more like a ‘single window for information on post-licensing procedures.’185 Thus, 
after obtaining a foreign investment license from SAGIA, investors must go through a 
mandatory process of commercial registration with the Ministry of Commerce and, 
depending on the type of business activity, may have to obtain additional special 
licenses from related ministries, such as Agriculture, Higher Education, Water, 
Health, Municipalities and Rural Affairs, Petroleum and Mineral Resources, 
Meteorology and Environmental Protection Administration, or Water.186 
Commercial registration is a required step for starting up any new business 
entity. According to the Companies Law of 1965, SAGIA is not involved in this 
process, which consists of obtaining approvals from the Ministry of Commerce, the 
Notary Public, and the Saudi Chamber of Commerce.187 The procedure involves six 
steps: (1) applying for the approval and the commercial registry number from the 
Ministry of Commerce; (2) gaining approval of the company’s articles of association; 
(3) securing notarisation of the articles of association with the Notary Public; (4) 
depositing the company’s capital at an authorised bank; (5) publishing a summary of 
the articles of association in the Official Gazette in Mecca; and (6) obtaining the 
commercial registration certificate and the commercial registry number from the 
Ministry of Commerce.188 In addition, a foreign partner in a joint venture must file a 
registration document from the partner’s home country with the Ministry of 
Commerce, and the registration document must be notarised and certified by the 
Saudi embassy in that country.189 Overall, the entire process ‘should not take more 
                                                 
185 Ibid., 47 section 228. 
186 Ibid., 54 section 261. 
187 Ibid., 59 section 277. 
188 Ibid., 60-63 subsections 278–292, which summarise all of these steps. 
189 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 53. 
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than five to six weeks [though] investors said that it can take up to four months.’190 
According to investors’ accounts, the process of notarisation, which must occur 
within thirty days of the formation of the company, appears to be the most 
complicated part of the procedure and has been described as a ‘nightmare.’191 It is 
very difficult to schedule an appointment with the Notary Public, and scheduling an 
appointment does not guarantee that the Notary Public will actually attend it.192 
There is also a lack of coordination between the SAGIA officers involved in 
investment licensing projects and the Ministry of Commerce officers involved in the 
commercial registration of investment enterprises.193 Thus, foreign investors often 
have to submit identical application documents for both procedures.194 In addition, 
‘the business activity mentioned in the license, is often questioned by the Ministry of 
Commerce [which results] in the investor going back and forth between SAGIA and 
the [ministry], and SAGIA’s License Department re-writing the activity to make it 
acceptable to the [ministry].’195 Furthermore, foreign investors can not open a bank 
account, rent or purchase real estate, or hire any employees until after they have 
obtained a Commercial Registry number.196 Therefore, ‘the roles and responsibilities 
of SAGIA do not seem to be fully understood or appreciated in other Ministries and 
Departments and this has led to a perception—even resentment—that the powers of 
these entities are being eroded.’197 As a result, the perception of many foreign 
investors has been that ‘while the Kingdom was trying to implement an ‘Investor 
Friendly’ environment, there was a clear lack of customer service and customer-
friendly attitude in the Ministries.’198 
 
                                                 
190 World Bank-FIAS, 63 section 293.  
191 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 52; see also World Bank-FIAS, 66 
section 299. 
192 World Bank-FIAS, 66 section 299. 
193 Ibid., In addition, in 2004, SAGIA signed seventeen agreements with government agencies to find 
solutions and tools to improve the investment environment for local and foreign investors. Despite 
these efforts, and with only scant improvement, the situation remains the same.  See Saudi-German 
Development and Investment Company. “Saudi Arabia Unveils 8th Five-Year Plan,” 
http://www.sageco.com.sa/sa/news/news_updates.html (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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195 Ibid., 57 section 268. 
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4.15 Investment Incentives and Guarantees 
In order to encourage and induce foreign investment, the government of Saudi 
Arabia has provided incentives and guarantees to foreign investors, some of which 
follow the standards of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of FDI. 
 As stated in the World Bank Guidelines:  
[A] State may not expropriate or otherwise take in whole or in part a foreign 
private investment in its territory, or take measures which have similar effects, 
except where this is done in accordance with applicable legal procedures, in 
pursuance in good faith of a public purpose, without discrimination on the 
basis of nationality and against the payment of appropriate compensation.199  
 
This guarantee against expropriation is intended to shield the foreign investor from 
the threat of nationalization or cancellation of the investment. Although a statement of 
the norm of full compensation is provided in foreign investment laws, legal systems 
differ as to the application of the premise. A promise to pay compensation is 
frequently made in accordance with the law or in accordance with the rules of 
international law. In addition, these are unilateral promises that are not binding on the 
states unless embodied in a treaty requiring the states to fulfil obligations made to 
other states regarding the treatment of investments made by their nationals.200 
 
4.15.1 Investment Incentives and Guarantees under the 1979 
Law  
The 1979 Law incorporated by reference privileges granted to all industrial 
projects pursuant to the Law on Protection and Promotion of National Industries of 
                                                 
199 Guideline IV.1. 
200 However, it has been argued that a guarantee of security to the foreign investment has legal 
implications. In S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, The Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels in International Legal 
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canceled the project because it was so close to the most important historical site in Egypt. An arbitral 
tribunal found the government liable, referring to the Egyptian investment law that stated: ‘Projects 
may not be nationalized or confiscated. The assets of such projects cannot be seized, blocked, 
confiscated or sequestrated, except by judicial procedure.’ Ibid., 763. See, generally, R. Doak Bishop, 
James Crawford, and William Michael Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases Materials, and 
Commentary, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 1531 et seq. 
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1962.201 These incentives were related mainly to ‘the allocation of land at nominal 
price, and the supply of electric power, gas and fuel at subsidized cost.’202 
Furthermore, certain foreign investment projects were eligible to obtain loans from 
the Saudi Industrial Development Fund in an amount ‘up to 50 per cent of the total 
project cost for a term of five to ten years, with a grace period of about one to five 
years.’203 
 
4.15.2 Failure to Address Guarantees in the 1979 Law 
The 1979 Law failed to address a number of important guarantees for the 
security of foreign investment, including providing explicitly for the foreign 
investors’ right to repatriate their investment capital and returns.204 In addition, it did 
not provide legal protection against expropriation, nationalisation, or other similar 
risks, nor did it provide protection against abuse by Saudi Arabia’s administrative 
agencies.205 Furthermore, it did not make any reference to important issues such as 
the standard of treatment of foreign investment, guarantees against non-commercial 
risk, or the procedure for the settlement of investment disputes.206 The only express 
guarantee offered by the 1979 Law was the right of all investment enterprises to 
appeal to the Board of Grievances against any arbitrary administrative action 
involving withdrawal of an investment license or deprivation of any investment 
incentives.207 However, the 1992 Basic Law of Governance guaranteed the protection 
of private property owned both by Saudis and by foreigners against expropriation, 
nationalisation, public confiscation without court order, and imposition of excessive 
taxes.208 
 
                                                 
201 1979 Law, Article 7 (a). see also El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private, 93. The 
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204 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 39. 
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206 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 40. 
207 1979 Law, Article 10. See also Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 45. 
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4.15.3 Policy Statements of the Saudi Government Concerning 
Investment Guarantees 
Several possible explanations for the lack of investment protection measures 
in the Saudi legislation have been analysed. First, some have suggested that Saudi 
Arabia did not think it necessary to provide specifically for foreign investment 
guarantees in the 1979 Law because of its attractive investment climate, free 
economic policy, and the ‘constructive attitude towards foreign investment.’209 
Indeed, numerous policy statements issued by the Saudi government emphasised the 
protection and security of foreign investment in the country.210 For example, the 
Saudi Arabia Industrial Studies and Development Center published a guideline that 
said, in part:  
 
The Government welcomes foreign capital as well as foreign expertise and 
their participation in the industrial development projects in cooperation with 
Saudi businessmen. The Government, recognizing the benefits to the 
industrial development of the Kingdom of the entry of foreign capital 
accompanied by administrative and technical capability and ability for 
international marketing, assures investors that it will always avoid imposing 
any restrictions on the entry and exit of money to and from the Kingdom and 
that it shall continue its policy based on the respect of private ownership in the 
Islamic Law.211 
 
However, as Dr Yahya Al Samaan has noted:  
 
[D]espite the fact that policy statements are accepted as an expression of good 
faith, which reassure the security of foreign investment in the host country, 
they are . . . merely public statements which are not legally binding. . . . In 
order for such policy statements to be of real value . . . they must be 
incorporated in municipal law or investment contracts. In this case, the host 
                                                 
209 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Invest, 54. 
210 Ibid., 55–56, quoting the 1974 Announcement of the Basic Principles of Industrial Policy. 
211 See El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 134. See also Abdullah Alghamdi, 
“Ability of the Foreign and Joint Venture Industries in Jeddah to Spread Benefits to the Local Spatial 
and Economic Environment,” Journal of King Abdul Aziz University, vol. 7, 1415 A.H. (1995): 21.  
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government will consider itself more obligated by such incorporations, and the 
national courts will consider them more readily enforceable than policy 
statements.212 
 
It should be noted that there has been no case of expropriation of private 
property in the country since 1975.213 
 
4.15.4 The Search for Investment Guarantees under Islamic 
Law 
Another explanation behind the lack of investment protection measures in the 
earlier Saudi legislation is that it was unnecessary for the government to mention the 
protection of foreign investment in legislation, because such protection was already 
guaranteed in the shari’ah, which is the predominant source of Saudi law. Indeed, it 
has been argued that: 
[E]ven though there are no written constitutional clauses guaranteeing foreign 
investment against illegal expropriation [and nationalization]. . . such a 
guarantee is accommodated within Islamic law and is actually guaranteed by 
the nature of the Saudi economy which is based on private ownership.214  
 
Islamic law emphasises that ‘no one can be arbitrarily deprived of his own 
property’ and it ‘protects the life and property of non-Muslims, be they subjects of the 
Muslim state or resident aliens and tourists.’215 The basic concepts of Islamic law 
guarantee at least equal treatment to Muslims and non-Muslims living within an 
Islamic state (that is, Saudi nationals and foreigners, which include foreign investors). 
Meanwhile the inviolability and sacred nature of private property, which includes 
allowing expropriation of private property for public purposes and against the 
payment of just compensation, is well established.216 The Qur’an states, ‘O ye who 
believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let there be 
                                                 
212 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 56.  
213 See Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA), “A Comparison between the Provisions 
of Old and New Foreign Investment Laws in Saudi Arabia. 
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/agora/images/docs/radE8BABPresentation_e%20Investment%20Law.ppt 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
214 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 122. 
215 Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 55; and El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of 
Foreign Private Investment, 121. 
216 See Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 57–59. 
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amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-will.’217 However, where private 
ownership conflicts with public interests, Islamic law, or public order, private 
ownership does not prevail.218  
 
4.15.5 Investment Incentives and Guarantees Provided under 
the FIL  
Despite these arguments, the concerns regarding the lack of legal investment 
guarantees in Saudi Arabia were addressed in the FIL. Thus, foreign investment 
enterprises with 100 per cent foreign ownership are now entitled to equal treatment 
and enjoy the same benefits, incentives, and guarantees as joint ventures with Saudi 
companies and wholly Saudi-owned companies.219 Article 7 of the FIL explicitly 
grants all foreign investors the right to repatriate their shares derived from the sale of 
equity, liquidation surplus, or profits generated by the investment enterprise.220 In 
addition, they have the right to transfer amounts required to settle any contractual 
obligations related to the investment project’s operation and to freely exchange the 
shares of the investment enterprise with partners and third parties.221 These guarantees 
are in line with Article 3 (6) of the World Bank Guidelines, which calls for free 
transfers of savings and net revenues and any other amount to which the investor is 
entitled.222 Furthermore, investors are guaranteed that their investment ‘shall not be 
confiscated wholly or partially without a court order [and] may not be subject to 
expropriation wholly or partially except for public interest against an equitable 
compensation.’223 Foreign investors are also entitled to ‘the benefits ensuing from 
agreements of avoiding double taxation and agreements of promotion and protection 
of Investment which are signed by the Kingdom.’224 In addition, the FIL grants an 
                                                 
217 Qur’an, verse 4:29; Al Samaan refers to some classical Islamic jurists' interpretation of this verse: 
‘One is not allowed to take another's property without legal cause,’ in The Legal Protection of Foreign 
Investment, 57. 
218 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 132. 
219 FIL, Article 6; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 5. 
220 FIL, Article 7; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(5). 
221 FIL, Article 7; see also FIL Executive Rules, Articles 5(5) and 5(6). 
222 Guideline III.6. 
223 FIL, Article 11; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(4); see also Basic Law of Governance, 
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adopted the ‘Hull Formula,’ discussed in Chapter 2, which requires the compensation to be prompt, 
adequate, and effective. 
224 FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(3); as indicated earlier, Saudi Arabia signed agreements for avoiding 
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exemption from customs duties for all ‘machinery, tools, equipment, spare parts, 
primary and semi-processed raw materials, bags, cylinders, and containers imported 
for existing or new industrial establishments.’225 Furthermore, foreign-owned 
companies are eligible for subsidised loans from the Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund.226 
 
4.15.6 Real Estate Ownership by Foreign Investors 
Wholly foreign-owned companies are also, for the first time, granted the right 
to purchase and own real estate in their name if it is necessary for operating the 
investment project or for housing the foreign investor’s family or staff. Thus, 
according to the FIL, a licensed foreign investment enterprise ‘shall be entitled to 
possess the required real estates as might be reasonable for practicing the licensed 
activity or for the housing of all or some of the staff as per the provisions for non-
Saudi nationals real estate acquisition.’227 This right has been further elaborated by 
the 2000 Regulation of Ownership and Investment in Real Estate by Non-Saudis 
(2000 Regulation).228 The 2000 Regulation states that:  
[N]on-Saudi investors, whether they are natural persons or corporate entities, 
may own real estate for the conduct of their licensed professional, technical or 
economic activities . . . . This includes real estate needed for private 
residences and for the housing of employees.229  
 
Foreign investors are also allowed to lease their real estate to third parties.230 
In addition, foreigners who reside in Saudi Arabia may ‘own real estate for use as a 
personal residence, subject to obtaining a permit from the Ministry of Interior.’231 The 
prime minister may also grant additional approvals for real estate ownership for 
                                                                                                                                           
http://www.mof.gov.sa/en/docs/Agreements/index.htm (last visited 25 September 2012). See Chapter 
6, on the agreements of promotion and protection of investments. 
225 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 92. 
226 FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(8). 
227 FIL, Article 8; see also FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(2). 
228 Regulation of Ownership and Investment in Real Estate by Non-Saudis (2000), issued by Royal 
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private residential purposes in situations not explicitly covered by the 2000 
Regulation.232  
The 2000 Regulation, nonetheless, may pose a major obstacle to foreign 
investors’ right to own real estate, because ‘the total cost of the project, both land and 
construction, shall not be less than SR30 million (US$8 million).’233 This minimum 
capital requirement is especially excessive when taking into account that the 
minimum investment levels for all other industries are much lower, therefore making 
the right to land ownership illusory for most foreign investors.234 The problem is 
exacerbated with the current inflation in real estate prices, which makes it difficult 
even for Saudi nationals to own real estate. The 2000 Regulation also requires that the 
foreign investor complete the development of an acquired land lot within five years of 
the purchase date.235 In addition, as mentioned earlier, an investor must be registered 
with the Ministry of Commerce to acquire real estate, and the lengthy registration 
process may further delay the exercise of this right. Finally, it should be noted that 
owning land located in industrial cities is impossible, because such land may only be 
leased for a fixed term of twenty-five years with an option of renewal under the same 
terms.236 Furthermore, 
[W]ith the exception of transfer through inheritance, Non-Saudis may not 
obtain the title, easement or use of real estate located within the city limits 
of Mecca and Medina. This excludes obtaining title if it is associated with 
endowing (Waqf) the owned real estate . . . to a certain Saudi Agency, 
provided that the Supreme Council of Endowment shall have the custodial 
rights to the endowed property. [However,] Non-Saudi Muslims may . . . 
lease real property inside the boundaries of Mecca and Medina for a period 
not exceeding two . . . years. Such leases are renewable for similar 
periods.237 
                                                 
232 Ibid., Article 4. 
233 2000 Regulation, Article 1(b). 
234 This requirement is particularly discriminatory toward small- and medium-sized businesses, which 
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4.16 Taxation of Foreign Investment 
Another drawback of the current legal framework for foreign investment is 
that the FIL fails to provide for equal treatment of foreign investors and Saudi 
nationals in tax matters. The law has eliminated the income tax holiday that was 
earlier granted to joint venture companies with foreign and Saudi participation, 
although this elimination does not apply retroactively to those companies that were 
already enjoying the benefit.238 At the same time, all foreign investors may carry 
forward losses incurred by the investment project for an unspecified period.239 
 
4.16.1 The Dual System of Taxation 
However, under the current dual system of taxation, non-Muslim foreigners 
must pay income tax. Thus, all foreign investment enterprises must pay tax on their 
corporate profits. At the same time, all Saudi-owned companies, Saudi-based 
companies owned by nationals of Gulf Cooperation Council members, and joint 
ventures between Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council–member nationals must pay 
zakat, which is a religious wealth tax, in lieu of the corporate profits tax. Although 
zakat is also collected on the Saudi-owned share of a joint venture with a foreign 
company, this is not the case for wholly foreign-owned companies. 
 
4.16.2 Discriminatory Effect of Income Tax Rates and Zakat 
Rates 
The major disadvantage of having to pay tax on corporate profits rather than 
zakat is the significant difference in tax rates, despite the adoption of the new Tax 
Law, which aims to attract more foreign investment. The new Tax Law provides for a 
fixed tax rate of 20 per cent on all income received from non-Saudi shares in joint 
                                                 
238 Under the 1979 Law, industrial and agricultural investment projects enjoyed a 10-year income tax 
holiday, while all other investment projects enjoyed a 5-year income tax holiday. See 1979 Law, 
Article 7(b). See also El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 88. The tax 
exemption was not discretionary and applied ‘as of right,’ provided that a foreign investment company 
had at least 25 per cent Saudi equity participation in the total capital, a percentage that had to be 
maintained throughout the period of exemption; note that this conclusion is evident from the text of 
Article 16 of the FIL, which provides that, ‘the implementation of this Act shall not prejudice the 
vested interests of Foreign Investments that legally existed before this Act shall come into force.’ 
239 FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(9). See also the new Income Tax Law, issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/1, dated 20/11/1424 (12 January 2004) (Tax Law), Article 21. It should be noted that the loss carry-
forward provision does not apply to foreign investment companies that enjoy tax holidays pursuant to 
the 1979 Law. 
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ventures, as well as by non-Saudi legal residents and non-residents doing business in 
the country through a permanent enterprise or earning income from other sources in 
Saudi Arabia.240 The income tax rate for investors working in the natural gas sector is 
set at 30 per cent, while the rate for investors working in the oil production and 
hydro-carbonic material sector increased to a sweeping 85 per cent.241 At the same 
time, zakat rates are much lower, at 2.5 per cent of the ‘capital that is not invested in 
fixed assets or long-term investments, or which relates to deferred pre-incorporation 
expenses.’242  
Although wages of local employees are not taxed, because Saudi Arabia has 
no personal income tax, employers employing ten or more workers must pay the 
General Organization for Social Insurance to cover workers’ compensation and 
pension benefits.243 
In fact, during the negotiation for Saudi Arabia's accession to the WTO, a 
question was raised by members of the WTO Working Party on the method of 
zakat/income tax application. The Saudi Arabian representative answered by stating,  
[T]here was a general misunderstanding about zakat and income tax. . . . The 
percentage of corporate income tax applied to non-Saudi was 20 per cent of 
net profit, while the percentage of zakat may reach or even exceed 100 per 
cent of net profit . . . zakat is a religious duty, and because its rate and basis of 
collection was prescribed by religion, it could not be altered.244 
4.17 Restrictive Immigration and Employment Policies 
The major restriction on foreign investment in Saudi Arabia is constituted by 
the immigration regulations, which remain largely unchanged following the adoption 
of the FIL. Among the restrictions are ‘cumbersome and restrictive visa, work permit, 
and residence permit policies and application processes [as well as] more restrictive 
employment policies, including non-Saudi hiring quotas and strict dismissal 
policies.’245 
                                                 
240 See Tax Law, Article 7(a). 
241 Ibid., Article 7(b-c). 
242 World Bank-FIAS, 128 section 594. Zakat Law, issued by Royal Decree No. 17/2/28/3321, dated 
21/11/1370 AH (2 November 1950). 
243 Labour Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/15, dated 23/8/1426 AH (23 September 2005), Article 
12. 
244 World Trade Organization, “Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia to the WTO,” restricted, WT/ACC/SAU/61 (1 November 2005).  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/wtaccsau61_e.doc (last visited 25 September 2012). 
245 World Bank-FIAS, VII-VIII section XI. 
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4.17.1 Abolishing the Sponsorship Rule 
Individuals traveling to Saudi Arabia for business purposes for short periods 
must obtain a business or visit visa. The application package for such visas must 
contain a sponsorship (invitation) letter from a Saudi company or a foreign company 
operating in Saudi Arabia. The FIL allows licensed companies with 100 per cent 
foreign ownership to sponsor foreign managerial staff members and other employees 
for visas, whereas the 1979 Law required foreign investors to work under the 
sponsorship of Saudi citizens or business entities.246 In theory, Saudi embassies have 
the discretion to grant sponsorless business visas. In practice, the granting of those 
visas occurs rarely, because most embassy staff members ‘are not aware of this 
specific procedure, and therefore do not inform the investor of its existence.’247 
According to the Immigration Law,248 the sponsor must be based in Saudi Arabia; 
thus, Saudi companies that operate in other countries and do not have offices in Saudi 
Arabia may not act as sponsors.249 The sponsor bears personal liability for all visitors’ 
actions, which includes responsibility for any misconduct or violations of law, as well 
as the duty to cover all expenses in the event of a visitor’s injury.250 
If a foreign investor wishes to employ a non-Saudi on a long-term basis, the 
investor is required to apply for a work visa on behalf of the potential employee. The 
employee must then obtain a work permit and a residence permit from the Labour 
Department and the Ministry of Interior, respectively. The FIL represents a significant 
shift in policy in this respect, because it provides, for the first time, that investors with 
full foreign ownership may sponsor their own employees for work visas.251 However, 
the sponsorship rule is a restraint on foreign employees from switching employers 
freely; the rule requires that if a foreigner wants to work for a new employer, he needs 
approval from his formal employer. Furthermore, the procedure for obtaining work 
and residence permits still remains complicated and lengthy and, therefore, represents 
a key impediment to foreign investment.252  
                                                 
246 FIL, Article 9. See also FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(7). 
247 World Bank-FIAS, 26 section 123.  
248 Immigration Law, issued by Royal Decree No. 17/25/2/1337, dated 11/9/1371 H (3 June 1952). 
249 World Bank-FIAS, 26 section 120. 
250 Ibid., 33 section 157 
251 FIL, Article 9. See also FIL Executive Rules, Article 5(7). 
252 World Bank-FIAS, 35 section 168.  
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The application process begins with SAGIA, which reviews the potential 
investor’s proposal regarding the planned number of workers, including the number 
of expatriate workers. Reports suggest that ‘the final number of employees is often 
different from the one originally requested by the investor.’253  
Within three days of a foreign employee’s arrival in Saudi Arabia, he or she 
must obtain a residence permit from the Passport Office of the Ministry of Interior. 
When the residence permit is issued, the employee must surrender his or her passport 
to the employer and must carry a residence permit at all times for identification.254 
Finally, foreign employees who hold residence permits may not leave the 
country permanently unless they obtain an exit visa and the visitor’s original visa 
sponsor must approve that application. Essentially, the employer is required to 
prepare a letter stating that the employee has satisfactorily completed the work 
contract.255 
 
4.17.2 Restrictions on Employment: The Saudization Policy 
The process then shifts to the Labour Department, which essentially ensures 
the compliance of foreign investment enterprises with the government’s strict 
Saudization policy.256 Saudization of the workforce was motivated by two growing 
problems: finding work for nationals and dependence on foreign labour. Nearly one-
third of the country’s 28.38 million inhabitants are foreign nationals.257 Since 1996, 
all companies operating in the country were required to increase their Saudi 
workforce by five per cent annually.258 In January 2003, the Council of Ministers 
issued a decision to support the objectives of the Sixth Development Plan, including 
designing policies for the replacement of foreign workers with Saudi nationals and 
policies that encourage the private sector to develop more opportunities for Saudi 
nationals.259 In addition, Article 25(2) of the Labour Law states that for all companies 
operating in Saudi Arabia, the share of Saudi employees in the workforce may not be 
                                                 
253 Ibid., 27 section 128. 
254 World Bank-FIAS, 30 section 141. 
255 Ibid., 31 section 149. 
256 Saudization is the process of replacing expatriate workers with Saudi nationals. For a general 
background on Saudization, see Manal Fakeeh, “Saudization as a Solution for Unemployment: the 
Case of Jeddah Western Region,” (PhD thesis, University of Glasgow Business School, May 2009), 78.  
257 Ministry of Economy and Planning, “Economic Indicators” 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/index.jsp;jsessionid=3AFA907046FA732B38AB623FD7D9AD47.alfa?event=
ArticleView&Article.ObjectID=79 (last visited 25 September 2012) 
258 World Bank-FIAS, 29 section 131. 
259 Council of Ministers, Decision No. 142, dated 19/11/1413 AH (1 January 2003). 
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less than 75 per cent. The Ministry of Labour, in a recent attempt to promote the 
Saudization policy, has established a program called ‘Nitaqat,’ which evaluates 
private-sector entities based on their Saudization performance.260 In an interview 
conducted on 17 June 2007, Saudi Arabia's former chief technical negotiator for the 
accession to WTO, Dr Fawaz Al-Alamy, mentioned that, during WTO accession 
negotiations, Saudi Arabia had succeeded in obtaining a reasonable percentage of 75 
per cent for its nationals' employment in foreign companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia.261 Compliance with these requirements are thoroughly scrutinised, and failure 
to meet them may be penalised by denial of applications for new foreign employment 
visas.262 A foreign investor may be troubled by the Saudization policy, especially 
when a Saudi national does not possess the required skills. It has been argued that 
opening up the Saudi economy to attract FDI ‘could cause conflict’ for Saudization, 
since the ‘aggressive Saudization policy’ could deter foreign investors, as they prefer 
to work in an open labour market in which supply and demand is derived from 
experience and qualifications.263 Although the Ministry of Labour, in theory, has the 
discretion to reduce the required percentage of Saudi labourers in situations where 
Saudi workers with the necessary technical proficiency or academic qualifications are 
not available, in practice ‘this ministerial discretion is not necessarily invoked and 
hence the foreign investor is usually compelled to hire not only foreign labourers, but 
also administrative personnel.’264 
 
4.17.3 Labour Law: Restrictions on Employee Dismissal 
An additional impediment to foreign investors is that Saudi employees, unlike 
their foreign counterparts, are subject to labour regulations that impose substantial 
restrictions on the employer’s right to dismiss employees. Essentially, foreign 
investors operating in Saudi Arabia ‘found that the [Labour Law] makes it difficult to 
dismiss employees who are simply not satisfactory.’265 
                                                 
260 For Nitaqat, see Ministry of Labour, http://www.emol.gov.sa/nitaqat/pages/default.aspx (last visited 
25 September 2012). 
261 See, generally, Fawaz Al-Alamy, The Concept of WTO in an Understandable Language: Saudi 
Arabia's Experience in the WTO (Saudi Arabia, Riyadh: Almoayyad, 2006): 545 sections 3-16. 
262 World Bank-FIAS, 29 section 131. 
263 See Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 369. 
264 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 66. 
265 World Bank-FIAS, section 192. 
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In general, the Labour Law requires an employer to give an employee a show-
cause notice presenting the proof of due cause for dismissal. In certain limited cases, 
however, an employer may dismiss an employee for cause without giving any prior 
notice. The grounds for such dismissal include: assault on an employer or supervisor, 
failure to perform contractual obligations or to obey orders, dishonest or 
dishonourable conduct, wilfully causing material loss to the employer, use of 
misrepresentation or forgery to obtain employment, inordinate absence, or disclosure 
of trade secrets to third parties.266 
In addition, contract employees hired for an unspecified term may be 
dismissed for any ‘valid reason,’ provided that they have been given prior notice; the 
notice is appealable within thirty days of receipt.267 However, the regulations do not 
define what constitutes a valid reason for termination. Rather, valid reasons are 
defined by the Commission for Solving Labour Disputes on a case-by-case basis.268 
If an employee is dismissed without cause or valid reason, the employer is 
generally required to pay termination compensation and offer a severance package.269 
In a number of employment cases, the issue of the lawfulness of an employee 
dismissal was raised, including dismissal for drinking alcohol; defamation of the 
employer; misconduct and violations of Article 80 (2) of the Labour Law, which 
provides that an employee may be dismissed if he does not perform the essential 
obligations as specified in the employment contract or if he fails to follow lawful 
employment instructions although notified to do so.270 According to Article 210 of the 
Labour Law, these disputes are to be settled by the Preliminary and High Commission 
for the Settlement of Labour Disputes.271  
 
4.18 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms for Foreign Investment  
The FIL provides that: 
[D]isputes arising between the government and the Foreign Investor relating 
to his licensed investments . . . shall as far as possible be settled amicably, and 
                                                 
266 Labour Law, Article 80. 
267 Ibid., Article 75. 
268 World Bank-FIAS, 40 § 196.  
269 Labour Law, Article 77. 
270 See, e.g., Commission for Solving Labour Disputes: Decision No. 1330-426, dated 15 August 2005; 
Decision No. 823, dated 23 November 2004; Decision No. 1161-426, dated 19 June 2005; Decision 
No. 1257-426, dated 24 July 2005. 
271 Labour Law, Part XIV.  
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if this shall prove to be impossible, then the dispute shall be settled according 
to regulations.272 
 
 An identical provision is made for disputes arising between the foreign 
investor and the investor’s Saudi partners.273 In turn, the FIL provides that all disputes 
in Saudi Arabia may be settled by means of litigation, which includes proceedings 
before the Board of Grievances or through arbitration.274 This process is consistent 
with the World Bank Guidelines, which state that ‘disputes between private foreign 
investors and the host state will normally be settled through negotiations between 
them and failing this, through national courts or through other agreed mechanisms 
including conciliation and binding independent arbitration.’275 Moreover, according to 
the implementing Rules of the FIL, an Investment Disputes Settlement Center is to be 
established within SAGIA.276 Although some changes in the dispute settlement 
mechanisms have been made, the government of Saudi Arabia has recently noted that 
‘the speed at which the [investment-] related disputes can be settled [is] among the 
most important elements that must be revised, modernized and integrated to create a 
suitable environment’ for the efficient and effective operation of the private sector.277 
 
4.19 Conclusion 
The FIL was enacted in order to assist in opening Saudi Arabia’s economy to 
FDI. This chapter concentrated first on whether the FIL does indeed assist in 
encouraging and attracting foreign investment to Saudi Arabia. It referred to the 
World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment; while these 
guidelines are not binding, they provide a benchmark for an effective legal framework 
designed to encourage FDI. 
                                                 
272 FIL, Article 13. Dispute settlement mechanisms for foreign investment is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
273 Ibid. 
274 For an overview of the dispute resolution mechanisms and methods in Saudi Arabia, see, generally, 
Nancy B. Turck, “Resolution of Disputes in Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly 6 (1991): 3. 
275 Guideline V.1. 
276 FIL Executive Rules, Article 26. 
277 Supreme Economic Council, “Privatization Strategy: Basic Issues to be Dealt With in the 
Privatization Process.” 
http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/64fdcaa1-3bf9-4fd0-ac80-bf6584022180/Basic_Issues.aspx (last visited 
25 September 2012). 
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To understand the necessity of the FIL, the economic backdrop in Saudi 
Arabia was examined through an analysis of the five-year development plans, as well 
through a discussion on the investment climate prior to the FIL.  The past three 
decades have witnessed considerable changes in the Saudi economy, mainly due to 
the five-year plans (and their varying rates of success). This chapter outlined several 
other reasons that demonstrate that the FIL was necessary for Saudi Arabia. The 
unemployment rate was, and continues to be, extremely high. The FDI, then, is meant 
to create new jobs and to reduce the country’s dependence on oil revenues. The FIL is 
also meant to help Saudi Arabia achieve greater globalisation, particularly in light of 
its recent accession to the WTO, and to help the transition from a dual-economic 
structure into a highly integrated economy. Indeed, the UNCTAD “World Investment 
Report 2006” asserted that Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO ‘has accelerated the 
country’s integration into the global economy as well as its liberalization of inward 
FDI.’278 
The various objectives of the Saudi Arabian investment policy were also 
discussed. The primary goal is diversification of the economy, followed by the 
creation of new sources of revenue within the country and creating more jobs for 
Saudi nationals. One way to achieve these objectives is through technology transfer, 
and it is hoped that this shift will lead to a Saudi-based technology industry. The 
country was required to open its markets to global business as a prerequisite for 
admission to the WTO, so joining this organisation required a significant change in 
investment rules. 
By the enactment of the FIL on 10 April, 2000, the Saudi Arabian government 
began to seriously encourage foreign investment, in line with the aforementioned 
objectives. This adoption indicated a significant shift in the country’s foreign 
investment policy. After adopting the FIL, SAGIA was established as the sole 
government agency responsible for licensing foreign investment projects.  
The transformation that took place in Saudi Arabia’s under the FIL 
demonstrates a clear determination by the Saudi government to open up the economy 
to FDI; which can be understood from the perspective of the middle-path theory. This 
theory, unlike the dependency and neo-classical theories, acknowledges both the 
benefits and possible negative effects of FDI on a host country. It can be argued, 
                                                 
278 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “World Investment Report 
2006,” 66, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2006_en.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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however, that the middle-path theory does not place much emphasis on cultural and 
religious considerations; rather it emphasises the economic effects of FDI on a host 
country. 
There are certain activities that are excluded from foreign investment due to 
their strategic importance for the protection of the economy and for national security. 
Under FIL, the authority for the licensing was vested within SAGIA, which issues 
both permanent and temporary licenses, and it is required to make a decision with 
respect to a license within thirty days. The FIL also requires SAGIA to assist foreign 
investors with other administrative processes that must be completed in the course of 
setting up the investment enterprises. 
As indicated, according to the FIL, wholly foreign-owned companies are 
granted the right to purchase and own real estate in their name if it is necessary for 
operating the investment project or for housing a foreign investor’s family or staff. 
The 2000 Regulations, however, may pose a major obstacle to foreign investors’ right 
to own real estate.  
The current legal framework also fails to provide for equal treatment of 
foreign investors and Saudi nationals in tax matters. The new law provides for a fixed 
tax rate of 20 per cent on all income received from non-Saudi shares in joint ventures, 
as well as by non-Saudi legal residents doing business in the country and by non-
residents doing business in the country through a permanent enterprise or earning 
income from other sources in Saudi Arabia. 
Immigration regulations pose another major restriction on foreign investment 
in Saudi Arabia, and these regulations have remained largely unchanged following the 
adoption of the FIL. The FIL allows licensed companies with 100 per cent foreign 
ownership to sponsor foreign managerial staff members and other employees for 
visas. These requirements, the restrictions on employment, and the labour regulations 
are all obstacles for foreign investment. An Investment Disputes Settlement Center is 
to be established within SAGIA, where disputes can be settled amicably, but if that is 
not possible, then they can be settled according to existing Saudi regulations. 
The FIL changed the investment rules that existed under the 1979 Law. The 
new law opened more investment fields to foreign investors, and it allowed a foreign 
investor to obtain more than one license in diverse activities. However, despite 
positive changes made by the FIL, which are largely in compliance with the World 
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Bank Guidelines, numerous administrative barriers still exist in Saudi Arabia for 
foreign investment.  
In striving to achieve globalisation and economic diversity, as well as 
attempting to provide a much-needed infrastructure for foreign investment, Saudi 
Arabia has demonstrated a shifting attitude towards privatisation and dispute 
settlement through arbitration. This thesis will now look in detail at the historical 
development and eventual acceptance of these two necessary components needed for 
a fully diversified approach to economic growth.  
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5.1 Introduction 
This study previously discussed the concept of FDI in general and its 
applicability in the context of the FIL. This chapter continues the examination of the 
legal framework by looking at privatisation and its role in FDI in Saudi Arabia. 
The first question to ask is whether a positive relationship exists between 
privatisation and FDI. A number of scholars and organisations have claimed that there 
is such a correlation. Findings by the World Bank and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development both indicate that ‘while several countries around the 
globe have been aggressive in strengthening their private sector, the significance of 
the privatization program also seems to be strengthened by massive increases in 
FDI.’1 Privatisation makes the climate more investor-friendly by increasing the 
opportunities for investment.2 The World Bank further stated in a report in 2003 that 
private markets are an ‘engine of productivity growth,’ as they not only improve 
productivity and raise income, but also improve basic services and the wellbeing of 
the poor by improving infrastructure, health, and education. Furthermore, 
privatisation ‘increases economic efficiency, promotes competition, improves 
delivery of public services and facilitates the transition to a market economy as well 
as reduction of government debt.’3 In recent years, many countries from around the 
world have decided to undergo the process of privatising different parts of their 
economy. Argentina, the Czech Republic, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Hungary, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, South 
Korea, and the United Kingdom are just a few examples.4 
                                                 
1 Azmat Gani, “Foreign Direct Investment and Privatization,” USPEC Working Paper 2005/6, 
Department of Economics, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji, 1, March 2005. See, generally, 
Paul Cook and Yuichiro Uchida, “Privatisation and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” 
Journal of Development Studies 39 no. 6 (2003): 121; World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” 
Washington, DC (2003); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “FDI 
and Development: Policy Issues Related to the Growth of FDI in Services” in Note by the UNCTAD 
Secretarait, TD/B/COM.2/55, 24 November 2003.  
2 See, generally, Kaushik Basu, “Globalization and the Politics of International Finance: The Stiglitz 
Verdict,” Journal of Economic Literature 41, no. 3 (September 2003): 885–899.  
3 Gani, “Foreign Direct Investment and Privatization,” 8. 
4 Pierre Guislain, The Privatization Challenge, a Strategic, Legal and Institutional Analysis of 
International Experience, World Bank Sectoral Studies Report, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997): 
1. The privatisation launched by the British government when Margaret Thatcher was the prime 
minister is historically the most important privatisation program. The major objectives were raising 
revenue for the state, promoting economic efficiency, reducing government interference in the 
economy, promoting wider share of ownership, providing opportunities to introduce competition, 
subjecting state-owned enterprises to market discipline, and developing the national capital market. See 
William L. Megginson and Jeffrey M. Netter, “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies 
on Privatization,” Journal of Economic Literature 39 (June 2001): 321. 
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This chapter provides an explanation for the essential role that privatisation 
played in attracting FDI to Saudi Arabia. This chapter addresses the economic effects 
of privatisation, and its impact on employment on the Saudi labour market. It also 
discusses various rationales for privatisation. In addition, this chapter addresses the 
privatisation approach in the Middle East region and its implications on Saudi Arabia. 
An overview of the relationship between privatisation and FDI in Saudi Arabia is 
discussed, and an examination of the extent of Saudi Arabia’s achievement in 
implementing its privatisation policy is undertaken, with several examples of sectors 
that have already been privatised. 
 
5.2 Defining Privatisation in Saudi Arabia  
The word ‘privatisation’ can have different meanings.5 While there is no 
standard definition, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) describes privatisation as the ‘transfer of ownership and control of 
government or state assets, firms and operation to private investors. This transfer 
takes the form of issue and sale or outright distribution of shares to the general 
public.’6 The OECD broadly defines privatisation as ‘other policies such as 
“contracting out”, that is, the process by which activities while publicly organized and 
financed, are carried out by private sector companies.’7 Similarly, the Supreme 
Economic Council (SEC) of Saudi Arabia defines it as:  
[T]he process of transferring the ownership or management of public 
enterprises, projects, and services to the private sector, relying on market 
mechanisms and competition, through a number of methods including 
contracts for managing, operating, leasing, financing, or selling all or part of 
the government’s assets to the private sector.8  
                                                 
5 It is interesting to note that some countries use other terms to describe the process of privatisation. 
For example, ‘capitalisation’ in Bolivia, ‘peopleisation’ in Sri Lanka, and ‘equitisation’ in Vietnam. In 
addition, the term ‘commercialisation’ was used for privatisation of the Canadian National Railway 
Company, and the term ‘strategic consolidation’ was used to refer to privatisation of the Belgian 
telecommunications company Belgacom. See Guislain, The Privatization Challenge, 12. 
6 See R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, “Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and 
Competition Law,” 161, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs,1993,  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
7 Ibid, 161. 
8 See Supreme Economic Council, Privatization Strategy, Privitization Objectives and Policies (B). 
http://www.sec.gov.sa/Privatization_Strategy/Privatization_Objectives_and_Policies.aspx?lang=en-US 
(last visited 25 September 2012). Black’s Law Dictionary defines privatisation as ‘the act or process of 
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In a broader sense, privatisation can be understood as referring to privatising 
public enterprises through divestiture or other methods. In a narrower sense, it can be 
understood as a concept of permanent transfer of control through a direct transfer of 
ownership from a public agency to a private party or through a capital increase to 
which a private party has a right to subscribe.9  
Privatisation is closely associated with deregulation and market 
liberalisation,10 however, it is important to differentiate between the two concepts.11 
Privatisation is the change from state ownership and management of an area of 
economic activity to private ownership and management of that activity. Deregulation 
of markets is possible without privatisation and may not involve the change of 
property rights linked with privatisation. In addition, market liberalisation can be 
described as a process of removing market restrictions with the intent of improving 
production efficiency. 
It has been argued that privatisation, when carried out with market 
liberalisation, creates greater competition and offers the prospect of broadening the 
choice of products to consumers.12  
Privatisation can be conducted on different levels: enterprise-level, sector-
level, and the entire economy-level. 
A broad definition of enterprise-level privatisation includes procedures that 
result in the temporary transfer of public agencies’ activities to the private sector, 
such as sub-contracting; management contracts; lease of state-owned enterprises, 
equipment, or assets; concessions; or build-operate-transfer contracts (BOT).13 It may 
be argued that transfer of ownership, as opposed to transfer of management, is a more 
                                                                                                                                           
converting a business or industry from governmental ownership or control to private enterprise.’ 
Black’s Law Dictionary Deluxe. 8th ed. (Saint Paul, MN: Thompson West, 2004). Similarly, the 
International Monetary Fund defines privatisation as ‘the sale of a state-owned enterprise to the private 
sector.’ International Monetary Fund, “Fabric of Reform Glossary,”  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fabric/gloss.htm (last visited 25 September 2012). 
9 Guislain, The Privatization Challenge, 10. 
10 See Mohammed Al-Sarhan and John R. Presley, “Privatisation in Saudi Arabia: An Attitudinal 
Survey,” Managerial Finance 27, no. 10/11 (2001): 114, doi: 10.1108/03074350110767600.  
11 Deregulation is ‘the reduction or elimination of governmental control of business, esp. to permit free 
markets and competition.’ Black’s Law Dictionary. 
12 See Al-Sarhan and Presley, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia, 114–116. 
13 Subcontracting can cover an entire public service (for example, trash collection) or part of the public 
service (for example, water or electricity meter reading and billing). See Guislain, The Privatization 
Challenge, 10. Management contracts temporarily transfer management responsibility without 
transferring the ownership or really transferring control. Ibid. For an example of a Build-Operate-Own-
Transfer (BOOT) contract, see Chapter 4, section 4.7. 
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suitable means of privatisation in Saudi Arabia, ‘where the cultural, religious, and 
social aspects have a relatively strong influential role in the economic policy making 
process.’14 This is especially true when newly appointed management may be 
subjected to political and bureaucratic interference that hinders its ability to make the 
necessary market-oriented decisions.15  
Sector-level privatisation is based on introducing private ownership into the 
sectors with exclusively public representation, often accompanied by abolishing the 
monopoly of the state in a particular sector and, thus, the barriers to private entry.16 
Privatisation at the economy level depends on the degree of state ownership prior to 
privatisation, the planned scope of privatisation, and the state control of the reform 
program adopted.17  
Despite the differences among these three levels of privatisation, all of them 
are interactive. On the one hand, the privatisation approach on the lower level—the 
state-owned enterprises—needs to be consistent with the privatisation approach on the 
higher levels—with sector-level or whole-economy privatisation. On the other hand, 
experience gained by privatising a state-owned enterprise can be useful in developing 
a more effective strategy for privatising an entire sector of an economy.18  
Certain trends can be observed in privatisation. First, states mainly focus on 
privatising industrial, financial, and commercial ventures. Second, states then focus 
on infrastructure and services sectors. Third, states look to privatise municipal, local, 
and social sectors, including health, education, and administrative activities.19  
                                                 
14 See Ibrahim Akoum, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia: Is Slow Beautiful?” Thunderbird International 
Business Review 51, no. 5 (September/October 2009): 437–438. doi: 10.1002/tie.20281. 
15 Ibid., 437–438 
16 See Guislain, The Privatization Challenge, 10. In 2003, the government of Saudi Arabia took a 
major step to privatise its telecommunications sector by selling 30 per cent of its shares to Saudi 
citizens, discussed in this chapter.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 11. 
19 Ibid., 2. Also, note that in Argentina, the government began privatisation in the 1980s to gain 
international financial resources. In 1989, it commenced passing decrees that deregulated its oil 
industry. Those decrees lifted the restrictions on the market for crude oil, allowed the renegotiation of 
contracts, lifted restrictions on creating both refineries and service stations, opened the domestic 
market, allowed the import and export of crude oil, and eliminated duties and tariffs. The decrees 
essentially meant that domestic and foreign oil companies could participate in all aspects of the oil 
industry, except ownership of the underground reserves of Argentina. In 1990, Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF; the Argentina National Oil Company) was declared a corporation, and in 
1993, it was sold to private investors. Overall, the privatisation was done in three steps: (1) eliminating 
non-strategic, unprofitable businesses, (2) restructuring the organization, and (3) offering the company 
to investors in national and foreign markets through an initial public offering. Robert Grosse and Juan 
Yanes, “Carrying Out a Successful Privatization: The YPF Case,” Academy of Management Executive 
12, no. 2 (May 1998): 51–63. 
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The privatisation phenomenon is not limited to countries with a liberal 
ideology. Privatisation programs have been designed in countries with a capitalist 
tradition, in countries in transition from a centralized economy to a market economy, 
and in developing countries.20 Such programs are also conducted at different levels, 
varying from mass nation-wide privatisation in some countries to financial incentives 
tendered to employees and small shareholders in other countries.21  
 
5.3 The Economic Effects of Privatisation  
Privatisation can bring benefits to the economy of the state through its likely 
positive effect on macroeconomic policies. By privatising state-owned companies, 
state expenses can be minimized by reducing the investment and support that the state 
has an obligation to provide to state-owned companies.22 Consequently, lower 
spending by the state, combined with higher fiscal revenues coming from privatised 
companies, can positively affects fiscal policy. Similarly, the sale of public assets can 
lead to larger fiscal receipts and as a result, better fiscal policy can reduce fiscal 
deficit. In addition, privatisation can contribute to a country’s external debt reduction, 
stimulate domestic and foreign investments, and generate new sources of tax 
revenues.23 Generally, an improved and more effective economy of a state increases 
domestic and foreign confidence in the economy.  
Privatisation of state-owned companies can benefit the economy of a country 
in different ways, it can be described by classifying the main objectives of the process 
of privatization: first, to achieve higher allocation-based and productive efficiency; 
second, to strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy; third, to improve 
                                                 
20 See Al-Sarhan and Presley, “Privatization in Saudi Arabiaey,” 114; Guislain, The Privatization 
Challenge, 2. 
21 See Guislain, The Privatization Challenge, 3. For example, over the past twenty years, South Korea 
has had an ever-increasing privatisation effort. This transfer of control from public sectors to private 
sectors has been accomplished by selling stocks and services to the private sector, which includes the 
direct sale to investors and the sale of capital stock in an open market. The government did this transfer 
in four stages between 1960 and 1996. The first and second stages involved developing technology and 
strategic industries, as well as creating a business environment to foster the financial industry. The 
third and fourth stages involved selling off major and minor public enterprises. Yang Ho Oh, 
“Privatization.” International Financial Law Review 21 no.7 (July 2002): 67–71. 
22 See Tariq M. Al-Salloum, “Policy Choices in Developing Countries: The Case of Privatization in 
Saudi Arabia,” (PhD thesis, George Mason University, May 1999) 15–16. 
23 Ibid, 16. For example, in 1987, the government of Malaysia reduced 20 per cent of its public debt by 
privatising its state-owned enterprises. In addition, the government saved nearly four billion Malaysian 
Ringgits (MYR) by privatising certain public works. Ibid. 
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the public sector’s financial health; and fourth, to free resources for allocation in other 
important areas of government activity.24 
Privatisation can improve the performance of the state companies and increase 
the value of their stocks, thereby contributing to an increase in the value of the local 
stock market and attracting more investment.25 The privatisation process generally 
encourages competition within the private sector, so, as a result, it is expected to 
increase productivity, efficiency, and quality of the products or services, leading to 
lower prices and to wider consumer choices.26 
Another important aspect of privatisation is an expectation of more efficient 
management of state-owned companies. Public companies tend to have little incentive 
to be efficient for two main reasons. The first reason can be referred to as the political 
perspective, in which managers of state-owned companies want to have political 
careers or report to someone who does. Therefore, they tend to lean toward maximum 
employment and minimum personal risk, while at the same time they have no concern 
for poor investments that would put the company at risk. There is also no concern 
about bankruptcy because of what is known as soft-budget constraints: the 
government will bail out a company before it goes bankrupt. The second reason can 
be referred to as the managerial perspective: managers of state-owned enterprises can 
perform poorly because they have no competition and no real monitoring. The 
company will continue to exist as long as it does just enough to get by. Adherents of 
this perspective argue that because state institutions create natural monopoly 
conditions since there is no competition to drive the enterprise.27  
When competition is introduced into the state economy as a result of 
privatisation, efficiency of state-owned companies improves for a number of reasons. 
First, eliminating restrictions on foreign investments and government control on 
prices helps the newly privatised firms reach the private sectors’ competitive 
standards.28 Second, open competition on the market economy puts continuous 
pressure on the managers of the state-owned enterprises to conduct their business in 
                                                 
24 See Eytan Sheshinski and Luis Lòpez-Calva, “Privatization and its Benefits: Theory and Evidence,” 
CESifo Economic Studies 49, no. 3 (2003): 429–430.  
25 See Obaid A. Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment System: 
A Study of Undergraduate College Students in Saudi Arabia,” (PhD dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, 2003), 30. 
26 See Al-Sarhan and Presley, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia, 114. 
27 Sheshinski and Lòpez-Calva, “Privitization and its Benefits,” 429. 
28 Ibid. 
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the most efficient way possible to avoid the risk of bankruptcy.29 Third, effective 
management leads to more efficient allocation of resources. Fourth, consequently, this 
incites economic growth of the state and enhances national wellbeing by creating 
more jobs and income.30 
The correlation between privatisation and FDI flows shows that privatisation 
can improve the investment climate, thus encouraging FDI inflows by providing ‘less 
policy risk for foreign investors.’31 It has been argued that the possibility of FDI can 
increase the incentive for privatisation to a certain degree; new capital inflows, 
technology, and managerial skills, often associated with FDI, play essential roles in 
enhancing the competitiveness of the economy and providing governments with an 
environment to privatise inefficient public firms.32 
 
5.4 Effects of Privatisation on Employment  
It might be argued that privatisation of state-owned enterprises has a mixed 
effect on employment.33 On the one hand, employees working for the privatised 
companies usually earn higher salaries and the investments accompanying 
privatisation often create new employment opportunities.34 On the other hand, 
privatisation can lead to the reduction of the workforce in the enterprises being 
privatised.35 Because of these possible negative employment effects of privatisation, 
                                                 
29 However, it must be emphasised that the validity of this assumption is contingent on efficiency of 
the markets and existence of significant competition pushing private producers to improve their 
productivity if they are to survive. Ibid., 437 
30 See Al-Salloum, “Policy Choices in Developing Countries,” 17. 
31 Narjess Boubakri, Jean-Claude Cosset, Nassima Debab and Pascale Valéry et al., “The Dynamics of 
Foreign Direct Investment and Privatization: An Empirical Analysis,” International Management 13 
(2009): 82. 
32 Ibid., 81, 83. 
33 Large layoffs especially happen in highly protected and political enterprises. For example, there were 
80 per cent layoffs in Argentina’s railways, 72 per cent in its petroleum enterprise, and 50 per cent in 
its electricity enterprise. In Brazil, the railroads saw an 82 per cent employment reduction; in Manila 
there was a 42 per cent employment loss in water infrastructure; and Mexico saw a 50 per cent loss in 
its firms. These cuts were needed to be competitive with competing firms. Firms in high-demand 
sectors, such as telecommunications, tend to experience little to no decline in employment, and it is 
generally assumed that any such downsizing is temporary only until the economy picks up and creates 
new jobs. See Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis, “Privatization in Competitive Sectors: The Record to 
Date” (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2860, June 2002): 17.  
34 Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment System,” 21. 
35 For example, during the privatisation of YPF, the Argentinian national oil company, close to 50,000 
workers were laid off. Grosse and Yanes, “Carrying Out a Successful Privatization,” 57. However, it 
must be emphasised that there are certain problems with this assumption. A review of seventeen 
privatisation projects found job increases in four cases (averaging 23 per cent increase), no change in 
six cases, and losses in seven cases (averaging 44 per cent loss of the workforce before privatisation). 
Rolph Van der Hoeven and Gyorgy Sziracki, Lessons from Privatization: Labour Issues in Developing 
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questions arise: Who should be responsible for restructuring the labour market? 
Should it be the government? before privatizing the state-owned enterprises, or should 
it be the newly created private company which has taken over the formerly state-
owned company? 
One way to approach this issue is by differentiating between the need to lay 
off employees because of overstaffing or because of the necessary restructuring of the 
company to address the needs of the market. However, opinions about who should be 
responsible for laying-off employees vary greatly. Some argue that because the 
government created the problem, it should be responsible for the layoffs. Others argue 
that because the government created the problem and cannot solve it, which produced 
the need for privatizing, the private sector should be responsible for restructuring. 
Others further argue that because the private sector is accustomed to layoffs for 
purposes of productivity and therefore it should be allowed to restructure the 
employee makeup of the newly privatized companies.36 In the first instance, firing 
employees should be done by the state before the actual privatisation, such as 
encouraging early and voluntary retirement.37  
The state can provide workers displaced because of privatisation and 
restructuring with social support packages, such as temporary income support, active 
labour programs, and labour redeployment services. For example, labour programs 
can include direct dialogue among the government, enterprise management, workers, 
and community leaders.38 
In the second instance, the work force reduction should be left to the new 
owners of the privatised enterprise.39 In either case, it is important that the 
                                                                                                                                           
and Transitional Countries (International Labour Organization 1997). For example, in Chile, 
employment in ten state-owned enterprises increased 10 per cent after privatisation because of overall 
economic growth. David H. Fretwell, “Mitigating the Social Impact of Privatization and Enterprise 
Restructuring,” (World Bank Working Paper, January 25, 2002), 3. Unfortunately, however, no such 
data is available in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
36 Fretwell, “Mitigating the Social Impact of Privatization and Enterprise Restructuring,” 9. 
37 Ibid., 5. See also Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment 
System,” 41. 
38 In Brazil, for instance, a set of support packages was used to retrench employees between 1995 and 
1997 in six state-owned enterprises; these included severance packages, medical benefits, retraining, 
help for business start-ups, and job search assistance. Fretwell, “Mitigating the Social Impact of 
Privatization and Enterprise Restructuring,” 3–9. In Argentina, when privatizing YPF, the Argentine 
national oil company, the government offered workers courses for retraining and developing additional 
skills for one year with full pay, and gave generous severance packages at the end of the year. The 
government also offered early retirement with full benefits to workers who qualified for it, and 
encouraged other workers to create their own private businesses from which YPF would contract their 
services for up to two years. Grosse and Yanes, “Carrying out a Successful Privatization,” 56. 
39 Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment System,” 41. 
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government lead a dialogue with employees and workers to keep them informed 
about steps undertaken and benefits brought by privatisation, so as to avoid fears of 
corruption and forced privatisation. This can be accomplished through various means, 
such as televised advertisements; open, public bids; and public offering transactions.40 
The response of Saudi Arabia to these challenges is discussed later in this chapter. 
. 
5.5 Rationales of Privatization: Would it work in Saudi 
Arabia? 
From a historic point of view, it can be argued that privatisation was a reaction 
to the expansion of state-controlled economies during the 1960s and 1970s.41 The 
justification given for this public-sector growth was the perceived need of a state to 
control what it viewed as strategic national resources and a hesitation to face 
competition from the private sector.42 However, this expansion of a state’s economy, 
accompanied by increased public expenditures, turned into economic stagnation in 
many countries. Heavy losses by state-owned enterprises, state provision of subsidies 
and of protection from domestic and foreign competitors, over centralization of the 
state enterprises, a lack of clear objectives, overstaffing, high labour turnover and 
managerial incompetence can all be characterized as the main reasons impeding 
sound economic management and efficiency in a state-controlled economy.43 These 
can be some of the motives for which Saudi Arabia has chosen to move toward 
privatization in recent years. 
 
5.5.1 Economic Rationale 
Restructuring a state’s economy through privatisation is based on the 
philosophical concept of the neo-classical economic theory, which claims that 
                                                 
40 Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis, “An Assessment of Privatization,” The World Bank Research 
Observer 19, no. 1 (2004): 111–112. doi: 10.1093/wbro/lkh014. For example, in South Korea, the 
employees of enterprises being privatised protested because they did not feel fully informed about what 
would happen to them after a change from public to private sectors. In addition, after privatization, the 
government failed to inform these workers about a cost-benefit analysis showing that the privatisation 
was working. Oh, “Privatization,” 67–71. 
41 Nicolas De Walle, “Privatization in Developing Countries: A Review of the Issues,” World 
Development 17, no. 5 (1989): 601. 
42 Tony Killick and Simon Commander, “State Divestiture as a Policy Instrument in Developing 
Countries.” World Development 16, no. 12 (1988): 1466; Richard A. Yoder, Philip L. Borkholder, 
Brian D. Friesen, “Privatization and Development: The Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Developing 
Areas 25, no. 3 (April 1991): 425–434. 
43 De Walle, “Privatization in Developing Countries,” 603. 
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resource allocation and economic growth are more efficient in a free market 
economy.44 The main benefits of free markets can be characterised as a competitive 
environment of multiple providers, price signalling of a market reflecting true 
economic costs,45 better responsiveness of private enterprises to customer needs, 
higher accountability to resource providers, and less inclination toward corruption and 
waste in private enterprises.46 In addition, privatisation brings other economic 
benefits— ‘non-market efficiency gains’—such as decreases in bureaucratic 
interference and political pressure, decentralised decision-making, and more effective 
information flow within the company.47 All of these benefits create more constructive 
conditions for operating companies more efficiently. However, it should be noted that 
privatisation in Saudi Arabia has done little to decrease bureaucratic interference in 
the affairs of foreign investors; such is the case of SABIC and Ma’aden, which have 
been partially privatised but whose boards of directors continue to be comprised of 
government representatives.48  
 
5.5.2 Social Rationale 
Proponents of privatisation argue that it leads to a better standard of living for 
more of the population. Competition among suppliers leads to better and more 
reasonably priced goods and services,49 as observed in the Saudi telecommunications 
industry as a result of privatization of this important sector of the economy. In recent 
years, Etihad Etisalat (Mobily) and Zain Group, two newly established 
telecommunications foreign companies, with the involvement of foreign shares, have 
begun to compete with Saudi Telecom Company. This has benefited Saudi consumers 
                                                 
44 An average of four studies’ data shows that profitability increases by 4 per cent after privatisation; 
efficiency rises by nearly 25 per cent; and between 79 per cent and 86 per cent of firms see increases in 
output per worker. Megginson and Netter, “From State to Market,” 93. 
45 Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis, and Mary Shirley, “Privatization: Lessons from Market Economies. The 
World Bank Research Observer 9, no. 2 (July 1944): 241–272. doi: 10.1093/wbro/9.2.241; John 
Vickers and George Yarrow, “Economic Perspectives on Privatization.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5, no.2 (Spring 1991): 111–132. 
46 E. S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government, (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House 
Publishers, 1987). 
47 De Walle, “Privatization in Developing Countries,” 605. 
48 See Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), “Our Company,” 
http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/default.aspx (last visited 25 September 2012); 
Ma’aden was formed in 1997 for the purpose of developing the Kingdom’s mineral resources. See 
Ma’aden, “Company History,” http://www.maaden.com.sa/eng/history.htm (last visited 25 September 
2012). 
49 Tony Killick and Simon Commander, “State Divestiture as a Policy Instrument in Developing 
Countries.” World Development 16, no.12 (1988): 1465–1479. 
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with lower prices and a greater variety of choices. For example, in the mid-1990s, the 
cost of a cell phone line was upwards of 10,000 Saudi riyals (nearly US$3,000). 
Privatisation of the industry in 2002 made cell phone technology affordable for the 
general public. Economic growth, in which privatisation may play a vital role, creates 
job opportunities and, consequently, raises the level of national income.50 It is 
claimed that, as a result, the social system of a country will become more stable.51  
Privatisation, however, is also associated with unequal income distribution. 
Therefore, the presumption of an automatic link between privatisation and economic 
growth of a country is contingent on reinvestment of the income from privatisation 
into the domestic economy by the groups that most benefit from it. In addition, a shift 
in the state’s expenditures and tax policies is essential to correct income inequalities 
created by privatisation.52 
Unfortunately, in the case of Saudi Arabia, despite the government’s efforts to 
balance the inequalities in income distribution, income disparities grew as the private 
sector broadened its role in the national economy. Consequently, it was assumed that, 
at least in the short-term, privatisation on a larger scale would create even greater 
gaps in income between different levels of society.53  
 
5.5.3 Political Rationale 
It can be argued that liberalising the economy of a state and transferring its 
economic power to the private sector contributes to the political liberalisation of a 
country. In particular, the decrease in governmental interference in the economy of a 
developing state and the growth of a free market can lead to less governmental 
interference in general and to the growth of a stronger civil society and democratic 
political system in particular.54 However, there are still cases of extensive economic 
liberalisation associated with only very limited political democratisation, especially in 
the Middle East, that prohibit this theory from becoming a general rule.55 In the case 
of Saudi Arabia specifically, while the government would like to portray its economy 
                                                 
50 Sunita Kikeri, “Privatization and Labor: What Happens to Workers when Governments Divest?” 
(World Bank Technical Paper No. 396, 1997): 8 
51 Al-Salloum, “Policy Choices in Developing Countries, 15–16. 
52 Killick and Commander, “State Divestiture as a Policy Instrument in Developing Countries.” 1472–
1473. 
53 Al-Salloum, “Policy Choices in Developing Countries,” 20. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 21–22. 
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as being a free market, governmental interference is apparent throughout many levels 
of the economy, especially in sectors of strategic importance to the country. However, 
as observed by Peter Muchlinski:  
Given that publically-owned enterprises have predominated in strategic 
industries such as transport, public utilities, natural resources, energy, 
financial services and defense, the unregulated sale of such enterprises to the 
private sector raises the possibility of their falling under foreign ownership 
and control, thereby threatening existing national control over vital economic 
interests. Consequently, privatization of publically-owned companies has 
often involved restrictions on foreign ownership.56 
 
5.6 The Approach of Arab Countries to Privatisation: 
Implications for Saudi Arabia 
Opinions regarding privatisation in the Middle East vary greatly.57 Those who 
support state control and protection of the domestic industry and who are suspicious 
of foreign investment argue against privatisation. In their view, there are several 
reasons why the slow progress of privatisation in Middle Eastern countries is 
justified.58  
These arguments can be summarised in two main points. One, not enough 
evidence exists to prove that privatisation makes any substantial difference to 
economic performance and to the growth rate of a country’s economy.59 Two, a state 
should continue to hold stakes in profitable businesses, such as telecommunications.60 
These main arguments can be broken out into specific reasons to oppose 
privatisation, including that it does not produce financial or operational benefits equal 
to the social dislocation it causes; it leads to layoffs and worsening labour conditions; 
even if privatisation brings economic benefits, the bulk of the benefits goes to 
                                                 
56 Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
189. 
57 For arguments both in favour of and against privatisation, see Mohamed A. Ramady, The Saudi 
Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges, 1st ed. (New York: Springer, 2005): 329.  
58 Edmund O’Sullivan, “Some Naughty Thoughts about Privatization by an Observer of Middle East 
Economies,” in Arab Commercial Law: Principles and Perspectives, ed. William Ballantyne and 
Howard L. Stovall, (Chicago: Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar Association, 
2002): 117-124. 
59 Kikeri and Nellis, “An Assessment of Privatization,” 88–89. 
60 See O’Sullivan, “Some Naughty Thoughts about Privatization.”   
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privileged groups such as shareholders, managers, and domestic and foreign 
investors, but not to the average person; and, finally, privatisation is often forced by 
external actors and markets without proper regard to a country’s economic and social 
conditions. 61 
Other practical reasons can be considered for justifying the slow process of 
privatisation in Middle Eastern countries. Poorly implemented privatisation is 
counterproductive and can be extremely damaging to a country’s economy. For 
example, this might happen when companies providing services are undersold or are 
given away to a small group of well-connected insiders. If privatisation goes wrong, it 
is highly publicised and very visible because the state was formerly providing the 
services.62  
Those countries that take the time to set up regulations for markets and 
economies tend to see greater results from privatisation.63 Thus, unless legally 
regularised in a proper and sufficient manner, privatisation can cause practical 
problems that result in failure. As Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis argue, “the general 
rule should be to move swiftly in privatizing firms operating in competitive or 
potentially competitive markets, but to take the time to get the market and regulatory 
structures right when privatizing infrastructure firms or banks.”64  
In general, services by privatised firms are more expensive, at least in the 
beginning. For example, governments that protect its citizens from the transitional 
costs of privatisation might need to subsidise the production of such services. 
However, as a political matter, governments are generally concerned with being 
accused of subsidising a private company from public funds.65  
Also, there might be political arguments that oppose the privatisation of state-
owned facilities and the accompanying influx of foreign investment. One argument is 
that privatisation means shifting full ownership of the assets from a state to private 
investors. Privatization of state-owned assets with the participation of the foreign 
                                                 
61 Kikeri and Nellis, “An Assessment of Privatization,” 88–89. 
62 Ibid., 105. 
63 For example, in the Latin American and African telecommunications sectors, where regulations were 
set up, there was a direct correlation between increased telephone penetration, investment, and cellular 
subscriptions. See Scott Wallsten, “Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and Privatization in 
Telecommunications Reform,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2817 (February 
2002): 2. 
64 Kikeri and Nellis, “An Assessment of Privatization,” 112. For example, the lack of a complete 
regulatory system governing the operation of the power sector in Saudi Arabia created uncertainties for 
potential investors and, consequently, caused the failure of the Shuaiba power scheme of privatisation. 
65 See O’Sullivan, “Some Naughty Thoughts about Privatization.”   
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investors means giving away the ownership of the assets to these foreign entities. 
However, the issue of foreign ownership is one of the most politically charged issues 
in Middle Eastern countries. In addition, because the objects of the privatisation are 
infrastructure systems, such as water and electricity, governments are obligated to 
ensure that those systems will operate in all circumstances. Another argument is that 
Arab countries rarely differentiate between the concepts of ownership and 
sovereignty; they believe that when one controls a country’s major assets, one has 
control over the country’s government. Some would argue that the main driver of this 
hesitation to open the door wide to FDI is a result of this fear of loss of control. Saudi 
Arabia, however, currently allows 100 per cent foreign ownership of enterprises 
unless excluded in accordance with the aforementioned negative list. 
Another set of arguments against the privatisation and accompanying influx of 
foreign investment comes from the local business community. Privatisation is 
effective only when accompanied by competition. In fact, it is extremely difficult for 
most local private companies in Middle Eastern countries to compete with Western 
companies. The whole business community is thus very sensitive to any suggestion of 
competition coming from abroad.66 As a result, local companies are frightened of the 
power of foreign investors, such as those from international banks and companies, 
and support privatisation only to the extent that it benefits them. However, 
policymakers, who understand that the economy of a country does not benefit from 
selling its major assets to unproductive and protected local businesses, have become 
reluctant to adhere to a policy of limiting sale to locals. At the same time, though, 
policymakers in many Middle Eastern countries do not have sufficient support for the 
sale of assets to foreign investors.67 
 
5.6.1 Saudi Arabia’s Approach 
Some historical facts need to be highlighted when studying the approach of 
Saudi Arabia to privatisation, before addressing the process of privatization is Saudi 
Arabia and its relationship with FDI. 
 
                                                 
66 As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.7.1, increased competition can lead to the death of insufficiently 
or formerly protected domestic industries.  
67 See O’Sullivan, “Some Naughty Thoughts about Privatization.”   
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5.6.1.1 Historical Facts . 
In 1933, for example, the government decided to form the Arabian American 
Oil Company (now the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, or Aramco) to handle its oil 
operations.68 Other joint ventures across different sectors were encouraged as a way to 
learn from foreign expertise and to gain technical and technological knowledge.69 
Four stages in Saudi Arabia can be distinguished since World War II.70  
Between 1945 and 1974, oil revenues provided the entire funding for Saudi 
social and development projects. All projects dealing with education, infrastructure, 
urbanisation, health care, water, and power were public and were, therefore, decided, 
organised, and implemented by the state. Overall, the private sector was 
underdeveloped and underrepresented and, with the notable exception of Aramco, 
generally lacked credibility. This period is typical of the total control of the Saudi 
government in the evolution of the country. 
The period between 1975 and 1985 was marked by several important changes 
in the Saudi economy. The changes were called, among other names, ‘the gigantic 
projects stage,’ ‘the boom period,’ ‘the infrastructure construction stage,’ and ‘the 
five-year plan stage.’ The scope of the programs was guided by the ambitious goals of 
increasing the diversification of the economy, thus reducing the dependence on oil 
revenues. The unanimous opinion among economists, sociologists, and political 
scientists is that this stage is the most unique period of transformation since the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia in 1932. During this decade, huge, innovative projects 
were initiated to modernise the country, including the construction of the national 
road network and modern airports; tapping of natural gas; construction of large 
industrial cities in Jubail and Yanbu; of universities, research centres, and other 
academic and scholarly institutes; development of urbanisation programs; 
improvement of the medical health care system; and projects in agriculture.71 This 
                                                 
68 See Saudi Aramco, 
http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home.html#our-company%257C%252Fen%252Fhome%252Four-
company%252Four-history0.baseajax.html (last visited 25 September 2012). 
69 Al-Sarhan and Presley, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia,” 115. 
70 For the historical stages, see Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Saudi Arabia: The Opening of a Kingdom,” 
Asia Times Online, 7 January 2003,  
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EA07Ak03.html (last visited 25 September 2012).   
71 In September 1975, the Saudi government established the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, 
two industrial cities, with the goal of encouraging the development of Saudi industries, especially 
petrochemicals, and to encourage FDI. The Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, “About RC,”  
http://www.rcjy.gov.sa/en-us/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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period was also significant because of the government’s new will to develop the 
private sector, to help it become organised, and to get it involved in society’s changes.  
The period between 1985 and 1995 saw the continuation of the huge projects 
inaugurated in the preceding stage and the start of the consolidation of the social and 
economic structures of the country. The Saudization policy was initiated, and the 
private business environment was reorganised, strengthened, and developed. Despite 
severe global circumstances, such as a recession, a decrease in oil prices, and two 
Gulf Wars, this decade represented an increased coherence and strength of the 
country. 
In the period post-1995, the economy has matured and modernised 
significantly, and it is prepared to face global challenges. It shows, to some extent, the 
success of the preceding phases of development. 
All of these stages led Saudi Arabia to adapt its economy to globalisation, 
while privatisation has played a key role in this adaptation. Nassir M. Al-Ajmi, 
former executive vice president of Aramco, gave an interesting definition of 
privatisation in Saudi Arabia in an interview with the Asia Times:  
By privatization, we mean the trend to place some of our commercial 
organizations for subscription in which all categories of the society will share 
the ownership of commercial enterprises with a view to expanding ownership, 
financing and management base, thereby creating an integrated interactive 
society where the individual stands beside the government in shouldering his 
share of the national responsibility to build a contemporary economic society 
dominated by honest competition, creativity, integration and creation of fields 
and opportunities for a dynamic and prosperous society.72 
 
However, these advances can only benefit all socioeconomic levels of Saudi 
society if corruption is punished and accountability is enforced among those who are 
responsible for the implementation of privatisation. 
 
5.6.1.2 The Privatisation Policy. 
Since the 1980s, the economy of Saudi Arabia has been characterised by a 
relatively small contribution of the private sector to the gross domestic product 
                                                 
72 Shahzad, “Saudi Arabia,” 3. 
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(GDP).73 The share of the private sector in the GDP of Saudi Arabia was only 21.7 
per cent in 1980; 19.5 per cent in 1990; and 19.3 per cent in 1999.74 It might be 
argued that such limited participation of the private sector in the GDP was one of the 
main arguments for privatisation of state-owned enterprises in Saudi Arabia and for 
encouragement of FDI.  
In response to this situation, the government of Saudi Arabia promoted 
participation of the private sector by including privatisation in the development 
strategy of the economy. The Council of Ministers empowered the Supreme 
Economic Council (SEC) to supervise the privatisation program and to monitor its 
implementation.75 This strategy outlined the goal of increasing domestic and foreign 
investments; it clearly stated that, “[P]rivatization reflects the government’s 
commitment to economic reform and positive image to attract foreign investment.”76  
In 2002, the Council of Ministers approved the privatisation strategy, on the 
condition that the SEC set the objectives and policies for privatisation, as well as the 
administrative reforms for its enforcement.77 The Council of Ministers also approved 
the Table of Public Utilities and the type of activities and services targeted for 
privatisation, which included:  
 water and sewage;  
 desalinisation;  
 telecommunications;  
 aviation and its services;  
 railroads, roads, and highways;  
 airport services;  
 postal services;  
 grain silos and flour mills;  
                                                 
73 Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment System,” 29. 
74 In comparison, the following are the share of the private sector in the GDP of other countries: Brazil: 
1980, 23.3 per cent; 1990, 20.2 per cent; 1999, 20.4 per cent; 2000, 20.5 per cent. The Czech Republic: 
1990, 25.5 per cent; 1999, 27.9 per cent; 2000, 29.7 per cent. Egypt: 1980, 23.3 per cent; 1990, 20.2 
per cent; 1999, 20.4 per cent; 2000, 20.5 per cent. Jordan: 1980, 36.7 per cent; 1990, 31.9 per cent; 
1999, 20.8 per cent;  2000, 25.5 per cent. Malaysia: 1980, 27.4 per cent; 1990, 32.2 per cent; 1999, 
22.1 per cent. Mexico: 1980, 27.2 per cent; 1990, 23.1 per cent; 1999, 23.5 per cent; 2000, 23.3 per 
cent. Ibid. 
75 Council of Ministers Decision No. 257, dated 11/11/1421 AH (5 February 2001). 
76 See Supreme Economic Council, “Privatization Objectives and Policies,”  
http://www.sec.gov.sa/Privatization_Strategy/Privatization_Objectives_and_Policies.aspx?lang=en-US 
(last visited 25 September 2012).  
77 Council of Ministers Decision No. 1/23, dated 23/3/1423 AH (23 June 2002). 
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 seaport services;  
 industrial city services;  
 government shares in corporations, including the Saudi Electricity 
Company, Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation, Saudi Arabian 
Mining Company (Ma’aden), and Saudi Telecommunications Company; 
 government shares in banks and domestic oil refineries; 
 government shares in joint investment companies with Arab and Islamic 
countries; 
 government-owned hotels, sports clubs, and municipal services (including  
slaughterhouses), public markets and shopping centres, public parks, 
public transportation services, municipal revenue collections, cleaning and 
waste management services; educational services (including construction 
of buildings, printing of books, school transportation, student housing), 
social services (including the management and operation of social welfare 
institutions), recruitment services of Saudi nationals into the private sector; 
agriculture services; and medical services.78  
 
As discussed later in this chapter, though, very few of these sectors of the 
economy ended up being subject to privatisation.  
From 1990 to the present, a strong political commitment has aimed to 
increase, encourage, and develop the involvement of the private sector in the Saudi 
economy.79 As a result, privatisation was at the heart of the Five-Year Development 
Plans between 1990 and 2009.80 
According to the Council of Ministers Decision No. 60,81 the process of Saudi 
privatisation relies on eight objectives, which are to:  
1. Improve the efficiency of the national economy and enhance its 
competitive ability to meet the challenges of regional and international 
competition; 
                                                 
78 Council of Ministers Decision No. 219, dated 6/9/1423 AH (10 November 2002); see Supreme 
Economic Council, “List of Utilities, Economic Activities and Services to be Privatized,”  
http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/47215a65-b78d-4598-8d7a-
2e597e5c1815/List_of_Utilities.aspx?lang=en-US (last visited 25 September 2012). 
79 Al-Sarhan and Presley, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia,” 114.  
80 Ministry of Economy and Planning, Saudi Arabia, “Development Plans,” http://www.mep.gov.sa/ 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
81 Council of Ministers Decision No. 60, dated 1/4/1418 (6 August 1997). 
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2. Encourage private sector investment and effective participation in the 
national economy, and increase its share of domestic production to achieve 
growth in the national economy; 
3. Enlarge the ownership of productive assets by Saudi citizens. Privatisation 
can be an effective means to expand the participation of Saudi citizens in 
the ownership of productive assets in public enterprises and projects by 
using the method of public subscription in the privatisation, which is 
considered the most important privatisation method to develop domestic 
capital markets; 
4. Encourage domestic and foreign capital to invest locally, as privatisation 
reflects the government’s commitment to economic reform and a positive 
image to attract foreign investments;  
5. Increase employment opportunities, optimise the use of the national work 
force, and ensure the continued equitable increase of individual income;  
6. Provide services to citizens and investors in a timely and cost-efficient 
manner;  
7. Rationalise public expenditure and reduce the burden on the government 
budget by giving the private sector opportunities to finance, operate, and 
maintain certain services that it is able to provide; and  
8. Increase government revenues from returns on participation in activities to 
be transferred to the private sector and from financing compensation 
obtained, for example, from granting concessions and from the proceeds of 
the sale of part of government shares.82 
 
The government argues that allowing and encouraging participation of the 
private sector is essential for the full realisation of the potential of Saudi Arabia’s 
economic growth. Today, SAGIA expects that privatising state-owned enterprises 
will lead to the opening of new opportunities for FDI in the private sector and an 
increase in local investor participation.83 Moreover, thanks to the privatisation 
procedure, the private sector is expected to contribute more efficiently to the 
provision of different goods and services, thus reducing the country’s dependence on 
                                                 
82 See Supreme Economic Council, “Privatization Objectives and Policies.” 
83 SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 4(4); see also Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA), Regulation and Economic Cooperation Agency, Privatization Unit, “Privatization in Saudi 
Arabia,” (2006): 7. 
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oil revenues.84 The government was prompted to diversify the country’s economy 
because, although the levels of oil production were once stable, oil revenues went flat 
and caused the Saudi income per capita to decline—from SR63,750 (US$17,000) in 
the 1980s to SR30,750 (US$8,200) in 2003—when the country faced a simultaneous 
and sudden increase of its population.85 
 
5.6.1.3 Privatisation and FDI. 
Privatising state-owned enterprises with the involvement of foreign investors 
tends to make the newly privatised companies more efficient. It can also be argued 
that increases in resources and strategic marketing capabilities are greater in firms that 
have been privatised through foreign investment. Also, those firms’ performance are 
better in terms of market share, sales volume, and profitability than firms that have 
been privatised through domestic investment.86  
Inflows of FDI in Saudi Arabia have been closely linked to the pace of 
privatisation, or private-sector participation, which increased from $US12.1 billion in 
2005 to $US28 billion in 2010. In 2010, the total stock of FDI value reached 
$US170.4 billion.87 Contracting, real estate, chemical and petrochemical industries, 
transport, storage, and communications have been the most attractive sectors for 
foreign investors. The most active investors were from the United States, followed by 
France, Kuwait, Germany, and the United Kingdom.88 
The Privatization Strategy, established in 2002, reflects the government’s 
commitment to attract foreign investment; one of its major goals is “encouraging 
domestic and foreign capital to invest locally.”89 Furthermore, Article 3 of the 
Executive Rules of SAGIA states that SAGIA shall undertake preparing policies 
related to ‘strengthening of competition, improvement of services and products and 
                                                 
84 Ibid; see also Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Mobilizing 
Investment for Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region,” Directorate for Financial 
and Enterprise Affairs,  Istanbul, Turkey, 11–12 February 2004, 3. 
85 See Chapter 4 section 4.5.1; see also Robert E. Looney, “Development Strategies for Saudi Arabia: 
Escaping the Rentier State Syndrome,” Strategic Insights 3, no. 3 (March 2004). 
86 John Fahy et al., “Privatisation and Sustainable Competitive Advantage in the Emerging Economies 
of Central Europe,” Management International Review 43, no. 4 (2003): 410–412. 
87 Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA) “Annual Report of FDI into Saudi Arabia 
2011,” National Competitiveness Center, 12 November 2011, 2,  
http://www.saudincc.org.sa/getattachment/47de8ea3-c4a3-47f9-bb54-22344f2610ce/IFC-World-Bank-
Doing-Business.aspx (last visited 25 September 2012), which notes that FDI inflows were lower by 
12.5 per cent than the total FDI inflows of US$32 billion attracted during 2009.  
88 Ibid., 3–9. 
89 See Supreme Economic Council, “Privatization Objectives and Policies.” 
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broadening of choices for consumers,’ in order to enhance domestic and foreign 
investment.90 
In January 2004, to help speed up the process of FDI-related privatisation in 
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi cabinet approved a 20 per cent reduction in taxes on FDI in 
most sectors and a 30 per cent reduction in taxes on FDI in the natural gas industry.91 
However, given the extent of government ownership of economic projects in the 
country, and the delays in privatisation, FDI-related privatisation has long been 
impeded. It also must be noted that privatisation in Saudi Arabia follows the general 
pattern of privatisation in most other countries in the Middle East: it is gradual and 
does not always mean that the state relinquishes 100 per cent of its interest in any 
particular project. For instance, the Saudi government owns 70 per cent of SABIC 
and 83 per cent of the electricity company.92 It may be argued that such a large 
percentage of state ownership may deter foreign investors from investing in these 
sectors of the economy. However, during several interviews conducted by the author, 
government representatives defended their approach to privatisation, claiming that the 
approach is not slow, but rather systematic, well-orchestrated, and thoroughly 
studied.93 
 
5.7 The Saudi Labour Market and Privatisation 
Saudi society can be described as a youth culture, with around 60 per cent of 
the population under the age of 25.94 While the public sector has traditionally been the 
largest employer of new entrants in the workforce, the rate of growth in the public 
sector today is below that of the population growth rate as a whole, making it 
necessary for the government to bolster opportunities for employment in the private 
                                                 
90 SAGIA Executive Rules, Article 3(5). 
91 Major incentives to promote FDI in Saudi Arabia that have been added in the FIL are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. See also SAGIA, “A Comparison between the Provisions of Old and New Foreign 
Investment Laws in Saudi Arabia,” 
http://www.agora.mfa.gr/agora/images/docs/radE8BABPresentation_e%20Investment%20Law.ppt 
(last visited 25 September 2012). 
92 See SABIC, “Our Company.” See also Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st 
Century: VI. Building True Wealth Versus Over-dependence on Petroleum and the State, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 3 December 2002, 126–127,  
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/s21_06.pdf (last visited 25 September 2012). 
93 Author interview with the former governor of the Supreme Economic Council, Dr Abdulrahman Al 
Tuwaijri, in 15 September 2009. 
94 Ministry of Economy and Planning, “Youth and Development” in the Ninth Development Plan, 
http://www.mep.gov.sa/inetforms/article/Download.jsp;jsessionid=9FA4D8682B3E8874F1904F750D
D49772.beta?Download.ObjectID=226 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
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sector.95 By privatising state-owned enterprises, and, consequently, decreasing the 
number of public-sector jobs and increasing the number of private-sector jobs, the 
government can better meet the needs of the Kingdom’s young and steadily growing 
population. This is an area of great concern to the government; given some estimates, 
indicated earlier, of 28.2 per cent unemployment rate among youth aged 15–24.96 
Two questions that arise are how Saudi employees fit the job market in the private 
sector, and how such a shift from public to private sector affects the unemployment 
rate in Saudi Arabia. In addition, one must consider what effect privatisation may 
have on the process of Saudization in the country.97 
 
5.7.1 Influence of Society on the Saudi Labour Market 
Such a low representation of Saudi employees in the private sector can be 
explained from different points of view. First, it can be argued that highly demanding 
requirements, such as long workdays and the low incentives of many private-sector 
jobs, cause the vast majority of the Saudi population to prefer to enter the public 
sector. Second, it is common for young Saudis to avoid accepting jobs involving 
physical labour or to work under foreign management. 
In addition, the majority of Saudi workers are reluctant to relocate to work 
sites away from their families.98 Saudi Arabia remains a traditional society in which 
family structure and values affect work-related attitudes. Members of the family are 
expected to live together to provide assistance to each other whenever needed. As a 
result, private jobs are less desirable for traditional families because they frequently 
require moving to another location or city. Saudis, in general, also prefer to work for 
                                                 
95 In 2002, 96 per cent of Saudi workers were employed in the public sector, with Saudi employees 
accounting for only 7 per cent of the private sector. See Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of 
Privatization and the Employment System,” 34; Zawya.com, “Saudi Arabian Economy: Demographic 
Profile,” 
http://www.zawya.com/printstory.cfm?storyid=EIU20080801210716564&l=131000080716 (last 
visited 25 September 2012). 
96  CIA, “Unemployment Rate: Country Comparison to the World,” in CIA World Factbook 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html (last visited 25 September 
2012). 
97 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the main motivation to promote Saudization is the high rate of 
unemployment among young Saudis, as well as the loss of public jobs attributable to budgetary 
constraints. In addition,  while large numbers of the Saudi middle class used to be employed in the 
public sector, important constraints in the 1990s impeded the government’s efforts to maintain such a 
high level of public employment. The Sixth Development Plan (1995–2000) sought to provide 
remedies for the budgetary crisis of Saudi Arabia. The main strategy was to increase the participation 
of the private sector in the economy and to progressively replace the foreign workers with Saudi 
workers. 
98 Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment System,” 36. 
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the government because such jobs are perceived as being more secure and stable than 
jobs in the private sector. 99 In addition, worship activities are very important for 
members of Saudi society; principles such as congregational Friday prayers and 
gender separation in the workplace are important parts of Islamic culture.100 However, 
these principles most likely conflict with the work environment of privatised 
enterprises, especially those with the involvement of foreign investors. 
In a recent media discussion, a number of issues were raised by private 
investors, in which they expressed their concerns about the Saudi workforce. They 
explained that ‘social status’ affects Saudi workers’ decisions to work in certain types 
of jobs or in multicultural environments, and that Saudis are generally less disciplined 
than expatriates and are more reluctant to relocate to other cities.101 
 
5.7.2 Saudization and the Effect of Privatisation 
It might be argued that the privatisation of state-owned enterprises may work 
against the process of Saudization because it significantly modifies the system of 
employment in the former state-owned companies. The important features of the 
employment system, for example, are education,102 qualifications, performance and 
skills, functional flexibility, longer workdays, and inducing higher performance for 
higher salaries.103 All these features are better fitted to foreign employees than to 
Saudis, especially in view of the specifics of Saudi society. Consequently, privately 
owned companies, in particular those privatised with the involvement of foreign 
investors, frequently prefer to offer job opportunities to foreigners, not to Saudis.  
 
5.7.3 Saudi Employment Regulations in Cases of Privatisation 
The Saudi government has adopted an employment policy that takes into 
consideration the interests of employees in the event that a state-owned enterprise is 
privatised.104 The Privatization Strategy outlines the goal of ‘increasing employment 
                                                 
99 Ibid., 38. 
100 Ibid., 126. 
101 Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 368–369. 
102 It must be noted that the current public education system of Saudi Arabia has not evolved at the 
same pace with the private school system, which follows a more progressive, international model. As 
the vast majority of Saudis cannot afford private education for their children, the current system has the 
potential to polarise society, as the majority of recent public-educated entrants to the workforce cannot 
compete with the private-educated minority.  
103 See Al-Modaf, “Attitudes toward the Effect of Privatization and the Employment System,” 42. 
104 Supreme Economic Council, Decision No. 1-27 (14 February 2006). 
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opportunities [and] optimizing the use of the national work force’ and acknowledges 
the possibility that privatisation may involve creating an excess of under-qualified 
government employees, which can lead to layoffs by the private sector.105 Thus, it 
stressed the importance of ensuring that the privatisation process includes training 
programs designed to enable the national workforce to meet the requirements of 
private investors. It also offered compensation by granting national workers shares in 
the newly privatised entities.106 In the case of the privatisation program of the General 
Port Authority, the government required the private investor to retain the current 
government employees under the same salaries and with the same privileges.107 It has 
been argued that such excessive requirement represents a drawback in the 
privatisation process.108 
 
5.8 Case Studies of Successful Projects in Saudi Arabia  
The banking and petrochemical sectors are now mostly privatised. They are 
recognised as early successes of the Saudi government’s efforts to reform the 
economy. This section details some examples of the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises in Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.8.1 Privatisation of the Telecommunications Sector 
The former government agency in charge of privatisation, the Ministerial 
Committee on Privatization, now the Supreme Economic Council, gave the strategy 
elaboration of the telecommunications sector’s privatisation to nine study groups, 
with implementation to begin in December 2002.   
Since 1999, the Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC) has been in 
charge of telecommunications services. Although it was financially independent, it 
was entirely owned by the state and was under the Ministry of Posts, Telephones, and 
Telegraphs. In 2001, the STC proved itself to be efficient and profitable, with an 
annual profit of SR3.479 billion (around US$93 million), demonstrating that it could 
                                                 
105 See Supreme Economic Council, “Privatization Objectives and Policies.” 
106 Ibid. 
107 General Port Authority, Privatization Strategy, 4. 
108 Abdulaziz Al-Dakheel, “Privatization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” (Consulting Center for 
Finance and Investment, October 2002). 
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be a sustainable private company. During the summer of 2001, a new 
telecommunications law was approved.109 
The privatisation of the telecommunications sector was conducted in three 
stages. The first stage converted the telephone and telegraph sector into a company 
under the STC. The second stage restructured the company and changed its 
operational method from one based on public sector rules to one that operated on a 
commercial basis. The third stage opened 30 per cent of the shares for subscription.110 
In September 2002, the Council of Ministers approved the increase of the STC’s 
capital from SR12 billion to SR15 billion (US$3.2 billion to US$4 billion) by 
transferring a portion of the company’s profits to its capital. Moreover, by listing the 
STC on the stock market in January 2003, the government sold 30 per cent of its 
shares in the company.111 Of that percentage, 20 per cent was offered to Saudi citizens 
and 10 per cent was divided between the Pension Fund and the General Organization 
for Social Insurance. Today, the STC is the largest publicly owned and traded 
corporation in Saudi Arabia, and its proceeds generate approximately SR100 billion 
(around US$27 billion).112 As previously mentioned, Zain and Mobily broke the 
monopoly of STC with their entry into the Saudi telecommunications industry in 2006 
and 2007, respectively.113  
 
5.8.2 Privatisation of the Natural Gas Sector 
In May 2001, Saudi Arabia reopened its hydrocarbons sector, which had been 
nationalised since the 1970s, to foreign investors, and selected companies to promote 
and extend the use of natural gas in the country. This ‘Saudi Gas Initiative’ is 
considered to be the most important effort to attract foreign investment. Some 
difficulties arose between the government and foreign oil companies in agreeing on 
the price of natural gas to be produced and the land offered, which generated delays in 
the implementation of the gas development projects.114 
 
                                                 
109 Telecommunications Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/12, dated 12/3/1422 AH (4 June 2001); 
see also Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, 126–127. 
110 SAGIA, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia,” 27–28. 
111 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century 126–127. 
112 SAGIA, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia,” 28. 
113 See section 5.5.2 
114 See Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, 126. 
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5.8.3 Privatisation of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Corporation 
The Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) represents the most 
successful example of privatisation to date. Its heavy activities were partially 
privatised to gain more capital and management expertise from the private sector. In 
1994, the Saudi government approved the sale of 75 per cent of its 70 per cent share 
in SABIC;115 though despite this approval, no sales to the public took place.116 
Aramco, in the oil sector, and SABIC together represent an astounding 70 per cent of 
the Saudi economy. In addition, SABIC plays a significant role in the region because 
it is the largest non-oil industrial company in the Middle East. It produces 10 per cent 
of the world’s petrochemical products.117 
 
5.8.4 Privatisation of the Electricity Sector 
The annual demand growth for electricity is estimated at 4.5 per cent, which 
means Saudi Arabia will need SR450 billion (US$120 billion) for power generation 
projects over the next two decades. The actual power generation capacity is 21,000 
megawatts. Saudi Arabia would have to increase generation to 70,000 megawatts to 
match its estimated needs by the year 2020. Such an investment is expected to be 
mostly private and only partly foreign.118  
The government merged the eleven regional power companies into the Saudi 
Electric Company, which was to be only 50 per cent owned by the Saudi government. 
However, in 2000, the government still owned 85 per cent of the company. The Saudi 
Electric Company began being actively traded in July 2002. The objective was to 
increase the price of electricity—traditionally largely subsidised and far below cost 
when sold to Saudi consumers—in order for the company to attract private investors. 
Bringing electricity prices closer to market prices is essential to strengthen the power 
production and to provide more independence.119 
The government has proposed several projects, but most of them have been 
delayed or disregarded. A new proposal apparently intends to create a separate 
transmission company to buy electricity from different suppliers. This proposal seeks 
                                                 
115 Ibid., 124. 
116 Ramady, The Saudi Arabian Economy, 331. 
117 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, 126. 
118 Ibid., 128–129. 
119 Ibid., 131. 
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to allow faster commercialisation of the power sector, even though the unification of 
the electricity sector is far from being achieved. This unification would need 
important additional investment to be realised and to provide efficient coverage 
throughout the country.120 
 
5.8.5 Privatisation of Postal Services 
The General Directorate of Post was transferred into a public corporation by a 
decision of the Council of Ministers in 2002. Operating within the philosophy of the 
private sector, a number of steps were taken at Saudi Postal Corporation in 2005, such 
as establishing new departments, launching new services, and announcing new 
projects that would provide postal addresses and postal deliveries to business and 
residential areas.121 
 
5.8.6 Privatisation of Saudi Arabian Airlines 
 The Saudi government opened its aviation sector to private competition in 
June 2003, promoting competition and ending decades of monopoly by the national 
carrier, Saudi Arabian Airlines.122 These efforts to reform the industry include 
privatisation of the management and operation of Saudi Arabian Airlines, though 
security is still managed by the government.123 Preparations have begun for the partial 
privatisation and sale of Saudi Arabian Airlines, in September 2007, 30 per cent of 
the shares of Saudi Catering were sold to Strategic Catering Company, a private 
entity.124Although the government is still hesitant to privatise the Saudi airline 
altogether, it has nonetheless allowed for the establishment of two private airline 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 131 et seq.  
121 Saudi Post, “Establishment and Development,”  
http://www.sp.com.sa/English/SaudiPost/aboutus/Pages/establishmentanddevelopment.aspx (last 
visited 25 September 2012). These services included installing mailboxes nationwide; as the majority 
of the public was unaware of what purpose the boxes served, many mailboxes were either vandalized 
or destroyed. This case study provides a valuable lesson on the importance of conducting background 
research and engaging the public before launching a nationwide privatisation campaign. 
122 See OECD, “Mobilizing Investment for Development in the Middle East and North Africa Region,” 
3. 
123 Diplomat, “Political and Economic Reforms in Saudi Arabia,” Institute of Diplomatic Studies 6, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia, March 2007, 33. 
124 Saudi Airlines Catering, “Saudi Arabian Airlines Catering Company Main Prospectus,” 
http://www.saudiacatering.com/e/prospectus/ (last visited 25 September 2012) 
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companies, Sama Airlines125 and Nas Air, which offered the public more options and 
competitive air travel prices.  
 
5.8.7 Privatisation of the General Railway Organization 
The expansion of the rail system was justified by the need to develop the 
country’s mining industry and its tourist activities, and to respond to growing 
transportation problems. The government never found the corresponding funding to 
finance such a rail expansion or a foreign partner willing to invest in this sector.126 As 
a result, the government tried to attract the private sector to participate in the 
construction and the operation of new rails on the basis of build, operate, and transfer 
(BOT). Such a plan was approved by the Ministerial Committee on Privatization in 
June 2000, and an implementation plan was ordered by the Public Investment Fund in 
coordination with the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Planning, and the General Port Authority.127 
The intention to privatise the Saudi Railway Organization was confirmed on 
11 April 2004, when Mr Khaled Al-Yahya, the railway’s former president, confirmed 
three major rail implementation projects for purchase by private companies. These 
projects included extending an existing line from Dammam to Riyadh to Jeddah, 
connecting Mecca with Medina through Jeddah, and linking Riyadh to phosphate and 
bauxite mines in Qasim and the Northern Borders.128 
 
5.8.8 Privatisation of the General Port Authority 
Saudi Arabia enjoys important coasts with eight main ports, six of which are 
commercial and two of which are industrial. However, the infrastructure was not 
efficiently built, with less than half of the utilities being used. Thus, the government 
sought to privatise the General Port Authority to improve the ports’ productivity and 
profitability. The privatisation process began by leasing contracts to the private 
sector. These leases have all been given to Saudi private companies. The direct 
investment from the private sector was estimated in 2000 at SR2,140 million (around 
                                                 
125 Sama Airlines had been forced to shut down due to budgetary constraints created by poor funding. 
Wael Mahdi, “Saudi Low-Cost Airline Sama to Cease Operations After $266 Million Loss,” 
Bloomberg News, 22 August 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-22/saudi-low-cost-
airline-sama-to-cease-operations-after-266-million-loss.html (last visited 25 September 2012). 
126 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, 132. 
127Ibid., 133. 
128 Diplomat, “Political and Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia,” 33. 
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US$571 million). Today, the government owns the port assets, and the private sector 
provides the services and management to operate them.129 
Private companies have already started running 10-year operation, 
maintenance, and management contracts of the ports.130 Furthermore, at the Jeddah 
Islamic Port, the King Abdulaziz Port in Dammam, and the King Fahd Ship Repair 
Yard, re-exports are now leased by the private sector.131 
 
5.8.9 Privatisation of the Health Sector 
On 3 June 2002, the Council of Ministers approved the Health Law, which 
provided for the establishment of the Health Services Council under the Ministry of 
Health.132 The new law permitted the transfer of ownership of some hospitals to the 
private sector.133 The role of the private sector in the provision of health care is 
increasing, and the Ministry of Health has recently reached out to private companies 
for the operation and maintenance of the ministry’s hospitals. The health sector also 
depends on private companies for the supply of medicines and for food services.134 
 
5.8.10 Privatisation of the Education Sector 
Under the privatisation strategy in the education sector, a total of four hundred 
boys’ and girls’ schools are under construction, financed by the private sector. 
Printing of curriculum books, services for school transportation, and school 
advertising have been assigned to private companies. University housing services 
have been assigned to student funds at each college, and the revenues realised will be 
spent in the interest of students. Other activities that may be privatised in the 
education sector are the construction of new schools, the provision of furniture and 
appliances, maintenance of schools, and leasing of colleges’ facilities (for example, 
playgrounds, swimming pools, and laboratories) to the private sector.135 
 
                                                 
129 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, 133. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Diplomat, “Political and Economic Reforms in Saudi Arabia,” 33–34. 
132 Health Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/11, dated 23/3/1432 (3 June 2002). 
133 Health Law Article 11; this permission can be decided by the Council of Ministers, based on 
Minister of Health suggestions. 
134 SAGIA, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia,” 26. 
135 Ibid. 
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5.8.11 Privatisation of Water, Sewage, and Desalinisation 
Services 
In June 2002, the Supreme Economic Council approved the principles and 
criteria for the participation of the private sector in water desalinisation projects, the 
goal of which was to establish four Independent Water and Power Production 
Projects, to be 60 per cent owned by the private sector, 32 per cent by the Public 
Investment Fund, and 8 per cent by the Saudi Electric Company.136 The Saline Water 
Conversion Corporation and the Saudi Electric Company will run the desalinisation 
project, so that dual production of water and electricity will be realised.137 In 2007, 
two public–private partnership projects were established in Riyadh and Jeddah for the 
operation of water and sewage facilities.138 
 
5.8.12 Privatisation of the Mining Sector 
Efforts have been made to open up the mining industry—a major Saudi 
resource that consists of tens of thousands of square kilometres of hard rock and 
mountainous regions that contain minerals, including bauxite, coal, copper, gold, iron 
ore, lead, phosphates, silver, tungsten, uranium, and zinc.139 On 19 May 2004, the 
Supreme Economic Council approved the privatisation of Ma’aden, the Saudi 
Arabian Mining Company, which is currently owned in whole by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources. On 1 January 2005, a unit from the council was set 
up to evaluate the sector and its resources.140 Currently, copper, gold, silver, and zinc 
from Ma’aden’s mines are in the process of being sold privately. In order to 
encourage participation from the private sector, Ma’aden offered 50 per cent of its 
shares to the public in an initial public offering through the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) in 2008.141 
 
                                                 
136 Michel Cousins, “Water Resources Supplement: Desalination Draws Private Sector,” Arab News, 8 
June 2009, http://www.arabnews.com/node/325019 (last visited 25 September 2012). 
137 See, for example, Water and Electricity Company, http://www.wec.com.sa/items.aspx?catId=20 
(last visited 25 September 2012).  
138 Akoum, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia” 432. 
139 AMEInfo, “Saudi Minerals: An Untapped Gold Mine for Privatization,” 2 June 2005,  
http://www.ameinfo.com/61566.html (last visited 25 September 2012).  
140 Diplomat, “Political and Economic Reform in Saudi Arabia,” 34. 
141 Akoum, “Privatization in Saudi Arabia,” 432. 
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5.8.13 Privatisation of the Insurance Industry 
The Supreme Economic Council approved in May 2004 the sale of shares of 
the largest insurance company in the Arab World, the National Company for 
Cooperative Insurance, and in December 2004, 70 per cent of the company’s shares 
were offered to the public.142 This opened the market for FDI in the insurance market, 
and thirty-two enterprises have since begun operating, many of which are partially 
owned by foreigners.143 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
Privatisation should be matched with strengthening the private sector, 
obtaining increased foreign investment, and persuading Saudis to repatriate foreign 
investments and to invest in the country.144 With the enactment of the FIL, all sectors 
of the Saudi economy are open to foreign investments, except those activities 
mentioned in the Negative List. The next step is to strengthen the private sector 
through joint ventures and repatriation of capital. 
This chapter demonstrated that privatisation in Saudi Arabia is not always 
asserted with a unanimous approach, and reasons for delayed progress of privatisation 
in the region were discussed. To recount, first, there is not enough evidence to prove 
that privatisation makes any substantial difference to a country’s economic 
performance and growth rate of its economy. Second, a country should continue to 
hold stakes in profitable businesses and strategic sectors, such as telecommunications. 
Privatisation minimises a country’s intervention and, thereby, provides more 
freedom to the participants of the market itself and changes the dynamics of the 
country’s economy as a whole. The economy of the state can benefit from 
privatisation through its likely positive effect on the state’s macroeconomic policies. 
As indicated in this chapter, privatisation has played a role in increasing FDI in the 
Kingdom. Lower spending by the state, combined with higher fiscal revenues coming 
                                                 
142 Ibid.  
143 However, the author observes that many of these companies are not properly functioning 
businesses, and exist solely for the purpose of being traded on the Tadawul. For a full list of enlisted 
companies, see Tadawul  
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gDAxN3D0
NnN19nAzMPzxBDV0sDKND388jPTdUPTizSL8h2VAQAm2h6Ew!!/dl2/d1/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9Z
QnB3LzZfMDA0R0gxQ0ZNQzA2SElUMThBMDAwMDAwMDA!/ (last visited 25 September 
2012). 
144 See Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century, 1. 
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from privatised companies, has positively affected the fiscal policy of the state. 
Privatisation of the state-owned enterprises, though, may have mixed effects on 
employment. The negative effect on employment was explained, and the Saudi labour 
market and effects on Saudi society were described. 
Privatisation of state-owned companies can benefit a country’s economy in 
different ways, which is the microeconomic effect of privatisation. The privatised 
banking and petrochemical sectors are recognised as early successes of the Saudi 
government’s efforts to reform its economy. This chapter has presented different 
examples of case studies on privatisation, covering sectors such as 
telecommunications, natural gas, electricity, airlines, and health. However, the extent 
of privatisation in Saudi Arabia is also characterised by a continuing large percentage 
of state ownership in certain sectors, which may discourage FDI inflows to Saudi 
Arabia. 
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia needs to continue to diversify its economy and 
revenues. The government has shown good intentions and the proper analysis to 
develop the country. What is lacking is the bridge linking theory to practice. The 
Privatisation Strategy proves the government’s willingness to reform the economy 
and reflects a positive image to attract foreign investment. Privatisation then, 
demonstrates the changing system of economic development in Saudi Arabia. 
The next chapter considers arbitration, yet another area of development to 
which Saudi Arabia has altered its approach. Inevitably, due to both administrative 
and other barriers that exist in Saudi Arabia, disputes arise. The dispute settlement 
process between the government and foreign investors, through means of arbitration, 
is also examined next. 
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6.1 Introduction 
In general, foreign investors prefer arbitration to litigation because, in many if 
not most countries, it is quicker and may be cheaper. Furthermore, foreign investors 
may not have sufficient knowledge of the legal system of the host country and, in 
many cases, are suspicious of the judicial system.  
In Saudi Arabia, from the early days of oil exploration until the 1950s, 
arbitration was the primary means of resolving disputes between Saudi and foreign 
companies. However, that attitude changed dramatically after the Aramco Arbitration 
Award in 1958 and was reinforced by two further awards, all of which are discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter. 
Article 13 of the Foreign Investment Law of 2000 (FIL) suggests a shift in this 
attitude. It provides: 
Without prejudice to the Agreements in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
shall be a party . . . disputes arising between the Government and the Foreign 
Investor relating to his licensed investments under this Act shall as far as 
possible be settled amicably, and if this shall prove to be impossible, then the 
dispute shall be settled according to regulations.1 
 
Article 13 also states: 
Disputes arising between the Foreign Investor and his Saudi partners relating 
to his licensed investments under this Act shall as far as possible be settled 
amicably, and if this shall prove to be impossible, then the dispute shall be 
settled according to regulations.2  
 
Furthermore, the World Bank Guidelines states that ‘disputes between private foreign 
investors and the host state will normally be settled through negotiations between 
                                                 
1 FIL, Article13.  
2 FIL, Article 13. In addition, Article 26 of the FIL Executive Rules states, ‘The Board of Directors 
shall form, subject to Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Act, a committee composed of at least a chairman 
and two members to be named The Investment Disputes Settlement Committee. This committee shall 
consider the disputes arising between the Foreign Investor and his Saudi partners in respect of a 
licensed investment under The Act. The committee shall work to settle the dispute amicably. In case an 
amicable settlement could not be reached, the dispute shall be settled through arbitration according to 
the Arbitration [Law] and its executive rules issued by Royal Decree no. 46, dated 12 7 1403 AH 
(April 25, 1983). This committee is the competent body to consider the dispute as stipulated in the 
Arbitration [Law].’  
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them and failing this, through national courts or through other agreed mechanisms 
including conciliation and binding independent arbitration.’3 
However, failure of the Saudi legal system to grant full recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may have an adverse effect on FDI in Saudi 
Arabia. Unfortunately, despite Article 13, the extent to which a foreign arbitral award 
will be enforced remains debatable. Saudi Arabia is a party to the New York 
Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 
(hereafter, New York Convention). Article 5(2)(b) of the New York Convention 
allows a state party to refuse to enforce an arbitral award that contradicts public 
policy.4 This provision of the New York Convention is investigated later in this 
chapter. The public policy exception should be strictly interpreted so that it does not 
allow a country to circumvent its objectives. In the context of Saudi Arabia, the most 
significant issue is the extent to which Saudi Arabia can assert Islamic law as a 
justification for refusing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  
This chapter first examines the development of arbitration in Saudi Arabia and 
the various attitudes that the government has adopted towards a system of arbitration. 
Following this, there is a general discussion on methods of arbitration and its 
usefulness as a means of dispute settlement within Saudi Arabia, as well as an 
explanation of the legal framework for arbitration in Saudi Arabia. Next, this chapter 
examines the enforcement policies of arbitral awards, especially how they interact 
with Islamic law and with multilateral and bilateral investment agreements with the 
Saudi Arabian government.  
 
                                                 
3 See World Bank Guidelines, Guideline V. For a general discussion of the Guidelines, see Ibrahim F. 
I. Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank Guidelines, (Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 29 et seq. 
4 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention), opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959. 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (25 September 
2012). Saudi Arabia’s reservation may be read at  
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXII/XXII-1.en.pdf, 7. 
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6.2 Initial Rejection of International Arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia  
Although arbitration is allowed as a means of settling investment disputes,5 
historically, the attitude of the Saudi government towards arbitration has been largely 
negative.6 Arbitration was initially perceived as a form of submission to the Western 
world. Saudi Arabia, like other Arab Middle Eastern countries, looked at arbitration 
as a way for industrialised countries to escape the national courts in the countries 
where they had projects.7 This attitude was caused by the outcomes of three well-
known commercial disputes that were settled by arbitration and were demonstrably 
hostile towards the application of Saudi national law. These disputes were the Abu 
Dhabi Award of 1952,8 the Qatar Award of 1957,9 and the Aramco Award of 1958.10  
In the Abu Dhabi Oil Arbitration of 1952, the arbitrator concluded that ‘if any 
municipal system of law were applicable, it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi,’ 
which is based on the principles of Islamic law.11 The arbitrator, however, concluded 
that the sheikh, an ‘absolute, feudal monarch … administers a purely discretionary 
justice with the assistance of the Qur’an, and it would be fanciful to suggest that in 
this very primitive region there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the 
construction of modern commercial instruments.’12  
Similarly, in the Qatar Arbitration of 1957, the arbitrator held, ‘I need not set 
out the evidence before me about the origin, history and development of Islamic law 
as applied in Qatar or as to the legal procedure in that country.’13 He further stated, ‘I 
                                                 
5 The Holy Qur’an 4:35 states, ‘If ye fear a breach between then twain, appoint (two) arbiters, one from 
his family, and the other from hers: if they wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation, for 
Allah hath full knowledge, and is acquainted with all the things.’  
6 See, generally, George Sayen, who analyses the arbitration rules and procedures in the country in 
“Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia,” University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 24, no. 4 (2003): 905–956. See also Charles N. 
Brower and Jeremy K. Sharpe, “International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase,” 
American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 643 et seq. 
7 For an overview of arbitration in the Islamic legal tradition, see, generally, Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, 
“The Moslem Arbitration Law,” in Arab Comparative and Commercial Law: The International 
Approach (London: Graham & Trotman, 1987). 
8 Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951), 1 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1952) 247 (hereafter, Abu Dhabi Award). 
9 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Company (1953), 20 International Law Reports 534 
(1957) (hereafter, Qatar Award). 
10 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) (1958), 27 International Law Reports 117 
(1963) (hereafter, Aramco Case). 
11 Abu Dhabi Award, 250.  
12 Ibid., 247–251. 
13 Qatar Award, 545. 
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have no reason to suppose that Islamic law is not administered that strictly, but I am 
satisfied that the law does not contain any principles which would be sufficient to 
interpret this particular contract.’14  
In these concessions, Islamic law was excluded and substituted with ‘general 
principles of law’ that were basically rooted in the legal systems of Western 
jurisdictions.15 Islamic legal systems became doubtful of resorting to arbitration that 
could apply Western law as opposed to Islamic law. 
 
6.3 When the Saudi Government Is Party to a Dispute: 
Prohibition of Arbitration except in Limited Cases  
In 1954, a dispute arose under an agreement between the government of Saudi 
Arabia and Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Ltd. (SAMT) and its owner, Greek 
shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis. The agreement gave Onassis a quasi-monopoly, 
granting SAMT a 30-year right of priority for the transport of Saudi Arabian oil. 
However, this concession was in direct conflict with that granted to Aramco, which 
held an oil concession from 1933 granting it the exclusive right to transport the oil 
extracted from its concession area in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, Aramco refused to 
comply with the SAMT agreement, maintaining that it had an absolute right under its 
concession to choose the means of transporting oil. An arbitral tribunal in Geneva 
upheld Aramco’s position by applying both Saudi and international law, but the Saudi 
government was not satisfied with this award. However, the government’s 
dissatisfaction was not caused merely because it was the losing party in the dispute. 
Rather, the Saudi government became concerned about the ability and willingness of 
foreign arbitrators to apply Saudi law to disputes involving Saudi Arabia’s most 
important natural resources.16 
In particular, the foreign arbitrators mistrusted Islamic law and thus prevented 
the application of the law of the host country.17 The Aramco concession agreement 
did not contain an express choice-of-law clause. Thus, the applicable law, under the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 546. 
15 Brower and Sharpe, “International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase,” 644. 
16 In this case, the arbitral tribunal held, ‘In view of the insufficiency of Muslim law as interpreted by 
the school of Imam Ahmad Ben Hanbal … and as the law in force in Saudi Arabia contains no 
determined rule concerning oil exploitation . . . it is necessary to resort to the general principles of 
law.” Aramco Award, 169.  
17 Ibid. 
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general rules of conflict of laws, was the law of the state with which the contract had 
its closest connection. The applicable law, therefore, was the law of the host state. 
However, the arbitrators argued that Islamic law—the domestic law of Saudi 
Arabia—did not contain any rules governing petroleum agreements. Consequently, 
these arbitrators concluded that Islamic law could not be applied and that, instead, 
general principles of law had to be used. Consequently, since the Aramco award, 
Saudi law has been hostile to arbitration outside of Saudi Arabia or under non-Saudi 
law.18 
Following the Aramco case, the government established the rule that any 
administrative contract between the government or state and individuals, companies, 
or private organisations can include an arbitration clause only with express 
permission from the Council of Ministers. This policy was introduced by a 1963 
resolution of the Council of Ministers. That resolution forbid government agencies 
from designating any foreign law to govern their relations with contracting parties, 
accepting arbitration as a method of settling disputes, or accepting the jurisdiction of 
any foreign court or other judicial body to the exclusion of the Saudi Board of 
Grievances.19 This decree ‘constituted an impenetrable barrier to any arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia.’20 Moreover, ‘companies incorporated within Saudi Arabia, including 
those formed by Saudi and foreign persons and entities, are not permitted to insert in 
their articles of association provisions submitting future disputes to arbitration held 
outside Saudi Arabia.’21  
In 1980, Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington Convention), 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Council of Ministers Decision No. 58, dated 3/2/1383 AH (25 June 1963). See also Paul E. Pompeo, 
“East Meets West: A Comparison of Government Contract Dispute Resolution in the Common Law 
and Islamic System,” Loyola Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Journal 14 (1992): 841. 
The same rule is stipulated in other Arab legal systems. For instance, Article 44 of Syrian State Council 
Law No. 55 of 1959 provides that ‘no ministry or state agency may conclude, accept or license any 
contract settlement, arbitration or the enforcement of any arbitral award for any item the value of which 
exceeds 50,000 Syrian pounds without obtaining the approval of the state council. Failure to obtain this 
prior approval can result in the arbitral award being voided or nullified and has led to refusal of the 
court to enforce a foreign arbitral award where such prior approval was not obtained.’  
20 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, 2nd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), 561. 
21 Ministry of Commerce Companies Department Circular No. 31/1/331/91, dated 1399 AH (1979). 
See also Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
(Saudi Arabia, Hail: Dar Al Andalus, 2000), 243. 
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which provided for arbitration under the auspices of the World Bank.22 However, 
despite this ratification, the 1963 policy did not change;23 Saudi Arabia made a 
reservation stating that ‘the Kingdom reserves the right of not submitting all questions 
pertaining to oil and to acts of sovereignty to the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, whether by way of conciliation or arbitration.’24 
In practice, despite the prohibition, the Saudi government has been more 
willing to allow for arbitration in many cases, including the loan agreements that the 
government had to execute to repay the Gulf War debt. These agreements provided 
for arbitration under the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.25 Indeed, some argue that after Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and acceded to the Washington 
Convention, both of which provide for arbitration, the prohibition was rendered 
largely inoperative.26  
When a foreign investor is the subject of a dispute with the Saudi government, 
Article 13 of the FIL allows for settlement of a dispute by arbitration rather than 
litigation, and the FIL does not provide any limitations. This new policy, no doubt, 
will encourage foreign investment in the country as long as the government enforces 
foreign arbitral awards. 
 
6.4 Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Method  
By far, arbitration is becoming the preferred method of settling disputes 
related to foreign investments in Saudi Arabia. The new policy of the Saudi 
government is to encourage settlement of investment disputes through arbitration in 
                                                 
22 The Washington Convention came into force in Saudi Arabia on 7 June 1980. International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, “List of Contracting States and other Signatories of the 
Convention,” 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocume
nt&language=English (last visited 25 September 2012). 
23 Sayen, “Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia,” 910. 
24 Royal Decree No. M/8, dated 22/3/1994 H (1974). See also Article 25(4) of the ICSID Rules, which 
gives the contracting state the right to not submit such disputes to the jurisdiction of the centre. 
25 Arbitration became recognised as the means to resolve disputes arising out of joint investments made 
by foreign companies, including the use of, for example, (1) Article 14 of the joint venture agreement 
between Petromin and Mobile Petroleum 6, Inc.; and (2) Article 12 of the Operating and Overseas 
Technical Service Agreement between Petromin and Mobile Yanbu Refining 6, Inc., and Mobile 
Technical Service, Inc. Both agreements provided for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the 
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. Al Samaan, The Legal Protection of 
Foreign Investment, 245. 
26 El-Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries, 562–563. 
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the event that the amicable resolution of a dispute fails.27 Foreign investors may 
resolve their disputes either through ad hoc tribunals established in accordance with 
the contract’s arbitration clause or by referral of the matter to a domestic, regional, or 
international arbitration institution. In Saudi Arabia, the permanent institution 
empowered with settling commercial disputes through arbitration is the Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry. Article 5(h) of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry law 
states: ‘The Chamber of Commerce shall provide for the arbitration of disputes 
arising out of commercial and industrial transactions between parties who are willing 
to abide by the judgment of the chamber of commerce.’28 Domestic arbitration 
tribunals, both institutional and ad hoc, must apply the principles of Islamic shari’ah 
law and applicable Saudi statutes as a source of substantive law when ruling on an 
arbitration award.29 At the same time, it has been argued that Saudi law need not be 
the exclusive source of substantive rules in the arbitration proceedings; thus, 
arbitrators can apply foreign substantive law ‘as long as it is not contrary to Saudi 
Public Policy, i.e. the Islamic shari’ah and applicable statutes.’30 Nonetheless, such 
application of foreign law is allowed only for filling gaps, such as when Saudi law is 
silent on a certain issue.31 
With respect to international arbitration, including that conducted within the 
International Court of Arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce, it is 
rarely ‘utilized, and is not expected to be utilized, as the result of the policy towards 
domestic ad hoc arbitration and enlarging the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances 
to undertake the task of settling all investment disputes between the government 
agencies and foreign investors.’32 
 
                                                 
27 FIL Executive Rule, Article 26. 
28 See Article 5(h) of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/6, 
dated 30/04/1400 (1980). For a general overview of domestic arbitration in Saudi Arabia, see Yahya 
Al-Samaan, “The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic Arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1994): 217–237. 
29 Al-Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment, 237–238. 
30 Ibid., 279. 
31 Ibid., 280. 
32 Fath El Rahman Abdalla El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and 
Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 402.  
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6.5 Legal Framework for Arbitration in Saudi Arabia  
Arbitration is a viable alternative for resolving disputes in cases involving 
foreign investors.33 However, there is a detailed set of requirements in the Saudi 
Arbitration Law that must be followed, such as the rules governing the selection of 
arbitrators, the length of the arbitration, and the review of the decision of the 
arbitrator. A careful understanding of these rules is imperative for minimising the 
possibility of denying the validity and enforcement of an arbitration clause or an 
arbitration agreement. 
As mentioned earlier,34 the legal system of Saudi Arabia consists of the shari’ah 
courts, the Board of Grievances, and different quasi-judicial commissions—the 
Investment Disputes Settlement Committee and the Committee for Violations of the 
Foreign Investment Law, under the supervision of the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority; the Committee for Commercial Paper and the Committee to 
Combat Commercial Fraud, which both are under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Commerce; the Committee for Solving Banking Disputes and the Committee for 
Stock Market Disputes, both under the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency; the 
Commission for Settlement of Labour Disputes, under the Ministry of Labour; and 
the Committee for Solving Insurance Disputes and Commission for Settlement of 
Customs Disputes, which both operate under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Finance. These quasi-judicial commissions were established to hear disputes 
considered to be inconsistent with the principles of the shari’ah. For the purpose of 
foreign investment and international arbitration, the most important of these 
institutions is the Board of Grievances.35   
The Board of Grievances has the authority to enforce foreign judgments and 
arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia. Article 13(g) of the Board Law states that the 
“jurisdiction of the Administrative Court is to … settle execution of foreign arbitral 
                                                 
33 See Zeyad Alqurashi, who notes that “in modern history, arbitration is considered one of the most 
important means for the settlement of commercial disputes, particularly the disputes of international 
trade and investment,” in “Arbitration under the Islamic Shari’ah,” Transnational Dispute Management 
1, no. 1, (February 2004), 2, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=43 
(25 September 2012). In addition, Alqurashi points out that arbitration has been recognised by the four 
sources of Shari’ah (Qur’an, Sunna, Ijma’, and Qiyas), and the acceptability of arbitration is not 
questioned by any of the main four Islamic Schools (Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, or Shafi).  
34 See Chapter 3 section 3.5. 
35 It is important to mention that in order to fulfil the requirements of the WTO, many of these 
commissions are in the process of being transferred to the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. See 
Torki Al-Shubaiki, “The Saudi Arabian Arbitration Law in the International Business Community, A 
Saudi Perspective,” (PhD dissertation, London School of Economics, 2003), 24. 
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awards and foreign judgment.”36 Also, it solves complaints filed against any action by 
administrative bodies or agencies. The Board of Grievances enforces foreign arbitral 
awards on the basis that ‘settlement is lawful between Muslims except settlement that 
bans a halal [permissible] or legalizes a haram [something forbidden].’37 
For example, in the Board of Grievances judgment concerning the arbitral 
award in Tohama Construction Co. Ltd. v. Hondi Construction Co. Ltd., a South 
Korean–based company was ordered to pay SR46 million (US$12.2 million) for 
failure to complete work for the Ministry of Health at King Fahad Hospital. The case 
was then heard before the Board of Grievances, and a judgment by the board reduced 
the original amount to approximately SR27.8 million (US$7.4 million), eliminating 
any claims that contradicted the prohibition of riba (interest or usury) under Islamic 
law. Consequently, suspension by the Board of Grievances of arbitral awards that did 
not comply with Article 20 of the 1983 Arbitration Law may lead, in practice, to the 
case being heard again.38  
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, in Saudi Arabia the absolute prohibition 
of riba is strongly implemented; it is therefore unlikely that foreign arbitral awards 
ordering riba would be enforced.39 In the same way, awards based on contracts 
including provisions on interest would most likely not be enforced.40 In a case where 
the enforcement of an award granting interest or loss of profit is denied, the Board of 
Grievances would need to consider whether valid severable parts of the award can 
still be enforced.41  
 
                                                 
36 See Article 13 (g) of the Law of Judiciary and Board of Grievances, issued by Royal Decree No. 
M/78, dated 19/9/1428 AH (30 September 2007). This regulation supersedes the previous regulation 
issued by the Royal Decree No. M/51, dated 17/7/1402 (10 May 1982). The old regulation gave the 
same authority to the Board of Grievances, see Article 8 (1) (g).  
37 Bahraini Civic Bank v. Abd Allah Bin Abd El-Aziz Al-Sani, Case No. 543 (1990), Board of 
Grievances. 
38 Tohama Construction Co. Ltd. v. Hondi Construction Co. Ltd., Case No. 35/T4 (1995), Board of 
Grievances. Arbitration Law of 1983, issued by Royal Decree No. M/46, dated 12/7/1403 AH (April 
25, 1983) (1983 Arbitration Law) 
39 See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, “Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention,” Journal of 
International Arbitration 11, no. 3 (September 1994): 87–92. To comply with Islamic law, the claimant 
may have to waive the interest and claim only the original amount. Consequently, on the basis of the 
Islamic prohibition against riba, the Board of Grievances may refuse to enforce any part of a foreign 
judgment that gives effect to interest. 
40 Ibid., 91. However, some scholars have expressed the view that the award containing an element 
violating Islamic law, such as interest, could still be enforced in Saudi Arabia if the party seeking 
recognition expressly disclaimed any right to recovery based on the contravening element. Michael J. 
T. McMillen, “Islamic Shari’ah—Complaint Project Finance: Collateral Security and Financing 
Structure Studies,” Fordham International Law Journal 24 (2000-2001): 1203. 
41 El-Ahdab, “Saudi Arabia Accedes to the New York Convention,” 87–91.  
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6.5.1 The Saudi Statute on Arbitration  
Saudi Arabia adopted its first arbitration law in 1983, which is a 
comprehensive set of norms to regulate arbitration disputes.42 The Council of 
Ministers also issued the Implementation Rules of the Arbitration Law (Implementing 
Rules) describing the procedural matters of arbitration.43 However, although the 1983 
Arbitration Law recognises arbitration as a means of settling disputes, such 
recognition is subject to various limitations that should be reconsidered.44  
The statute does not limit application of arbitration only to commercial 
matters. However, Islamic law limits the option of using arbitration as a means of 
dispute resolution. Article 2 of the 1983 Arbitration Law states, ‘[A]rbitration shall 
not be permitted in cases where settlement is not allowed.’ As explained by Article 1 
of the Implementing Rules, those cases would include criminal offenses, all matters 
related to public order and public policy, matters related to inheritance, and certain 
marital disputes.45 Both the 1983 Arbitration Law and the Implementing Rules set the 
rules governing the qualification requirements for an arbitrator. Under Article 4 of the 
1983 Arbitration Law, ‘an arbitrator is required to be of experience, good conduct and 
full legal capacity…[and] [i]f there are several arbitrators, their number must be 
uneven.” Under Implementing Rules, Article 3, the arbitrator must be a Muslim, who 
is either a Saudi national or a foreigner. The arbitrator must also be a male; jurists are 
referring to verse 4:34 of the Qur’an when arguing this requirement as a base for their 
exclusion: “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has 
given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from 
their means.”46 However, some argue that many legal advisers in Saudi Arabia argue 
                                                 
42 This 1983 Arbitration Law has been superseded by the new Arbitration Law, issued by Royal Decree 
No. M/34, dated 24/5/1433 AH (15 April 2012), and activated in 7 July 2012 (2012 Arbitration Law). 
43 The Implementation Rules of the Arbitration Law, issued by the Royal Decree No. 7/2021/M, dated 
8/9/1405 AH (27 May 1985).  
44 The 1983 Arbitration Law allows for two types of arbitration. Article 1 provides, first, that 
‘arbitration may be agreed upon in specific existing dispute.’ Second, it provides that it may be agreed 
in advance to arbitrate any dispute arising as a result of the execution of a specific agreement.’  
45 See also Zeyad Alqurashi, who says that according to the four Schools of Islamic Shari’ah, 
arbitration is not authorised in matters relating to the “Rights of God,” in “Arbitration under the Islamic 
Shari’ah,” 3. As to the issues that would be excluded from arbitration, Alqurashi refers to matters of 
criminal law and patrimonial right, as well as subjects such as guardianship on orphans. Ibid. 5–6.  
46 See Al-Shubaiki, “The Saudi Arabian Arbitration Law in the International Business Community,” 
39. See, generally, Christie S. Warren, “Lifting the Veil: Women and Islamic Law,” Cardozo Journal 
of Law and Gender 15, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 33–65; David J. Western, “Islamic ‘Purse Strings:’ The Key 
to the Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle East,” Air Force Law Review 61 (2008):  
79–147. 
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that “the justification for excluding a woman from being a judge was a lack of 
capacity and inexperience, but this no longer is the case.”47 
According to the Implementing Rules, Article 3, “[I]f there is more than one 
arbitrator, the Chairman [must] be knowledgeable in shari’ah rules and the 
commercial regulations, custom and traditions in effect in the Kingdom.” These 
limitations regarding the qualifications of arbitrators are justified on the basis of 
Islamic law. However, restricting arbitrators to those who are Muslim and male may 
contradict the rules of equality under Islamic law.48 These rules should be 
reconsidered without offending the basic rules of Islam.49  
The 1983 Arbitration Law follows the government policy of the 1963 
Decision, which restricted the freedom of government agencies to use arbitration as a 
means of solving their disputes with third parties.50 Under Article 3 of the 1983 
Arbitration Law, ‘government agencies are not allowed to resort to arbitration for 
settlement of their disputes with third parties except after having obtained the consent 
of the president of the Council of the Ministers.’ In addition, Article 8 of the 
Implementing Rules affirms this restriction: ‘[W]here a government agency is a party 
to a dispute which it deems appropriate to refer to arbitration, [it must draft a 
memorandum that] must be approved by the president of the Council of Ministers.’51 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, this prohibition should not hinder the ability 
of the Saudi government to enter into international contracts.  
By adopting the 1983 Arbitration Law, Saudi Arabia recognised that an 
agreement to arbitrate must be enforceable by law.52 The intent of the 1983 
                                                 
47 Al-Shubaiki, “The Saudi Arabian Arbitration Law in the International Business Community,” 39. 
48 For a detailed discussion on the ban of non-Muslims as arbitrators and also on the views of the 
different schools of thought on the issue of women as arbitrators, see Mohammed A. H. Al Jarba, 
“Commercial Arbitration: A Study of Its Role in the Saudi Arabia Context,” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2001).  
49 However, Zeyad Alqurashi summarises developments in the criteria of selecting arbitrators, saying 
that, ‘recent trends in Islamic law would put no restrictions on the selection of arbitrators based on 
religion or sex.” Alqurashi, “Arbitration under the Islamic Shari’ah,’ 5–6. 
50 Council of Ministers Decision No. 58, dated 3/2/1383 AH (25 June 1963). 
51 Article 8 of the Implementing Rules also states the following: ‘In disputes wherein a government 
authority is a party along with others and decides to submit to arbitration, such authority shall prepare a 
memorandum with respect to arbitration in such disputes, stating the subject matter, the reasons 
justifying resort to arbitration and the names of the parties to be submitted to the Council of Ministers 
for approval to resort to arbitration. The Prime Minister may, by a prior resolution, authorize a 
government authority to settle disputes arising from a particular contract, through arbitration. In all 
cases, the Council of Ministers shall be notified of the arbitration award delivered.’ 
52 Al-Shubaiki, “The Saudi Arabian Arbitration Law in the International Business Community,” 39. 
According to Arbitration Law, Article 5, the arbitration agreement must be submitted for approval to 
the judicial authority having original jurisdiction over the dispute. The parties to the dispute need to file 
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Arbitration Law to make an arbitration agreement capable of being enforced and, 
thus, have a legal effect, is further evidenced by its provisions. More specifically, 
where adversaries agree to arbitration before a dispute arises, or where a decision has 
been issued sanctioning an arbitration instrument in a specific existing dispute, the 
subject matter of the dispute may only be heard in accordance with the provisions of 
the 1983 Arbitration Law.53 However, Torki Al-Shubaiki, a legal scholar, claims that 
the Board of Grievances has heard cases in spite of a valid arbitration clause between 
the parties to the dispute. Al-Shubaiki highlights the case of Al-Hoshan Ltd. v. Al-
Hejaz Ltd. In this case, one of the parties submitted the dispute to the Board of 
Grievances despite having an arbitration clause in the contract. Moreover, the other 
party did not stay the judicial proceeding on the ground of having a valid arbitration 
clause. However, when the dispute went to the Appeal Division of the Board of 
Grievances, the board ruled that the parties had to go to arbitration because they had a 
valid arbitration clause.54 
The 1983 Arbitration Law is designed to ensure that arbitrators comply with 
shari’ah law and applicable Saudi statutes in deciding the merits of a case. It is 
noteworthy that the 1983 Arbitration Law does not distinguish between Saudi and 
foreign arbitrations,55 and that neither the 1983Arbitration Law nor the Implementing 
Rules expressly provide that the governing law of the arbitrated dispute has to be the 
law of Saudi Arabia.56 Nonetheless, Article 39 of the Implementing Rules states that 
the arbitration award ‘shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic 
shari’ah and regulations in effect.’ Consequently, foreign legal principles can be 
applied when they are consistent with provisions of Saudi law.57  
In 2012, a new arbitration law was passed (2012 Arbitration Law),58 which 
explicitly stipulates that arbitration must be conducted in accordance with Islamic 
law. For instance, Article 2 of the 2012 Arbitration Law states that the law applies to 
                                                                                                                                           
‘the arbitration instrument . . . [which must be] signed by the parties or their authorized attorneys, and 
by the arbitrators.’ The arbitration instrument must ‘state the details of the dispute, the names of the 
arbitrators and their acceptance to hear the dispute.’ In addition, this document must be written in 
Arabic.  
53 1983 Arbitration Law, Article 7. 
54Al-Shubaiki, “The Saudi Arabian Arbitration Law in the International Business Community,” 38.  
55 Ibid., 40. 
56 Nancy B. Turck, “Resolution of Disputes in Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly 6 (1991): 3 
57 See Zayed Alqurashi, who writes that ‘recourse to a non-Islamic legal system is valid as long as the 
rules to be applied on the contract do not violate express provisions of Qur’an or Sunna,’ in 
“Arbitration under the Islamic Shari’ah,” 5. 
58 The 2012 Arbitration Law cannot be fully implemented since the Implementation Rules for this new 
law are not issued yet. 
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all types of arbitration, without contradicting Islamic law or international convention 
to which the Kingdom is party. Under Article 5, if both parties to the arbitration agree 
to have the relationship subject to the provisions of any document, be it a model 
contract or an international convention, it is mandatory to follow the provision of the 
document, providing that these provisions are in accordance with Islamic law. In 
addition, in accordance with Article 38 (c), when adjudicating, the arbitration 
committee must adhere to the condition of the contract and take into consideration the 
current norms and established traditions. Article 50 (2) states that a specialised court 
that investigates a nullity suit can, on its own accord, nullify the arbitration judgment 
if it contradicts Islamic law, is in opposition to the public policy of the Kingdom, or 
goes against what the two parties of the arbitration had agreed upon.  
Moreover, Article 10 of the 2012 Arbitration Law follows the government 
policy of the 1963 Decision and Article (3) of the 1983 Arbitration Law, which each 
restrict the freedom of government agencies to resort to arbitration, except after 
having obtained the consent of the president of the Council of Ministers. 
There are several key changes in the 2012 Arbitration Law that significantly 
improve the arbitration process in Saudi Arabia. Under this law, unlike the lengthy 
process detailed in Article 5 of the 1983 Arbitration Law, arbitration suits do not need 
to be filed in a court that would supervise the arbitration. Additionally, Article 16 of 
the 2012 Arbitration Law states that arbitrators must now inform both parties about 
any conflict of interest, which increases the transparency of the arbitration system. 
Article 25 (1) of the new 2012 law increases the length of time to complete the 
arbitration process, which was ninety days in the 1983 Arbitration Law; arbitral 
awards must now be submitted within twelve months of the commencement of the 
arbitration, unless all parties agree to an extension.59 The new law provides the parties 
with the choice to apply particular rules and processes, such as the rules of 
international organisations, as long as it does not contradict Islamic law.60 The new 
law also requires sole arbitrators or the chairman of multiple arbitrators to hold a 
degree in the shari’a sciences.61 Additionally, arbitration no longer must be 
                                                 
59 Mayer Brown, “Saudi Arbitration Law Takes a Big Step Forward,” Legal Update, July 2012. 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/saudi-arbitration-steps-forward/ (last visited 25 September 2012). See 
also 2012 Arbitration Law, Article 40 (1). 
60 2012 Arbitration Law, Article 25 (1). 
61 2012 Arbitration Law, Article 13, 14 (3) 
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conducted in Arabic if the parties agree upon another language.62 It is worth 
mentioning that the new law is silent about the gender, nationality, and religion of the 
arbitrator; this represents a significant change from Article 3 of the implementation 
rules of the 1983 Arbitration Law, which specifically stipulated that the arbitrator 
must be a Muslim. 
 
6.5.2 Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
One of the most distinct features of Saudi arbitration ‘is the extent to which 
arbitration is supervised at all stages by the Saudi court or administrative tribunal with 
original jurisdiction over the dispute.’63 In most commercial cases, this supervisory 
tribunal is the Board of Grievances, which must ‘ensure that arbitrators adhere closely 
to Saudi Arabian substantive and procedural law.’64 As a result, arbitration may look 
similar to litigation. A party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment must submit a 
petition to the board, which may refuse to enforce a foreign judgment because of the 
principle of reciprocity or because such judgment is in conflict with the provisions of 
Islamic law.65 However, the Board of Grievances may refuse to enforce an award 
against assets located within Saudi Arabia, even if the arbitral award is reduced to 
judgment by a foreign court, particularly if the award is initially issued by a non-
Muslim arbitrator.66 If the board refuses to enforce the arbitration award, there is an 
‘option of instituting a new proceeding before a Saudi Arabian court with jurisdiction 
over the matter that would hear the case de novo and render a decision based solely on 
Saudi Arabian substantive law.’67 With respect to foreign arbitration clauses, although 
the law does not explicitly prevent the parties from resorting to this dispute resolution 
mechanism, Saudi courts have been inconsistent in enforcing the foreign arbitration 
                                                 
62 Abdulaziz Al-Bosaily and Ben Cowling, “New Arbitration Law in Saudi Arabia-A Major 
Development for Commerce in the kingdom.” Clyde & Co, 2012. See also 2012 Arbitration Law, 
Article (29). 
63 World Bank-FIAS, 15 section 64. 
64 Ibid., 15 section  65. 
65 It should be noted that Saudi Arabia was very reluctant to ratify the New York Convention; finally 
ratifying it in 1994. For an overview of Saudi Arabia’s attitude towards the New York Convention, see, 
generally, Kristin T. Roy, “The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the 
Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?” Fordham 
International Law Journal 18 (1994–1995): 920–958. 
66 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 427. For instance, as mentioned 
previously in this chapter, because of the Islamic prohibition on payment of interest, the claimant, to 
comply with Islamic law, may have to waive the interest and claim only the original amount. 
Otherwise, the Board of Grievances may refuse to enforce any part of a foreign judgment that gives 
effect to interest. 
67 World Bank-FIAS, 19 section 87. 
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clauses in contracts.68 Nevertheless, the recent trend with the Board of Grievances has 
been to enforce such clauses.69  
 
6.5.3 Enforceability of a Non-Saudi Arbitral Award in 
Accordance with the New York Convention for the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
 In December 1994, Saudi Arabia ratified the New York Convention,70 
applying it ‘to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the 
territory of a State other than a State where the recognition and enforcement of such 
awards are sought.’71 Under New York Convention’s Article 3, each contracting state 
agrees to ‘recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with 
the rules of procedure’ of the contracting state. 
In general, the New York Convention applies to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in both contracting and non-contracting states 
that are parties to the convention. However, under Article 1(3), any contracting state 
‘may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another 
Contracting State.’ Pursuant to this article, Saudi Arabia made the reciprocity 
reservation, which limits recognition of awards under the New York Convention to 
arbitral awards made in another contracting state only.72  
                                                 
68 Ibid., 16 section 69, which states that there are examples of courts giving full effect to the arbitration 
clauses and refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute, as well as examples of the courts having 
ignored such clauses. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Royal Decree No. M/11, issued 16 7 1414 AH (30 December 1994). Saudi Arabia is a party to 
regional and international bilateral mechanisms regulating enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
These agreements are the Convention on Judicial Co-operation between States of the Arab League 
(Riyadh Convention), endorsed April 6, 1983; the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) (open for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 
19 April 1994); the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, and the 
Protocol on the Enforcement of Judgment Letters Rogatory and Judicial Notices, issued by the Courts 
of the Member States of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council in 1995. In addition, Saudi Arabia recently 
entered into bilateral agreements with a number of countries to encourage and protect FDI and to 
regulate the arbitration and enforcement of arbitral awards, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
71 New York Convention, Article 1. 
72 Royal Decree No. M/11/1994, dated 16 7 1414 AH (21 January 1994). As of January 2007, there 
were 142 contracting states to the New York Convention. The list is available at 
Arbitration and Mediation Center, “Parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards,” http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/ny-convention/parties.html (last 
visited 25 September 2012). 
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The New York Convention provides exemptions from the obligation of the 
contracting parties to enforce a foreign arbitral award.73 For example, under Article 
5(1), the contracting party may refuse to recognise and enforce  international arbitral 
awards in cases in which: 
 parties cannot come to an agreement;  
 an agreement becomes invalid;  
 there was improper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the 
arbitration itself,  
 an award falls outside the terms of the submission to arbitration;  
 the composition of the arbitral authority or an arbitral procedure 
violates the agreement of the parties; or  
 an invalid award is based on the fact that the award has not become 
binding on the parties to the dispute or was adjourned by a competent 
authority. 74  
 
In addition, an award can be denied by proving that ‘the subject matter of the 
difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country.’75  
Finally, the New York Convention provides for the public policy exception, 
stating:  
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
                                                 
73 New York Convention, Article 5(1) states, ‘Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof.’ 
74 New York Convention, Article 5(1)(a) states, ‘Tthe parties to the agreement referred to in article II 
were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under 
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
country where the award was made’; 5(1)(b) states, ‘The party against whom the award is invoked was 
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case;’ 5(1)(c) states, ‘The award deals with a difference not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions 
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters 
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced’; Article 5 
(1)(d) states, ‘The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the 
country where the arbitration took place’; 5(1)(e) states, ‘The award has not yet become binding, on the 
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under 
the law of which, that award was made.’  
75 Article 5(2)(a). 
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sought finds that . . . the recognition or enforcement of the award should be 
contrary to the public policy of that country.76  
 
One could argue that by referring to the public policy of ‘that country,’ the 
New York Convention leaves room for broad interpretation of this exception and, 
thus, allows state parties to apply it whenever they consider it convenient for their 
own interests. However, the drafting history of the New York Convention limits this 
wide interpretation of the public policy exception to cases in which recognition and 
enforcement would be ‘distinctly contrary to the basic principles of the legal system 
of the country where the award is invoked.’77  
Although Saudi Arabia signed the New York Convention, the enforcement of 
a foreign arbitral award in Saudi Arabia is still subject to many limitations.78 For 
example, in Ridaria Colgate Sally Corporation (Finland) v. The Saudi Corporation 
for Research and Development (1989), Ridaria Colgate Sally Corporation presented a 
claim to execute a judgment made by the Supreme Trade Court in London against the 
Saudi Corporation for Research and Development. The Board of Grievances 
concluded that a foreign judgment should not be enforced domestically until a Saudi 
court examines its validity under Saudi law and ensures that all necessary evidence 
and documents are available. In addition, the judgment must not be contradictory to 
Islamic law. However, the enforcement of the ruling is conditioned by the principle of 
reciprocity. The board further declared that it is the responsibility of the party seeking 
enforcement of a foreign judgment in Saudi Arabia to prove reciprocal treatment of a 
Saudi judgment in that foreign court. Because there is no agreement of reciprocity 
between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, to prove reciprocity, the plaintiff in 
this case presented a memorandum from the British Ministry of Justice assuring that a 
foreign judgment can be enforced in the United Kingdom whether it was issued by a 
Saudi court or by any other foreign court. However, the board stated that such 
                                                 
76 Article 5(2)(b). Consequently, the Board of Grievances may refuse to recognise or enforce an arbitral 
award that is inconsistent with the shari’ah, which constitutes the basis of public policy in Saudi 
Arabia.  
77 United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), “Report of the Committee on the 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards” (March 28, 1955), U.N. docs. E/2704 and 
E/AC.42/4/Rev.1, para. 49, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/travaux/arbitration/NY-conv/e-
ac/eac424r1-N5508097.pdf (25 September 1012). 
78 The Board of Grievances is the body responsible for enforcement of all arbitral awards in Saudi 
Arabia. However, a party seeking enforcement of an award may have to petition for a court order 
securing the opposing party’s assets.  
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evidence did not constitute definitive proof that the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia treat the judgments on the basis of the principles of reciprocal treatment.79 
An international arbitral award is enforceable only if it is accompanied by a 
court judgment from the state where it was rendered. In addition, it needs to be 
validated by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Saudi Ministry of Justice, and 
the Saudi consulate in the state where the award was rendered. Nevertheless, the 
Saudi government reserves the right to decline enforcement of an international 
arbitral award. The rules governing enforcement of an award vary depending on who 
the parties to a dispute are and where the award is rendered. Awards from the 
countries that are members of the Arab League Convention are enforceable in Saudi 
Arabia. However, if a country is not a member of this convention, enforceability is 
based on reciprocity. 
In addition, concerns have been raised regarding proceedings established in 
the 1983 Arbitration Law. Although the law acknowledges the validity of a 
contractual clause to arbitrate future disputes, it is unclear how this will be enforced 
when one of the parties is uncooperative. One may also question the exact extent to 
which Saudi law must be applied to the substance of a dispute and the grounds on 
which the Saudi authority may refuse or set aside the execution of an award.80 
Even though Saudi Arabia acceded to the New York Convention, the 
execution of foreign awards remains conditioned by compatibility with Islamic law. 
Some commercial issues, such as conventional insurance and the charging of interest, 
which are upheld in civil and common law, cannot be enforced under Islamic law as 
applied in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, a question arises: What happens when a 
foreign award includes an interest-based transaction?  
Contradicting the rules of Islamic law in arbitration awards is stipulated in the 
1983 Convention on Judicial Cooperation between States of the Arab League (Riyadh 
Convention) concerning regional agreements related to arbitration. Under Article 37 
of the Riyadh Convention, arbitral awards from originating states are recognised and 
enforced in recipient states. However, the Riyadh Convention provides a set of 
exceptions permitting a recipient state to refuse recognition and enforcement of 
                                                 
79 Ridaria Colgate Sally Corporation (Finland) v. The Saudi Corporation for Research and 
Development, Case No. 438/T/3 (1989), Board of Grievances. 
80 Sayen, “Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia,”913. 
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arbitral awards from an originating state.81 Important exceptions include, among 
others, conflict of the award with Islamic law, public order, or good morals; improper 
notification of the arbitration; non-arbitrability of the dispute; and invalidity of the 
arbitration agreement.  
To be specific, the Riyadh Convention states a number of exceptions, 
summarised as follows: 
 the judgment is contrary to Islamic law or the Constitution or public 
order of the Recipient State;  
 the judgment is a default judgment and the defendant was not properly 
notified of the case or the judgment;  
 the dispute, in respect of which the judgment was issued, was 
previously finally adjudged in the Recipient State or was referred to 
the courts of the Recipient State before it was referred to the courts of 
the Originating State and is still before the courts of the Recipient 
State;  
 the judgment is against the government of the Recipient State or an 
official of the Recipient State for acts arising out of the performance of 
his duties as an official of the Recipient State; 
 the enforcement or recognition of the judgment would be contrary to 
an international agreement or convention in force in the Recipient 
State; 
 if under the law of the Recipient State, the dispute that is the subject of 
the arbitral award from the Originating State is not arbitrable;  
 if the arbitration agreement upon which the arbitration was based was 
voided or had expired;  
 if the arbitrator(s) was not competent under the terms of the arbitration 
agreement or the laws under which the arbitral award was made;  
 if both parties to the arbitration were not duly summoned to appear; or  
                                                 
81 Riyadh Convention, Articles 28 and 30. 
 231 
 
 if the terms of the arbitral award are such that the enforcement of the 
arbitral award would be against the public policy of the Recipient 
State. 82 
 
6.5.4 Public Policy Exceptions: Refusal to Recognise and 
Enforce a Foreign Arbitral Award on the Basis of Islamic Law 
Public policy can be described as ‘that principle of law which holds that no 
subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or 
against public good.’83 Consequently, when applying public policy as an exception to 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, such policy can be understood as ‘moral, 
social or economic considerations, which are applied by courts as grounds for 
refusing enforcement of an arbitral award.’84  
It is generally acknowledged that a violation of the public policy of the state 
where an arbitral award is being enforced has long been a ground for rejecting 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.85 The public 
policy exception can be viewed as recognition of the right of a particular state to 
exercise final control over the arbitral process.86 However, from the perspective of 
parties to the arbitration, application of the public policy exception leads to 
uncertainty and unpredictability of the outcome of arbitration proceedings, because it 
offers the losing party a ground for defending against the enforcement of the arbitral 
awards.87  
If one looks at the application of the public policy exception in Islamic 
countries, it seems that the most common basis for rejecting the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award as contrary to the public policy of a particular state is the 
charging of an interest rate as part of the award. In addition, other areas where 
enforcement of foreign awards would most likely be denied as being against public 
                                                 
82 Ibid., summarized by the law firm of Yousef and Mohammed Al-Jadaan. “Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgements and Foreign Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia,” (June 2004). An overview is available at 
Legal500.com;  
http://update.legal500.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=470&Itemid=525 (last 
visited 25 September 2012). 
83 See Audley Sheppard, “Public Policy and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Should There Be a 
Global Standard?” Transnational Dispute Management 1 (2004): 2. 
84 Ibid,. 2.  
85 Ibid., 1.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid. 
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policy are foreign awards involving uncertain obligations, such as risk or 
uncertainty.88 For instance, in Abdullah Girgi Beserani v. Ismael Fawzi Abu Khadra, 
the enforceability of a New York court ruling was challenged before the Board of 
Grievances, which refused to allow for punitive damages because they were 
considered speculative in nature and thus in contradiction with the Islamic concept of 
gharar.89 This legal principle holds that ‘any contract containing speculation, or 
contract clauses that turns on the happening of a specified but unsure event, is void.’90   
 
6.5.5. Recognition of Arbitration in Multilateral and Bilateral 
Investment Agreements with the Government of Saudi Arabia.  
As mentioned earlier, when Saudi Arabia ratified the Washington Convention, 
it reserved the right of not submitting all disputes related to oil or to acts of 
sovereignty to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes for 
conciliation or arbitration.91 Between 2000 and 2012, Saudi Arabia entered into 
bilateral agreements concerning promotion and reciprocal protection of investments 
with Austria, the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the Republic of Korea.92 These agreements have obtained special weight in light 
of the FIL, which includes that ‘the provisions of the investment treaties and all 
special agreements with investors shall prevail over the Foreign Investment Law in 
cases of inconsistency.’93 Furthermore, Article 13 of the FIL states that in cases of a 
dispute settlement, Saudi regulations shall be applied ‘without prejudice to the 
agreements in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [is] party of.’94  
All of these agreements, which were agreed on with the intent to ‘create 
favourable conditions for investments by investors of either party in the territory of 
                                                 
88 See, generally, Mark Wakim, “Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign 
International Arbitral Awards in the Middle East,” New York International Law Review 21, 1 (2008): 
1-15. 
89Abdullah Girgi Beserani v. Ismael Fawzi Abu Khadra, 1417 Case No. 2195 (1996), Board of 
Grievances. 
90 Roy, “The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia,” 8. 
91 Royal Decree No. M/8, dated 22/3/1994 H (1974). See also Article 25(4) of the ICSID Rules, which 
gives the contracting state the right to not submit such disputes to the jurisdiction of the centre. 
92United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment Instrument Online 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (last visited 25 September 2012). A 
number of these agreements were obtained by the author from the Bureau of Experts, Council of 
Ministers. 
93 El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment, 191. 
94 FIL, Article 13. 
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the other party,’ provide for arbitration as an alternative way of investment dispute 
settlement. 95 However, one should ask the question that has been raised by many: 
Have bilateral investment treaties (BITs) contributed to encouraging FDI?96 
The agreements provide for amicable settlement as a preferable means of 
settling disputes between ‘a contracting party and an investor of another contracting 
party.’97 However, if the dispute cannot be settled amicably within six months after 
submitting the request for the settlement, the dispute shall be, at the request of an 
investor, submitted to the court or filed for arbitration.98 Although all the agreements 
refer to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes) as 
the authority governing the arbitration process, the agreement with Austria, for 
example, gives more alternatives to the investor regarding the choice of arbitration 
tribunal.99 It states that except for the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), created under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, disputes can be filed for arbitration’by an ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law [(UNCITRAL)] [or] to any other form of dispute settlement 
agreed upon by the parties to the dispute.’100 
Regarding awards, the provisions of the agreements are uncertain with respect 
to assuring investors about enforcement of the award. The agreements state that ‘the 
award shall be binding and shall not be subject to any appeal or remedy other than 
those provided for in the . . . Convention.’101 However, the agreements further state 
that ‘the award shall be enforced in accordance with domestic law.’102  
 
                                                 
95 Austria Agreement, Preamble; Belgo-Luxembourg Agreement, Preamble; Malaysia Agreement, 
Preamble. All of these agreements provide for amicable settlement of possible investment disputes. See 
Austria Agreement, Article 11(2); Belgo-Luxembourg Agreement, Article 10(2); Malaysia Agreement, 
Article 11(2), and several other agreements.  
96 Anne Van Akken, “Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection,” European 
Business Organization Law Review 9, no. 1 (April 2008): 1–26. doi: 10.1017/S1566752908000013.  
97 Austria Agreement, Article 11(1); Belgo-Luxembourg Agreement, Article 10(1); Malaysia 
Agreement, Article 11(1). 
98 Austria Agreement, Article 11(2); Belgo-Luxembourg Agreement, Article 10(2); Malaysia 
Agreement, Article 11(2). 
99 Austria Agreement, Article 11(7). 
100 Ibid., Article 11(2). 
101 Ibid., Article 11(7); Belgo-Luxembourg Agreement, Article 10(3)(b); Malaysia Agreement, Article 
11(3). 
102 Ibid. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
In general, foreign investors prefer arbitration to litigation because it is 
quicker and may be more economically sound. Foreign investors may also prefer 
arbitration because of their lack of knowledge of the legal system in the host country 
and their lack of trust of the judicial system. Throughout the 1950s, arbitration was 
the preferred method in Saudi Arabia, however the Aramco Arbitration Award in 
1958 drastically changed this attitude. 
Historically, Saudi Arabia viewed arbitration as a form of submission to the 
Western world and thus has always been quite sceptical towards the concept. This 
attitude resulted from three commercial disputes settled by arbitration, including the 
aforementioned Aramco Arbitration Award in 1958, in which the arbitrators applied 
general principles of law because they did not think that the Islamic law regulated 
petroleum agreements. Since then, the Saudi government and its corresponding law 
have been hostile to arbitration. Following the Aramco case, the government 
prohibited administrative clauses in contracts unless a party had received express 
permission from the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers, in 1963, forbade 
foreign law from being applicable for contractual disputes. In practice, however, the 
Saudi government allowed arbitration in many cases. 
Today, arbitration is again the preferred method, but it must apply the 
principles of Saudi law and be conducted within those parameters. The newly enacted 
2012 Arbitration Law, which replaced the 1983 Arbitration Law, demonstrates the 
Saudi government’s desire to create more certainty to attract FDI through introducing 
a reformed comprehensive legal framework. However, this certainty is undermined by 
the continuous reservation on the basis of Islamic law and Saudi public policy. In 
addition, the Board of Grievances may still refuse to enforce a foreign judgment 
because of the principle of reciprocity or if such judgment is in conflict with the 
provisions of Islamic law.  
In 1994, Saudi Arabia ratified the New York Convention for the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which requires the country to recognise 
arbitral awards as binding, in both contracting and non-contracting states. However, 
Saudi Arabia reserved the right to apply awards made only in another contracting 
state. In addition, the international arbitral award must be accompanied by a court 
judgment from the state where it was rendered and must be validated by the Saudi 
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government. However, the execution of foreign awards is still conditioned by 
compatibility with Saudi law; if an award violates public policy, the state can refuse 
to recognise and enforce the award. For example, as discussed in several chapters, in 
Saudi Arabian courts, charging an interest rate is considered riba, and so it is a breach 
of public policy. Nevertheless, the changing attitude of the Saudi Arabian government 
towards arbitration demonstrates that the legal system is open to reform, and even 
shows a beneficial side effect of FDI. 
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Chapter Seven: General Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This study examined the nature and significance of the legal framework for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Saudi Arabia and primarily referred on a critical 
analysis of the Foreign Investment Law, enacted on 10 April 2000 (FIL). This thesis 
demonstrated that the FIL changed the investments rules which existed under the 
Foreign Capital Investment Law, enacted in January 1979 (1979 Law). 
The FIL opens more investment fields to foreign investors and allows such 
investors to obtain more than one license in diverse activities. The law simplifies 
admission rules by establishing the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority as 
the single government agency responsible for licensing foreign investment projects 
and providing administrative assistance to foreign investors setting up their 
investment enterprises. Furthermore, the FIL provides investment incentives, 
including real estate ownership and accepting arbitration as a vehicle for settling 
disputes with a foreign investor.  
Although the FIL has opened the door to foreign investment by facilitating 
entry and providing a number of incentives and guarantees, in practice there continue 
to be burdensome requirements that foreign investors must meet, and the Negative 
List of Exempted Activities poses challenges to increasing foreign investment. 
Furthermore, while the FIL allows for ownership of real estate by foreigners, this 
privilege is limited to business establishments. To continue to increase investment 
opportunities, the government should consider expanding real estate ownership to 
foreigners.  
As indicated in the thesis, immigration and labour regulations of the Kingdom 
present another major restriction on foreign investment, these regulations remained 
largely unchanged following the adoption of the FIL. While the FIL allows licensed 
companies with 100 per cent foreign ownership to sponsor foreign employees, the 
employer is restricted in hiring employees and terminating their contracts, in 
accordance with the Saudi Labour Law. While the FIL is generally in conformity with 
the World Bank Guidelines, this study questioned whether the principle of equal 
treatment is truly incorporated in Saudi law, particularly in the area of tax rates and 
restrictive immigration regulations.   
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Privatisation has traditionally followed a slow process in the Middle East, 
primarily due to the lack of evidence that it can affect positive change in a country’s 
development and a desire to retain a hold on businesses that are consistently 
profitable. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia has shown a more marked willingness to 
change in the area of privatisation; this has been embodied throughout its various 
five-year economic plans and in its relatively recent Privatization Strategy, which 
recognises privatisation as an important driver in encouraging foreign investment. 
Saudi Arabia has privatised sections of the banking, telecommunications, electricity, 
airline, mining, and petrochemical sectors, resulting in successful economic reform. 
As the FIL has opened the country to foreign investment, the government must now 
focus on strengthening its private sector. However, state control over certain sectors 
reflects suspicion of foreign investment which may deter FDI away from these 
sectors. Conversely, allowing a higher percentage of private ownership may help 
attract more investment. 
Saudi Arabia has once again accepted arbitration as a means of settling 
disputes with foreign investors, after a long period of scepticism following the 
landmark ARAMCO Arbitration Award in 1958. This is an important change because 
arbitration is preferred by foreign investors due to a lack of trust and knowledge of 
local legal and judicial systems. With passage of the 1983 Arbitration Law and the 
successive 2012 Arbitration Law, Saudi Arabia has come to allow, and even prefer, 
arbitration in many cases. However, although the new arbitration law of 2012 reflects 
the Saudi government’s desire to introduce a reformed legal framework in order to 
create more certainty for FDI, this certainty is undermined by continuous reservations 
on the part of foreign countries on awards being decided or overturned based on 
Islamic law and Saudi public policy. 
Theoretically, Saudi Arabia’s evolving approach towards FDI can, to a certain 
extent, be understood from the perspective of the middle-path theory. As the country 
adopts an open policy that favours FDI inflows, it lays the foundation for a supportive 
legal framework through which it attempts to minimise risks and, at the same time, 
reap the benefits associated with FDI. Nonetheless, this theory is limited because it 
only recognises the economic effects of FDI but does not place emphasis on religious 
or cultural considerations. 
The thesis also discussed Islamic law as the basis of public policy, and raised 
the question of the relevancy of these laws in the areas of investment and trade, and 
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whether they constitute a hurdle for foreign investors. It was concluded that while the 
Saudi Arabian legal system applies Islam in its entirety in the area of personal status 
laws, the laws of commerce, trade and investment evolved independently of Islamic 
law. In other words, there are man-made regulations, especially in the areas of 
company, labour, and intellectual property laws.   
However, the Saudi legal system is based on the Hanbali school of 
interpretation, which calls for a more traditional interpretation of the text. The 
shari’ah prohibition against riba requires creative solutions to ensure that a foreign 
investor is entitled to the full potential of his investment. Since riba violates public 
policy, the Kingdom is not obligated to recognise or enforce any foreign award 
involving riba. Similarly, the Islamic prohibition against gharar may limit the amount 
of damages to the actual loss and not expectation damages. Such limitations should be 
subject to reinterpretation, especially in cases where there is no doubt, uncertainty, or 
speculation. 
Reconciling traditional values of Islam and modern laws is always a difficult 
task, especially as these laws must not contradict any Islamic principles or teachings. 
However, certain Islamic principles need to be reconsidered, such as the practice of 
women unable to conduct business without the involvement of a Saudi male legal 
representative. In fact, there are many restrictions on social life in Saudi Arabia that 
can be lifted without offending Islamic principles and teachings. There have been 
steps taken in this direction, although gradual, which mark the beginning of a much-
needed change in the society. 
Saudi Arabia has a dual system of judiciary; apart from the shari’ah courts 
and the Board of Grievances, there exist a number of specialised quasi-judicial 
committees. It is questionable whether these special committees have the full 
adjudicatory guarantees to decide cases, especially as not all members of these 
committees are judges. For foreign investors, the prospect of having local courts as 
the only channel for settlement of investment disputes may be undesirable. 
Based upon the analysis of the obstacles facing foreign investment in Saudi 
Arabia, this thesis proposes a number of recommendations to be incorporated within 
the legal framework of FDI. For example, it is necessary to streamline the procedures 
for licensing and registering companies with foreign participation, in addition to 
increasing coordination and cooperation among the different government agencies 
involved in the processes related to the foreign investment. 
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Transparency needs to be improved, by which the government could mandate 
the release of an annual report detailing the financial status of all business enterprises 
headquartered or operating in Saudi Arabia. In the settlement of investment disputes, 
the Kingdom should accelerate the establishment of a specialised commercial court, 
which would expedite the resolution of commercial disputes. In this vein, however, it 
is even more important to train judges on commercial matters. 
Needless to say, the economic benefits resulting from FDI are an undeniable 
incentive to integrate foreign investment into the host economy. Indeed, the influx of 
capital, a necessity for growth, is a primary enticement to encourage FDI. 
Additionally, FDI increases the potential to fracture monopolies and brings local 
suppliers and national markets into the world economy. The technological expertise 
that frequently emerges as FDI is incorporated into a host country brings increased 
productivity, experienced personnel, and knowledge. Infrastructure and development 
benefits include a more skilled and better-trained domestic labour force and higher 
wages.  
Moreover, FDI involves the investor to a greater degree than other types of 
investment, allowing for direct management of an enterprise, upon which the success 
will vary depending on the economic development of the host country. Within this 
context, bilateral agreements (BIT) are formulated to protect investors who are 
managing or investing in enterprises in foreign nations. The derivative ‘spill-over’ 
effects of foreign investment include many other benefits, such as an increased 
efficiency among domestic firms (as they are forced to compete with foreign 
investors) and intangible skill diffusion (such as managerial and marketing skills that 
are passed along to domestic economies).  
This case study of Saudi Arabia demonstrated that FDI is, first, a necessary 
consequence of accession to the WTO, and second, will diversify the economy and 
reduce dependency on oil revenue, which has been a prime goal of the government 
for decades throughout its successive development plans. Third, FDI serves as a 
vehicle to reduce the high unemployment rate that currently threatens the Saudi 
economy, and fourth, FDI will hopefully give Saudi Arabia the necessary resources to 
be a technological exporter as opposed to a technological importer. Lastly, the most 
obvious benefit of FDI is the boost of capital into Saudi Arabia. 
As indicated throughout this thesis, it is possible to derive FDI regimes in 
Muslim countries that prove adequate and effective in attracting foreign investment 
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while still respecting traditional values and Islamic law. General FDI theory needs to 
be modified, where Islamic countries are concerned, in which emphasis is given to 
various aspects related to FDI such as economic, religious, cultural, and other 
significant factors. 
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Appendix 1 
List of Interviewees 
 
Al-Alami, Dr. Fawaz, former Consultant of the Ministry of Commerce and Saudi 
Arabia's former Chief Technical Negotiator for the accession to the World Trade 
Organization. 
Al-Dabbagh, Amr, former Governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA). 
AlMubarak, Abdullah, Board of Grievances, judge. 
Al-Nimr, Dr. Khalid, Board of Grievances, judge. 
Al-Othman, Abdullatif, Governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA). 
Al-Saleh, Saud, Secretary-General of the Supreme Economic Council. 
Al-Tuwaijri, Dr. Abdulrahman, former Secretary-General of the Supreme Economic 
Council. 
Abunayyan, Khalid, Vice-president of Abunayyan Group. 
Bin Saeed, Dr. Issam, Chief of the Saudi Arabian Bureau of Experts, Council of 
Ministers. 
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Appendix 2 
Foreign Investment Law of 2000 
 
Article One 
The following terms and expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them, 
unless the context requires otherwise: 
(a) Council: The Supreme Economic Council.  
(b) Board of Directors: The Board of Directors of the General 
Investment Authority. 
(c) Authority: The General Investment Authority. 
(d) Governor: The Governor of the General Investment Authority and 
Chairman of the Board of Directors. 
(e) Foreign Investor: A natural person who is not of Saudi nationality 
or a corporate person whose partners are not all Saudi. 
(f) Foreign Investment: Investment of foreign capital in an activity 
licensed by this Law. 
(g) Foreign Capital: For purposes of this Law, foreign capital shall 
mean, for example, but not limited to, the following assets and 
rights so long as they are owned by a foreign investor. 
(1) Cash, securities and negotiable instruments. 
(2) Foreign investment profits, if invested to increase capital, expand 
existing projects, or establish new ones. 
(3) Machinery, equipment, furnishings, spare-parts, means of transport 
and production requirements related to the investment. 
(4) Intangible rights, such as licenses, intellectual property rights, 
technical know-how, administrative skills and production techniques 
(h) Commodity Firms: Projects for the production of industrial and     
agricultural goods (crops and livestock). 
(i) Service Firms: Service and contracting projects. 
(j) Law: The Foreign Investment Law. 
(k) Regulations: The implementing regulations of this Law. 
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Article Two 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the laws and agreements, the authority 
shall issue a license for foreign capital investment in any investment activity in the 
Kingdom, whether permanent or temporary. 
The authority shall act on the investment’s application within thirty days of the 
submission of all the documents required by the regulations. If the specified period 
lapses without the authority acting on the application, it shall issue the required 
license to the investor. 
If the authority rejects the application within the prescribed period, the decision 
must be justified, and the party whose application has been rejected shall have the 
right to appeal such decision according to laws. 
 
Article Three 
The council shall have the authority to issue a list of activities excluded from 
foreign investment. 
Article Four 
 
Subject to the provisions of Article 2, the foreign investor may obtain more than 
one license for different activities, and the regulations shall specify the necessary 
requirements. 
 
Article Five 
Foreign investments licensed under the provisions of this Law may be in either of 
the following forms: 
(1)  Firms jointly owned by a national and foreign investor. 
(2)  Firms wholly owned by a foreign investor. 
The legal form of the firm shall be determined in accordance with laws and 
directives. 
 
Article Six 
A project licensed under this Law shall enjoy all the benefits, incentives and 
guarantees extended to a national project, according to laws and directives. 
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Article Seven 
A Foreign Investor may repatriate its share that is derived either from the sale of 
its equity, the liquidation surplus, or from profits generated by the firm, or to 
dispose of it in any other lawful manner. The foreign investor may also transfer the 
amounts required to settle any contractual obligations related to the project. 
 
Article Eight 
A foreign firm licensed under this Law may acquire necessary real estate as 
needed for operating the licensed activity, or for housing all or some of its staff, 
subject to the provisions governing real estate ownership by non-Saudis. 
 
Article Nine 
 
The foreign investor and its non-Saudi staff shall be sponsored by the licensed 
firm. 
 
Article Ten 
The authority shall make available to all interested investors required 
information, clarifications and statistics as well as provide them with all services 
and carry out all procedures to facilitate and complete all investment related 
transactions. 
 
Article Eleven 
The foreign investor’s investments may not be confiscated, wholly or partially 
without a court judgment. Moreover, they may not be subject to expropriation, 
wholly or partially, except for public interest, against a fair compensation according 
to laws and directives. 
 
Article Twelve 
(1) The authority shall notify the foreign investor in writing of any violation of 
the provisions of this Law and its regulations, in order to rectify such 
violation within the period of time the authority deems appropriate for the 
rectification of the violation. 
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(2) Without prejudice to any harsher penalty, the foreign investor shall be 
subject to any of the following penalties if the violation persists:  
(a) Withholding all or some of the incentives and benefits given to the 
Foreign Investor. 
(b) Imposing a fine not exceeding 500,000 (Five hundred thousand Saudi 
riyals). 
(c) Revoking the foreign investment license. 
(3) The penalties referred to in paragraph (2) above, shall be imposed pursuant 
to a resolution by the board of directors. 
(4) The resolution issued may be appealed before the Board of Grievances in 
accordance with its Law. 
 
Article Thirteen 
Without prejudice to agreements to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is party: 
(1) Disputes arising between the government and the foreign investor in relation to its 
investments licensed in accordance with this Law shall, as far as possible, be settled 
amicably. Failing such settlement, the dispute shall be settled according to the 
relevant laws. 
(2) Disputes arising between the foreign investor and its Saudi partners in relation to its 
investments licensed in accordance with this Law shall, as far as possible, be settled 
amicably. Failing such settlement, the dispute shall be settled according to relevant 
laws. 
 
Article Fourteen 
All foreign investments licensed under this Law shall be treated in accordance 
with applicable tax provisions and amendments thereto in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Article Fifteen 
The foreign investor shall comply with all laws, regulations and directives in 
force in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as international agreements to which 
the Kingdom is party. 
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Article Sixteen 
 
The implementation of this Law shall be without prejudice to acquired rights of 
the foreign investments, legally existing before this Law comes into force. However, 
such projects shall be governed by provisions of this Law, as far as conducting their 
activities, or increasing their capital is concerned. 
 
Article Seventeen 
The authority shall issue the regulations and they shall be published in the 
Official Gazette and shall become effective as of the date of its publication. 
 
Article Eighteen 
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall become effective 
thirty days after its publication. It shall supersede the Foreign Capital Investment 
Law, issued by Royal Decree No. (M/4), dated 2/2/1399 H, as well as any 
provisions inconsistent therewith. 
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 3 xidneppA
 9791 fo waL tnemtsevnI latipaC ngieroF
  الأولى المادة
يقصد برأس المال الأجنبي في ھذا النظام النقود والأوراق المالية والأوراق التجارية والآلات والمعدات وقطع 
الغيار والمواد الأولية والمنتجات ووسائل النقل والحقوق المعنوية كحق الاختراع والعلامات الفارقة وما ماثل 
يتمتع بجنسية المملكة العربية السعودية أو لشخص معنوي لا ذلك من القيم متى كانت مملوكة لشخص طبيعي لا 
  .يتمتع جميع مالكي حصص رأس ماله بجنسية المملكة العربية السعودية 
 
 المادة الثانية
مع عدم الإخلال بما تقضي به الأنظمة الأخرى يخضع استشار رأس المال الأجنبي لشرط الحصول على 
الصناعة والكھرباء بناء على توصية لجنة الاستثمار متى استوفي الشرطين ترخيص يصدر به قرار من وزير 
  ـ: الآتيين 
ان يستثمر في مشروعات التنمية والتي لا تشمل فيما يختص بأحكام ھذا النظام مشروعات استخراج البترول  -١
  .والمعادن 
  .أن يكون مصحوبا ًبخبرات فنية أجنبية  -٢
 
 المادة الثالثة
روعات التنمية بقرار يصدر من وزير الصناعة والكھرباء بناء على اقتراح لجنة الاستثمار وذلك يتم تحديد مش
  .ضمن خطة تنمية 
 
 المادة الرابعة
  ـ:تنشأ بوزارة الصناعة والكھرباء لجنة تسمى لجنى استثمار رأس المال الأجنبي وتشكل على النحو التالي 
  رئيسا ً                        يقوم مقامه عند غيابهرباء أو من وكيل وزارة الصناعة والكھ -
  مندوب عن وزارة التخطيط -
  مندوب عن وزارة المالية والاقتصاد الوطني -
  مندوب عن وزارة الزراعة والمياه -
  مندوب عن وزارة البترول والثروة المعدنية -
  مندوب عن وزارة التجارة -
  842
 
عضاء اللجنة عن المرتبة العاشرة ويقوم رئيس مكتب ويشترط أن لا تقل مرتبة أي مندوب  عن أ
الاستثمار بوزارة الصناعة والكھرباء بأعمال الأمين العام لھذه اللجنة ويعين لھا وزير الصناعة والكھرباء 
ولا . ولھا أن تسمع رأي من تشاء من الخبراء على أن لا يكون لھم صوت في اتخاذ القرارات . مستشارا ًقانونيا ً
. جتماعاتھا صحيحة ألا بحضور أربعة أعضاء على الأقل من بينھم الرئيس وتعتبر مداولاتھا سرية تكون ا
ولا تكون . وتصدر قراراتھا بأغلبية أصوات الحاضرين وعند التساوي يرجح الجانب الذي صوت معه الرئيس 
  .قراراتھا نھائية إلا أذا صدق عليھا وزير الصناعة والكھرباء 
 
  الخامسةالمادة 
  :تختص اللجنة المشار إليھا في المادة الرابعة بما يلي  -
  .اقتراح ما يعتبر من مشروعات التنمية ( ١
  .النظر في طلبات الاستثمار ( ٢
بحث ما يقدمه المستثمرون الأجانب وغيرھم من ذوي الشأن من شكاوى أو منازعات ناشئة عن تطبيق أحكام ( ٣
  .الشأن إلى جھات الاختصاص ھذا النظام وبعث توصياتھا في ھذا 
  .التوصية بالجزاءات التي ترى توقيعھا على المنشأة التي تخالف أحكام ھذا النظام( ٤
  .النظر في مشروع اللوائح اللازمة لتنفيذ ھذا النظام ( ٥
  .النظر في يحيله إليھا وزير الصناعة والكھرباء من مسائل متعلقة بأحكام ھذا النظام ( ٦
 
  ةالسادسالمادة 
يقدم مكتب استثمار رأس المال الأجنبي في وزارة الصناعة والكھرباء كافة المعلومات والإيضاحات  
كما يقوم المكتب . والإحصاءات اللازمة لمن يطلبھا من الراغبين في توظيف رأس المال الأجنبي في المملكة 
تي رخص لھا بالعمل وتمنح وزارتا المذكور بتسھيل وإنجاز المعاملات المتعلقة برؤوس الأموال الأجنبية ال
الخارجية والداخلية المستثمرين وموظفيھم وعمالھم المرخص لھم بموجب ھذا النظام تأشيرات الدخول والخروج 
  .والتصريح بالإقامة 
 
  السابعة  المادة 
  :ينتفع رأس المال الأجنبي الذي استوفى الشروط المنصوص عليھا في النظام بالمزايا الآتية  -
المزايا التي يتمتع بھا رأس المال الوطني بموجب نظام حماية وتشجيع الصناعات الوطنية بالنسبة للمشروعات  (أ
  .الصناعية فقط 
إعفاء المشروع الصناعي أو الزراعي الذي يستثمر فيه رأس المال الأجنبي من ضرائب الدخل والشركات ( ب
  .رائب مدة خمس سنوات مدة عشر سنوات وإعفاء المشاريع الأخرى من ھذه الض
  .وتستفيد من حكم الإعفاء الوارد بھذه الفقرة المشاريع التي تتمتع بالاعفاء وقت العمل بھذا النظام 
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ويشترط للإعفاء ان يمتلك رأس المال الوطني نسبة لا تقل عن خمسة وعشرين بالمائة من رأس المال المشروع 
  .وأن تبقى ھذه النسبة مدة الاعفاء 
  .الاعفاء من تاريخ بدء الانتاج  وتبدأ مدة
  .ويجوز لمجلس الوزراء تعديل ھذه الفقرة 
  .تملك العقار اللازم وفقا ًلنظام تملك غير السعوديين للعقار  - ج
 
 المادة الثامنة
فيما لا يتعارض مع أحكام ھذا النظام تخضع المشروعات المنتفعة بأحكام ھذا النظام لأنظمة العمل والتأمينات 
  .الاجتماعية وغيرھا من الأنظمة المعمول بھا في المملكة 
 
 المادة التاسعة
  ـ: لا تسري أحكام ھذا النظام على المشروعات التي يستثمر فيھا رأس مال أجنبي في الأحوال الآتية 
زيادة  إذا كانت قائمة بصورة نظامية قبل نفاذ ھذا النظام ومع ذلك فإن ممارسة ھذه المشروعات بنشاطھا أو -أ
  .رأس مالھا تخضع لأحكامه 
  .ب ـ إذا صرح لھا بمزاولة نشاطھا في المملكة بموجب أنظمة أو اتفاقيات خاصة 
 
 المادة العاشرة
كل منشأة رخص لھا بمقتضى ھذا النظام فخالفت أحكامه ينذرھا وزير الصناعة والكھرباء بإتباع ھذه الأحكام 
ا الإنذار جاز للوزير بناء على توصية لجنة الاستثمار سحب الرخصة خلال مدة يعينھا لھا فإذا لم تستجب لھذ
  .الممنوحة لھا أو تصفيتھا نھائيا ً
ويجوز للوزير بناء على اللجنة المذكورة عوضا ًعن السحب أن يقرر حرمان المنشأة من كل أو بعض المزايا 
  .المنصوص عليھا في ھذا النظام 
يوما ًمن تاريخ ( ثلاثين)المظالم من قرار الوزير الصادر بالعقوبة خلال ويجوز لذوي الشأن التظلم إلى ديوان 
  .تبليغه بالطرق الرسمية ويكون حكم الديوان في التظلم باتا ًونھائيا ً
 المادة الحادية عشرة
  .يصدر وزير الصناعة والكھرباء اللوائح التنفيذية لھذا النظام وتنشر في الجريدة الرسمية 
 
  عشرةالمادة الثانية 
  .يوما ًمن تاريخ نشره( ثلاثين)ينشر ھذا النظام في الجريدة الرسمية ويعمل به بعد 
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Appendix 4 
2000 Regulation of Ownership and Investment in Real Estate by Non-
Saudis 
 
Article One: 
(a) A non-Saudi investor with natural or corporate personality, licensed to 
practice any professional, vocational or economic activity may acquire the 
real estate necessary for practicing that activity. It shall include the real estate 
required for his residence and for the residence of his employees, following 
the approval of the body issuing the license. The said real estate may be rented 
subject the stipulation stated in Article Five of this Law. 
(b) If the license referred to includes purchasing buildings or lands in order to 
erect buildings on them and invest them by means of selling or renting, the 
total cost of the project, land and construction, shall not be less than thirty 
million riyals. This amount may be amended by the Council of Ministers. It is 
also stipulated that such real estate be invested within five years from its 
acquirement (possession?). 
 
Article Two: 
Non-Saudi natural persons legally residing in the kingdom shall be allowed to 
acquire real estate for their private residence, following permission from the Ministry of 
Interior.  
 
Article Three: 
On the basis of reciprocity, foreign representatives approved in the Kingdom may 
acquire the official seat of office and the residence for its head and members of staff. 
International and regional agencies, within the scope of the agreements governing them, 
may acquire their official headquarters, subject to obtaining permission from the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 
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Article Four: 
Possession of real estate for private residence, in cases other than the above 
mentioned, may be allowed upon the approval of the President of the Council of 
Ministers. 
 
Article Five: 
Other than by way of inheritance, a non-Saudi may not have the right to 
ownership, easement or benefit of real estate located within the boundaries of the cities of 
Mecca and Medina. Acquirement of right to ownership shall be excepted if accompanied 
by endowing the owned real estate, in accordance with Shari’ah rules, on a specific Saudi 
entity. It shall also be stipulated in the endowment document that the Supreme Council 
for Endowments has the right to supervise (oversee?) the endowed property. However, 
non-Saudi Muslims may rent real estates within the boundaries of the cities of Mecca and 
Medina for a period not exceeding two years, renewable for a similar period or periods. 
 
Article Six: 
Notaries public or any other competent body may not notarize any action 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Law. 
 
Article Seven: 
Implementation of the provisions of this Law shall be without prejudice to the 
following:  
(a) Rights to ownership granted for non-Saudis under previous laws. Provisions of 
this Law shall be effected after its coming into force, upon transfer of the real 
estate ownership. 
(b) Privileges included in the rules regulating real estate ownership by citizens of  
GCC countries. 
(c) Acquirement of right to ownership or any other original right in rem (corporeal 
right?)  to real estate by way of inheritance. 
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(d) Laws, Council of Ministers’ resolutions and Supreme Orders prohibiting 
ownership at certain sites 
 
Article Eight: 
(a) This law shall replace the Law of Real Estate Ownership by non-Saudis in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued by Royal Decree No. (M/22) dated 
12/7/1390H. 
(b) This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force 
after ninety days from the date of its publication. 
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Appendix 5 
Negative List of Excluded Activities under the FIL 
List of businesses prohibited for foreign investments 
 
Industrial Sector 
 
1.  Oil exploration 
2.  Drilling and production. Except the services related to mining sector listed at 
(CPC 5115+883) in  International Industrial classification codes. 
3.  Manufacturing of military equipment, devices and uniforms. 
4.  Manufacturing of civilian explosives. 
 
Service Sector 
1.  Catering to military sectors. 
2.  Security and detective services. 
3.  Real estate investment in Makkah and Madina. 
4.  Tourist orientation and guidance services related to Hajj and Umrah. 
5.  Recruitment and employment services including local recruitment offices. 
6.  Real estate brokerage. 
7. Printing and publishing. Except the following activities: 
 Pre-printing services internationally classified at ( CPC 88442) 
 Printing Presses internationally classified at ( CPC 88442) 
 Drawing and calligraphy internationally classified at ( CPC 87501) 
 Photography internationally classified at ( CPC 875) 
 Radio and Television Broadcasting Studios internationally classified at ( CPC 
96114) 
 Foreign Media Offices and Correspondents internationally classified at ( CPC 
962) 
 Promotion and Advertising internationally classified at ( CPC 871) 
 Public Relations internationally classified at ( CPC 86506) 
 Publication internationally classified at ( CPC 88442) 
 Press Services internationally classified at ( CPC 88442) 
 Production, selling and renting of computer software internationally classified at 
(CPC 88) 
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 Media consultancies and studies internationally classified at ( CPC 853) 
 Typing and copying internationally classified at ( CPC 87505 + 87904). 
 Motion picture and video tape distribution services internationally classified at ( 
CPC 96113). 
      8.   Commission agents internationally classified at ( CPC 621). 
      9.   Audiovisual and media services. 
    10. Land transportation services, excluding the inter-city passenger transport by trains. 
   11. Services provided by midwives, nurses, physical therapy services and quasi-
doctoral    services internationally classified at ( CPC 93191). 
    12. Fisheries 
    13. Blood banks, poison centers and quarantines. 
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  المادة الاولى
كما يجوز الاتفاق ُمسبقا على التحكيم في أي نزاع يقوم نتيجة لتنفيذ . يجوز الاتفاق على التحكيم في نزاع ُمعين قائم
 عقد ُمعين
 
 الثانية مادةال
ولا يصح الاتفاق على التحكيم إلا ممن له أھلية لا يقبل التحكيم في المسائل التي لا يجوز فيھا الصلح 
  .التصرف 
  
  المادة الثالثة
لا يجوز للجھات الحكومية اللجوء للتحكيم لفض منازعاتھا مع الآخــــرين إلا بعد موافقة رئيس مجلس 
  .ويجوز بقرار من مجلس الـــوزراء تعديل ھذا الحكم . الوزراء 
  
  المادة الرابعة
يكون من ذوي الخبرة ، حسن السيرة والسلوك ، كامل  الأھلية وإذا تعدد المحكمون  يشترط في المحكم أن
  .وجب أن يكون عددھم وترا ً
  
  المادة الخامسة
يودع أطــراف النزاع وثيقة التحكيم لـــدى الجھة المختصة أصـــلاً بنظر النزاع  ويجب أن تكون ھذه 
وكـــلائھم الرسميين المفوضين ومن المحكمين ، وأن يبين بھا موضوع النزاع الوثيقة موقعـــة من الخصـــوم أو من 
  .وأسماء الخصـــوم وأسماء المحكمين وقبولھم نظر النزاع وأن ترفق بھا صور من المستندات الخاصة بالنزاع
 
 المادة السادسة
صدر قراراً باعتماد وثيقة تتولى الجھة المختصة أصلاً بنظر النزاع قيد طلبات التحكيم المقدمة إليھا وت
  .التحكيم 
 
 المادة السابعة
إذا كان الخصوم قد اتفقوا على التحكيم قبـــل قيام النزاع أو إذا صـــدر قـــرار باعتماد وثيقة التحكيم في 
  .نزاع معين قائم فـــلا يـــجوز النظر في موضوع النزاع إلا وفقا ًلأحكام ھذا النظام 
  
  المادة الثامنة
  .ى كاتب الجھة المختصة أصلا ًبنظر النزاع كافة الاخطارات والإعلانات  المنصوص عليھا في النظاميتول
  
  المادة التاسعة
يجب الحــكم في النزاع في الميعـــاد المحدد في وثيقـــة التحكيم مـا لــم يتفق على تمديده وإذا لم يحدد 
علــــى المحـــكمين أن يصدروا حكمھم خـــلال تسعين يوماً من  الخصـــوم في وثيقة التحكيم أجلاً للـــحكم وجـــب
تاريـــخ صـــدور القــــرار باعتـــماد وثيقة التحكيم وإلا جــــاز لــــمن شـــاء من الخصوم رفـــع الأمــــر إلى 
 .ـــد الميعاد لفترة أخرى الجھـــــة  المختصــــة أصــــلا ًبنظر النزاع لتقــــرر إما النظر في الموضـــوع أو م
 
 المادة العاشرة
إذا لم يعـــين الخصــوم المحكمين أو امتنع أحد الطرفين عن تعيين المحكم أو المحكمين الذين ينفرد 
باختيارھم أو امتنع واحد أو أكثر من المحكمين عن العمل أو اعتزله أو قام به مانع من مباشرة التحكيم أو عزل عنه 
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الخصــــــوم شرط خاص عينت الجھة المختصة أصلاً بنظر النزاع من يلزم من المحكمين وذلك بناء ولم يكن بين 
على طلب من يھمه التعجيل من الخصوم ويكون ذلك  بحضور الخصم الآخر أو في غيبته بعد دعوتـــه إلى جلسة 
المتفـــق عليه بين الخصـــوم أو مكملاً له تعقـــد لھذا الغرض ويجـــــب أن يكون عــدد مــــن يعينون مساوياً للعدد 
  .ويكون القرار في ھذا الشأن نھائيا ً
 
 المادة الحادية عشر
لا يجوز عزل المحكــم الابتراضي الخصـــوم ويجــوز للمحــــكم المعزول المطالبة  بالتعويض إذا كــان قد 
وز رده عن الحكـــــم إلا لأسباب تحــــدث أو شرع في مھمته قبـــل عـزله ولم يكن العزل بسبب منه كما لا يج
  .تظھـــر بعد إيـــداع وثيقة التحكيم 
 
  المادة الثانية عشرة
  
يطلب رد المحكم للأسباب ذاتھا التي يرد بھا القاضي ويــــرفع طلب الـــرد إلى الجھة المختصة أصلا ًبنظر 
المحكم أومن يوم ظھور أو حدوث سبب من أسباب الرد النزاع خلال خمسة أيام من يوم أخبار الــــخصم  بتعيين 
  .ويحكم في طلب الرد بعد دعوة الخصوم والمحكم المطلوب رده إلى جلسة تعقد لھذا الغرض 
 
 المادة الثالثة عشرة
لا ينقضي التحكيم بـــموت أحـــد الخصوم وإنما يمد الميعــــاد المحدد للحـــكم  ثلاثين يوماً ما لم يقرر 
  .مون تمديد المدة بأكثر من ذلك المحك
 
 المادة الرابعة عشرة
  .إذا عين محكم بدلا ًعن المحكم المعزول امتد الميعاد المحدد للحكم ثلاثين  يوما ً
 
 المادة الخامسة عشرة
يجوز للمحكمين بالأغلبية التي يصدر بھا الحكم وبقرار مسبب مد الميعاد المحدد للحكم لظروف تتعلق 
  .ع بموضوع النزا
  
  المادة السادسة عشرة
  .يصدر حكم المحكمين بأغلبية الآراء وإذا كانوا مفوضين بالصلح وجب صدور الحكم بالإجماع 
 
 المادة السابعة عشرة
يجب أن تشتمل وثيقة الحكم بوجه خاص على وثيقة التحكيم وعلى ملخص أقوال الخصوم ومستنداتھم 
وتوقيعات المحكمين وإذا رفض واحد منھم أو أكثر التوقيع على الحكم أثبت  وأسباب الحكم ومنطوقة وتاريخ صدوره 
  .ذلك في وثيقة الحكم 
 
 المادة الثامنة عشرة
جميع الأحكام الصادرة من المحكمين ولو كانت صادرة بإجراء من إجراءات التحقيق يجب إيداعھا خلال 
ويجوز للخصوم تقديم اعتراضاتھم . الخصوم بصور منھا خمسة أيام لدى الجھة المختصة أصلاً بنظرالنزاع وإبلاغ 
على ما يصدر من المحكمين إلى الجھة التي أودع لديھا الحكم خلال خمسة عشر يوماً من تاريخ إبلاغھم بأحكام 
  .المحكمين وإلا أصبحت نھائية 
 
 المادة التاسعة عشرة
مدة  المنصوص عليھا في المادة السابقة إذا قدم الخصوم أو أحدھم اعتراضاً على حكم المحكمين خلال ال
تنظر الجھة المختصة أصلاً بنظر النزاع في  الاعتراض وتقرر إما رفضه وتصدر الأمر بتنفيذ الحكم أو قبول 
  .الاعتراض وتفصل فيه 
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  المادة العشرون
بنظر النزاع يكون حكم المحكمين واجب التنفيذ عندما يصبح نھائياً وذلك بأمر من الجھة  المختصة أصلاً 
  .ويصدر ھذا الأمر بناء على طلب ذوي الشأن بعد التثبت من عدم وجود ما يمنع من تنفيذه شرعا ً
  
 المادة الحادية والعشرون
 يعتبر الحكم الصادر من المحكمين بعد إصدار الأمر بتنفيذه حسب المادة  السابقة في قوة الحكم الصادر من
  . الجھة التي أصدرت الأمر بالتنفيذ
 
 المادة الثانية والعشرون
تحدد أتعاب المحكمين باتفاق الخصوم ويودع ما لم يدفع منھا لھم خلال خمسة أيام من صدور القرار باعتماد 
  .وثيقة التحكيم لدى الجھة المختصة أصلا ًبنظر النزاع ويصرف خلال أسبوع من تاريخ صدور الأمر بتنفيذ الحكم 
 
  المادة الثالثة والعشرون
لم يوجد اتفاق حول أتعاب المحكمين وقام نزاع بشأنھا تفصل فيه الجھة  المختصة أصلاً بنظر النزاع إذا 
  .ويكون حكمھا في ذلك نھائيا ً
 
 المادة الرابعة والعشرون
تصدر القرارات اللازمة لتنفيذ ھذا النظام من رئيس مجلس الوزراء بناء  على اقتراح من وزير العدل بعد 
  .ر التجارة ورئيس ديوان المظالمالاتفاق مع وزي
 
 المادة الخامسة والعشرون
  .ينشر ھذا النظام في الجريدة الرسمية ويعمل به بعد ثلاثين يوما ًمن تاريخ  نشره 
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 نظـــــام التحكيــــم 
 الباب الأول
  أحكام عامة
  
  المادة الأولى
  :الواردة في ھذا النظام على المعاني الموضحة أمامھا، ما لم يقتض السياق خلاف ذلكتدل العبارات الآتية 
ھو اتفاق بين طرفين أو أكثر على أن يحѧيلا إلѧى التحكѧيم جميѧع أو بعѧض المنازعѧات المحѧددة التѧي : اتفاق التحكيم -١
سواًء أكان اتفاق التحكيم في , قديةنشأت أو قد تنشأ بينھما في شأن علاقة نظامية محددة، تعاقدية كانت أم غير تعا
  .صورة شرط تحكيم وارد في عقد، أم في صورة مشارطة تحكيم مستقلة
  .ھي المحكم الفرد أو الفريق من المحكمين، الذي يفصل في النزاع المحال إلى التحكيم :ھيئة التحكيم -٢
  .ازعات التي اتفق على التحكيم فيھاھي المحكمة صاحبة الولاية نظاما ًبالفصل في المن: المحكمة المختصة -٣
  
  المادة الثانية
مع عدم الإخلال بأحكام الشريعة الإسلامية وأحكام الاتفاقيات الدولية التي تكون المملكة طرفѧا ًفيھѧا ؛ تسѧري 
التحكѧيم فѧي أحكام ھذا النظام على كل تحكيم، أيا ًكانت طبيعة العلاقة النظامية التي يدور حولھا النѧزاع، إذا جѧرى ھѧذا 
  .المملكة، أو كان تحكيما ًتجاريا ًدوليا ًيجرى في الخارج، واتفق طرفاه على إخضاعه لأحكام ھذا النظام
ولا تسѧري أحكѧام ھѧذا النظѧام علѧى المنازعѧات المتعلقѧة بѧالأحوال الشخصѧية، والمسѧائل التѧي لا يجѧوز فيھѧا 
  .الصلح
  
  المادة الثالثة
النظام إذا كان موضوعه نزاعѧا ًيتعلѧق بالتجѧارة الدوليѧة، وذلѧك فѧي الأحѧوال يكون التحكيم دوليا ًفي حكم ھذا 
  :الآتية
إذا كان المركز الرئيس لأعمال كل من طرفي التحكيم يقع في أكثѧر مѧن دولѧة وقѧت إبѧرام اتفѧاق التحكѧيم، فѧإذا كѧان  -١
اع، وإذا لѧم يكѧن لأحѧد طرفѧي لأحد الطرفين عدة مراكز للأعمال فالعبرة بالمركز الأكثر ارتباطѧا ًبموضѧوع النѧز
  .التحكيم أو كليھما مركز أعمال محدد فالعبرة بمحل إقامته المعتاد
إذا كان المركز الرئيس لأعمال كل من طرفي التحكيم يقع فѧي الدولѧة نفسѧھا وقѧت إبѧرام اتفѧاق التحكѧيم، وكѧان أحѧد  -٢
  :الأماكن الآتي بيانھا واقعا ًخارج ھذه الدولة
  .حكيم كما عيﱠنه اتفاق التحكيم، أو أشار إلى كيفية تعيينهمكان إجراء الت -أ
  .مكان تنفيذ جانب جوھري من الالتزامات الناشئة من العلاقة التجارية بين الطرفين -ب
  .المكان الأكثر ارتباطا ًبموضوع النزاع -ج
  .تحكيم يوجد مقره خارج المملكةإذا اتفق طرفا التحكيم على اللجوء إلى منظمة، أو ھيئة تحكيم دائمة، أو مركز لل -٣
  .إذا كان موضوع النزاع الذي يشمله اتفاق التحكيم يرتبط بأكثر من دولة -٤
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  المادة الرابعة
في الأحوال التي يجيز فيھا ھذا النظام لطرفي التحكيم اختيار الإجراء الواجب الاتباع في مسѧألة معينѧة، فѧإن 
اختيار ھѧذا الإجѧراء، ويعѧد مѧن الغيѧر فѧي ھѧذا الشѧأن كѧل فѧرد، أو ھيئѧة، أو ذلك يضمن حقھما في الترخيص للغير في 
  .منظمة، أو مركز للتحكيم في المملكة العربية السعودية، أو في خارجھا
  
 المادة الخامسة
عقѧѧد نمѧѧوذجي، أو اتفاقيѧѧة دوليѧѧة أو )إذا اتفѧѧق طرفѧѧا التحكѧѧيم علѧѧى إخضѧѧاع العلاقѧѧة بينھمѧѧا لأحكѧѧام أي وثيقѧѧة 
وجب العمل بأحكام ھذه الوثيقة بما تشѧمله مѧن أحكѧام خاصѧة بѧالتحكيم، وذلѧك بمѧا لا يخѧالف أحكѧام الشѧريعة ، (غيرھما
  .الإسلامية
  
 المادة السادسة
 -إذا لم يكن ھناك اتفاق خاص بين طرفي التحكيم في شأن الإبلاغات فيتم تسليم الإبلاغ إلѧى المرسѧل إليѧه شخصѧيًّا  -١
إلѧى عنوانѧه البريѧدي المحѧدد فѧي العقѧد محѧل المنازعѧة، أو المحѧدد فѧي مشѧارطة  أو إرسѧاله -أو مѧن ينѧوب عنѧه 
  .التحكيم، أو في الوثيقة المنظمة للعلاقة التي يتناولھا التحكيم
؛ يعد التسليم قѧد تѧم إذا كѧان الإبѧلاغ بكتѧاب مسѧجل إلѧى آخѧر (١)إذا تعذر تسليم الإبلاغ إلى المرسل إليه وفقا ًللفقرة  -٢
  .محل إقامة معتاد، أو عنوان بريدي معروف للمرسل إليه مقر عمل، أو
  .لا تسري أحكام ھذه المادة على الإبلاغات القضائية الخاصة ببطلان حكم التحكيم أمام المحاكم -٣
  
 المادة السابعة
 إذا استمر أحد طرفي التحكيم في إجراءات التحكيم ـ مع علمه بوقوع مخالفة لحكم من أحكѧام ھѧذا النظѧام ممѧا
يجوز الاتفاق على مخالفته أو لشرط في اتفاق التحكيم ـ ولم يقدم اعتراضا ًعلى ھذه المخالفة فѧي الميعѧاد المتفѧق عليѧه، 
  .أو خلال ثلاثين يوما ًمن علمه بوقوع المخالفة عند عدم الاتفاق، عد ذلك تنازلا ًمنه عن حقه في الاعتراض
    
 المادة الثامنة
بطلان حكѧم التحكѧيم والمسѧائل التѧي يحيلھѧا ھѧذا النظѧام للمحكمѧة المختصѧة معقѧودا ًيكون الاختصاص بنظر دعوى  -١
  .لمحكمة الاستئناف المختصة أصلا ًبنظر النزاع
إذا كان التحكيم تجاريا ًدوليѧا ًسѧواء جѧرى بالمملكѧة أم خارجھѧا، فيكѧون الاختصѧاص لمحكمѧة الاسѧتئناف المختصѧة  -٢
  .ا لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على محكمة استئناف أخرى في المملكةأصلا ًبنظر النزاع في مدينة الرياض م
  
  
 الباب الثاني
  اتفاق التحكيم
  
  هالمادة التاسع
  .يجوز أن يكون اتفاق التحكيم سابقا ًعلى قيام النزاع سواء أكان مستقلا ًبذاته، أم ورد في عقد معين -١
كانت قد أقيمت في شأنه دعوى أمام المحكمة  كما يجوز أن يكون اتفاق التحكيم لاحقا ًلقيام النزاع، وإن
 .المختصة، وفي ھذه الحالة يجب أن يحدد الاتفاق المسائل التي يشملھا التحكيم، وإلا كان الاتفاق باطلاً 
  .يجب أن يكون اتفاق التحكيم مكتوبا،ً وإلا كان باطلاً  -٢
التحكѧيم، أو إذا تضѧمنه مѧا تبѧادلاه مѧن مراسѧلات يكون اتفاق التحكيم مكتوبѧا ًإذا تضѧمنه محѧرر صѧادر مѧن طرفѧي  -٣
وتعد الإشارة في عقد مѧا، أو الإحالѧة . موثقة، أو برقيات، أو غيرھا من وسائل الاتصال الإلكترونية، أو المكتوبة
كما يُعّد في حكم اتفѧاق التحكѧيم المكتѧوب كѧل إحالѧة . فيه إلى مستند يشتمل على شرط للتحكيم، بمثابة اتفاق تحكيم
العقد إلى أحكام عقѧد نمѧوذجي، أو اتفاقيѧة دوليѧة، أو أي وثيقѧة أخѧرى تتضѧمن شѧرط تحكѧيم إذا كانѧت الإحالѧة  في
  .واضحة في اعتبار ھذا الشرط جزءا ًمن العقد
  
  المادة العاشرة
م لا يصѧح الاتفѧاق علѧى التحكѧيم إلا ممѧن يملѧك التصѧرف فѧي حقوقѧه سѧواء أكѧان شخصѧا ًطبيعيѧًّا ـ أو مѧن يمثلѧه ـ أ -١
  .شخصا ًاعتباريًّا
لا يجوز للجھѧات الحكوميѧة الاتفѧاق علѧى التحكѧيم إلا بعѧد موافقѧة رئѧيس مجلѧس الѧوزراء، مѧا لѧم يѧرد نѧص نظѧامي  -٢
  .خاص يجيز ذلك
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 المادة الحادية عشرة
 يجب على المحكمة التي يرفع إليھѧا نѧزاع يوجѧد فѧي شѧأنه اتفѧاق تحكѧيم أن تحكѧم بعѧدم جѧواز نظѧر الѧدعوى إذا دفѧع -١
  .المدعى عليه بذلك قبل أي طلب أو دفاع في الدعوى
لا يحѧول رفѧع الѧدعوى المشѧار إليھѧا فѧي الفقѧرة السѧابقة دون البѧدء فѧي إجѧراءات التحكѧيم، أو الاسѧتمرار فيھѧا، أو  -٢
  .إصدار حكم التحكيم
  
  ادة الثانية عشرةالم
النظام؛ إذا تم الاتفѧاق علѧى التحكѧيم أثنѧاء نظѧر من ھذا ( التاسعة)من المادة ( ١)مع مراعاة ما ورد في الفقرة 
  .النزاع أمام المحكمة المختصة، وجب عليھا أن تقرر إحالة النزاع إلى التحكيم
  
  
 الباب الثالث
  ھيئة التحكيم
  
  المادة الثالثة عشرة
  .تشكل ھيئة التحكيم من محكم واحد أو أكثر، على أن يكون العدد فرديا ًوإلا كان التحكيم باطلاً 
  
 المادة الرابعة عشرة
  : يشترط في المحكم ما يأتي
  . ـ أن يكون كامل الأھلية١
  . ـ أن يكون حسن السيرة والسلوك٢
ـ أن يكون حاصلا ًعلى الأقل على شھادة جامعية في العلوم الشرعية أو النظامية، وإذا كانت ھيئة التحكيم مكونة مѧن ٣
  .رئيسھاأكثر من محكم فيكتفى توافر ھذا الشرط في 
  
 المادة الخامسة عشرة
  :لطرفي التحكيم الاتفاق على اختيار المحكمين، فإذا لم يتفقا اتبع ما يأتي -١
  .إذا كانت ھيئة التحكيم مشكلة من محكم واحد تولت المحكمة المختصة اختياره -أ
المحكمان على اختيѧار  إذا كانت ھيئة التحكيم مشكلة من ثلاثة محكمين اختار كل طرف محكما ًعنه، ثم يتفق -ب
المحكم الثالѧث، فѧإذا لѧم يعѧين أحѧد الطѧرفين محكمѧه خѧلال خمسѧة عشѧر يومѧا ًالتاليѧة لتسѧلمه طلبѧا ًبѧذلك مѧن 
الطرف الآخر، أو إذا لم يتفق المحكمان المعينان على اختيار المحكم الثالث خلال خمسة عشر يومѧا ًالتاليѧة 
ة اختيѧاره بنѧاًء علѧى طلѧب مѧن يھمѧه التعجيѧل، وذلѧك خѧلال لتاريخ تعيين آخرھما ؛ تولت المحكمة المختص
خمسة عشر يوما ًمن تاريخ تقديم الطلب، ويكون للمحكم الذي اختاره المحكمان المعينان، أو الѧذي اختارتѧه 
المحكمة المختصة رئاسة ھيئة التحكيم، وتسري ھѧذه الأحكѧام فѧي حالѧة تشѧكيل ھيئѧة التحكѧيم مѧن أكثѧر مѧن 
  .ثلاثة محكمين
إذا لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على إجراءات اختيار المحكمين، أو خالفھا أحѧد الطѧرفين، أو لѧم يتفѧق المحكمѧان المعينѧان  -٢
على أمѧر ممѧا يلѧزم اتفاقھمѧا عليѧه، أو إذا تخلѧف الغيѧر عѧن أداء مѧا ُعھѧد بѧه إليѧه فѧي ھѧذا الشѧأن، تولѧت المحكمѧة 
بالإجراء، أو بالعمل المطلوب، ما لم ينص في الاتفѧاق علѧى  القيام -بناًء على طلب من يھمه التعجيل  -المختصة 
  .كيفية أخرى لإتمام ھذا الإجراء أو العمل
تراعي المحكمة المختصة في المحكم الذي تختѧاره الشѧروط التѧي نѧص عليھѧا اتفѧاق الطѧرفين، وتلѧك الشѧروط التѧي  -٣
  .يوما ًمن تاريخ تقديم الطلبيتطلبھا ھذا النظام، وتُصدر قرارھا باختيار المحكم خلال ثلاثين 
من ھذا النظام، يكѧون قѧرار المحكمѧة المختصѧة ( الخمسين)و( التاسعة والأربعين)مع عدم الإخلال بأحكام المادتين  -٤
  .من ھذه المادة غير قابل للطعن فيه استقلالا ًبأي طريق من طرق الطعن( ٢و  ١)بتعيين المحكم وفقا ًللفقرتين 
 المادة السادسة عشرة
 -كتابѧة ً -يجѧب ألا يكѧون للمحكѧم مصѧلحة فѧي النѧزاع، وعليѧه ـ منѧذ تعيينѧه وطѧوال إجѧراءات التحكѧيم ـ أن يصѧرح  -١
لطرفي التحكيم بكل الظروف التي من شأنھا أن تُثير شكوكا لھا ما يسوغھا حول حياده واستقلاله، إلا إذا كѧان قѧد 
  .سبق له أن أحاطھما علما ًبھا
فѧي الحѧالات نفسѧھا  -ولو لم يطلب ذلك أحد طرفي التحكيم  -ا ًمن النظر في الدعوى وسماعھا يكون المحكم ممنوع -٢
 .التي يُمنع فيھا القاضي
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لا يجوز رّد المحكم إلا إذا قامت ظروف تثير شكوكا ًجدية حول حياده أو استقلاله، أو إذا لѧم يكѧن حѧائزا ًلمѧؤھلات  -٣
 .من ھذا النظام( الرابعة عشرة)ل بما ورد في المادة اتفق عليھا طرفا التحكيم، وذلك بما لا يخ
لا يجوز لأي من طرفي التحكيم طلب رّد المحكم الذي عينѧه أو اشѧترك فѧي تعيينѧه إلا لأسѧباب اتضѧحت بعѧد أن تѧم  -٤
  .تعيين ھذا المحكم
  
 عة عشرةالمادة الساب
إلѧى ھيئѧة التحكѧيم  -كتابѧة ً -يقѧدم طلѧب الѧرد  إذا لم يكن ھناك اتفاق بين طرفي التحكيم حѧول إجѧراءات رّد المحكѧم، -١
مبينا ًفيه أسباب الرّد خلال خمسة أيام من تاريخ علم طالب الرّد بتشكيل الھيئة، أو بالظروف المسوغة للرّد، فѧإذا 
لم يتنح المحكم المطلوب رّده، أو لم يوافق الطرف الآخر على طلѧب الѧرّد خѧلال خمسѧة أيѧام مѧن تѧاريخ تقديمѧه ؛ 
يوما ًمѧن تѧاريخ تسѧلمه، ولطالѧب الѧرد فѧي حالѧة رفѧض طلبѧه ( خمسة عشر)ھيئة التحكيم أن تبت فيه خلال فعلى 
يوما،ً ويكѧون حكمھѧا فѧي ذلѧك غيѧر قابѧل للطعѧن بѧأي طريѧق مѧن ( ثلاثين)التقدم به إلى المحكمة المختصة خلال 
  .طرق الطعن
  . سه في التحكيم نفسه، للأسباب ذاتھالا يُقبل طلب الرّد ممن سبق له تقديم طلب برّد المحكم نف -٢
يترتѧب علѧى تقѧديم طلѧب الѧرّد أمѧام ھيئѧة التحكѧيم وقѧف إجѧراءات التحكѧيم، ولا يترتѧب علѧى الطعѧن فѧي حكѧم ھيئѧة  -٣
  .التحكيم الصادر برفض طلب الرد وقف إجراءات التحكيم
ترتѧب علѧى ذلѧك اعتبѧار  -عند نظر الطعن سواء من ھيئة التحكيم، أم من المحكمة المختصة  -إذا ُحكم برّد المحكم  -٤
  .كأن لم يكن -بما في ذلك حكم التحكيم  -ما يكون قد تم من إجراءات التحكيم 
  
 المادة الثامنة عشرة
إذا تعѧѧذر علѧѧى المحكѧѧم أداء مھمتѧѧه، أو لѧѧم يباشѧѧرھا، أو انقطѧѧع عѧѧن أدائھѧѧا بمѧѧا يѧѧؤدي إلѧѧى تѧѧأخير لا مسѧѧوغ لѧѧه فѧѧي  -١
، ولم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على عزلـه، جاز للمحكمѧة المختصѧة عزلѧه بنѧاًء علѧى طلѧب إجراءات التحكيم، ولم يتنح ّ
  .أي من الطرفين، بقرار غير قابل للطعن بأي طريق من طرق الطعن
ما لم يكن المحكم معينا ًمن المحكمѧة المختصѧة، فإنѧه لا يُعѧزل إلا باتفѧاق طرفѧي التحكѧيم، دون إخѧلال بمѧا ورد فѧي  -٢
  .ذه المادة، وللمعزول المطالبة بالتعويض إن لم يكن العزل قد حصل بسبب منهمن ھ( ١)الفقرة 
  
 المادة التاسعة عشرة
إذا انتھѧت مھمѧة المحكѧم بوفاتѧه، أو بѧرّده، أو عزلѧـه، أو تنّحيѧه، أو عجѧزه، أو لأي سѧبب آخѧر، وجѧب تعيѧين 
  .بديل له طبقا للإجراءات التي اتبعت في اختيار المحكم الذي انتھت مھمته
  
 المادة العشرون
تفصل ھيئة التحكيم في الدفوع المتعلقة بعدم اختصاصھا بما في ذلك الدفوع المبنيّة علѧى عѧدم وجѧود اتفѧاق تحكѧيم،  -١
  .أو سقوطه، أو بطلانه، أو عدم شموله لموضوع النزاع
مѧن ( الثلاثѧين)مѧن المѧادة ( ٢)يجب إبداء الدفوع بعدم اختصاص ھيئة التحكيم وفقا ًللمواعيد المشار إليھا في الفقرة  -٢
  .ھذا النظام
ولا يترتب على قيام أحد طرفي التحكيم بتعيين محكم أو الاشتراك فѧي تعيينѧه سѧقوط حقѧه فѧي تقѧديم أي 
أما الدفع بعدم شمول اتفاق التحكيم لما يثيره الطرف الآخر مѧن مسѧائل أثنѧاء نظѧر النѧزاع فيجѧب . من ھذه الدفوع
ويجѧوز فѧي جميѧع الأحѧوال أن تقبѧل ھيئѧة التحكѧيم الѧدفع المتѧأخر إذا رأت أن . لحѧق فيѧهإبѧداؤه فѧورا ًوإلا سѧقط ا
 .التأخير كان لسبب مقبول
مѧن ھѧذه المѧادة قبѧل الفصѧل فѧي الموضѧوع، ولھѧا أن ( ١)تفصѧل ھيئѧة التحكѧيم فѧي الѧدفوع المشѧار إليھѧا فѧي الفقѧرة  -٣
فع فѧلا يجѧوز الطعѧن بѧه إلا بطريѧق رفѧع دعѧوى تضمھا إلى الموضوع لتفصل فيھما معا،ً فإذا قضѧت بѧرفض الѧد
  .من ھذا النظام( الرابعة والخمسين)بطلان حكم التحكيم المنھي للخصومة كلھا وفقا للمادة 
 المادة الحادية والعشرون
ولا يترتب على بطلان العقѧد . يعد شرط التحكيم الوارد في أحد العقود اتفاقا ًمستقلا ًعن شروط العقد الأخرى
يتضمن شرط التحكيم ـ أو فسخه أو إنھائه بطلان شرط التحكيم الѧذي يتضѧمنه إذا كѧان ھѧذا الشѧرط صѧحيحا ًفѧي ـ الذي 
  .ذاته
 المادة الثانية والعشرون
للمحكمѧة المختصѧة أن تѧѧأمر باتخѧاذ تѧѧدابير مؤقتѧة أو تحفظيѧѧة بنѧاًء علѧى طلѧѧب أحѧد طرفѧѧي التحكѧيم قبѧѧل البѧدء فѧѧي  -١
طلѧѧب ھيئѧѧة التحكѧѧيم أثنѧѧاء سѧѧير إجѧѧراءات التحكѧѧيم، ويجѧѧوز الرجѧѧوع عѧѧن تلѧѧك إجѧѧراءات التحكѧѧيم أو بنѧѧاًء علѧѧى 
  .الإجراءات بالطريقة نفسھا، ما لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على خلاف ذلك
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 .يجوز للمحكمة المختصة بناًء على طلب ھيئة التحكيم الأمر بالإنابة القضائية -٢
تھا علѧى إجѧراءات التحكѧيم وفѧق مѧا تѧراه ھѧذه الھيئѧة مناسѧبا يجوز لھيئة التحكيم أن تطلب من الجھة المعنية مسѧاعد -٣
دعوة شاھد، أو خبير، أو الأمر بإحضѧار مسѧتند، أو صѧورة منѧه، أو الاطѧلاع عليѧه، أو : لحسن سير التحكيم مثل
  .غير ذلك، مع عدم الإخلال بحق ھيئة التحكيم بإجراء ذلك استقلالاً 
  
 المادة الثالثة والعشرون
  بنѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧاًء علѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧى طلѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧب  -تحكѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧيم الاتفѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧاق علѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧى أن يكѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧون لھيئѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧة التحكѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧيم يجѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧوز لطرفѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧѧي ال -١
ولھيئѧة التحكѧيم أن . أن تأمر أيًّا منھما باتخاذ ما تراه من تدابير مؤقتة أو تحفظية تقتضيھا طبيعة النѧزاع -أحدھما 
  .تلزم الطرف الذي يطلب اتخاذ تلك التدابير تقديم ضمان مالي مناسب لتنفيذ ھذا الإجراء
تخلف من صدر عليه الأمر عن تنفيذه جاز لھيئة التحكيم بنѧاًء علѧى طلѧب الطѧرف الآخѧر أن تѧأذن لھѧذا الطѧرف إذا  -٢
في اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لتنفيѧذه، وذلѧك دون إخѧلال بحѧق الھيئѧة أو الطѧرف الآخѧر فѧي أن يطلѧب مѧن الجھѧة 
  .المختصة تكليف من صدر عليه الأمر بتنفيذه
  
 ونالمادة الرابعة والعشر
يجب عند اختيار المحكم إبرام عقد مستقل معه توضح فيه أتعابه، وتودع نسخة مѧن العقѧد لѧدى الجھѧة التѧي تحѧددھا  -١
  .اللائحة التنفيذية لھذا النظام
إذا لم يتم الاتفاق بѧين طرفѧي التحكѧيم والمحكمѧين علѧى تحديѧد أتعѧاب المحكمѧين، فتحѧددھا المحكمѧة المختصѧة التѧي  -٢
وإذا كان تعيين المحكمين من قبѧل . فصل فيه بقرار غير قابل للطعن بأي طريق من طرق الطعنيجب عليھا أن ت
  .المحكمة المختصة وجب معه تحديد أتعاب المحكمين
  
  
 الباب الرابع
  إجراءات التحكيم
  
  :المادة الخامسة والعشرون
في ذلѧك حقھمѧا فѧي إخضѧاع ھѧذه الإجѧراءات لطرفي التحكيم الاتفاق على الإجراءات التي تتبعھا ھيئة التحكيم، بما  -١
للقواعد النافذة فѧي أي منظمѧة، أو ھيئѧة، أو مركѧز تحكѧيم فѧي المملكѧة أو خارجھѧا، بشѧرط عѧدم مخالفتھѧا لأحكѧام 
  .الشريعة الإسلامية
م ـ أن إذا لم يوجѧد مثѧل ھѧذا الاتفѧاق كѧان لھيئѧة التحكѧيم ـ مѧع مراعѧاة أحكѧام الشѧريعة الإسѧلامية، وأحكѧام ھѧذا النظѧا -٢
  .تختار إجراءات التحكيم التي تراھا مناسبة
  
 المادة السادسة والعشرون
تبدأ إجراءات التحكيم من اليوم الذي يتسلم فيه أحѧد طرفѧي التحكѧيم طلѧب التحكѧيم مѧن الطѧرف الآخѧر، مѧا لѧم 
  .يتفق طرفا التحكيم على غير ذلك
  
 المادة السابعة والعشرون
  .المساواة، وتھيأ لكل منھما الفرصة الكاملة والمتكافئة لعرض دعواه أو دفاعهيعامل طرفا التحكيم على قدم 
  
  
 المادة الثامنة والعشرون
لطرفي التحكيم الاتفاق على مكان التحكيم فѧي المملكѧة أو خارجھѧا، فѧإذا لѧم يوجѧد اتفѧاق عينѧت ھيئѧة التحكѧيم 
ولا يخل ذلك بسلطة ھيئѧة التحكѧيم فѧي أن تجتمѧع  مكان التحكيم مع مراعاة ظروف الدعوى، وملاءمة المكان لطرفيھا،
في أي مكان تراه مناسبا للمداولة بين أعضائھا، ولسماع أقوال الشھود، أو الخبراء، أو طرفي النزاع، أو لمعاينة محѧل 
  .النزاع، أو لفحص المستندات، أو الاطلاع عليھا
  
 المادة التاسعة والعشرون
لم تقرر ھيئة التحكيم أو يتفق طرفا التحكيم على لغة أو لغات أخرى، ويسري حكѧم  يجرى التحكيم باللغة العربية ما -١
الاتفاق أو القرار على لغة البيانات والمذكرات المكتوبة، والمرافعات الشفھية، وكذلك على كل قѧرار تتخѧذه ھيئѧة 
  .التحكيم على غير ذلكالتحكيم، أو رسالة توجھھا، أو حكم تصدره، ما لم ينص اتفاق الطرفين أو قرار ھيئة 
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لھيئة التحكيم أن تقرر أن يرافق كل الوثائق المكتوبة أو بعضھا التي تقدم فѧي الѧدعوى ترجمѧة إلѧى اللغѧة أو اللغѧات  -٢
  .وفي حالة تعدد ھذه اللغات يجوز للھيئة قصر الترجمة على بعضھا. المستعملة في التحكيم
  
 المادة الثلاثون
المتفق عليه بين الطرفين، أو الذي تعينه ھيئة التحكيم إلى المدعى عليه وإلى كل واحѧد  يرسل المدعي خلال الميعاد -١
من المحكمين ؛ بيانا ًمكتوبا ًبدعواه، يشتمل على اسمه، وعنوانѧه، واسѧم المѧدعى عليѧه، وعنوانѧه، وشѧرح لوقѧائع 
  .يانالدعوى، وطلباته، وأسانيده، وكل أمر آخر يوجب اتفاق الطرفين ذكره في ھذا الب
يرسل المدعى عليه خلال الميعاد المتفق عليه بين الطرفين، أو الذي تعينه ھيئة التحكيم إلى المدعي وإلى كل واحѧد  -٢
ولѧـه أن يضѧمن جوابѧه أي طلѧب متصѧل . من المحكمين ؛ جوابا ًمكتوبا ًبدفاعه ردا ًعلى ما جاء في بيان الѧدعوى
د الѧدفع بالمقاصѧة، ولѧه ذلѧك ولѧو فѧي مرحلѧة لاحقѧة مѧن بموضѧوع النѧزاع، أو أن يتمسѧك بحѧق ناشѧئ منѧه بقصѧ
  .الإجراءات إذا رأت ھيئة التحكيم أن الظروف تسوغ التأخير
يجوز لكل واحد من  الطرفين أن يرفق ببيان الدعوى أو بجوابه عليھا ـ علѧى حسѧب الأحѧوال ـ صѧورا ًمѧن الوثѧائق  -٣
ولا يُخل ھذا بحѧق ھيئѧة . ، وأدلة الإثبات التي يعتزم تقديمھاالتي يستند إليھا، وأن يشير إلى كل الوثائق أو بعضھا
التحكيم في أي مرحلة كانت عليھا الدعوى في طلب تقديم أصول المسѧتندات أو الوثѧائق التѧي يسѧتند إليھѧا أي مѧن 
  .طرفي الدعوى، أو صور منھا
  
 المادة الحادية والثلاثون
التحكѧيم مѧن مѧذكرات أو مسѧتندات أو أوراق أخѧرى إلѧى ترسѧل صѧورة ممѧا يقدمѧه أحѧد الطѧرفين إلѧى ھيئѧة 
الطرف الآخر، وكذلك ترسل إلى كѧل مѧن الطѧرفين صѧورة مѧن كѧل مѧا يقѧدم إلѧى الھيئѧة المѧذكورة مѧن تقѧارير الخبѧراء 
  .والمستندات وغيرھا من الأدلة التي  يمكن أن تعتمد عليھا ھيئة التحكيم في إصدار حكمھا
  
 المادة الثانية والثلاثون
أو اسѧتكمالھا خѧلال إجѧراءات التحكѧيم، مѧا لѧم تقѧرر  -أو أوجѧه دفاعѧه  -كل من طرفي التحكيم تعديل طلباته ل
  .ھيئة التحكيم عدم قبول ذلك منعا ًلتعطيل الفصل في النزاع
  
 المادة الثالثة والثلاثون
ض حججѧه وأدلتѧه ولھѧا تعقد ھيئة التحكيم جلسات مرافعة لتمكين كل من الطرفين من شرح موضوع الدعوى وعر -١
  . الاكتفاء بتقديم المذكرات والوثائق المكتوبة، ما لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على غير ذلك
يجب إبلاغ طرفي التحكيم على عناوينھم الثابتة لدى ھيئة التحكيم بموعد أي جلسѧة مرافعѧة شѧفھية، وموعѧد النطѧق  -٢
النزاع، أو ممتلكات أخرى، أو لفحص مستندات، وذلѧك وأي اجتماع لھيئة التحكيم لأغراض معاينة محل , بالحكم
  .قبل الانعقاد بوقت كاف
تدون ھيئة التحكيم خلاصة ما يدور في الجلسة في محضر يوقعه الشھود أو الخبراء والحاضرون من الطرفين، أو  -٣
حكѧيم علѧى غيѧر وكلائھم، وأعضاء ھيئة التحكيم ، وتسلم صورة منه إلى كѧل مѧن الطѧرفين، مѧا لѧم يتفѧق طرفѧا الت
  .ذلك
  
 المادة الرابعة والثلاثون
  مѧѧѧѧѧن المѧѧѧѧѧادة ( ١)إذا لѧѧѧѧѧم يقѧѧѧѧѧدم المѧѧѧѧѧدعي ـ دون عѧѧѧѧѧذر مقبѧѧѧѧѧول ـ بيانѧѧѧѧѧا ًمكتوبѧѧѧѧѧا ًبѧѧѧѧѧدعواه وفقѧѧѧѧѧا للفقѧѧѧѧѧرة  -١
من ھذا النظام، وجب على ھيئة التحكيم إنھاء إجراءات التحكيم، مѧا لѧم يتفѧق طرفѧا التحكѧيم علѧى غيѧر ( الثلاثين)
  .ذلك
من ھذا النظѧام، وجѧب علѧى ھيئѧة ( الثلاثين)من المادة ( ٢)لمدعى عليه جوابا ًمكتوبا ًبدفاعه وفقا ًللفقرة إذا لم يقدم ا -٢
  .التحكيم الاستمرار في إجراءات التحكيم ما لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على غير ذلك
  
 الخامسة والثلاثون المادة
  أو عѧѧѧѧѧѧѧن تقѧѧѧѧѧѧѧديم  -بعѧѧѧѧѧѧѧد تبليغѧѧѧѧѧѧѧه  -إذا تخلѧѧѧѧѧѧѧف أحѧѧѧѧѧѧѧد الطѧѧѧѧѧѧѧرفين عѧѧѧѧѧѧѧن حضѧѧѧѧѧѧѧور إحѧѧѧѧѧѧѧدى الجلسѧѧѧѧѧѧѧات 
ما طلب منه من مستندات جاز لھيئة التحكѧيم الاسѧتمرار فѧي إجѧراءات التحكѧيم، وإصѧدار حكѧم فѧي النѧزاع اسѧتنادا ًإلѧى 
 .عناصر الإثبات الموجودة أمامھا
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 المادة السادسة والثلاثون
خبير أو أكثر، لتقديم تقرير مكتوب أو شفھي يثبѧت فѧي محضѧر الجلسѧة فѧي شѧأن مسѧائل معينѧة لھيئة التحكيم تعيين  -١
  .تحددھا بقرار منھا، وتبلغ به كلا ًّمن الطرفين ما لم يتفقا على غير ذلك
على كل من الطرفين أن يقدم إلى الخبير المعلومات المتعلقة بالنزاع، وأن يمكنه مѧن معاينѧة وفحѧص مѧا يطلبѧه مѧن  -٢
وتفصل ھيئة التحكيم في كل نزاع يقوم بين الخبيѧر وأحѧد الطѧرفين . ثائق أو سلع أو أموال أخرى متعلقة بالنزاعو
  .في ھذا الشأن بقرار غير قابل للطعن بأي طريق من طرق الطعن
لإبѧداء  ترسل ھيئة التحكيم صورة من تقرير الخبير بمجرد إيداعه لديھا إلى كل من الطرفين، مع إتاحة الفرصѧة لѧه -٣
ويصѧدر الخبيѧر  .ولكليھما الحق في الاطلاع على الوثائق التي استند إليھا الخبيѧر فѧي تقريѧره وفحصѧھا. رأيه فيه
  .  حولهطرفا التحكيم تقريره النھائي بعد الاطلاع على ما أبداه 
طرفѧي التحكѧيم، عقѧد جلسѧة لھيئة التحكيم بعد تقديم تقرير الخبير أن تقرر من تلقاء نفسھا، أو بنѧاًء علѧى طلѧب أحѧد  -٤
  .لسماع أقوال الخبير، مع إتاحة الفرصة للطرفين لسماعه ومناقشته في شأن ما ورد في تقريره
  
 المادة السابعة والثلاثون
إذا عرضت خلال إجراءات التحكيم مسألة تخرج عن ولاية ھيئة التحكѧيم، أو طعѧن بѧالتزوير فѧي مسѧتند قѧدم 
عن تزويره، أو عن فعل جنائي آخر؛ كان لھيئة التحكيم الاسѧتمرار فѧي نظѧر موضѧوع لھا، أو اتخذت إجراءات جنائية 
النزاع إذا رأت أن الفصل في ھذه المسألة، أو في تزوير المستند أو فѧي الفعѧل الجنѧائي الآخѧر، لѧيس لازمѧا ًللفصѧل فѧي 
لى ذلك وقف سريان الميعاد موضوع النزاع، وإلا أوقفت الإجراءات حتى يصدر حكم نھائي في ھذا الشأن، ويترتب ع
  .المحدد لإصدار حكم التحكيم
 
 
 الباب الخامس
  إجراءات الفصل في الدعوى التحكيمية
  
  المادة الثامنة والثلاثون
  :مع مراعاة عدم مخالفة أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية والنظام العام بالمملكة، على ھيئة التحكيم أثناء نظر النزاع الآتي -١
التي يتفق عليھا طرفا التحكѧيم علѧى موضѧوع النѧزاع، وإذا اتفقѧا علѧى تطبيѧق نظѧام دولѧة معينѧة  تطبيق القواعد -أ
  .اتبعت القواعد الموضوعية فيه دون القواعد الخاصة بتنازع القوانين، ما لم يتفق على غير ذلك
ت ھيئѧة التحكѧيم إذا لم يتفق طرفا التحكѧيم علѧى القواعѧد النظاميѧة واجبѧة التطبيѧق علѧى موضѧوع النѧزاع طبقѧ -ب
  .القواعد الموضوعية في النظام الذي ترى أنه الأكثر اتصالا ًبموضوع النزاع
يجب أن تراعي ھيئة التحكيم عند الفصل في موضوع النزاع شروط العقد محل النѧزاع، وتأخѧذ فѧي الاعتبѧار  -ج
  .ن الطرفينالأعراف الجارية في نوع المعاملة، والعادات المتبعة، وما جرى عليه التعامل بي
إذا اتفق طرفا التحكيم صراحة على تفويض ھيئة التحكيم بالصلح جاز لھا أن تحكم به وفѧق مقتضѧى قواعѧد العدالѧة  -٢
  .والإنصاف
  
 المادة التاسعة والثلاثون
  .يصدر حكم ھيئة التحكيم المشكلة من أكثر من محكم واحد بأغلبية أعضائھا بعد مداولة سرية -١
يومѧا ً( ٥١)ھيئة التحكيم ولم يكن ممكنا ًحصول الأغلبية فلھيئة التحكيم اختيار محكم مѧرجح خѧلال إذا تشعبت آراء  -٢
 .من قرارھا بعدم إمكان حصول الأغلبية وإلا عينت المحكمة المختصة محكما ًمرجحا ً 
التحكيم بذلك كتابة، يجوز أن تصدر القرارات في المسائل الإجرائية من المحكم الذي يرأس الھيئة إذا صرح طرفا  -٣
 .أو أذن له جميع أعضاء ھيئة التحكيم ما لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على غير ذلك
  .إن كانت ھيئة التحكيم مفوضة بالصلح وجب أن يصدر الحكم به بالإجماع -٤
كلھѧا، مѧا لھيئة التحكيم أن تصدر أحكاما ًوقتية أو في جزء من الطلبات، وذلك قبل إصدار الحكم المنھي للخصѧومة  -٥
  .لم يتفق طرفا التحكيم على غير ذلك
  
 المادة الأربعون
على ھيئة التحكيم إصدار الحكم المنھي للخصومة كلھا خѧلال الميعѧاد الѧذي اتفѧق عليѧه طرفѧا التحكѧيم، فѧإن لѧم يكѧن  -١
  .ھناك اتفاق وجب أن يصدر الحكم خلال اثني عشر شھرا ًمن تاريخ بدء إجراءات التحكيم
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ة التحكيم ـ في جميع الأحوال ـ أن تقرر زيادة مدة التحكيم على ألا تتجاوز ھذه الزيادة ستة أشѧھر، مѧا لѧم يجوز لھيئ -٢
 .يتفق طرفا التحكيم على مدة تزيد على ذلك
إذا لم يصدر حكم التحكيم خلال الميعاد المشار إليه في الفقرة السѧابقة، جѧاز لأي مѧن طرفѧي التحكѧيم أن يطلѧب مѧن  -٣
ختصة أن تصѧدر أمѧرا ًبتحديѧد مѧدة إضѧافية، أو بإنھѧاء إجѧراءات التحكѧيم، ولأي مѧن الطѧرفين عندئѧذ المحكمة الم
  .رفع دعواه إلى المحكمة المختصة
  .إذا عين محكم بدلا ًمن محكم وفقا ًلأحكام ھذا النظام، امتد الميعاد المحدد للحكم ثلاثين يوما ً  -٤
  
 المادة الحادية والأربعون
التحكيم بصدور الحكم المنھي للخصومة، أو بصدور قرار من ھيئة التحكيم بإنھاء الإجѧراءات فѧي تنتھي إجراءات  -١
  : الأحوال الآتية
  .إذا اتفق طرفا التحكيم على إنھاء التحكيم -أ
إذا ترك المدعي خصومة التحكيم، ما لم تقرر ھيئة التحكيم بناًء على طلب المدعى عليه أن له مصلحة جديѧة  -ب
  .استمرار الإجراءات حتى يحسم النزاعفي 
  . إذا رأت ھيئة التحكيم لأي سبب آخر عدم جدوى استمرار إجراءات التحكيم أو استحالته -ج
 . من ھذا النظام( الرابعة والثلاثين)من المادة ( ١)صدور أمر بإنھاء إجراءات التحكيم وفقا ًلحكم الفقرة  -د
ما لم يتفق من له صفة في النزاع مع الطѧرف  -د طرفي التحكيم، أو فقد أھليته لا تنتھي إجراءات التحكيم بموت أح -٢
ولكن يمتѧد الميعѧاد المحѧدد للتحكѧيم ثلاثѧين يومѧا،ً مѧا لѧم تقѧرر ھيئѧة التحكѧيم تمديѧد المѧدة مѧدة  -الآخر على انتھائه 
  . مماثلة، أو يتفق طرفا التحكيم على غير ذلك
من ھذا النظام، تنتھي مھمѧة ھيئѧة ( والحادية والخمسين( )والخمسين( )والأربعين التاسعة)مع مراعاة أحكام المواد  -٣
  .التحكيم بانتھاء إجراءات التحكيم
 
 المادة الثانية والأربعون
يصدر حكم التحكيم كتابة ويكѧون مسѧببا،ً ويوقعѧه المحكمѧون، وفѧي حالѧة تشѧكيل ھيئѧة التحكѧيم مѧن أكثѧر مѧن محكѧم  -١
  .غلبية المحكمين بشرط أن يثبت في محضر القضية أسباب عدم توقيع الأقليةواحد يُكتفى بتوقيعات أ
يجѧѧب أن يشѧѧتمل حكѧѧم التحكѧѧيم علѧѧى تѧѧاريخ النطѧѧق بѧѧه ومكѧѧان إصѧѧداره، وأسѧѧماء الخصѧѧوم، وعنѧѧاوينھم، وأسѧѧماء  -٢
، المحكمين، وعناوينھم، وجنسياتھم، وصفاتھم، وملخص اتفاق التحكيم، وملخص لأقوال وطلبات طرفي التحكѧيم
ومرافعتھم، ومستنداتھم، وملخص تقرير الخبرة ـ إن وجد ـ ومنطѧوق الحكѧم، وتحديѧد أتعѧاب المحكمѧين، ونفقѧات 
  .من ھذا النظام( الرابعة والعشرون)دون إخلال بما قضت به المادة . الطرفين التحكيم، وكيفية توزيعھا بين
  
 المادة الثالثة والأربعون
طرفي التحكѧيم صѧورة طبѧق الأصѧل مѧن حكѧم التحكѧيم خѧلال خمسѧة عشѧر يومѧا ًمѧن  تُسلّم ھيئة التحكيم إلى كل من -١
  .تاريخ صدوره
  .لا يجوز نشر حكم التحكيم أو جزء منه إلا بموافقة طرفي التحكيم كتابة -٢
  
 المادة الرابعة والأربعون
المختصѧة وذلѧك تودع ھيئة التحكيم أصل الحكم، أو صورة موقعѧة منѧه باللغѧة التѧي صѧدر بھѧا لѧدى المحكمѧة 
مѧن ھѧذا النظѧام، مѧع ترجمѧة باللغѧة العربيѧة ( الثالثѧة والأربعѧين)من المادة ( ١)خلال المدة المنصوص عليھا في الفقرة 
  .مصدق عليھا من جھة معتمدة إذا كان صادرا ًبلغة أجنبية
  
 المادة الخامسة والأربعون
ي النѧزاع، كѧان لھمѧا أن يطلبѧا إثبѧات شѧروط إذا اتفق طرفا التحكيم خѧلال إجѧراءات التحكѧيم علѧى تسѧوية تنھѧ
التسوية أمام ھيئة التحكيم، التي يجب عليھا في ھذه الحالة أن تصدر حكما ًيتضمن شروط التسوية وينھѧي الإجѧراءات، 
  .ويكون لھذا الحكم ما لأحكام المحكمين من قوة عند التنفيذ
  
 المادة السادسة والأربعون
كيم أن يطلب من ھيئة التحكيم خلال الثلاثين يوما ًالتالية لتسلمه حكم التحكيم تفسير يجوز لكل واحد من طرفي التح -١
ويجب على طالب التفسير إبلاغ الطرف الآخر على عنوانѧه الموضѧح فѧي حكѧم . ما وقع في منطوقه من غموض
  .التحكيم بھذا الطلب قبل تقديمه لھيئة التحكيم
  .ما ًالتالية لتاريخ تقديم طلب التفسير لھيئة التحكيميصدر التفسير كتابة ًخلال الثلاثين يو -٢
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  .يعد الحكم الصادر بالتفسير متمما ًلحكم التحكيم الذي يفسره وتسري عليه أحكامه -٣
  
 المادة السابعة والأربعون
تصѧدره مѧن تتولى ھيئة التحكيم تصحيح ما يقع في حكمھا مѧن أخطѧاء ماديѧة بحتѧة كتابيѧة ًأو حسѧابية،ً وذلѧك بقѧرار  -١
وتجري ھيئة التحكيم التصحيح من غير مرافعة خلال خمسة عشѧر . تلقاء نفسھا، أو بناًء على طلب أحد الخصوم
  .يوما ًالتالية لتاريخ صدور الحكم، أو لإيداع طلب التصحيح بحسب الأحوال
يومѧѧا ًمѧѧن تѧѧاريخ  يصѧدر قѧѧرار التصѧѧحيح كتابѧѧة ًمѧѧن ھيئѧѧة التحكѧѧيم، ويبلѧѧغ إلѧى طرفѧѧي التحكѧѧيم خѧѧلال خمسѧѧة عشѧѧر -٢
وإذا تجاوزت ھيئة التحكيم سلطتھا في التصحيح جاز التمسك ببطلان ھذا القرار بدعوى بطلان تسѧري . صدوره
  .من ھذا النظام( والحادية والخمسين)، ( الخمسين)عليھا أحكام المادتين 
  
 المادة الثامنة والأربعون
لتحكيم ، أن يطلب من ھيئة التحكѧيم خѧلال الثلاثѧين يومѧا ًالتاليѧة يجوز لكل من طرفي التحكيم ولو بعد انتھاء ميعاد ا -١
. لتسѧلمه حكѧم التحكѧيم ؛ إصѧدار حكѧم تحكѧيم إضѧافي فѧي طلبѧات قѧدمت خѧلال الإجѧراءات وأغفلھѧا حكѧم التحكѧيم
  .ويجب إبلاغ الطرف الآخر على عنوانه الموضح في حكم التحكيم بھذا الطلب قبل تقديمه لھيئة التحكيم
يئة التحكيمحكمھا خلال ستين يوما ًمن تاريخ تقديم الطلب ، ويجوز لھا مѧد ھѧذا الميعѧاد ثلاثѧين يومѧاًأخرى تصدر ھ -٢
  .إذا رأت ضرورة لذلك
 
  
 الباب السادس
  بطلان حكم التحكيم
  
  المادة التاسعة والأربعون
طرق الطعѧن، عѧدا رفѧع لا تقبل أحكام التحكيم التي تصدر طبقا لأحكام ھذا النظام الطعن فيھا بأي طريق من 
  .دعوى بطلان حكم التحكيم وفقا للأحكام المبينة في ھذا النظام
  
 المادة الخمسون
  :لا تقبل دعوى بطلان حكم التحكيم إلا في الأحوال الآتية -١
 .إذا لم يوجد اتفاق تحكيم أو كان ھذا الاتفاق باطلا،ً أو قابلا ًللإبطال، أو سقط بانتھاء مدته -أ
  .أحد طرفي اتفاق التحكيم وقت إبرامه فاقد الأھلية، أو ناقصھا، وفقا ًللنظام الذي يحكم أھليتهإذا كان  -ب
إذا تعذر على أحد طرفي التحكيم تقديم دفاعه بسبب عѧدم إبلاغѧه إبلاغѧا ًصѧحيحا ًبتعيѧين محكѧم أو بѧإجراءات  -ج
  .التحكيم، أو لأي سبب آخر خارج عن إرادته
تطبيق أي من القواعد النظامية التѧي اتفѧق طرفѧا التحكѧيم علѧى تطبيقھѧا علѧى موضѧوع إذا استبعد حكم التحكيم  -د
  .النزاع
  .إذا شكلت ھيئة التحكيم أو عين المحكمون على وجه مخالف لھذا النظام، أو لاتفاق الطرفين -ھـ
حكѧم الخاصѧة إذا فصل حكم التحكѧيم فѧي مسѧائل لا يشѧملھا اتفѧاق التحكѧيم، ومѧع ذلѧك إذا أمكѧن فصѧل أجѧزاء ال -و
بالمسائل الخاضعة للتحكيم عن أجزائه الخاصة بالمسائل غير الخاضعة له، فلا يقع البطلان إلا على الأجزاء 
  .غير الخاضعة للتحكيم وحدھا
علѧى  إذا لم تراع ھيئة التحكيم الشروط الواجب توافرھا في الحكم على نحو أثّر في مضمونه، أو استند الحكѧم -ز
  .لة أثّرت فيهإجراءات تحكيم باط
تقضي المحكمة المختصة التي تنظѧر دعѧوى الѧبطلان مѧن تلقѧاء نفسѧھا بѧبطلان حكѧم التحكѧيم إذا تضѧمن مѧا يخѧالف  -٢
أو إذا وجѧدت أن موضѧوع , أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية والنظام العѧام فѧي المملكѧة، أو مѧا اتفѧق عليѧه طرفѧا التحكѧيم
  . ا بموجب ھذا النظامالنزاع من المسائل التي لا يجوز التحكيم فيھ
لا ينقضي اتفاق التحكيم بصدور حكم المحكمة المختصѧة بѧبطلان حكѧم التحكѧيم، مѧا لѧم يكѧن طرفѧا التحكѧيم قѧد اتفقѧا  -٣
 .على ذلك، أو صدر حكم نص على إبطال اتفاق التحكيم
أن يكѧون لھѧا فحѧص  تنظر المحكمة المختصة في دعѧوى الѧبطلان فѧي الحѧالات المشѧار إليھѧا فѧي ھѧذه المѧادة ، دون -٤
  .وقائع وموضوع النزاع
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  المادة الحادية والخمسون
ولا . ترفع دعوى بطلان حكم التحكيم من أي من طرفيه خلال الستين يوما ًالتالية لتاريخ إبلاغ ذلك الطѧرف بѧالحكم -١
  .يحول تنازل مدعي البطلان عن حقه في رفعھا قبل صدور حكم التحكيم دون قبول الدعوى
حكمت المحكمة المختصة بتأييد حكѧم التحكѧيم وجѧب عليھѧا أن تѧأمر بتنفيѧذه، ويكѧون حكمھѧا فѧي ذلѧك غيѧر قابѧل  إذا -٢
أما إذا حكمت ببطلان حكم التحكيم، فيكون حكمھا قابلا ًللطعن خلال ثلاثѧين . للطعن بأي طريق من طرق الطعن
  .يوما ًمن اليوم التالي للتبليغ
  
  
 الباب السابع
  كمين وتنفيذھاحجية أحكام المح
  
  المادة الثانية والخمسون
مع مراعاة الأحكام المنصѧوص عليھѧا فѧي ھѧذا النظѧام، يحѧوز حكѧم التحكѧيم الصѧادر طبقѧا ًلھѧذا النظѧام حجيѧة 
  .الأمر المقضي به، ويكون واجب النفاذ
  
 المادة الثالثة والخمسون
  :ويقدم طلب تنفيذ الحكم مرافقا ًله الآتي. تصدر المحكمة المختصة أو من تندبه، أمرا ًبتنفيذ حكم المحكمين
  .أصل الحكم أو صورة مصدقة منه -١
  .صورة طبق الأصل من اتفاق التحكيم -٢
  .ترجمة لحكم التحكيم إلى اللغة العربية مصدق عليھا من جھة معتمدة، إذا كان صادرا ًبلغة أخرى -٣
  .من ھذا النظام( الرابعة والأربعين)دة ما يدل على إيداع الحكم لدى المحكمة المختصة وفقا ًللما -٤
  
 المادة الرابعة والخمسون
ومѧع ذلѧك يجѧوز للمحكمѧة المختصѧة أن تѧأمر . لا يترتب على رفѧع دعѧوى الѧبطلان وقѧف تنفيѧذ حكѧم التحكѧيم
وعلѧى المحكمѧة . بوقف التنفيذ إذا طلب مدعي البطلان ذلك في صحيفة الدعوى، وكان الطلب مبنيѧا ًعلѧى أسѧباب جديѧة
وإذا أمѧرت بوقѧف التنفيѧذ جѧاز . لمختصة الفصل في طلب وقف التنفيذ خلال خمسة عشر يوما ًمن تاريخ تقѧديم الطلѧبا
لھا أن تأمر بتقديم كفالة أو ضمان مالي، وعليھا إذا أمرت بوقف التنفيذ الفصل في دعوى البطلان خѧلال مائѧة وثمѧانين 
  .يوما ًمن تاريخ صدور ھذا الأمر
  
 والخمسونالمادة الخامسة 
  .لا يقبل طلب تنفيذ حكم التحكيم إلا إذا انقضى ميعاد رفع دعوى بطلان الحكم -١
  :  لا يجوز الأمر بتنفيذ حكم التحكيم وفقا ًلھذا النظام إلا بعد التحقق من الآتي -٢
النѧزاع فѧي أنه لا يتعارض مع حكم أو قرار صادر من محكمة أو لجنة أو ھيئة لھا ولاية الفصل فѧي موضѧوع  -أ
 .المملكة العربية السعودية
أنѧه لا يتضѧمن مѧا يخѧالف أحكѧام الشѧريعة الإسѧلامية والنظѧام العѧام بالمملكѧة، وإذا أمكѧن تجزئѧة الحكѧم فيمѧا  -ب
  .يتضمنه من مخالفة، جاز الأمر بتنفيذ الجزء الباقي غير المخالف
  .أنه قد أبلغ للمحكوم عليه إبلاغا ًصحيحا ً  -ج
التظلم من الأمر الصادر بتنفيذ حكم التحكيم، أما الأمر الصادر برفض التنفيذ فيجوز التظلم منه إلى الجھة لا يجوز  -٣
  .المختصة خلال ثلاثين يوما ًمن تاريخ صدوره
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 الباب الثامن
  أحكام ختامية
  
  المادة السادسة والخمسون
  .يصدر مجلس الوزراء اللائحة التنفيذية لھذا النظام
  
 ة السابعة والخمسونالماد
  وتѧѧѧѧѧѧاريخ ( ٦٤/م)يحѧѧѧѧѧѧل ھѧѧѧѧѧѧذا النظѧѧѧѧѧѧام محѧѧѧѧѧѧل نظѧѧѧѧѧѧام التحكѧѧѧѧѧѧيم، الصѧѧѧѧѧѧادر بالمرسѧѧѧѧѧѧوم الملكѧѧѧѧѧѧي رقѧѧѧѧѧѧم 
  .ھـ٣٠٤١/٧/٢١
  
  المادة الثامنة والخمسون
  .يعمل بھذا النظام بعد ثلاثين يوما ًمن تاريخ نشره في الجريدة الرسمية
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